'A Vertical Slice'

Child Labour and the International Labour Organisation: A Critical Analysis of the Transformation of Vision into Policy and Practice

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Abstract

Recent years have witnessed growing concern with 'child labour'; the prevention of which has, at least in rhetoric, shot to the top of childhood research and policy agendas in both developing and industrialised countries. Little primary data exists, however, to support or challenge the major theories upon which policy and programming are based, a situation which this thesis seeks to redress.

This research embraces Nader's (1980) suggestion that those studying children should consider the hierarchies which impact on the lives of those children they research. One of the most important hierarchies involved in child labour at present is the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations agency with the global mandate to work towards the progressive elimination of child labour. The thesis explores the labyrinthine world of the Organisation in the light of the realities of child labour; using multi-locale ethnographic research conducted between 1999 and 2000 in the International Labour Office (ILO) in Dar Es Salaam, in ILO headquarters in Geneva and in Mirerani, a mining village in Northern Tanzania.

This thesis explores two key hypotheses. The first relates to current anthropological thought, expounded by Foucault influenced theorists such as Boyden, which argues that failure of organisations such as the ILO to successfully tackle child labour is due to the adoption of a 'Northern construction of childhood', which is then exported globally and imposed in culturally distinct countries. My hypothesis is that the vision of childhood used by the ILO is a far more complex process of negotiation and re-negotiation. I use historical and contemporary evidence to explore the roots of the campaign against child labour (Chapter 2) and the vision of childhood promoted by the ILO (Chapter 3). I draw on the arguments of Gardner and Lewis (2000) to argue that the 'Northern construction of childhood' theory denies agency to the many

activists in non-Northern countries who have been central in developing and fighting for the vision of childhood promoted by the ILO.

My second hypothesis is that it is not a particular vision or 'construction' of childhood which is responsible for failure to translate good intentions into successful programme implementation but specific bureaucratic procedures, power relations and human failings within the machinations of international bureaucracies. Drawing on the unique opportunity of working within the ILO for 14 months, I explore the multiple discourses and practices of those responsible for implementing the ILO 'vision' in Geneva and Tanzania (Chapters 4 and 6) in an attempt to explore what lies under the apparently rigid and 'dehumanised' organisational structures. Chapter 5 attempts to move beyond 'vision' and towards reality and considers the factors that led to the growth of child labour in Tanzania generally and in Mirerani specifically. Chapter 7 takes one particular case study of the development of a child labour intervention programme in Mirerani. I explore the particular factors which prevented so many 'good intentions' from being translated into effective practice for the benefit of the children, drawing primarily on the work of Hertzfeld (1992), Fineman (1993) and Chambers (1983, 1997, 1998). Chapter 8 considers 'the missing link', the children themselves, and the cultural constructions of childhood and work which are dominant in Mirerani. I argue that 'children's voices' should come first and yet are superseded in importance and in resource allocation by the need to negotiate bureaucratic procedures, power relations and 'people' issues within the Organisation. The final chapter attempts to take a step back from the ethnography itself and to place the two central hypotheses into a wider context by considering how these findings contribute to wider anthropological debates, knowledge and practice.

Declaration

I have composed this thesis myself on the basis of my own work.

Leslie Groves

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There are too many people to whom I am indebted to list them all. Authorship in this case is the result of a lifetime of reading and debate with many people in different contexts. First I would like to thank my family for giving me the freedom as a child to make my own mistakes and for making me aware of the fact that suffering is not a necessary part of life but something against which we all have the power to fight. Secondly, I would like to thank DFID for providing the funding for this thesis and Judy Walker in particular for her support and advice. At the University of Edinburgh I am indebted to Rachel Hinton for her incredible facilitation skills, sharp mind and spiritual inspiration as well as to Tony Good for his support, suggestions and guidance.

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List of Abbreviations

AE	Associate Expert
ACTEMP	ILO department dealing with employers' issues
ACTRAV	ILO department dealing with workers' issues
APOS	Associate Professional Officer Scheme
ATE	Tanzanian Employers' Group
CHODAW	Tanzanian Domestic Workers Union
CLU	Child Labour Unit
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DFID	Department for International Development
DG	Director General
GB	Governing Body
ILC	International Labour Conference
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IPEC	International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour
JPO	Junior Professional Officer
MINASCO	Tanzanian Miners' and Construction Workers' Union
MML	Merelani Mining Limited
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NPC	National Programme Coordinator
NPM	National Programme Manager
NSC	National Steering Committee
OPS	Operations
PM	Project Memorandum
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SDA	Social Development Adviser
STAMICO	State Mining Corporation
TBP	Time Bound Programme
TGI	Tanzania Gemstone Industries Ltd.
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
ZMO	Zonal Mining Office

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1. Situating the Research

Recent years have witnessed growing international concern in the problem of child labour or what is seen to be the 'unsuitable work' of children. The prevention of child labour has, at least in rhetoric, shot to the top of the global research and policy agendas in both developing and industrialised countries. The topic is an emotive one and strikes at the very heart of key anthropological concerns such as knowledge and power, structure and agency, kinship, constructions of identity and childhood as well as taking us to the core of wider contemporary concerns; from globalisation and the growth of the capitalist agenda to human rights and poverty. Little primary data exists, however, to support or challenge the major theories upon which child labour policy and programming are based, a situation which this thesis seeks to redress.

The initial inspiration for this research was Nader's (1980) suggestion that those studying children should consider the hierarchies which impact on the lives of those children. One of the most important hierarchies involved in child labour at the present time is the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations agency which has been given the global mandate to work towards the progressive elimination of child labour. I therefore take what Nader terms a 'vertical slice' in order to gain a fuller understanding of ILO child labour intervention: from the ILO Area Office, to Headquarters, via the child labour field itself. This thesis is based on multi-locale ethnographic research conducted between 1999 and 2000 in the International Labour Office (ILO) in Dar Es Salaam and in ILO headquarters in Geneva. Findings are considered in the light of the realities of child labour in the third field site, Mirerani, a

mining township in Northern Tanzania. Through careful ethnographic analysis, I hope to explore the labyrinthine world of the Organisation and gain a holistic view of the dynamics which lead to the development of particular child labour discourses and practices. Such a study is essential to further our understanding of the almost invisible machinations of the international bureaucracies which impact on the lives of child labourers. While this research is clearly limited in time and space to the ILO child labour programme in Tanzania and Geneva, the ethnographic approach taken allows us to examine a number of important elements which can influence wider programme success and failure.

First, it is perhaps useful to define exactly what is meant by 'child labour'. 'Child labour' is the generic term used to describe a phenomenon which occurs throughout the world, in both rich and poor countries, in both rural and urban areas and in a diversity of settings from the home to the mining site. The term has different meanings and usage in different contexts and to different people but is generally taken to refer to children engaged in undesirable forms of work. There has been much debate as to the distinction between child 'work' and child 'labour'- does 'labour', for example, imply all work conducted by children or just the most hazardous occupations? Fyfe (1989) makes a clear distinction between child work and child labour, arguing that not all work is bad for children and work can be a positive element in a child's development. Others such as Boyden argue that the term child 'labour' has become so confused with the broader notion of child work that it is no longer useful in precise discussion (Boyden *et al.* 1998: 19). White has also suggested that it may be best to abandon the term and to adopt a continuum of child work situations, from 'best' to 'worst' (White 1996: 837).

I do not propose to go further into this debate, which Myers (1999: 21-22) has described as 'tedious beyond words' and which has 'engendered rancour among allies, exasperated both practitioners and researchers to the end of their patience, and resisted all attempts to minimise or resolve it'. I take the view that it is unhelpful to extend the debate further, particularly as in most languages there is no distinction between the two terms 'labour' and 'work' and in Swahili only one term, *kazi*, exists. In this thesis I therefore use the words 'labour' and 'work' intermittently.

Beyond the theoretical definitional debates, growing international concern in the work of children has had dramatic consequences, not only for working children and their families but also for local and national economies. Media denunciations of children in developing countries being forced to work long hours in appalling conditions to manufacture items for rich countries has stirred up public outcry as well as increasing research interest, and the result of consumer boycotts and other pressure in rich countries has often been the sacking of children engaged in work that is not considered to be suitable, as was the case in a number of Bangladeshi garment factories in 1993 (Macdonald 1997: 9). Subsequent studies by O'Malley (1997) and Boyden, Ling and Myers (1998) have revealed, however, that 'saving' children from work can in fact leave them more vulnerable than before. Child labour is thus a complex issue, embedded in a system which is far wider than that of the local area in which children work. Figure 1 below illustrates this system visually in an attempt to group together the key dynamics which impact on child labour.

Figure 1: Linkage diagram to show the dynamics impacting on child labour practice



Each box is inter-linked, leading to a dynamic situation in which the wider context in terms of socio-cultural norms and political economy lead to developments in child labour policy, in the organisational bureaucracies responsible for working on child labour issues and ultimately on child labour practice itself. Child labour policy in turn can impact on the political economy and socio-cultural norms as well as on organisational bureaucracies and child labourers. Children are also starting to have an impact on the functioning of the bureaucracies, on child labour policy and on socio-cultural norms, predominantly through the growing recognition of the importance of children's participation, as discussed in Chapter 3.4. Child labour also affects the

national and global political economy, by virtue of the economic value of the work as well as of the consequences of boycotts, as mentioned above.

An extensive literature review revealed that one of the greatest problems with writing on child labour is that a holistic approach is rarely taken. The anthropological literature has mainly focused its attention on detailing the lives of child labourers themselves and the specific socio-cultural contexts within which they work as well as on critiquing child labour policy. Nieuwenhuys (1994) and Reynolds (1991) provide detailed ethnographies of the local conditions in which children work in India and Zimbabwe respectively, highlighting the importance of critically assessing the work routine of children within the context of household organisation, gender, kinship, state ideology and gender. They show that cultural constructions of childhood and work play a fundamental role in determining child labour (see also Chapter 8). Boyden (1997 [1990], 1998) and White (1994, 1996, 1999) use anthropological understandings to challenge the universality and simplicity of international child labour policy. In contrast, the media and political science attention has predominantly focused on the wider context in terms of the political economy (Klein 2000, Observer 2001) as well as on graphically documenting the suffering and misery of children labouring in predominantly poor countries. An extensive literature review revealed, however, that no detailed ethnographic attention has been given to gaining an understanding of the international bureaucracy which has been given the global mandate to develop child labour policy and to attempt to counter the impact of the wider political economy: the International Labour Organisation. It is this Organisation which has become the focus of this ethnographic study; although I do not separate the Organisation from the holistic picture and attempt to consider wider issues of policy, context and the child labourers themselves. I argue that it is essential to keep this wider framework in mind when considering child labour, as analysis of any one dynamic will be incomplete without considering the consequences for the other dynamics.

In this thesis, I draw on development theory, organisation theory and childhood theory; my guiding theoretical framework strongly influenced by a postmodernist approach. My

pledge to retain a holistic perspective means that a pragmatic approach to the use of theory is adopted. I have chosen a path which enables me to use different theories in ways which allow me to consider universalised child labour policy, the wider political economy, different socio-cultural norms, the practical needs of the international bureaucracy and its staff, as well as the realities of the child labourers.

In terms of development theory, the latest wave in development critique has been pioneered by authors such as Ferguson (1997 [1990]) and Escobar (1995) who use a Foucauldian postmodernist approach to argue that knowledge, power and action are intrinsically linked in the practices of development agencies which impose particular discourses[1] upon those they seek to 'develop'. Ferguson (1997 [1990]: xv) shows that the institutionalised production of certain forms of knowledge has important effects and the production of this knowledge plays a key role in the production of structural change. He suggests that anthropologists should examine the real social effects of the implementation of particular ideas or 'discourses' by organisations and the ways in which they connect with wider social processes. To apply this to my study would be to argue that the ILO as an institution produces certain ideas about 'the child labourer', which are then institutionalised through the production of policies, projects, documents, videos and legislation, which are then globalised and imposed throughout the world. Chapter 3 will reveal that leading child labour commentators have adopted this approach to argue that international organisations such as the ILO are exporting and imposing a 'Northern construction of childhood'. I argue in this thesis, however, that such an approach provides an oversimplified portrayal of the ways in which the discourse is developed and imposed and I propose an alternative frame of reference.

In Chapter 2, I take a genealogical approach to the development of the child labour debate to examine how the child labour discourse became established within the ILO. I explore the roots of the child labour debate and consider the external and internal influences which shaped discourse and propose that there is no such thing as 'The ILO child labour discourse'. Instead there are multiple discourses which develop through

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[1] According to Foucault, 'discourses' are historically variable and powerful ways of specifying knowledge and truth (Foucault in Ramazanoglu 1993: 19).

ongoing internal and external dialogical processes. In Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 7, I expand upon the findings of Chapter 2 to explore how contemporary influences shape the multiple discourses and practices and to show that within any development 'discourse' or organisation there is a multitude of discourses and individuals working within their own frames of reference and belief systems. Each individual uses his or her own agency to impact on the functioning of a particular organisation.

Authors such as Phillips and Edwards (2000) and Gardner and Lewis (2000) also criticise the perspective of Ferguson and Escobar which, they argue, sees the construction of knowledge as amounting to a unilateral exercising of power by the development organisation over its so-called 'beneficiaries'. The critics claim that Ferguson and others leave no scope for resistance within and outside the organisation. Gardner and Lewis (2000: 16) argue that development organisations do not simply impose their discourse in a top-down manner but are subject to political activism and resistance both from within and outside of the organisation:

> Rather than presenting 'development' as invariably top-down, hegemonic and static, the challenge for anthropology is to show how political activism both from within and outside the institutions and networks which produce development discourses can help problematise and overturn dominant paradigms.

The 'development as discourse' approach thus suffers from some degree of over-simplification[2] but to what extent is it true to say that it serves a purely polemical purpose, leading to political disengagement as Gardner and Lewis (2000: 15) argue? Having reviewed the literature as well as the policies of different development agencies, I argue that the 'development as discourse' approach has played a central role in moving the anthropology of development forward and has even had directly practical and

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[2] Furthermore, the 'development as discourse' argument gives an over-inflated importance to the development apparatus. Local communities have and use their agency in a number of ways, as revealed in 7 and 8. Discussions reveal that where people do not agree with a project they simply won't participate in it. They are very capable of identifying their own priorities and not simply absorbing those imposed up on them. In Mirerani, informants expressed how much they required assistance in helping the children working in the mines and this was before the possibility of IPEC assistance was established. Concerned individuals felt that while their efforts were beneficial to individual children they needed technical and financial assistance to implement a more concerted strategy.

political outcomes in that it has opened the way for alternative discourses. Evidence reveals that the deconstruction of dominant development discourses in the 1980s has led to a number of agencies such as the Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank reviewing their policies; exemplified by the introduction of new ideas such as 'partnership' and 'participation'. Ultimately, however, my research supports Gardner and Lewis's (2000: 16) argument that we are now at the stage where reducing everything to discourse makes it difficult to move beyond critique and point out productive avenues for change[3].

On the other hand, focusing solely on the bureaucratic realities of the Organisation in order to point out productive avenues of change can also lead to a disregard for the ways in which knowledge, power and action are intrinsically linked and used by international organisations such as the ILO. Focusing on individual agency also means that the 'bigger picture' in terms of the overall effect of the actions of individual agents is ignored.

Starting from this point, therefore, I propose not to reject the 'development as discourse' approach but to use it as a tool, subject to particular flaws, within a broader theoretical framework, to move forward and to explore the relationship between the ideas and practices of a 'development' organisation, namely the ILO. Through doing so I explore the reasons behind successes and failures and attempt to move the debate one step further by using these findings to suggest possible ways to overcome failures and to build upon successes. My evidence will show that by understanding and acknowledging the ways in which the ILO's dominant 'child labour' discourse is applied and modified in practice, the Organisation can develop in ways which allow for greater flexibility at field level, rewarding innovation and impact as opposed to the following of bureaucratic procedures which, whilst sustaining the dominant discourse, achieve questionable results as far as eliminating child labour is concerned.

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[3] Furthermore, the 'development as discourse' approach is subject to some of its own criticisms: For example, it raises concerns about the failure of development to address political complexity and yet it fails itself to address the political complexities facing practitioners working within development, who are often well aware that there are a number of discourses to which they are subject and which they themselves use, interpret and/or resist in a number of ways (see also Czarniowska 1997: 200).

In terms of theoretical frameworks for considering child labour itself, anthropologists such as Reynolds (1991) and Nieuwenhuys (1994) have taken a social construction of childhood perspective in order to argue that child labour is a culturally defined task[4]. Such an approach, however, is inadequate in terms of the holistic perspective which I have chosen to use as it pays insufficient attention to the wider framework of global capitalism. For many child labourers, work is an expression of freedom but this 'freedom' must be seen as embedded in the wider context of the 'un-freedom' of their position (see Sen 1999). For example, child labourers in Mirerani expressed their freedom through choosing to migrate in search of a better life for themselves. This freedom, however, must be seen in the context of growing poverty in Tanzania, an education system which is inaccessible to many (in terms of finance, distance and curriculum) and the lack of alternative means of survival or of obtaining the desired life style in their home area (see Chapter 8). To use cultural relativism to romanticise the freedom of children to choose to work can therefore be a short-sighted analysis. While it is clearly important to recognise the importance of individual agency in breaking out of poverty and other forms of deprivation, it is also important to recognise that individual agency is often constrained by social arrangements in terms of the social, political and economic opportunities available to us (Sen 1999: xi-xii). Lavalette (1999) takes a similar approach to argue that, in view of the economic pressures imposed by capitalism which force children to work, it becomes meaningless to talk of a deliberate and informed decision by the children. While Chapter 8 reveals that children *do* make deliberate and informed decisions to engage in labour, I argue in Chapter 9 that it is important to understand that this decision is made within a particular economic, social and political system which has resulted in growing poverty for many people. Children should therefore have the right to work but they should also have the right not to work.

Having briefly highlighted some of the theoretical ideas which have influenced this thesis, it is equally important to introduce the author and to consider the ways in which her positioning has also affected the research process.

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[4] This argument has been taken on by 'liberationists' such as Boyden (1990) who argue that children have the right to work and has been opposed to the view of 'protectionists' such as the ILO who argue that children have the right not to work, an argument discussed further in Chapters 3 and 9.

1.1 Situating the Researcher in the Research Process

Social Anthropology, perhaps more than any other discipline, has developed a highly individualised style of research practice which usually consists of the anthropologist engaging in intensive participant observation in a particular community for an extended period of time (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 25)[5]. Recent anthropological debates have centred on the issue of reflexivity, with key commentators arguing that there can be no such thing as an objective ethnography as the socio-historical locations of the anthropologist will shape his/her orientation (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Okely 1992; Hammersley and Atkinson 1995)[6]. In this section, I take a reflexive approach and focus on the impact that my 'personal biography as a gendered researcher, who speaks from a particular class, racial, cultural and ethnic community perspective' (Denzin and Lincoln 1994: 11) may have had on my relationships with informants. Such an approach is not being used as a justification, as a 'device for establishing authority', but merely as a way of situating myself within the research process (Rabinow 1986: 144).

As my research relates to child labour in Tanzania, it is important to explore my own childhood experiences as these have been influential in directing my thinking[7]. As a member of a close-knit, English-French, middle-class nuclear family, my childhood was privileged and my time was mainly divided into 'play' and school. My 'work' experiences consisted of a paper round from the age of 11 and then shop work from the age of 14. Both jobs would be considered 'exploitative' in the sense that I was extremely underpaid and working below the legal age limit (ILO Convention 138, 1973). However, I was very happy to earn a bit of money to prove my independence to myself and to my family and peers. My experiences thus contrast starkly with those of my Tanzanian child

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[5]This model was pioneered by Malinowski who outlines his 'scientific method' in *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (1961).

[6]Contemporary ethnographies, such as Marjorie Shostak's *Nisa: The life and words of a !Kung woman* (1990), represent a move away from the Malinowskian scientific ideal and consider the position of the researcher in the field, revealing that the ethnographic process is a two-way relationship which may have important consequences for the community.

[7]For a fuller discussion of the benefits of a reflexive approach for childhood researchers, see James, Jenks and Prout (1998: 171).

informants, a large number of whom have migrated independently to Mirerani to seek their fortunes and live outside family structures, working long hours to build their futures, to contribute to household survival or to pay for their schooling or for the schooling of their siblings (see Chapter 8). My experiences do also, however, reveal certain similarities in that, as a child, I was also subject to the disciplinary powers of adult 'authority' (be it in the form of parental authority, community authority or school authority) which could determine the activities in which I could and could not engage even where this was against my will and better judgement.

My privileged background meant that at 18 I was able to go to University to study Law with the aim of becoming a human rights lawyer. My experiences of working with a law firm led to disillusionment and disappointment whilst voluntary work in Algeria and Brazil led me to an MSc in Development Administration and Planning and to casual employment with the Department for International Development (DFID). This eventually resulted in my obtaining a place on DFID's training programme for Social Development Advisors (Associate Professional Officer's Scheme/APOS). The scheme runs over three years, the first and third years of which are spent at a university studying for an M.Phil., the second year of which is spent on placement. I was sent to Edinburgh University to the Social Anthropology Department where I was advised to study for a PhD and underwent a crash course in 'becoming a social anthropologist'. The Department became my 'field-site' and I initially felt like Malinowski; 'suddenly set down surrounded by all (my) gear, alone on a tropical beach close to a native village, while the launch or dinghy which has brought (me) sails away out of sight' (1961: 4). I felt intellectually estranged; my previous training of little use in this new world. I had to learn the language of social anthropology; that of *tropes*, *hermeneutics*, of *techne* and *metis,* in order to convince the 'natives' of my worth[8]. Having experienced over three years in the social anthropology 'field' I feel that I can now understand the 'natives' better and have in fact 'gone native', identifying myself as a social anthropologist with a tool-bag of valuable skills to facilitate effective participant observation in the 'field'.

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[8]My experience would therefore appear to respond positively to Clifford's question: 'Can the University itself be seen as a kind of field site- a place of cultural juxtaposition, estrangement, rite of passage, transit and learning? (Clifford 1997: 210).

In September 1999, I was seconded to the ILO's International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) in Tanzania 'in order to provide IPEC Tanzania with additional research and analytical capacity to inform programme design' (DFID 1999a.). I was expected to conduct my fieldwork whilst carrying out my employment duties for the ILO as a DFID employee. This combination of roles placed me in an interesting position and has been useful in revealing the difficulties involved in attempting to negotiate employment conditions within a power structure in which I have little authority. This situation, whilst clearly less extreme, is helpful in understanding the difficulties faced by child workers attempting to negotiate a fair work contract with a 'power-full' adult employer whose position is sustained through creating and employing 'docile bodies' (Foucault 1977).

My ethnographic research took the form of what Marcus (1986) has termed a 'multi-locale ethnography'. Between September 1999 and December 2000, my time was divided between the field office in Dar Es Salaam (eight months), a mining township in Northern Tanzania, Mirerani (four months), and ILO HQ in Geneva (two months), as shown in Box 1.1 below.

Box 1.1 : The Research Process: A Chronology

September 1998 - September 1999	Preparation in Edinburgh
January 1999	Field visit to Tanzania to look at the overall child rights framework and collect secondary data
September 1999 - September 2000	Field work in Tanzania: Time divided between ILO Office in Dar Es Salaam (8 months) and Mirerani Mines (4 months)
October 2000 - December 2000	Field work in ILO HQ, Geneva
January 2001 - December 2001	Writing- up in Edinburgh and cross-checking of ethnography with informants

First and foremost, my social positioning as a white, middle-class, university educated, European female impacted on my intellectual disposition as well as the way in which I was received in all three locales[9]. At ILO-IPEC, I was seen as a DFID social development 'expert' with set functions and targets and also as a potential source of much needed funding. In fact ILO-IPEC requested that one of my key activities be 'the design of a sectoral programme for consideration by DFID'. The research opportunities provided by such a position were substantial as I was given free and privileged access to ILO-IPEC partners and resources. The key challenge, however, was reconciling my various roles of committed child labour activist, ILO internee, DFID employee and social anthropology PhD researcher.

In Mirerani, my position as an unmarried, childless woman meant that I was seen by many as no more than a child, particularly by children themselves who saw me as far younger than I am (27). My multiple identities were also a source of some confusion: some saw me as a student, others as a link to ILO funds, others as a friend. This was quite useful, however, as it allowed me to adopt different personae when attempting to

[9]An interesting discussion of positionality by a student in a similar position to myself is that of Crewe (1992: 4).

obtain different types of information. For example, the hierarchical structures of Tanzanian bureaucracy meant that as a young, female student it was quite difficult to access information. As a white employee of a UN agency, however, I was perceived to be a powerful person, regardless of gender, and was therefore given access to people and documents which would have been harder to obtain by my student persona[10]. This also meant, however, that information was given to me as a staff employee and not as a researcher, which brought with it a different set of responsibilities with regard to confidentiality and the use of data collected. Relationships of trust were formed by my different personae and it was important not to breach confidentiality by my other persona using the information for purposes other than that for which it was intended.

I found that different roles came to the fore in different moments: pre-fieldwork, initial fieldwork and 'writing-up' were times very much associated with my social anthropologist researcher self. My DFID identity became more dominant as proposals were being put forward to DFID for funding and as the ILO bureaucratic procedures got in the way of effective action, causing many delays (Chapter 7). As I became more and more involved with people in Mirerani and consequently developed more empathy with their lives, I found that my child labour activist self came to the fore, sparked principally by my concerns with conducting what I felt to be extractive research. These children and other community members had been interviewed by others before me and nothing had ever come of the interviews, either by way of reports being sent back to the township or by way of project funding. When it became clearer that DFID were not going to fund the project proposal, for reasons entirely outside the project's control (Chapter 7), my social anthropologist persona came to the fore in an attempt to understand how the less than satisfactory chain of events could have been prevented. In Mirerani, the researcher persona continued to carry out her research but the activist persona remained dominant, using research findings to attempt to raise funds locally for the project proposal and also becoming a member of the Board of Directors of the local NGO proposing to work with child labourers. My role in the process was therefore as multifaceted as the process

[10] An experience which was quite common in the early days of research when my student persona was dominant.

itself. In Geneva, I encountered similar identity crises: once again employed by DFID to carry out specific tasks and yet also seen to be some form of ILO 'insider' due to the Tanzania experience. This blurred identity, however, allowed me to continue with participant observation and to get access to otherwise hidden data.

This section has thus revealed the importance of considering the social positioning of the researcher when conducting research. The impact of social positioning is clearly substantial and demonstrates that despite our best efforts there can be no such thing as an objective ethnography: both researcher and informant are closely woven into a web of personal experience, each interpreting the other in a way which reflects not only their own positioning but the way in which the other's positioning has influenced their worlds.

1.2 Some methodological considerations: Ethics, Access and Method

In terms of overall methodological approach, I adopted a participatory stance in my use of ethnographic participant observation. It was very important for me to allow the multiple voices to which I had privileged access to express themselves in as open a manner as possible. In turn, it was therefore important that I was as open as possible about my different personae and consequently I took on what Fine and Sandstrom describe as 'explicit cover' (1988: 18), which involves being very open and honest about my different roles. My 'participant observer' role was one which developed throughout the research process: sometimes I saw myself very much as a participant, observing a process in which I was also a central player. At other times, I was very much an observer as opposed to a player, taking on a predominantly facilitatory role, as was the case with focus group discussions, for example[11].

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[11] Focus group discussions were a useful tool in that they allowed me to obtain concentrated amounts of data from a number of people on the exact topics that I was interested in, as well as to note non-verbal communication; they also enabled the observation of group dynamics which led to new research questions. For further discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of focus groups see Boyden and Ennew (1997); Morgan (1997); Stewart and Shamdasani (1990).

In terms of ethics, the selection of methods was more complicated when conducting research with children in Mirerani than with the Organisation. The fact that I was working with children, mainly in their place of work, meant that I had to be very sensitive to the potential adverse consequences arising from my presence. Research of this kind may be seen as challenging the status quo and may therefore be perceived as a threat by those with a vested interest in child labour. I was concerned that employers might dismiss or abuse children who revealed that their employment conditions were exploitative. Furthermore, the research process may cause psychological distress to informants or jealousy and feelings of rejection amongst those who felt excluded. It was therefore important for all informants to consider the potential impact of their involvement before agreeing to take part in the research process (Johnson 1996: 31)[12]. Confidentiality was also an important issue and it was crucial that my informants felt that they could trust me not to report them to the authorities, particularly in view of the illegal nature of much of their work (not just in terms of age but in terms of working without licences or safety equipment). Real names are therefore never used in this thesis (ASA guidelines, www.les1.man.ac.uk/asa/ethics.htm).

With regard to working with children, another relevant aspect of my positioning is my status as an adult. Researchers have employed a range of techniques in forming relationships with child informants. In the past, children were often ignored as research subjects and attempts to find out about children's lives were often made through questioning responsible adults, such as parents and teachers (James, Jenks and Prout 1998: 172-174). With the development in the late 1980s and 1990s of an 'anthropology of childhood', based on a social constructionist perspective of childhood, the relationship between adult researcher and child informant was transformed and certain researchers have tried to narrow the distance between themselves and children. During her fieldwork

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[12]Another issue to consider is that of taking children from their work, education or leisure time. The research process should interfere as little as possible with children's daily activities. Johnson suggests that the researcher should go to where the children are conducting their activities and help with tasks (1996: 32). During my fieldwork, it was completely inappropriate to help them with their tasks, as this would have involved going down a private pit or helping them sort through their sand which would both have been appropriate due to the fear of theft (I went down a pit belonging to the family with whom I lived on several occasions). It was very important throughout the research to show that I was not interested in gem-stones as this would have put me in the role of buyer or employer rather than researcher-activist.

with young children in England, Anna Laerke sought to locate herself as firmly as possible on 'the children's level' which involved dressing in similar ways to the children, eating with them, addressing adults in the deferential ways expected of children, imitating children and 'rejecting the instruments of adult domination' (1998: 3). Such a novel technique clearly challenges a number of assumptions about how adults interpret children but I did not feel comfortable adopting such a role and I would question how children would feel with such an 'invasion'. I am clearly an adult in terms of size, age and experience and children would see straight through my 'child' persona. This is also an argument used by Fine and Sandstrom who suggest that:

> Like the white researcher in black society, the male researcher studying women, or the ethnologist observing a distant tribal culture, the adult participant observer who attempts to understand a children's culture cannot pass unnoticed as a member of that group (1988: 13)[13].

My position was therefore to recognise the differences between child informants and myself and to consider the significance of these differences as well as the role of age and culture in defining childhood (Chapter 8). As a white, female adult my presence was one of novelty as well as power. Regardless of this, however, the children were so engaged with their work that only those with whom I had built a rapport would give me more time than a simple comment. My response to this, as well as to my concern with conducting extractive research by virtue of the fact that I was taking children away from their work and giving them little in return, was to give all mining children informants an item of clothing (facilitated by my DFID one tonne freight allowance). This was a useful technique and many children in fact sold the clothes on to make some cash, which meant that there was some recompense for the time spent talking with me and my research assistant.

In terms of language, it is important to note that although I had studied Swahili for a year before going on field work and spoke the language relatively well I was always

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[13]Geertz's argument that anthropologists do not have to turn native to argue from a native's point of view can also be used to argue that childhood researchers do not have to pretend to be children (Geertz 1983 cited in James, Jenks and Prout 1998: 183).

accompanied by my research assistant/interpreter who was a male miner and who played a vital facilitatory role throughout the research process. This was also essential in terms of my safety: women are not supposed to go up to the mines for their own security (see Chapter 5.2) and I found myself in extremely dangerous situations on more than one occasion. In view of the large sums of money going through the area, many people carry guns and it was therefore important for my own protection to be with a well-known male miner. Mirerani is also a multi-lingual area with different groups of people speaking different tribal languages. My research assistant spoke Chagga (a dominant language), Swahili and 'miner language' which consists of Swahili slang particular to the mines and often used to mask illicit activities (see for example, the discussion on the township name in 5.2).

With regard to my work in the ILO, the dominant method employed was participant observation. The primary concern throughout the process related to confidentiality. Access was never an issue, with the Director of ILO Tanzania and one of the Geneva Directors giving me full access to any information that I requested. Staff and social partners were extremely open to being interviewed and to my taking part in meetings. This was facilitated by the fact that I was seen as 'one of us', in that I was also working for the Organisation. Only on one or two occasions was I told that information was 'off the record' and this applied to personal opinions about other staff members. I did, however, have to self-limit the type of material used as the reality is that both the ILO and DFID will read this thesis and it is therefore important that staff members are not identifiable as this could lead to problems not just for myself but for them.

Another difficulty I faced was the fact that a number of staff informants became friends, emphasised by the fact that we had similar cultural backgrounds and objectives in terms of our professions. I therefore found myself in the difficult position of attempting to carry out a critique of their work, in which I was also implicated as a staff member: a problem also facing other organisational ethnographers:

> Having been deeply entwined in the lives and views of those with whom I spent so much time, I felt a sense of protectiveness towards them. Yet at the same time I felt critical of some of things that they had done. These different impulses were not easy to marry; and all made writing an especially awkward process of negotiation and expression. (MacDonald 2001: 92)

Initial writing up was thus difficult to negotiate but with time I was able to 'detach' myself from the process, to move away from the emotional ties, and to 'make the familiar strange'. This was facilitated by a genuine desire to understand the process and what it was that led to the delays and failure to reach the children themselves.

1.3 Outlining the Thesis

This thesis attempts to explore two key hypotheses. The first relates to current anthropological thought, expounded by Foucault influenced theorists such as Boyden, which argues that failure of organisations such as the ILO to successfully tackle child labour is due to the adoption of a 'Northern construction of childhood', which is then exported globally and imposed in culturally distinct countries. My hypothesis is that the vision of childhood used by the ILO is a far more complex process of negotiation and re-negotiation. I use historical and contemporary evidence to explore the roots of the campaign against child labour (Chapter 2) and the vision of childhood promoted by the ILO (Chapter 3). I draw on the arguments of Gardner and Lewis (2000) to argue that the 'Northern construction of childhood' theory denies agency to the many activists in non-Northern countries who have been central in developing and fighting for the vision of childhood promoted by the ILO.

My second hypothesis is that it is not a particular vision or 'construction' of childhood which is responsible for failure to translate good intentions into successful programme implementation but specific bureaucratic procedures, power relations and human failings within the machinations of international bureaucracies. Drawing on the unique opportunity of working within the ILO for 14 months, Chapter 4 explores the multiple discourses and practices of those responsible for implementing the ILO 'vision' at headquarters in Geneva in an attempt to explore what lies under the apparently rigid and 'dehumanised' organisational structures. Chapter 5 attempts to move beyond 'vision' and towards reality and considers the factors that led to the growth of child labour in Tanzania generally and in Mirerani, a mining township in Northern Tanzania, specifically. The way in which the ILO conducts its child labour programme in Tanzania

is explored in Chapter 6 and notions such as 'top-down', 'power-distance' and 'organisational culture' are explored in order to deepen our understanding of the organisational dynamics. Chapter 7 takes one particular case study of the development of an intervention programme in Mirerani. I explore the particular factors which prevented so many 'good intentions' from being translated into effective practice for the benefit of the children in Mirerani, drawing primarily on the work of Hertzfeld (1992), Fineman (1993) and Chambers (1983, 1997, 1998). Chapter 8 considers the missing link, in other words, the children themselves and the cultural constructions of childhood and work which are dominant in Mirerani. In this Chapter I argue that 'children's voices' should come first and yet are superseded in importance and in resource allocation by the need to negotiate bureaucratic procedures, power relations and 'people' issues within the Organisation. The final chapter, Chapter 9, attempts to take a step back from the ethnography itself and to place the answers to the two central hypotheses into a wider context by considering how these findings contribute to wider anthropological debates, knowledge and practice.

2. Child Labour and the ILO: A Historical Analysis

Growing international concern in the problem of child labour has culminated in the universal adoption[14] of a new international convention on the worst forms of child labour, ILO Convention 182 (1999). Convention 182 has already achieved the fastest ratification pace in ILO history (ILO 2000b: 1), 100 ratifications by September 2001, demonstrating the high profile nature of the child labour agenda.

The ILO has been committed to the abolition of child labour since its inception in 1919 and its programme on child labour has become its flagship, so successful in attracting donor money that it has the largest budget of any ILO programme (see Chapter 4). It is useful to briefly highlight the historical development of ILO involvement in the fight against child labour in order to better contextualise our present day understanding of the Organisation. This chapter attempts to explore the reasons for the creation of the ILO, one of the first international human rights organisations, and for the inclusion of child labour, one of the first universal 'child rights' issues. The final section explores the development of the child labour agenda within the historical development of the ILO.

[14] 'Universal' in terms of adoption by all 175 ILO member states. It is important to note that adoption does not mean ratification. Adoption is the commitment made by delegates at the International Labour Conference whereas ratification is the act by which member states formally undertake to make the provisions of a Convention effective in their national laws and practices. For further discussion on ratification see Osieke (1985: 152).

2.1 What were the historical developments which led to the creation of the ILO?

> The special treatment accorded to the social problem by the peace makers of 1919 can be understood only in the light of the past. In the history of institutions, thought has always preceded action (ILO 1931: 22)

Although the ILO was formally established by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, its constitution embodied in Part XIII of the Treaty which emphasised the importance of fair and decent labour conditions to social justice and universal peace, the formal constitution of the Organisation was merely the end result of a long historical process in which lobbyists such as philanthropic factory bosses, the fast-growing trade union movement and parliamentary reformers, amongst others, argued for 'international' agreement on labour standards (Brett 1994: 24)[15]. This section attempts to highlight the key factors which led to the creation of the ILO, the first ever League of Nations/ United Nations specialised agency, to explore the thought which preceded the action, and brings with it the usual caveat of any historical analysis based on limited sources[16]. It is hoped that such an analysis will shed light upon a number of questions which will arise in later chapters.

According to many commentators, the ideological origins of the ILO are to be found in the nineteenth century with the advent of the industrial revolution, which produced 'a new industrial working class whose problems ceased to be local and became national and international' (ILO 1933: 5, see also Ghebali 1987: 21-22). The 'human costs' of the industrial revolution led to the development of two complementary sets of ideas: the need for international regulation of work as well as the need for an international labour

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[15] Although the literature refers to 'international' processes, the origins of the ILO and of the moves for international labour regulation are firmly rooted in West European, and to a lesser extent North American, history.

[16] Available texts refer mainly to the same limited sources and yet within their analyses there are a number of conflicting statements, particularly with regard to dates. The version I present is the result of extensive analysis and cross-referencing of the various sources with the aim of presenting the most accurate picture possible.

organisation. The main arguments brought forward were: humanitarian, the need to improve the conditions of workers; political, social peace is dependent on the protection of workers; and economic in that unequal working conditions between countries would affect competition (Ghebali 1987: 23). The political motivation will be discussed further below but it is perhaps useful to refer to some primary sources in order to gain a better understanding of the humanitarian and economic motivations.

The misery brought about by the industrial revolution and the difficulties faced by workers is brought vividly to life by commentators from the 1820s and 1830s, who express their shock at the situation of many workers:

> Some of these lords of the loom have in their employ thousands of miserable creatures. In the cotton spinning work these creatures are kept, fourteen hours in each day, locked up, summer and winter, in a heat of from EIGHTY TO EIGHTY FOUR DEGREES. The Rules which they are subjected to we saw as no negroes were ever subjected to. (William Cobbett, Political Register, 20th November 1824, Vol. II cited in Tames 1971: 91, emphasis in original text).

And:

> The vast deterioration in personal form which has brought about in the manufacturing population, during the last thirty years, a period not extending over one generation, is singularly impressive (..) Their complexion is sallow and pallid (..) Their limbs slender, and playing badly and ungracefully. A very general bowing of the legs (..) A spiritless and dejected air (P Gaskell, The Manufacturing Population of England, 1833, Chapter 4, cited in Tames 1971: 132-133).

The misery and poverty brought about by the industrial revolution led to campaigns by a number of philanthropists for the introduction of national labour standards. Activists from these countries consequently argued that national standards would lead to unfair economic competition from countries without such standards and therefore started to call for international standards to be set in place.

The fear of the introduction of national labour standards on competition was clearly expressed by the resolution of a group of wool manufacturers meeting in Halifax in 1831

and which referred to the introduction of a Parliamentary Bill limiting the hours of labour in textile factories to eleven hours daily:

> It will raise the price of goods to the consumers, which will affect the home trade considerably, and will produce the most serious effects on the prosperity of this district, by tending to foster the manufacturers of foreign nations, our trade with whom depends on the cheap advantageous terms on which we now supply them with goods, and whose manufacturers would be enabled by an advance of price successfully to compete with the British merchant (Follows 1951: 13, citing Kydd 1857 : 109)

This fear is similar to that expressed by some commentators in poor countries today who argue against the introduction of a number of international labour standards on the basis that such measures would reduce their competitiveness and therefore be detrimental to their economic development (see 3.4).

Therefore, while the misery and poverty of the working classes motivated the fight of the philanthropists at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the fear of unfair competition inspired the development of private, voluntary organisations fighting for international labour standards during the second half of the nineteenth century[17] (Ghebali 1987: 24-25). The best example of one of these private organisations is the 1900 International Association for the Legal Protection of Workers, which can be seen as the direct antecedent of the ILO. The International Association was composed of intellectuals and others, with governments invited to appoint a representative to the committee of the Association. One of its most active members, Ernest Mahaim, described the Association as 'consisting of middle-class reformers sympathetic to the working classes' (Phelan undated: 30). According to Albert Thomas, first director of the ILO (Thomas 1996 [1921]: 264), the International Association had two fatal weaknesses. Firstly, proposals could only be adopted through diplomatic channels i.e. through lengthy conference proceedings and then submitted for final

[17] The idea that labour problems are international was expressed as far back as 1788 by Louis XVI's former financial adviser. The argument against factory regulation was that it would raise the costs of production which would handicap manufacturers who compete with foreign producers. See Follows (1951: Preface).

approval/rejection/amendment to diplomats who had little expertise in the issues. Secondly, the nature of the organisation itself was problematic as members of employers' and workers' organisations were never included in discussions.

The liberal reform movement of the nineteenth century, based on the humanitarian and economic issues discussed above, led to the creation of a number of forerunners to the ILO, such as the 1890 International Convention on Labour Law in Berlin organised by the Swiss government; the 1900 International Association for the Legal Protection of Workers set up by a group of scholars and economists in Paris to convene international labour conferences and which was responsible for the adoption of two draft labour conventions in 1906 banning night shifts for women workers and prohibiting the use of phosphorous in match production; the 1916 Leeds, 1917 Stockholm and the 1918 Berne conferences on labour where the demand for a permanent international labour office was formalised (see ILO 1931:22-25; Brett 1994: 24-25; Guerin 1995: 17-21; Raman 1978: 9-14).

It was not until the First World War that the voice of the labour movements[18] who were campaigning for international labour legislation began to be heard (Beguin 1959: 406; Ghebali 1987:27-28). The formation of the International Working Men Association or the First Internationale in London in 1864 led to the first International Workers' Movement. This Movement was later to split into the Second (Socialist) Internationale and then again to form the International Federation of Trade Unions (Raman 1978:14). During the First World War these organisations as well as other trade union movements held a number of national and international conferences (see above), the common theme being that any peace treaty must include social clauses as well as provision for the creation of a body to monitor these (Ghebali 1987: 29). The sacrifices of wartime left many with the feeling that peace must mean something more than a return to the pre-war conditions. A new order needed to be created; and the workers' delegates at the international conferences of 1916, 1917 and 1918 argued that peace should:

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[18] For an extensive history of labour movements in Europe, dating back to the Romans, see Durkheim (1968: Preface to the 2nd Edition).

> safeguard the working class of all countries from the attacks of international capitalist competition and assure it a minimum guarantee of moral and material order as regards labour legislation, trade union rights, migration, social insurance, hours of work and industrial hygiene and safety (quoted in ILO 1931: 25[19]).

By the time of the drafting of the Peace Treaty international labour regulation had become a central political concern. The war-time campaigns for the rights of workers and for the establishment of an international body could not be ignored by the governments, who felt not only that the workers deserved some compensation for their war time sacrifices but also feared the contagious effect of the socialist revolutions that had occurred elsewhere in the world[20]. The victory of the Bolsheviks was threatening established order throughout Europe and unrest and strikes were to mark the end of the war, even in countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands which had not been engaged in the hostilities (Beguin 1959: 406-407; Ghebali 1987: 29; Stewart 1969: 4-5).

The response of the Peace Treaty drafters was to set up a 15-member Commission on International Labour Legislation, representing delegates from Belgium, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States[21]. The Commission was not just composed of Government representatives but also of individuals who had influenced the 'intellectual' development of the pre-war labour movement, such as Arthur Fontaine and Ernest Mahaim, but also trade union representatives, notably George Barnes and Samuel Compers, the Commission's

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[19] The reference for the quote is not given in the text but is presented as a quote by the workers delegates of the Leeds, Stockholm and Berne conferences.

[20] For commentaries from British parliamentarians see Hansard (1918: 1580; 1919: 968- 978).

[21] Certain countries had more than one delegate, explaining the apparent number mismatch. Non-allied forces were not invited to join which meant that neither neutral Switzerland not Germany, who had respectively organised and hosted the 1890 Berlin international convention on labour law, were party to the discussions. This meant not only that their expertise was lost but is interesting in the light of the fact that the ILO sits in Switzerland and that Germany was later to become the instigator and primary funder of IPEC.

President (Ghebali 1987: 31). Phelan (undated: 17) described Gompers[22] as a 'fortunate' choice, 'only a chairman of exceptional ability and long experience could have presided with success over a meeting in which so many issues had to be discussed'. The aim of the Commission was :

> To enquire into the conditions of employment from the international aspect and to consider the international means necessary to secure common action on matters affecting conditions of employment, and to recommend the form of a permanent agency to continue such enquiry and consideration in co-operation with and under the direction of the League of Nations (ILO 1931: 26).

A number of proposals were submitted to the Commission but it was the document of the British Delegation which was finally approved. According to Ghebali (1987: 30), three points are worth noting with regard to the drafting of the ILO constitution. Firstly, the two men primarily responsible for the drafting process, Harold Butler and Edward Phelan, were later to become ILO Directors; secondly, the starting point for the organisation was the concrete experience of the International Association for the Legal Protection of Workers; and thirdly, the concept of tripartism (direct involvement not only of government but of the employers and workers as well) was included from the very first stages. The key question which arises here, however, is where did this revolutionary idea of tripartism come from? Ghebali (1987:30) tells us that Edward Phelan was influenced by the writings of the socialist writer Leonard Woolf, who had published an article in 1916 in the London Fabian Society journal advocating tripartism. Beguin (1959: 409) also attributes the inclusion of tripartism to Edward Phelan, arguing that Phelan based his proposal on the experiences of the British Board of Trade which, concerned with the problem of war stoppages and the need to sustain the war effort, had created joint councils of workers and employers within non-unionised industries where salaries were especially low. The idea of tripartism was not, therefore, a proposal of the

[22] Phelan spells the name as Gompers, unlike Ghebali who spells it Compers. For a revealing and personal account of the goings-on of the Commission see Phelan (undated).

trades union movements, nor of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, nor of the employers. Instead it was the brainchild of a British civil servant[23].

The final proposal of Great Britain, officially submitted by George Barnes, the labour representative in Lloyd George's coalition government, involved the creation of a permanent administration which would hold periodic conferences in which delegates would represent government, workers, and employers, each with an equal voice. Other than the inclusion of tripartism, the proposal held another radical suggestion: the break with the diplomatic 'tradition that treaties had to be adopted by unanimous vote, signed by plenipotentiaries, and ratified by sovereigns with, where appropriate, the advice and consent of parliaments' (Beguin 1959: 412). This lengthy process often ended in failure. Phelan's proposal was that all member governments must propose any decision arrived at by a two-thirds majority before their national parliament. Thus the process would be speeded up by this new approach to international convention making. It is important to note that the proposal to create the ILO was only one part of the wider Peace Treaty, although the proposal gave rise to considerable debate:

> Luckily for the ILO, when the time came to examine the text that was to become its fundamental charter, the Powers were at sword's point on all the basic problems of the Peace Treaty. Preoccupied with this political impasse, the plenipotentiaries unanimously accepted as a whole the proposal of the Commission on International Labour Legislation (Beguin 1959: 412).

This is significant as it would appear that the proposal of the ILO was 'rushed through' in a sense and therefore a number of its more original and radical aspects, such as tripartism, were approved with almost no debate. This is fortunate when one considers the extremity of views expressed within the Commission itself before a final proposal could be approved and the fact that the final proposal was only accepted by 8 votes to 7 (Phelan undated: 32).

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[23] For further detail on the history of Phelan and tripartism see Beguin (1959: 408-411) and Phelan (undated: 3). The influence of the individual is one that we return to again in this thesis, see Chapters 4, 6 and 7, particularly with regard to the conflicting theories which regard the Organisation as a sovereign, non-human body and those which see the organisation as merely the end product of the activities of individuals.

And so the constitution of the ILO was approved in April 1919, later to be Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles, in an atmosphere of dynamism, enthusiasm and more importantly optimism for a world in which collective agreements could solve fundamental problems of social justice and peace. Chapters I and II of Part XIII form the actual constitution of the ILO and regulates its working and the obligations assumed by member states[24]. As important, however, are the Preamble, which precedes Chapter I, and Section II, which give the 'soul' to the Organisation (ILO 1931: 28).

It is worth quoting the preamble in its entirety in order to illustrate the optimism and the ambition that lay behind the Constitution of the ILO :

> whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice; and whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently required: as, for example, by the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of children, young persons and women, provision for old age and injury, protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the principle of freedom of association, the organisation of vocational and technical education and other measures;
>
> Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries;
>
> The High Contracting Parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity as well as by the desire to secure a permanent peace of the world, agreed the following:

The 'following' being Chapters I and II. The Preamble was thus an emotional plea to governments and employers to respond to the needs of workers in a concerted effort to bring about universal peace and social justice. Section II lays down the General

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[24] The Constitution is explored further in Chapter 3.

Principles which required immediate action, including the right of association, payment of a reasonable wage, the adoption of an eight hour day and a 24 hour weekly rest period, the abolition of child labour, the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value for men and women, equitable economic treatment of all workers and a system of inspection to ensure the enforcement of laws and regulations[25]. The significance of the document is perhaps brought even better into perspective when one remembers that this was written twenty five years before the advent of the United Nations and its plethora of specialised agencies. In a time when we are continually bombarded by talks of 'social justice', 'peace', 'development', 'aid' etc. it is all too easy to forget how radical these ideas were at the end of the First World War, as well as the campaigns fought by committed individuals to even get these words into the common language and practice of the politicians.

The creation of the ILO was thus the result of a century long process during which different groups of people, with different interests, campaigned for international labour legislation and the creation of an international labour organisation. The abolition of child labour was one of the priorities of the constitution drafters, the protection of children highlighted in the preamble and the abolition of child labour included in the priorities for action listed in Section II. What were the factors, however, which led to the inclusion of child labour in the list of international labour priorities?

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[25] None of which are guaranteed to this day, even in Northern Europe.

2.2 What led to the inclusion of child labour in the ILO objectives?

> The protection of children against industrial exploitation is one of the first fields in which labour legislation was adopted. Many Governments had adopted legislative measures to protect children long before they thought of intervening in the regulation of conditions of adult labour. (..) And when the movement in favour of international labour legislation began to develop, one of the questions which appeared in the forefront of every programme was the protection of children. It was therefore natural that when the International Labour Organisation was established by Part XIII of the Peace Treaty in 1919, a prominent place should have been given in its constitution to the legal protection of children (ILO 1926: 1).

The above quote from a 1926 ILO publication is useful in demonstrating that the protection of children was at the forefront of concern for labour regulation. To what extent, however, is the inclusion of the child labour abolition objective in the ILO constitution really 'natural'? In order to explore this question it is useful to explore the wider historical context of the development of the international movement for labour regulation itself. In addition, however, any discussion of child labour must be contextualised within conceptions of childhood and child development (Boyden, Ling, Myers: 1998: 27). Extensive historical analyses of the development of 'childhood' have been already conducted (Aries 1986 [1960]; Cunningham 1991, 1995a, 1995b; Jenks 1996; Hendrick 1997; James, Jenks and Prout 1998; Lavalette 1999) so I propose to highlight only the key developments pertinent to our study of child labour.

According to Hendrick (1997 [1990]: 35):

> the numerous perceptions of childhood, which have been produced over the last 200 years or so, can only be fully comprehended within the context of how different generations and social classes have responded to the social, economic, religious and political challenges of their respective eras.

It is therefore useful to briefly consider the perceptions of childhood which led to the inclusion of child labour as one of the international community's priority areas for action towards social justice, as laid down in the ILO constitution. It is important to

remember at this point that the primary drafters of the ILO constitution were British and that the experiences of Great Britain would therefore have been foremost in the minds of the drafters. Furthermore, 'the Industrial Revolution developed first in Great Britain; it was there that it first victimised childhood, and consequently it was there that the legal protection of young persons first got under way' (ILO 1933: 5). It is for this reason that I select mainly British sources for this section[26].

According to Hendrick (1997: 36), who provides a succinct summary of the writings of previous commentators, particularly Cunningham (1991, 1995b), there is 'a general agreement among historians that from the late seventeenth century a new attitude towards children (and notions of childhood) began to manifest itself'. This attitude was one, inspired by the writings of Locke and Rousseau, which saw childhood as a 'natural' state i.e. as distinct from adulthood. Children therefore had different and particular needs. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Romantic and Evangelical revivals had led to a new vision of childhood in which childhood was seen as a quality, the 'source of 'innocence'' in the words of Hendrick (1997 [1990]: 37), as opposed to a state of preparation for adulthood. With the industrial revolution and the Evangelical revival (see Hendrick 1997 [1990]: 38-30) came alternative visions of childhood, each group arguing that their's was the correct one. The domain of 'childhood' thus became, and continues to be, a contested terrain. In the years that were to follow, particular theories of 'childhood' were used by various groups of adults to argue for their particular visions of society.

Where does our particular interest, that of child labour, fit into these conflicting visions of childhood? Until the end of the eighteenth century, child labour was an issue which was relatively ignored (Alden 1909: 3, Hendrick 1997 [1990]: 39), although as early as 1284 a Venetian glass makers' statute forbade the employment of children in certain dangerous branches of the glass making trade and in 1396 a Venetian declaration prohibited work for children under 13 in certain trades (Weiner 1991: 110). Work was

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[26] It would be useful to conduct a comparative survey of the development in thought on childhood and child labour across Europe, although De Wilde's (2000) text on Belgium is particularly useful in illustrating the similarities between Belgian and British thought and experience.

seen as a form of life education in which children would learn important lessons necessary to the transition to adulthood as well as a necessary component to family survival strategies (similar to the Tanzanian perspective explored in 5.1). Lavalette (1998) provides a particularly useful historical summary of child labour during 'proto-industrialisation' i.e. the period before the 'take-off' as well as during the industrial revolution. He argues that while children and their families laboured under harsh conditions during proto-industrialisation, it was the spread of the competitive market relations and the commodification of labour which led to an intensification of child labour. When production outstripped local consumption middle men or 'merchant capitalists' took control over the production process, their access to markets allowing them to control prices and force down wages, forcing families to hire out their children to increase family income. In the words of a British child welfare commentator writing in 1909:

> Up to the end of the eighteenth century it would not be unjust to say that practically no consideration whatever had been given to the child, except on the part of a few philanthropists, and not even a beginning of legislative work for the welfare and education of children had been made. But with the end of the eighteenth century commenced the industrial revival which grew rapidly (..) amongst the new and complex social problems which arose was the question of a sufficient supply of cheap labour for the new industries which are being started in all directions in the manufacturing districts. Choosing the line of least resistance, our statesmen, our administrators, our employers, turned with one accord to the child, who was consequently engaged in large numbers (Alden 1909: 3-4).

Children, along with other groups of workers, thus found themselves employed in miserable, slave-like conditions. Alden continues to describe the pitiful condition facing these children:

> The average number of hours worked by these gangs of little children was from 12-14, but frequently 16 or 18 hours was the period a which quite little children were engaged in unhealthy labour. Naturally the death rate amongst these children was very high, and even where they did not die, the effect of the hard labour for excessive hours, the unhealthy air of the factory the bad or insufficient food, was an enfeebled and wretched maturity (Alden 1909: 4-5).

This quote raises a number of issues worthy of comment. Firstly, it was this type of depiction of the misery faced by child labourers that led to a change in the vision of 'childhood'. The child was no longer seen as purely 'innocent' or 'natural' but as a 'victim' (which can be seen as a sequential progression from the other two categories) in need of adult protection. School came to replace the workplace as the natural environment of the child. Secondly, the conditions faced by children were also faced by many adults (see 8.1.1 where I argue that child labour should be seen more as a 'class' or 'group' labour issue than as an 'age' specific issue). Thirdly, the quote is striking in that the vision portrayed and the language used is almost identical to descriptions of child labour in poor countries today. Finally, it is worth noting the subjective nature of Alden's depiction. De Wilde (2000: 12) provides an extremely interesting analysis of the voices of working children in Belgium between 1800 and 1914 and argues that the common portrayals of the child labourer are flawed in that they present only the most terrible aspects of child labour and minors are seen as inarticulate, defenceless victims. Indeed this portrayal of the child labourer as victim persists to this day. The argument that many child labourers are active participants in forming their life paths, choosing to engage in child labour for a variety of personal and economic reasons has only recently emerged (see Ennew 1994; Boyden, Ling and Myers 1998). This is a theme to which return in Chapters 3 and 8.

It has thus been shown that the vision of 'childhood' has been in a state of constant flux[27]. The child labour phenomenon, however, was largely responsible for inspiring one of the most pervasive visions of childhood as a state of dependence, of passivity, of potential victimisation. This vision is still used to this day, although recent commentators have argued for a new 'sociology of childhood' (James and Prout 1997 [1990]; James, Jenks and Prout 1998), inspired largely by wider postmodernist and deconstructionist movements.

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[27] The argument that childhood is a modern concept is one which is extremely controversial (see debates around Aries 1960). I take the view that the various life stages of the human being have always been 'known' and that the seventeenth century cannot be seen as the birth of 'childhood' although it can perhaps be seen as the birth of the 'modern' vision of childhood.

Having briefly explored child labour within the context of the wider 'childhood' debates it is also important to consider child labour within the wider social reform debates of the post industrial revolution nineteenth century. Hendrick argues that many commentators of the time saw the plight of the child labourer as :

> symbolic of profound and often little-understood changes in British society, changes that often appeared to threaten what was held to be a natural order. In campaigning against child labour, reformers – of varying persuasions- were in effect arguing about much else besides, including the direction of industrialization and, within this context, the meaning of progress (Hendrick 1997: 40, italics in original text).

Again this quote is striking in its applicability to today's debates on child labour in poor countries. Furthermore, it helps us to understand the prominence of the issue for nineteenth century campaigners. It was very difficult for politicians and others to dispute the 'inhumane' and 'uncivilised' treatment of the wretched factory child. Child labour thus became one of the flagship issues of social campaigners[28]. Cunningham (1991) and Hendrick (1997) provide a useful analysis of the wider historical context which gave strength to the anti-child labour campaigns[29]. It is useful to merely highlight a number of them as parallels can be drawn to the situation facing present day child labour campaigns. Firstly, middle and upper classes were afraid of the impact of the growing labour movement on social order and national security. Child labour was a relatively unthreatening issue which could be taken on board with the hope of appeasing campaigners. Secondly, discussions leading to the 1802 Factory Act made clear that children were not equal participants in the drawing up of labour contracts and were therefore in a different situation to adult workers, who were seen as 'free'. Thirdly, the anti-child labour campaign coincided with the anti-slavery movement of the time. With slaves being freed in far away countries, it was hard to justify the existence of British children working in slave-like conditions.

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[28] This is interesting in the light of 4.1 which reveals that the ILO child labour programme is its flagship programme.

[29] See also chapters on child work in Walvin (1982), Hopkins (1994).

Fourthly, the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act, 1802, failed to apply to children working in the more hazardous industries. Campaigners argued that the special character of children meant that they were more vulnerable to the physical and moral dangers of labour and that their exposure to these could threaten the reproduction of society. Finally, it is important to note the threat of the growing demand for the labour of women and children to the 'natural' order in which the wages of men were to provide for the family. Instead there was a growing situation of unemployed fathers, made redundant in favour of the cheaper labour of their wives and children[30].

From 1802 onwards there was a string of parliamentary acts with the aim of reducing child labour (Hopkins 1994). The campaigners had at least succeeded in getting their issue onto the public agenda. The Berlin conference of 1890 (2.1) stated that no children under the age of 12 should work in industry, there was also a draft convention banning the night work of children under 16 developed at the 1913 Berne conference (2.1), (Stewart 1969: 3). It would therefore appear that it was inevitable that the ILO constitution should, in reflecting the key priority labour issues of the day, take the abolition of child labour to be one of its primary areas of intervention. A closer look at the debates of the time reveals that the inclusion of child labour was not so clear cut. In Phelan's personal memories (undated: 2), he describes a conversation with Professor Shotwell, an American delegate, during a series of Peace Treaty meetings:

> Shotwell outlined a memorandum he had written proposing that a provision should be inserted in the Peace Treaty prohibiting child labour. This, he argued, was the one question of social reform which had no connection with class warfare, and one that made a universal appeal to humanitarian sentiment. 'The Congress of Vienna banned the slave trade; the Congress of Paris must save children' was his eloquent conclusion. Impressive though this was, his approach seemed to me to be curiously remote from the realities of the situation (..) Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States had declared federal legislation on child labour unconstitutional, and it hardly seemed likely that the Government of the United States would take the initiative in proposing international action on the subject.

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[30] This situation is similar to one observed in Tanzania by a UNICEF study (1995) which revealed that work traditionally assigned to men is being passed on to children. See Chapter 5.1.

The quote is revealing in illustrating the motivation for some behind the inclusion of the child labour objective as well as the fact that its inclusion was by no means a fait accompli. Eventually, however, the objective was included in article 427, paragraph 6, of the Treaty of Versailles, later to become article 41 of the ILO constitution, and which stated that:

> The abolition of child labour and the imposition of such limitations on the labour of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development

was to be of 'special and urgent importance' to the High Contracting Parties[31]. The abolition of child labour was thus definitively linked to the ultimate goals of the ILO.

2.3 The evolution of the child labour objective

The early days of the ILO were characterised by 'boundless enthusiasm and explosive energy' (Morse 1969: 13) and the belief that collective action could lead to a future in which there would be universal peace and social justice[32]. No time was lost in getting started and the first session of the International Labour Conference was opened in Washington on 29 October 1919, with the employment of children on its agenda (ILO 1931: 143). It was at this first Conference that the ILO adopted its first minimum age convention[33] and since then there have been nine further sectoral minimum age conventions as well as the more comprehensive Minimum Age Convention, no. 138 (1973) and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, no. 182 (1999)[34]. It would

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[31] Although remaining legally in force Article 41 was later removed but it is unclear exactly when or why. It has been argued that the article became unnecessary with the signing of the 1944 Philadelphia Declaration of Principles in that the basis of the Declaration was article 41 and therefore superseded it. There is no mention in the Declaration, however, of child labour, except article III (4) which places the obligation on ILO to further 'provision for child welfare'.

[32] The ILO was actually established in Geneva before the League of Nations itself (Morse 1969: 13).

[33] ILO C5 Minimum Age (Industry) Convention, 1919.

[34] For a full listing see Haspels and Jankanish (2000: 87).

therefore appear that throughout the historical development of the ILO the issue of child labour, at least with regard to legislative development, has remained firmly on the agenda. Has this really been the case, however?

This section explores the evolution of the child labour objective within the wider development of the ILO. Such a historical analysis allows us to explore the extent to which the wider context has influenced the various directions which the ILO has chosen to take through time as well as to examine the patterns behind fluctuations in interest in child labour abolition, if any. Unfortunately, the texts which proved so useful to our understanding of the rise of the child labour issue until the creation of the ILO only provide data up to the First World War. There is a dearth of data on the international community and child labour from this period until the 1990s when there was an explosion in writing on child labour, amongst other child related issues[35]. In fact most of the writings on eighteenth and nineteenth century child labour were also written in the 1990s. The available data is primarily ILO material (ILO 1926; ILO 1931; ILO 1933; ILO 1969; Morse 1969; ILO 1978; ILO 1985; ILO 1989)[36].

Before embarking on this section, it is useful to briefly highlight a number of key developments in the wider child rights' movement as these provide an important back-drop for the evolution of the child labour objective within the ILO. Firstly, it is important to note that at the same time as the setting up of the ILO, an equally important organisation in the international campaign for children's rights and for child labour intervention was also established: the Save the Children Movement, dedicated to child protection and responsible for the first global charter on child rights; the Declaration of Child Rights (Ennew 2000: 44). This Declaration was later embodied in the League of Nations' 1924 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which included the right

[35] The debate surrounding the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 was largely responsible for this explosion.

[36] We focus more on the publications of the 1990s in later chapters, as unfortunately the majority of these publications provide little historical context.

not to be economically exploited (Black 1996: 21)[37]. This right is thus embedded in the first international child rights Declaration, and not just in the first International Peace Organisation, demonstrating its importance as a universal rights issue. The 1924 Declaration was later incorporated into the 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child. Ennew (2000) argues that these declarations all took the child as objects of human rights law as opposed to subjects of rights and it was not until the International Year of the Child in 1979 that the international community started to see children as full subjects of rights, influenced primarily by the Polish government's proposal for a Convention on the Rights of the Child, based on the Declaration of 1959. From 1979 to 1989, government representatives met annually to turn the Declaration into a human rights instrument which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1989. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) thus came into being and has been of extreme importance in moving the child rights' agenda forward. In the words of Maggie Black (1996: 139):

> The pursuit of rights as a rallying cry helped redefine the children's cause. It provided a framework in which to view childhood universally, across cultures and societies, across the North-South, rich-poor divides.

The CRC was thus a stimulus for the world-wide attention on children that was seen in the 1990s, with many donors, including DFID, jumping on the bandwagon to prove that they were, at least in rhetoric, taking children's rights as a serious development issue. Within this wider movement of enthusiasm for action on children's rights, the CRC also had a substantive impact on child labour movements. While the impact was far ranging, I wish to focus on two issues at this stage. Firstly, the 'child' was defined as anyone under 18, which brought a whole new meaning to 'child' labour, as until then ILO legislation had taken a differentiated approach to minimum age, offering different age limits for children working in different circumstances, as seen below. Secondly, the CRC recognised the right of children to participate in any decisions affecting them. This

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[37] The other principles were: the child's right to the means for moral, material and spiritual development; to special help when hungry, sick disabled or orphaned; to first call on relief in distress; to an upbringing that installed a sense of responsibility towards society.

provided legitimisation to a number of organisations who had already been taking a participatory approach to children and to those child labour movements, primarily in poor countries, composed of children who had been arguing that they had the right to engage in labour, such as ENDA in Senegal and MANTHOC in Peru[38].

It has thus been seen that in parallel to the child labour campaigns of the ILO there was also an active non-governmental movement advocating the rights of children[39]. This movement has played a monitoring and pressure group role as far as the ILO and child labour is concerned and has also been important in bringing the issue of child labour to the forefront of international attention. Without this outside contribution it is doubtful whether the ILO would have had as much influence and funding as it has had in recent years. It is time, however, to return to the ILO itself.

Legislation was the primary tool used by the ILO to regulate child labour. There have so far been eleven Minimum Age Conventions as well as a Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour. If we return to the origins of the ILO, we will recall that it was founded on the belief that the collective action of governments would enable the creation of greater social justice. This explains the belief in international legislation as a tool. Ratification of an ILO Convention brings with it the obligation on member states to incorporate the Convention into national law. The relatively high ratification rates of early conventions, namely the 1919 Minimum Age (Industry) Convention, the 1920 Minimum Age (Sea) Convention and the 1921 Minimum Age (Agriculture) which all set 14 as the minimum age, led commentators within the ILO to question whether they were in fact not aiming high enough:

> It is perhaps doubtful whether the success of the first three of these Conventions is a matter for unqualified satisfaction. It may merely indicate that the Conventions do not aim high enough, and that their ratification involved

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[38] It is interesting to note that the ILO's latest publication on child labour which provides a summary of relevant articles of the CRC does not refer to the participation right (Haspels and Jankanish 2000: 76-77).

[39] UNICEF, the UN child rights agency, has also played an important role, primarily in facilitating the 1990 World Summit for Children which was the largest ever meeting of heads of state and had the objective of getting universal ratification of the CRC. The non-governmental movement has, however, played a far more important role in moving the agenda forward (see Ennew 2000: 45; Black 1996: 22; Boyden 1997 [1990] : 216).

> practically no change in national custom even where that custom was quite unsatisfactory. It may indeed be asked whether the limit of 14 years of age meets the demands of modern social life. Has a child completed his physical development at the age of 14? Has it acquired all the knowledge and all the education which will enable it to live a complete human life in this modern world?[40] (ILO 1931: 143).

The author then raises two important questions, which remain unanswered to this day and are still relevant in the context of many countries. What is to be done where there is a gap between the age of completion of schooling and the age of admission to employment? The author suggests that the ILO should maybe take on the role of campaigning for a higher age for completion of schooling (an issue still being considered seventy years later!). The second question posed relates to the need to protect children working in the entertainment industry as well as the need to prohibit or regulate the employment of children 'in occupations deemed as dangerous, or unhealthy or immoral and to organise their work in such a way that they can continue their intellectual education and become capable of enjoying human life to the full'. It is in these words that we can recognise what would become, 42 years later, Article 3 of the Minimum Age Convention 1973.

The 1931 International Labour Conference took the comment regarding children working in non-industrial sectors on board. This led to the 1932 Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention[41], which maintained 14 as the minimum age. In 1936 the Minimum Age for industrial, non-industrial and employment at sea Conventions were revised, the minimum age raised to 15. During this time, however, there was the feeling that the ILO had been moving too fast and over-producing Conventions (a feeling which remains to this day). A curb was placed on the

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[40] The reference to the child as 'his' and then 'it' is interesting and revealing of the ways in which language has developed through time. Nowadays such wording would be extremely controversial, particularly in its absence of the child as being potentially female as well as male.

[41] In 1930, the Forced Labour Convention No. 29 was introduced. Whilst this was not child labour specific, the instrument is an important tool in action against forced child labour. Forced labour is defined as 'work or service which is exacted from a person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.'

development of new Conventions (Morse 1969: 14) and more importantly, the budget of the ILO was reduced. When Albert Thomas, the first Director of the ILO, died in 1932 he was replaced by Harold Butler who was left with the task of rebuilding the ILO in a time of global economic recession. One of the most significant results of his time in office was the increase in non-European membership. Butler resigned in 1938 under conditions which highlight the 'other' side of having an international civil service i.e. political appointment as opposed to appointment by merit. Butler refused to appoint an official in whom he had no confidence but whose candidature was being heavily pressed by his government (Morse 1969: 24), an issue which has unfortunately never left the ILO and which I believe has been an important factor in the organisation performing less well than it could have done. During the Second World War the ILO maintained a skeletal operation but held an important Conference in 1944 in Philadelphia which was to develop the new vision for the Organisation, under its new Director, Edward Phelan, who we will remember as being one of the key figures in the development of the Constitution in 1919 (see 2.1). The Philadelphia Declaration of 1944 marked a new era in ILO history:

> The earlier concept of protecting workers against the hazards of sickness, accident and old age was replaced by a more affirmative ideal of social security to provide a basic income, comprehensive medical care, and effective promotion of health and well-being (..) After the uncertainties of the wartime years, Philadelphia symbolised the rebirth of steadfast confidence in the mission of the ILO. It permitted a start to be made in reconstructing the ILO, which could begin again to take its place in the mainstream of world affairs (Morse 1969: 29-30).

In 1946 the first agreement to be concluded between the United Nations and a specialised agency was with the ILO, revealing the importance attributed to labour issues as well as the success of the negotiation skills of the ILO representatives. It is beyond the scope of this study to explore the origins and development of the UN but it is important to note the extent to which the ILO is an 'invisible' agency in much of the literature on the UN. Texts, such as that by Whittaker (1997), provide useful descriptions of the development of the UN but omit to mention the relevance of the ILO. Jenks (1971: 8) describes the importance of the ILO to the development of the UN system:

> Historically, the impact of the ILO on the development of the UN system was so far-reaching as to be fundamental. The UN system is, of course, the resultant of so many complex influences (...) but the record shows conclusively that the example and action of the ILO were significant and dynamic influences (...) The ILO afforded the prototype for the creation of specialised agencies in the UN system.

The ILO was thus an important element in the development of the UN system, for a number of reasons (see also Ryan 2000: 137) despite its 'invisibility' to many[42].

In 1949, the new Director-General (DG), David Morse, (the same Morse who has been providing much of our data) announced his intention to turn the ILO into an 'operational organisation', engaging in technical assistance in the 'utilization of manpower resources, including organization of employment services, vocational guidance, and technical training' (Morse 1969: 46-47). This list is a far cry from the 'we can do anything' approach currently found in the ILO but signifies an important change of direction for the ILO, from Convention drafting to direct in-country action. This also linked in with Morse's decentralisation agenda in which 'field offices' were opened on a regional level (Chapter 6). Finally, during this period a number of ex-colonies were gaining independence and it is interesting to note that many chose to join the ILO, demonstrating the perceived prestige of the organisation as well as the importance attributed to labour issues.

What of the child labour agenda during all this time? Other than the documentation relating to the introduction of the various pieces of legislation, and an international survey on the laws governing the employment of children and young people, it would appear that the ILO was relatively silent on this issue. In 1926, the ILO produced a publication entitled 'The International Labour Organisation and the Protection of Children'. What is striking about this is its similarity with the type of publication which one would expect from the ILO today, though without the glossy cover and emotive

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[42] This was also confirmed during the vast majority of conversations with people in Tanzania and in Britain. The statement that I was working with the ILO was generally met with a blank stare to which I would have to answer 'It is part of the UN' or 'It is like UNICEF'.

photographs. The document provides an analysis of the legislation introduced as well as referring to other relevant, non child-specific legislation, such as technical and vocational training and social insurance, an example of what in today's language is termed 'taking a holistic approach', often presented as a 'new' concept. Furthermore, the document refers to collaboration with other organisations, what is today termed 'partnership', another example of an old concept being repackaged as an 'innovative' approach by many development organisations, not only the ILO (see, for example, DFID 1997). The next ILO report on children and the ILO (1933) is based on a similar model, with an important difference. The document refers to 'children and young persons', a return to the language of the Preamble and an acknowledgement perhaps of the fact that it is maybe inappropriate to refer to fifteen and sixteen year old workers as 'children'[43] (see 8.1). Significant in both documents is the lack of reference to 'child labour', the emphasis instead on 'employment of children and young people'.

In fact in the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944, which laid down the aims and purpose of the ILO and which forms an Annex to the ILO Constitution, the abolition of child labour objective has been removed. Instead Article IIId refers to the solemn obligation of the ILO to further provision for child welfare and maternity protection. What does this mean? Does this revoke article 41 of the ILO Constitution (see 2.2), which refers to the 'abolition of child labour'? According to an authoritative ILO informant:

> Article 41 is still legally in force. The 1944 International Conference adopted the Philadelphia Declaration which was the programme for future action, post World War Two. It was seen as taking on the provisions of article 41 and that maybe 41 was therefore not necessary but there was no formal decision. It disappeared without formal decision. It is a strange way and it the only time this method has been used. You need to see it in historical context, in the definition of the organisation's mandate (..). We have a mandate which has been defined in general terms to include all conditions of work, including child labour. Maybe it was felt that there was no need to mention child labour as children are automatically included in the mandate. As for the issue of *suppression*, this is political and was dealt with through earlier minimum age conventions. (pers.

[43] This issue of language is a hotly debated one with many independent young workers in poor countries, refusing the labelling of 'child' labourers.

comm. Italics refer to informant speaking in French, translated as 'abolition' or more recently 'elimination').

Whatever the justification and despite the argument that the ILO 'automatically' deals with child labour issues, the fact that the abolition of child labour is not included in the Declaration reflects the lack of its prominence as an issue in the minds of the drafters, for whatever reason. This lack of interest is again reflected in the series of speeches given by David Morse, the DG of the ILO in 1969 in which there is not one single reference to child labour[44]. It is important to return to the wider world in order to further our understanding of the relative silence surrounding the child labour objective in the 1960s. This period was known as the First Development Decade, and efforts of the international community were firmly placed on 'rescuing' the developing world from its backwardness and wide-scale poverty (Black 1996: 150). Intellectual thought was more focused on developing grand, regional prescriptions than on the needs of specific groups, such as child labourers. Having said this, there was an ILO publication in 1969, entitled 'The ILO and Youth' which could indicate a lack of linkage between management and the day-to-day activities of staff (to which we return in Chapter 7). The progress of technology is evident between this document and the previous two. There is a photograph of hard-working children and 'youth' on every page and it is interesting to note that the picture of a young Asian girl harvesting the crops is still used by the ILO to this day! Again, it is interesting to note the change in language: 'Children and young persons' has been replaced with 'Youth'. The pamphlet is a response to the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child (see above), and is described as seeking 'to show some of the ways in which the International Labour Organisation, within its sphere of competency, works towards the achievement of the aims and objectives of the Rights of the Child' (ILO 1969: 5). There are a number of issues which are worthy of comment and which are useful to bear in mind when we return to the current child labour activities of the organisation. Firstly, the document takes a holistic approach highlighting its 'responsibility' to regulate and progressively limit child labour with a view to eventual

[44] There is one reference on p.67 to the Minimum Age (Industry) Convention but this is not even mentioned in relation to child labour.

abolition everywhere and to protect young workers[45]. Secondly, child labour is defined for one of the first times in a public text; described as 'work by children under 14-15 years of age'. The two basic problems of child labour are seen to be 'poverty and lack of schools', factors which are still seen as primary (see Chapters 5 and 8). There is a strong emphasis on vocational training and assistance in preparing for work and finding work.

The 1970s saw a return to the prioritisation of child labour within the ILO agenda with the introduction of a new minimum age convention as well as the International Year of the Child in 1979. The backdrop to these developments was the Second Development Decade, which became known as the 'alternatives' era (Black 1996: 150). It was a time of experimentation and of recognition of the 'basic needs' of the poorest groups in society. Child labourers clearly fell into this category and the way was thus paved for the approval by the International Labour Conference in 1973 of the Minimum Age Convention, no. 138. Convention 138 remains to this day the key international convention on child labour. Article 1 reaffirms the original ILO goal of total abolition:

> Each member for which this Convention is in force undertakes to pursue a national policy designed to ensure the effective abolition of child labour and to raise progressively the minimum age for admission to employment or work to a level consistent with the fullest physical and mental development of young persons.

The question which arises, however, and which has been subject to misinterpretation, by those within and outside the organisation, is what is actually meant by the 'abolition of child labour'. Recent commentators see this as meaning that no child under the age of 18 must labour. But this is because they are ignoring the historical context of the legislation as well as its actual wording and are focusing on the CRC definition of child as under 18 (see above). 18 is set as an age limit in Article 3, which refers to work that 'is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons'. Where the health, safety and morals of the young person are protected and where they have received relevant instruction or vocational training, they may engage in such activities from the age of 16.

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[45] Protection is a term which has almost disappeared in the current discourses of the ILO. The emphasis is now on 'progressive elimination of child labour'. See Convention 182 and 6.1.

In all other cases, the minimum age standard is set at not less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling and not less than the age of 15, or 14[46] in countries 'whose economy or educational facilities are insufficiently developed (Article 2). Children of 12 in the latter case or 13 can engage in light work which is not 'likely to be harmful to their health or development' or which does not 'prejudice their attendance at school, their participation in vocational orientation or training programmes' (article 7). 'Child' labour is thus seen as applying to under 14 or 15 year olds, except in specific conditions. The next paragraph shows that this was not an arbitrary age laid down by the ILO but was the accepted UN definition of 'child' at this particular time. It is useful to mention that 138 applies to all forms of economic activity, not just wage employment – a recognition that child labour could exist in other spheres, although work in education institutions (8.1.2.1) and family farm work for local consumption are exempt (Article 5).

In 1978, the ILO prepared a policy framework for the 1979 International Year of the Child (IYC). The document was prepared by the ILO IYC focal point, based in the Office for Women Workers' Questions, illustrating the lack of emphasis placed on the issue, which it would appear was seen as an 'add-on' to the issue of women's work rather than as a labour issue in its own right. In the document there is an interesting reference to definition of 'child' as under 14 or 15 (see above):

> The UN Secretary-General's report to ECOSOC on IYC was to be children and not children and youth. Though there is no explicit reference to the age of children in that report, or in the resolution, the Preparatory Committee to ACC (May 1976) states that 'the Year should focus on children from birth to about age 14 or 15. (ILO 1978: 1, underlining in original text).

The rest of the text refers to ILO activities and policy orientation, which focused on *prohibition* of child labour, *protection* of children at work, *development* of children for work, *attacking* the basic causes of child labour and *protection* of working mothers.

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[46] 14 was the age of the original 1919 convention on minimum age in industry. It would thus appear that 138 was allowing countries to 'catch up', so to speak.

In 1981, a general survey by the ILO committee of experts on the application of Minimum Age Convention 138 was presented to the International Labour Conference. The report was extremely comprehensive, exploring the various elements of the Convention and the extent to which these had been applied by Member States. It concludes that:

> It will be apparent that only a few States have achieved anything approaching full compliance with all the detailed requirements of the Convention and the provisions of the Recommendation. In most cases this is understandable (..) The Committee is struck, however, with the extent to which the general principle of a minimum age for admission to employment or work has been recognised. There is not a single State among all those which have provided information which has not set some standards in this field (ILO 1981: 162).

This provides, in the usual language of international diplomacy, an optimistic picture. It is important to note, however, that until recently Convention 138 was the least ratified of the core Conventions[47]. Furthermore, the fact that each country had some form of legislation cannot be attributed to 138, except perhaps in a minority of cases. 138 was ratified 54 years after the first minimum age convention and even longer after some countries had passed their own national legislation. For example, the first British piece of legislation was passed in 1802 (2.2) and in Tanzania the Employment of Women and Young Persons law was passed in 1940 (3.1 below)[48]. Moreover, the text does not indicate how many States did not provide information and how serious the issue of child labour is in such countries[49].

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[47] There has been a dramatic leap in the number of ratifications since 1999 which could be due to the high profile of the C182 ratification campaign, which also seeks to encourage states to ratify 138, as well as the inclusion of child labour abolition in the Declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work by the International Labour Conference in 1998.

[48] It is important not to forget that the majority of the activities considered to be 'labour' and which have been regulated on were introduced to many colonies by those European powers that were responsible for the setting up of the ILO and for developing labour legislation. We will return to this in 3.1 and 5.

[49] Under the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted in 1998 all countries who have not ratified core conventions, which include 138 and 182, must make annual reports on progress towards ratification.

By 1982, responsibility for child labour had been transferred to the Conditions of Work and Welfare Facilities branch (CONDIT) of the wider department TRAVAIL, demonstrating the recognition of child labour as a labour issue in its own right, at least with regard to the administrative structure of the organisation. The task was assigned to Assefa Bequele, who was to become the primary driving force of the ILO child labour agenda. At this time, child labour was not seen as an important issue:

> It was a subject that no-one thought was important. Someone even said to me 'child labour is not a sexy subject'. There was considerable scepticism, sometimes even opposition (Senior ILO official, pers. comm.).

According to my informant, opposition was based on three arguments:

> Firstly, there was the intellectual argument that the approach was wrong as child labour was a poverty based issue and the problem should be tackled through poverty eradication. The second argument was of a qualitative nature in that some argued that child labour was not a suitably important issue throughout the world in terms of numbers of children. The third area of opposition was based on practical grounds centring on what could be done about the problem (Senior ILO official, pers. comm.).

What stands out here to anyone accustomed to the child labour debate is that these three arguments have yet to be resolved. It is also important to note that this opposition was expressed at a time of world-wide economic recession and growing poverty for many- the 1980s were known as the 'lost decade of development' (see Black 1996: 149) - and it is highly likely that the child labour agenda was initially lost in the multitude of requests for ILO resources.

In 1983, however, members of the ILO were forced to consider child labour as an important issue- it was the theme of the 1983 Director-General report to the International Labour Conference, which for the first time took child labour as its key

issue[50]. The report provides a situation analysis as well as pointing out future directions for work and commenting that:

> In spite of growing awareness of the prevalence and harmful effects of child labour and the vast literature on the subject, policy and programme-oriented research remains surprisingly meagre (ILO 1983 : 34).

This statement was to mark a new direction in ILO action, from the strictly legalistic approach of the past to a more policy and action oriented programme.

Further to this report the ILO found itself taking the innovative step of changing its strategy from the strictly legalistic approach of the pre-1980s to one of trying to engage in advocacy and policy development through more systematic research into the realities of child labour. A number of important ILO documents were produced at this time, which were to form the basis of policy and programme development in the 1990s (such as ILO 1985, Bequele and Boyden 1988, Rodgers and Standing 1981). According to my informant there were three phases in the development of ILO child labour intervention:

> There were three phases, a first phase took us well up to the early 1980s, late 1970s and which was characterised by standard-setting, international labour standards, minimum age conventions. The second phase which was really in the 1980s was concerned with documenting the problem and policy responses. Work up to the mid-1980s was primarily documentation, rather than the pure legislative approach, we tried to go further and engage in advocacy and policy development, the only way to do this was by documenting the problem, the extent, the magnitude, what had already been tried, what had had a degree of success. This is where some of us came in. There was a major research programme on problems and policies. In the third phase, work was policy and programme development. This was the type of work, as of the late 80s and early 90s. Now this does not mean that there is such a clear cut date of starting, there was always an overlap (Senior ILO official, pers. comm.)

In the early 1990s, the Director-General made child labour one of the three inter-departmental projects of the 1992-1993 biennium budget[51]. The Inter-Departmental

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[50] Director General reports are drafted by the responsible department although are officially written by the Director General himself.

project on child labour (INTERDEP) was established and the campaign against child labour was thus pushed to the core of the ILO's mission[52]. The INTERDEP took a two prong approach:

> First, was to promote a world-wide movement against child labour. Well into the early 90s in many parts of the developing world there was considerable apathy and even downright hostility. One of the first things was to give attention to the issue and to put it onto the national and international agenda. And so we felt that we should adopt a very supportive and even subversive approach, in that we needed to create a movement which would put pressure on national and international governments where political will was lacking and support were political will existed. The second strategy we tried to follow was to provide direct support to governments in policy formulation and programme development. As we were the only organisation working on this at the time, there were two fortuitous events - the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which came into force in 1990 and which gave momentum to world-wide concern for children. Secondly by then the ILO had started to give visibility to the problem and the German government came up with the grant of around $10 million for child labour (Senior ILO official, pers. comm.).

This substantial grant of DM 50, 000, 000 from the German government, to be used on child labour abolition, led to the expansion of ILO child labour activities and to the creation in its own right of the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) in 1992[53]. Germany had in fact expressed interest in funding child labour activities in September 1990, 'soon after the decision of the Director- General of the ILO to make the elimination of child labour a major theme of integrated and concentrated Office-wide action' (ILO 1991: 1), demonstrating the time it takes for projects to get set up (Chapter 7). IPEC was to provide technical assistance to countries signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the ILO. It has now become one of the ILO's flagship programmes, so successful in attracting donor money that it has the

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[51] The other two were Gender and Structural Adjustment.

[52] It is useful to remember that Morse was advocating direct action in 1949, so this third phase of direct action seems to be out of step with the rest of the developments in ILO action, probably because of the lack of prioritisation given to it until the CRC gave the necessary push.

[53] The distinction between INTERDEP and IPEC can be quite confusing so it is important to briefly highlight it. INTERDEP was a regular budget programme of the biennium and provided the internal basis for IPEC, which was an extra-budgetary programme.

largest budget of any ILO programme (see 4.1). In terms of regular budget IPEC's allocation for 2000-01 is only around $7 million, including Programme Support Income[54], whereas the technical co-operation allocations budget, which includes core funding (donor money which can be spent as IPEC chooses) and project funding (donor money allocated for a specific project), is $77.5 million (as of December 2000), which is around one fifth of total ILO extra budgetary technical co-operation[55]. In 1999, IPEC became the InFocus Programme on Child Labour: IPEC. The new programme incorporates all ILO child labour activities (although the workers and employers' departments, ACTEMP and ACTRAV, continue to have their own small activities) and 49 countries have now signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with the ILO to implement a child labour elimination programme. The ILO has thus maintained its 1919 commitment to child welfare and abolition of child labour and has played a fundamental role in transforming the strictly legal commitment of member states to various conventions to a worldwide movement encompassing NGOs, workers and employers organisations, the media, businesses, consumers and, to a much lesser extent, children's organisations[56]. Child labour has not, however, been abolished. On the contrary, with the context of growing poverty and inequality for many, the number of children labouring has grown.

2.4 Chapter Conclusions

A historical exploration of the factors leading to the creation of the ILO and to the inclusion of the abolition of child labour as a primary area of intervention has thus

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[54] This is the 13% added to project costs by the ILO to cover general service staff. These technical aspects of IPEC will be expanded on in Chapter 4.

[55] ILO 1999 Programme and Budget Proposals for 2000-01, p.52. The figures given of $7 and $77 million were obtained from the IPEC finance officer in December 2000. It is important to note that the figures are constantly changing as more donor funds come in. The results of the US election campaign are also significant as there is concern that the new government may reduce the allocation of US funds which are central to IPEC activities.

[56] Clearly the climate for a child labour movement was also ripe, especially with the passing of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which brought a whole new dimension to the thinking on children's rights.

revealed several factors relevant to our understanding of current day child labour policy and programming.

Firstly, the process leading to the setting up of the ILO was a lengthy one, inspired by many different individuals with different motivations; from philanthropic factory bosses, parliamentary reformers and scholars to trade unionists and civil servants. This is revealing of the various conflicts of interest which persist in the Organisation today (Chapter 3) as well as of the importance of individual agency in moving agendas forward, a theme to which we return throughout this thesis, notably in Chapters 7 and 9.

Secondly, the vision of childhood as a time of innocence, passivity and potential victimisation, which inspired early child labour campaigners, persists to this day despite the growth in movements led by and for child labourers, primarily in developing countries, who argue that this is not *their* reality and therefore that the solutions of industrialised nations may not be the most adequate solutions for them (see 2.3). This issue is considered in detail in the following chapter.

Thirdly, the historical analysis of the child labour agenda within the ILO has allowed us to briefly explore the wider context which has influenced the various directions taken by the ILO. It has been seen that child labour has fluctuated in importance through time. Extremely important to the founders of the Constitution, the issue was lost in the wider debates that followed World War Two. The advent of the CRC led to a prioritisation of children's issues within the wider 'development' agenda of both developed and developing countries. Within this agenda of children's rights, child labour came through as one of the primary issues, not just for the ILO but for other agencies such as DFID. It is this context which provides some of the backdrop for the ethnography presented in this thesis.

In the following chapters, we explore the development of IPEC child labour policy and programming in greater detail, from the points of view of the policy makers, of staff in HQ and in the field, and some of the potential 'recipients' and 'partners'.

3. Voices of the Formal Policy Makers[57]

> ... under colonial rule and the more recent influence of the United Nations and international legislation of children's rights, the images of childhood favoured in the industrial North have been exported to the South (Boyden 1997 [1990]: 202)

Recent years have seen an explosion in theorising on the child. The most influential body of thought has come from a social constructionist perspective, notably as a result of James and Prout's (1990) ground-breaking collection of essays. In one of these essays, the notion of a 'Northern' construction of childhood was proposed (Boyden 1990). This construction of childhood, it has been argued, has been exported globally and imposed in countries with radically different cultural contexts through international organisations, such as the ILO. This statement has since been echoed or welcomed by many child labour commentators (such as Nieuwenhuys 1994 and 1996[58]; White 1994 and 1996) and has been used to explain the apparent failures of international initiatives to improve the lives of children labouring in poverty situations. Before embarking on fieldwork, I was seduced by this argument as it offered a seemingly obvious explanation to the failures of so many child labour initiatives. In fact, my research proposal title was:

[57] I use the term 'formal' policy makers to refer to those who are in formal positions of power to influence and develop the policy making process i.e. the tripartite partners (government, trade unions and employers). This term also implicitly acknowledges the existence of informal policy makers such as the staff described in Chapters 4 and 6 and the various pressure groups capable of informally influencing policy development.

[58] Nieuwenhuys refers to studies by the ILO and others: 'Typical of these publications is a moral preoccupation with abolition through legislation and a zealous belief in the desirability of extending Western childhood ideals to poor families worldwide' (1996: 241).

'Cultural constructions of child work: A research proposal to explore the ways in which western notions of childhood are applied by the International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour in the cultural context of Tanzania' (Groves 1999), reflecting the assumption that western or 'Northern' notions of childhood *were* being applied.

Field work revealed, however, that whilst such a perspective has been useful in opening up the child labour debate and in the development of a 'participatory approach' to child labour initiatives, it does not address the real reasons for failure to improve the lives of working children, which are further explored in Chapter 7, and, more seriously, is in fact based on incomplete analysis of the work of international organisations, such as the ILO. The result is to deny the agency of the many activists in non-'Northern' countries who have played a fundamental role in developing the ILO's child labour policy and practice. I argue in this thesis that the 'Northern construction of childhood' is too simplistic an explanation for the failures of the Organisation. This chapter examines Boyden's argument in detail and then brings in the ILO's particular construction(s) of child labour. I explore who it is in the ILO who is responsible for developing such constructions i.e. the formal decision-makers: the employers', trade unions and governments. To what extent are these voices 'Northern' or based on a 'Northern' construction of childhood? Finally, I will take the recent adoption of the ILO's latest child labour Convention, No. 182, to illustrate the complexity of the decision-making process and the consequent difficulty of imposing any one pre-determined construction of childhood.

3.1 A 'Northern' construction of childhood?

Let us briefly return to Boyden's argument in order to gain a clearer idea of what she was really saying:

> The major tenet of contemporary rights and welfare thinking is that regulation of child life should give priority to making childhood a carefree, safe, secure and happy phase of human existence (..) To this end, child life has been characterised by a range of appropriate contexts, experiences, relationships and behaviours (..) Significantly the norms and values upon which this ideal of a safe, happy and

> protected childhood are built are culturally and historically bound to the social preoccupations and priorities of the capitalist countries of Europe and the United States (1997 [1990]: 191-192).

Let us take this quote in sections. First is the argument that contemporary rights and welfare thinking prioritises the making of childhood as a carefree and secure phase of the life cycle[59]. This is based on Piaget's (1972) theory that child development is a unitary process, marked by a series of stages through which the child develops from immature child to mature adult. Such a theory legitimates the idea that childhood is a natural and universal phase of the life cycle and that if children are to mature correctly they must follow the linear pattern of growth, 'school' being the appropriate context for development. Those who do not follow the set path, such as child labourers, are seen as at risk and in need of protection. This recognition has led to a proliferation of agencies aiming to 'protect' children; 'the anxiety about young people in the present day is such that the political and social condition of whole societies is now gauged by the status of their children' (Ibid.: 191. See also Jenks 1996: 67). In the next part of the quote we see that Boyden is criticising the vision because it has led to the creation of a series of norms, a 'range of appropriate contexts, experiences, relationships and behaviours' of what a 'happy and protected childhood' should consist of. This 'normalised' childhood has led to the dichotomisation of childhoods – on the one hand there is the innocent, victimised child in need of protection and on the other there is the 'unsocialized or anti-social child, the deviant or trouble maker' (Ibid.: 194). The latter is the child who does not fit into the normalised childhood category and who needs to be controlled. Boyden

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[59] Despite the global acceptance of such a theory of child development, anthropological studies of children have demonstrated that childhood is neither a universal nor an absolute category; its definition varies through time and culture and according to class, gender, ethnicity and age (Mead 1928; Stainton-Rogers and Stainton-Rogers 1992; Jenks 1996; Nieuwenhuys 1994; Boyden *et al.* 1998). Childhood is now seen as a social construct which is constituted in particular socially located forms of discourse (Jenks 1996: 29). The construction of the child is therefore not neutral but moral and political (ibid.: 69), which has important implications for universalised child rights legislation, such as ILO conventions, and means that the use of the term must primarily be assessed within a local context. The ILO tries to do this through the use of differentiated age limits as well as allowing governments to define 'worst forms' of child labour, see 3.4. White (1999: 141) argues that C.182 is in fact a compromise measure between the need for universalised legislation and the importance of relativism: 'It appears therefore to represent an attempt to incorporate relativist principles in a global standard-setting exercise, and therefore to have side-stepped the issue of cultural relativism.'

thus concludes that 'adult protectiveness towards children, then, is tempered by the perceived need for control' (Ibid.: 194), a point with which White (1994: 849) concurs when he points out that although children are not the only group vulnerable to exploitation in the labour market they are the only structurally disadvantaged group whose exploitation is addressed by attempts to remove them from the labour market (see 8.1.2.2). This reveals that the chief concern is the fact that child labourers are 'children' as opposed to exploited and vulnerable 'labourers'.

A Foucauldian (1977) analysis informs us that this need for control is expressed in the development of a number of 'concerted strategies for control', such as the division of childhood spaces (school is seen as the 'natural' place for the child, whereas the street or mining site is not) and the 'control of activity' (times of sleep, work, school are strictly defined for most 'normalised' children) and 'instruments of discipline', such as the 'means of correct training', through hierarchical observation involving a complex chain of authority and training and 'normalising judgement' i.e. that which transgresses the disciplinary 'norm' is defined not only as bad but as abnormal. Such an analysis could be used to argue that child labourers are deviant in that they are not in their 'normal' space i.e. school/home, many control their own activities in that they are self-employed and are outside of the means of correct training. Moves by organisations, such as the ILO, to 'help' or 'protect' them could thus instead be seen as means of 'controlling' child labourers (see Rose 1990: 121). I would not agree with this fully but it is a useful perspective for understanding the power relations between child labourers and those institutions developed to 'protect' them. Boyden's argument is thus useful in leading us to a greater understanding of the power relations of adult-developed institutions over the children they aim to 'protect'[60].

The second section of the paragraph quoted is the one which I would like to consider further in this chapter. It is suggested that these norms of childhood as 'safe, happy and protected'[61] are built on 'the social preoccupations and priorities of the capitalist

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[60] This issue of power relations will be discussed further in Chapters 1, 6 and 7.

[61] 'Safe, happy and protected' are terms which are clearly subject to different interpretations by different people in different contexts but for these purposes are to be seen in terms of the construction of childhood

countries of Europe and the United States' and are then, she argues later in her paper, exported and imposed in countries with different cultural contexts. In Chapter 2, we saw that the child labour agenda, embodied in the ILO, did indeed come from the experiences of Northern Europe and to a lesser extent the United States. Does this mean, however, that that these norms are not prevalent in other countries?[62] In order to consider the question further, it is useful to deconstruct Boyden's 'social preoccupations and priorities' into two categories: those of individual nationals of a country and those of the institutions which are set up to reflect the prevailing norms within the country. With regard to the first category, fieldwork revealed that many informants in Tanzania expressed very similar ideals of childhood as a time that should ideally be safe, happy and protected, as will be discussed further in Chapter 8 where their voices are expressed in full. When presented with the idea that this vision was 'Northern', imposed into the Tanzanian context, the response was one of laughter and disbelief that we 'Northerners' could be so arrogant as to believe this. Time and time again, the opinion that in an ideal world children should not be 200 metres underground but at school[63] or somewhere else such as vocational training was expressed, not just by parents, but by teachers, politicians, mining children[64] (nyoka in Swahili) and non-mining children and others:

> Working in the mines is very difficult for children. It is not good for us. I do not think that children should work in the mines. I must because I have my problems, for me it is good because I can get money (nyoka, pers. comm.).

> I will not let my son go to the mines. It is bad there and dangerous. I want him to go to school. He will not go to the mines (parent, pers. comm.).

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which sees children as needing to be protected from the dangers of mining work. 'Happy' is harder to define but as will be seen in Chapter 8, the majority of *nyoka* informants did not feel 'happy' to be working in the mines but felt that they had to engage in the work because of the lack of alternatives.

[62] It is important to reiterate at this point that my research interest is specifically focused on the worst forms of child labour, particularly mining, and I can not therefore claim to comment on other, less hazardous and perhaps more controversial forms, such as family based agriculture, for example.

[63] See Serpell (1993) for a revealing account of the often dysfunctional impact of the institutionalisation of Western style schooling into the African context, not only for the young people who enrol in it but also for the wider community.

[64] As will be seen in Chapter 8, 71% of *nyokas* interviewed argued that children should not be working in the mines.

With regard to the second category, institutionalised norms, the first piece of child labour legislation, the Employment of Women and Young Persons Ordinance, was passed in Tanzania in 1940 while the country was a British Protectorate (2.3). It could therefore be argued that the legal norm that children needed to be protected from certain forms of employment was introduced by the British. At this point, however, it is important to point out that the type of labour from which children were prohibited - industrial undertakings (Section 91)- was the very one introduced by the 'Northern' colonising countries of Germany and Britain (see 5.1.2 and 5.1.3) and was also the one from which children were protected by legislation in Britain since the first 1808 Factory Act and internationally by the 1919 ILO Minimum Age (Industry) Convention. 1940 was thus extremely late in the day for the British to introduce child labour legislation in Tanzania, having signed up to the principles of the ILO, as expressed in the Preamble to the Constitution, in 1919. I would suggest that there was considerable pressure at home for the British Government to do so, and that the 1940 Ordinance was a compromise measure (see Shivji 1985). I say compromise as the vast majority of children in Tanzania were (and still are) employed in the agricultural, and not the industrial, sector. The interests of the colonial administration were, however, firmly rooted in the agricultural sector and it has been suggested by Tanzanian academics that the British Government neglected to introduce protective or restrictive legislation in this sector, the primary employer of child labour, to protect its own interests (Rwegoshora, Mbeo and Amma 1997: 32, see also Nieuwenhuys 1996: 240). Protecting children from work was thus not a priority for the colonial government although the British government had been legislating on child labour in Britain for over a century (see Chapter 2). The 'social preoccupations and priorities' of Britain with regard to child labour did not therefore extend to its colonies.

On gaining independence, the Tanzanian President, President Nyerere, made his 'social preoccupations and priorities' towards children very clear: everyone who was able to work must do so with the exception of small children (Nyerere 1968a: 15). There is no definition of 'small children' but it would appear that Nyerere expected all older children to work. This is exemplified in his vehement critique of the tendency for school children not to contribute to household work (Nyerere 1968a: 49). Nyerere was clear, however, that all workers must receive a just return for their labour and that no-one has

the right to exploit others (Nyerere 1968a: 15). Children were thus to be protected from exploitation and small children were not to engage in work. This ideal seems much the same as those of Northern governments as described by Boyden. Since Nyerere's statements the Tanzanian government has repeatedly affirmed its belief in the ideal of a safe, happy and protected childhood, ratifying a number of ILO child labour conventions, including 138, and the UN CRC. During field work, I sat through a number of Government, and other, meetings on the ratification of 182 and it was clear that many participants held strong personal beliefs in the rights of children to be protected and safe. With regard to the second part of Boyden's quote, I would therefore have to add that the ideal of 'a safe, happy and protected childhood' builds not only on the 'social preoccupations and priorities of the capitalist countries of Europe and the United States' but also on those of other countries, such as Tanzania. This will be illustrated further below.

One important consequence of the values and norms discussed above has been the increase in welfare protection and legal regulation, at both national and international levels. While this led to an increase in Foucauldian style regulation and control it had the positive effect of ensuring that children in Britain, for example, can access schooling and basic social services. While these clearly can be improved, there is no doubt that what exists is an improvement on the situation facing children at the beginning of the industrial revolution, as described in Chapter 2.2. In Tanzania, although it has been shown that there are similar ideals and values at an institutional level as well as on an individual level, the development of normalising structures (such as free education and health care, recreation facilities and family support services) has been slower for a number of historical and other reasons and it is unlikely that the government will be able to 'generate in the near future the social surplus that the maintenance of these institutions requires' (Nieuwenhuys 1996: 247).

It is worth noting, perhaps, that Boyden herself seems to have moved away from her 'Northern' construction argument, adopting the term 'global construction' in the 1997 postscript to her 1990 paper (p. 222). Her paper remains extremely influential, however, and her coining of the term 'Northern construction' has taken on a life of its own and what started out as a social constructivist alternative to normalising theory has, I suggest,

become normative in itself, with generations of students[65] and others continuing to refer to the imposition of a 'Northern construction of childhood' on to Southern countries[66]. My data suggests that it is important to avoid the dichotomization of North-South in terms of constructions of childhood. The fallacies of referring to a 'Northern' or a 'Western' set of values are also pointed out by Amartya Sen, amongst others, in his inspirational book *Development as Freedom* (1999), in which he argues that:

> Our understanding of the presence of diversity tends to be somewhat undermined by constant bombardment with oversimple generalizations about "Western civilisation", "Asian values", "African cultures" and so on. Many of these readings of history and civilisation are not only intellectually shallow, they also add to the divisiveness of the world in which we live (1999: 247).

In terms of childhood, it would therefore perhaps be more appropriate to refer to 'dominant' constructions, reflecting the fact that there are particular groups of people who have similar ideals, be they from the North or South. For example, most of my informants in Tanzania, including the children themselves, felt that children should not be working in the mines, i.e., in a 'worst form of child labour' (see Chapter 8). In terms of worst forms of child labour therefore they shared a similar and, I would argue, 'dominant' construction of childhood with many people in the 'North'.

Other forms of child labour remain more controversial, however, and again I suggest that the 'North-South' dichotomy is unhelpful. The conflict between the constructions of childhood of child labour activists and those of commercial interests is illustrative. A business person in the South may share similar business values with a colleague in the North, with both arguing that grass-roots activists campaigning on child-labour issues in England or Tanzania are hindering economic growth. Grass-roots activists, in turn may share similar values which clash with those of the business people. While the cultures of

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[65] In a recent child-focused conference, for example, two student papers referred to the 'Northern construction' without even questioning its validity (Children in Their Places 2001).

[66] It is important here to consider this within the context of the academy itself: the hierarchical and exclusive nature of the institution leads to the reification of particular perspectives, which then become dogma and, I would suggest, are often applied to contexts far beyond that intentioned by the original author.

each may be very different, particular values, I suggest, may be very similar. Recognising this takes us away from the distraction provided by entering into a 'North-South' debate and towards the very real issue of competing interests. We are currently in a situation where two dominant images are being sent out to children labouring in poor countries. On the one hand, children are being told that they should not have to work under particular circumstances deemed harmful (Chapter 2.3) and on the other, they are being exposed to the global, read American, capitalist dream. To obtain the dream they must work, no matter what the circumstances.

This is supported by White (1996: 830-831) who argues that :

> All over the world, media and peer pressures make it increasingly important for children not just to have sufficient food and clothing, time for recreation etc. but to have certain (non-traditional) kinds of clothes, ornaments and other possessions, to consume certain kinds of foods and beverages, and to engage n certain kinds of recreational activity which are considered to be the attributes for 'proper' people. The majority of the world's children, of course, do not have access to all these things, but that does not mean that they are not aware of them nor that they are free of the need for cash to buy them (..) We can thus speak of a new kind of child labour: alongside the cases that are better known and publicized - of children forced into labour by parents or unscrupulous labour recruiters- there are many children, all over the world who simply decide that they need to earn money. (italics in original text).

It has been all too easy to forget or underestimate the power of globalisation forces which have ensured that a large number of the world's population have access to the vision of childhood prioritised by global and capitalist consumer culture, television, radio, advertising, newspapers etc.[67] Fieldwork revealed that Masai youths would walk many miles from Masai villages to come to Mirerani to watch television, mainly African-American sitcoms or African-American pop videos. Many would even swop their traditional dress for combat trousers and trainers whilst in the township. Other children came to the mines in order to get cash to buy themselves 'nice things', these being determined by fashion, i.e., by what cool young people on Coca-Cola billboards

[67] For a fascinating account of the globalisation of 'brands' and marketing, see Klein (2000).

scattered throughout the area were wearing. On the basis of my data, I would therefore argue that these children were subject to forces far stronger than that of the ILO or any other development or human rights agency, whose impact is in fact negligible in the context of the predominantly US commercial interests, which are currently determining the global order[68]. If any construction of childhood is thus being imposed on children in Tanzania and throughout the world, therefore, it would have to be that of the commercial interests of organisations such as Coca-Cola.

In the remainder of this thesis, I provide empirical evidence against the notion that the ILO is exporting and imposing a 'Northern' construction of childhood. As Sen argues such a notion is not only 'shallow' but can also add to the 'divisiveness of the world in which we live' as it sets 'Northern' constructions of childhood and child labour apart from those of non-Northerners. Furthermore, such an approach also denies agency to the many non-Northerners who are strong campaigners in the fight against child labour and who are fully supportive of the ILO approach. In the next section I therefore propose to explore the ILO's 'construction' of the 'child labourer'.

3.2 Who is 'the child labourer' for the ILO?

In the previous chapter it was shown that the development of international labour regulation, including child labour intervention, was largely based on the historical experience of Northern Europe. Does this therefore mean that 'the child labourer' subject to such regulation is based on a construction of childhood that is purely 'Northern'? To answer this, we must explore whether the ILO's vision of 'the child labourer', as a target of intervention, has remained constant since 1919 and secondly (3.3), whether those

68 At this point it is useful to place the 'power' of the ILO and other such agencies into perspective: According to Ryan (2000) the total UN budget is equivalent to the amount spent on alcohol consumption by British people in 15 weeks and the total staff employed by the UN is one third of McDonald's total staff. The commercial interests of the private sector are thus far more powerful and influential than any construction of childhood being imposed by the likes of the ILO. As far will explored further in Chapter 7, even within the aid hierarchy the ILO falls quite low in terms of power and influence.

responsible for developing this vision have been 'Northern' or at least basing themselves on a 'Northern' vision of childhood.

In Chapter 2 we explored the development in thinking on child labour within the ILO but let us briefly return to the various pieces of legislation which have laid down the ILO's definitions of 'child labour'. Such an analysis reveals that there is not one ILO 'child labourer' but many. The child labour objective of the ILO constitution, as laid down in article 41, advocates:

> The abolition of child labour and the imposition of such limitations on the labour of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development.

There is no definition here of who exactly 'the child labourer' is but one interpretation would be that child labourers are children whose labour prevents them from continuing with their education and hinders their proper physical development. The first pieces of child labour legislation, Minimum Age Conventions 5, 7 and 10, set the minimum age of admission to industrial, sea and agricultural labour at 14. Minimum Age Convention 15 banned all those under 18 from working as trimmers and stokers. The definition of 'child' thus depended on the type of labour. In the cases of industry, sea and agriculture 'the child labourer' was defined as under 14 years of age and yet in what was considered to be the more dangerous activity of stoking and trimming the 'child labourer' was under 18. In 1932, another labour activity was added to the list with Convention 33 on non-industrial employment which set 14 as the minimum age limit, although children of 12-13 years could engage in 'light work', and 18 as the limit for working more than twelve consecutive hours at night. In 1936 and 1937, the first three Conventions and Convention 33 were revised and the minimum age was brought up to 15, although children could still engage in light, non-industrial work from the ages of 12-13 (see 2.3 for factors leading to these changes). 'The child labourer' was thus defined according to the labour activity in which he or she engaged and the minimum age for each activity was one which changed over time. In 1969, an ILO publication specifically defined 'child labour' for the first time as 'work by children under 14-15 years of age' (ILO 1969: 5). This is interesting, as it does not refer to the higher age limit of 18 set down by Convention 15 for stokers and trimmers.

In 1973, a new piece of legislation was introduced which was to supersede all previous documents. Minimum Age Convention 138 set out the basis for a world-wide definition of child labour. The document offers a flexible age limit, which may differ depending on the kind of work, whether it is a developing or industrial country and on the age of completion of primary education (see Chapter 2.3). The basic rule, however, is 12 (poorer countries)-13 for light work, 18 for work which is particularly harmful and 14 (poorer countries)-15 for all other work.

This highlights one of the primary problems which arises when developing international Conventions to be applied on a 'universal' basis - how to make them flexible enough to meet the needs of all member states, whatever their level of social and economic development. Article 19 (3) of the ILO Constitution provides that:

> In framing any Convention or Recommendation of general application the Conference shall have due regard to those countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organisation, or other special circumstances make the industrial conditions substantially different and shall suggest the modifications, if any, which it considers may be required to meet the case of such countries.

The latest convention, No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999, has helped to identify the 'child labourer' further, at least as far as the worst forms of child labour are concerned. C. 182 takes the CRC age limit of 18 in its definition of 'child'[69] (article 2) and clearly states three situations considered to be 'worst': slavery and similar practices; prostitution and involvement in pornography; and other 'illicit activities'. There is a return to C. 138[70], however, in article 3(d) which once more takes a qualitative approach to definition stating that other worst forms comprise 'work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of

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[69] C 138 also uses 18 as the age limit for engagement in work or employment which is likely to jeopardise the health, safety or morals of children (article 3).

[70] As well as to article 32 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that under 18s must be protected from 'economic exploitation and from any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development'.

children'. It is this subjective and qualitative element which has been most criticised by those arguing that the common interpretation of this will be taken from a Northern constructionist stance. This argument, however, is less viable in the light of article 4, which states that the activities to be included in 3(d) are to be determined by the national laws/ regulations of the competent national authority after consultation with employers' and workers' groups[71].

It has thus been seen that according to ILO legislation, there is not one but many 'child labourers'. The profile of the child labourer is thus determined by type of labour activity, which in turn determines age limits, and the economic and educational status of the country in which he or she is labouring. In other words, not all work done by children is to be considered child labour and certain forms of work may be acceptable for children at particular ages. The new Director-General of the ILO, Juan Somavia, confirms this in the current ILO 'brochure':

> Child labour is not jobs for kids. It is neither valuable work experience not apprenticeship combined with schooling that enhances a child's present and future prospects. Child labour- in its worst forms- is abuse of power. It is adults exploiting the young, naive, innocent, weak, vulnerable and insecure for personal profit (ILO undated: 3)[72].

For a further analysis of Boyden's idea of the ILO's child labourer let us return to her text (1997 [1990]: 201) in which she recognises that the ILO has changed its stance through time:

> Whereas at one time the International Labour Office advocated total abolition of child labour, the overwhelming impact of poverty in the South has forced it to adopt a compromise in recent years. The present aim, therefore, is to encourage policies that prohibit child labour in occupations damaging to health and development and to regulate child labour in non-hazardous occupations (Bequele and Boyden, 1988). A further distinction is made by the International Labour

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[71] White (1999: 141) argues that this article provides the compromise between the need for universal standard setting and the cultural relativist arguments expressed by many national states and academics.

[72] While I would have to add that it is not just adults exploiting children for personal profit, as many children engage in worst forms of work on a free-lance basis (see Chapter 8), I would also have to argue that it is adults who have created the system whereby children are having to engage in such work.

> Office between child work and formal labour or employment, on the grounds that while the latter is often highly exploitative, the former may not be harmful to children and may even be beneficial. The only real concern of labour policy is to regulate the waged or semi-waged occupations of children; non- remunerated labour, self-employment and so-called 'informal' activities are considered to fall within the confines of social welfare intervention.

The analysis in Chapter 2 leads us once more to question the generalised statement of this leading child labour researcher. If we recall the original ILO constitution, we will see that Boyden's stated present compromise of 'encouraging policies that prohibit child labour in occupations damaging to health and development and to regulate child labour in non-hazardous occupations' is almost identical to the 1919 aim of 'the imposition of such limitations on the labour of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development.' The abolition of child labour always was and remains the overall goal, with the imposition of limitations as a means for achieving this. It is not the goal therefore that has changed- this has always been the same. What have changed are the age and labour categories within legislation through time. Originally the ILO distinguished between child and young person. 'Children' were seen as under 14, this was then raised to 15 and with the advent of the CRC all under the age of 18 are defined as 'children'.

With regard to the second part of Boyden's statement, I would like to highlight two points. First of all the apparent criticism that the ILO distinguishes between child work and child labour. This is interesting as usually the criticism is that they do not make such a distinction and that they do not appreciate the socialisation value of certain forms of culturally defined work (Reynolds 1991, Nieuwenhuys 1994), an argument countered by the Somavia quote above.

Unfortunately, many commentators do not go back to original sources before making their comments, leading to a situation where there is a gross misunderstanding of what the ILO stands for, how it works, and what its objectives are. It must not be forgotten that many of those involved in drafting statements, such as the above, come from poor countries and so the argument of the 'western imposition of ideas' is far more complex than some would have us believe, as will be revealed further in 3.4.

Secondly, I also disagree with the final statement that 'informal' activities fall within the confines of social welfare intervention. The adoption of IPEC in 37[73] countries has been significant in that it has brought these activities directly under the responsibility of the labour ministries. Child labour in the mines in Mirerani was very clearly informal, the children were self-employed and mostly non-remunerated (until gemstones were discovered) and yet it is a target area of IPEC intervention, as determined by the Tanzanian Ministry of Labour (see Chapter 5).

The vision of 'the child labourer' as in need of protection has thus not changed through time. Children of certain ages must be protected from working in certain industries[74] through banning their employment. The vision has developed, however, as experiences are gained[75]. This was shown by the increase in age limits, the expansion of activities as well as current moves in the post-CRC years to include children in the decision making process (See also Chapter 3.4 below).

3.3 The nature and structures of the ILO decision-making process

In order to understand how the 'child labourer' is defined in ILO legislation and programme activity it is important to understand the formal decision making structures of the Organisation. Such an analysis also reveals the complexity and the multi-voiced nature of the decision making process and therefore the extent to which it is difficult to argue for a 'Northern' construction of childhood which is then exported and imposed into different cultural contexts.

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[73] Preparation is underway for IPEC to be extended to a further 31 countries and IPEC is supported by 21 donor agencies.

[74] There does remain, however, the issue of the nuance within a particular type of industry, what is bad and what is good i.e. mining children in Mirerani saw surface mining as 'worst' and 'pit' mining as 'best', unlike Recommendation 190 which saw underground mining as 'worst'- we will focus on this in Chapter 8.

[75] In fact the ILO sees change as key to its success :'If there is one lesson from eight decades of ILO history, it is that renewal, change and adaptation have been vital to its success' (ILO undated: 3).

First it is important to say a brief word about the *nature* of the organisation. It was seen in Chapter 2 that the ILO was not created overnight but was the result of a lengthy process, culminating in the Peace Treaty talks which involved protracted negotiations between governments on the one hand and employers' and workers' organisations on the other. What was significant about the ILO was that it possessed an independent legal status and could adopt decisions which would create binding obligations for members. Prior to the creation of the Organisation member states were sovereign in issues pertaining to labour. Through ratifying the ILO Constitution, however, member states were in fact limiting their sovereignty, placing 'a voluntary and deliberate limitation based upon the conscious realisation that the improvement of the conditions of labour all over the world would be better and more effectively attained by international collective action through an autonomous independent body with limited, but autonomous, legal status, and functions and powers' (Osieke 1985:7). This demonstrates the lengths to which states were prepared to go to ensure decent labour conditions. In today's climate where governments ratify Convention upon Convention, such a step does not seem particularly controversial but at the time, the loss of sovereignty, to whatever degree, was seen as a very important move. This is an emphasis I want to maintain throughout this thesis: people fought long and hard for labour rights and legislation and the ratification of the ILO Constitution is not something that sovereign states undertook lightly. The setting up of the ILO was, and remains, an important step in international human rights law and practice.

One of the primary features of the Organisation is its political character. It is composed of 175 states with different interests and ideologies. This political dimension is often forgotten by commentators (Osieke 1985: 9) who see the Organisation as a homogeneous entity, imposing the will, or even the 'construction of childhood', of the rich nations onto the less rich. It is important to note, however, that more poor countries than rich are members of the ILO and that their representatives are not simple 'yes men' to the rich 'Northern' nations. That would be a far too simplistic explanation of a highly complex and often conflictual process. The ILO cannot exercise its functions and powers without the consent of member states, usually by a majority vote or in the case of the adoption of Conventions and Recommendations by a two third majority (Articles 17(2) and 19(2) of the Constitution). Traditionally, members have voted according to general

political divisions: the 'Group of 77'[76], the industrialised market economy countries (IMEC) and until recently the Group of Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe. The Group of 77 constitutes a clear majority and can therefore cause a proposal to be adopted or rejected. According to Osieke (1985: 11):

> This 'automatic' majority in international organisations has been subjected to severe criticisms by some legal commentators on the ground, i.a., that very often resulting decisions are politically motivated and do not take account of the legitimate interests and legal rights of the minority which are expected to implement them.

This view point of legal commentators is interesting in that it appears quite distinct from the anthropological opinion on international organisations dealing with child related issues that western countries impose their particular constructions onto poorer countries. Instead, it would appear that all too often it is the Group of 77 which imposes its will onto the rich nations; the main funders of the organisation. There are a number of examples of where G-77 countries have taken constitutional aspects of the organisation to task and where they have won, as will be discussed below.

While the Organisation clearly functions according to political divisions it is important to note the other two forms of division: regional (Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe) and representational (workers, employers, governments). These divisions are also pertinent to the ways in which delegates to the International Labour Conference and elsewhere choose to vote (see Osieke 1985). The introduction of tripartism to the ILO was explored in Chapter 2 but it is important to remember the 'revolutionary' nature of tripartism in 1919 and its impact on sovereign states. Member Governments, by ratifying the ILO Constitution, were agreeing to share their sovereignty with workers and employers organisations and to this day the ILO is the only UN agency to include non-governmental representatives on the same basis as government representatives within its power making structure. In addition to workers' and employers' organisations, article 12 (3) of the ILO Constitution authorises the Organisation 'to make suitable arrangements

[76] The Group of 77 consists of 133 members and was developed to ensure representation of the interests of 'Third world' countries in the UN system. See www.g77.org.

for such consultation as it may think desirable with recognised non-governmental international organisations'. As seen below, the drafting of Convention 182 was carried out with substantial consultation with the NGO sector.

All this reveals that the imposition of one particular construction of childhood, be it Northern or otherwise, is difficult in a context where different countries and different groups within those countries, from employers, workers, NGOs and government, are present and vocal in the formal decision making process. To argue that the 'North' imposes its particular construction (which I would dispute even exists in view of the diversity of opinions and policies relating to childhood issues- see New Zealand's dissenting opinions in 3.4 below) is to arrogantly deny the agency of these various representative groups, all with different ideologies, motivations and experiences, as well as to over-inflate the importance of groups from the 'North'.

There are two representative organs within the ILO- the International Labour Conference (ILC) and the Governing Body of the International Labour Office (GB). The International Labour Office is the international secretariat of the ILO and is based in Geneva. The Director-General (DG) is the Chief Executive of the Organisation. Whilst the functions of each are complex and multi-dimensional it is important to briefly summarise their roles in order to gain a clearer understanding of the wider functioning of the Organisation (See also Box 3.3; Osieke 1985).

Box 3.3
International Labour Organisation: Structure

3.3.1 The International Labour Conference and the Governing Body

The International Labour Conference is the ILO's plenary body, in which all member states, workers' and employers' organisations are entitled to be represented[77]. The ILC is composed of four representatives of each member state: two from Government, one from the Workers and one from the Employers (see 2.1 and above for history of this division). The ILC usually meets once a year and the agenda is determined by the GB.

[77] Formal functions are laid down in the Constitution but its main tasks are: adopting the programme and budget for each biennium, examining and adopting Conventions and Recommendations (see 3.2), reviewing the application of existing international standards, electing GB members and admitting States to ILO membership. Informally, the ILC provides an important forum for government and non-government delegates to discuss issues with their contemporaries from all over the world.

Each Conference delegate is entitled to one vote and is free to vote individually (which may lead to delegates from the same member state voting against each other).

The Governing Body is the executive organ of the Organisation and meets three times a year, in March, June and November[78]. Article 7 of the Constitution lays down that the GB is to consist of 56 persons: 28 from government, 14 from employers and 14 from workers, thus maintaining the tripartite nature of the Organisation. One of the most controversial aspects of the ILO is the fact that:

> of the twenty-eight persons representing governments, ten shall be Members of chief industrial importance, and eighteen shall be appointed by Members selected for that purpose by the Government delegates to the Conference, excluding the delegates of the ten Members mentioned above (Article 7 (2)).

This aspect is important in considering Boyden's argument of the imposition of a 'Northern' construction of childhood, especially as the GB is the primary organ responsible for ILO policy. Who, therefore, are these 'members of chief industrial importance'? At present they are: Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. The ten members have changed through time, however. Canada was a member until recently when it was replaced by Brazil, which had been previously dismissed in 1980 when the United States resumed its membership of the ILO[79]. The criteria for determining the ten states has also varied through the years, although the primary criteria relate to national income, contributions to the ILO budget and economically active population (Osieke 1985: 105). The other 18 Government members are elected by the Conference every three years (the

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[78] It is elected for a term of three years and is responsible, amongst other functions, for appointing and supervising the DG, determining the ILC agenda, considering complaints and representations against member states for failure to implement ratified Conventions and recommending action. In other words, the GB is responsible for directing and approving the Organisation's policies.

[79] For explanation as to the mechanisms of dismissal and replacement see Osieke (1985: 38, 129-132). The US submitted its letter of withdrawal from the ILO in 1975, giving the constitutional two year notice period. The four reasons given for withdrawal were the erosion of tripartism, selective concern for human rights, disregard of process, and the increasing politicisation of the ILO. After withdrawal a UN member country may regain membership by simply addressing to the DG their formal acceptance of the Constitutional obligations (non-UN members must apply to Conference). For further discussion of US withdrawal see Osieke (1985: 35).

last elections were held in June 1999) and the Employer and Worker members are elected in their individual capacity.

The question of the ten states of industrial importance is one which the Group of 77 has disputed, arguing that the maintenance of permanent seats is contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of states and that all seats should be elective. The counter-argument was that the ten states contributed 71% of the ILO budget, 60% of the population of the world and 65% of the world's labour force (Osieke 1985: 129) and were therefore representative. The 1974 Working Party on the Structure of the ILO recommended a new system in which there would be 54 government seats all of which would be elective and distributed on the basis of four regions, with regional delegates selecting representatives (Osieke 1985: 130, citing International Labour Conference, 65th session 1979, Provisional record no.2: 6). The Record of Proceedings of the 1986 International Labour Conference reveal that an instrument for the amendment of the ILO Constitution was adopted which would, inter alia, allow changes to the composition of the GB. While this instrument of amendment was adopted, however, it still needs to be ratified by two thirds of the members of the Organisation. This has not yet occurred as there are currently only 89 ratifications and therefore the amendment has not come into force[80] (ILO official, pers. comm.).

3.3.2 The Director-General

The Director-General's role (DG) is to ensure 'the efficient conduct of the International Labour Office and for such other duties as may be assigned to him' (article 8). The DG is generally elected for five years, which may be extended for further periods of five years. The current DG is Mr Juan Somavia who was elected in March 1999. Returning to Boyden's argument, it is interesting to note that Mr Somavia is from Chile and is therefore less likely to be concerned with imposing a 'Northern' vision of childhood. His predecessors, however, were all from the 'North'. There have been two DGs from France, Britain and the United States respectively and one from Ireland and one from

[80] At the 1995 Conference, modifications were made to the voting procedures for electing GB members. These changes addressed a number of concerns which were raised in the 1986 amendment.

Belgium. Whilst the presence of European and North American DGs might have been justified in the early stages of the ILO as it developed out of historical developments in Europe and North America, there seems no clear reason as to why more recent DGs should be so over-representative of these particular countries. It has been seen that the DG is elected by the GB, the majority of whom are not from Britain, the US, France or Belgium. Could it simply be that the previous DGs have simply been the best candidates for the job or do the nations from which they belong wield tremendous influence on the other member states?

One of the DGs, Harold Butler, resigned from his position over the appointment of an official whom he felt to be unsuitable but whose candidature was being heavily pressed for by his government (2.3). Unfortunately, the issue of political appointments affects many organisations, international or otherwise. During fieldwork I heard of a number of incidents where UN staff were complaining about people in positions of authority who were felt to have been appointed because of political pressure from their governments rather than on merit. This is especially the case where countries have few representatives and in the interests of 'universalism' people are kept on despite proven incompetence[81]. It would, however, be inappropriate to comment on the appointment of DGs as this was not a specific focus of my study. Suffice it to say, that the fact that the DG is elected by the GB as opposed to the ILC has given rise to controversy within the organisation (Osieke 1985: 118-119). The question was examined in 1967 by the Working Party on the Programme and Structure of the ILO. The majority of the Party, however, were against transferring the power to appoint the DG to the ILC but felt that there needed to be some compromise to accommodate the conflicting views and therefore recommended that the Chairman of the GB should formally notify the Conference of the election of the DG. In 1975 a new procedure was introduced by which the GB would elect the DG and then submit their choice to Conference for approval and in 1976 the Constitution was amended accordingly (Osieke 1985: 119 cites International Labour Conference 1976: 241). In my copy of the ILO Constitution, published in 1998, however, article 8(1) does

[81] The counter-side of this problem is that highly competent people may feel that they are excluded due to their nationality. See below. This issue seems to be a universal problem relating to all quota-based recruitment systems.

not appear to have been amended and still reads that the DG shall be appointed by the GB. It was seen earlier that for amendments to come into force they require a two third majority, and there have currently only been 89 ratifications.

Interviews revealed that it is the DG who retains the real power in the organisation:

> The power is in the DG. He is the one who sets out lines and influences what is going to be discussed in the Governing Body and at the Conference, he must keep everyone happy. The Governing Body is not full time, there is a relation of trust between the DG and Governing Body, they won't interfere in his decisions. (ILO official, pers. comm.)

3.3.3 The International Labour Office

Finally, it is time to turn to the International Labour Office, the permanent secretariat of the International Labour Organisation. The Office employs some 1,900 officials of over 110 nationalities at the Geneva headquarters and in 40 field offices around the world. In addition, some 600 experts undertake missions in all regions of the world under the programme of technical co-operation (see www.ilo.org)[82]. The budget for the current biennium (200-2001) is US$467, 470, 000. The Office is responsible for servicing meetings by providing reports, interpretation, translation and other administrative and research support. It is also expected to 'accord to governments at their request all appropriate assistance within its power in connection with the framing of laws and regulations (..) and the improvement of administrative practices and inspection' (Article 10 (b) Constitution). Furthermore, the Office houses a research and documentation centre and a printing house issuing a broad range of specialised studies, reports and periodicals.

With regard to staffing, the Office is not tripartite but is composed of permanent international officials, appointed by the DG. Article 9 (2) of the Constitution states that 'so far as is possible with due regard to the efficiency of the work of the Office, the

[82] The staff numbers have thus been reduced since 1985 when there were over 3,000 staff (Osieke 1985: 123)

Director-General shall select persons of different nationalities'. Such a policy is laudable and to be expected in accordance with the principle of universality. It has led to a rich and diverse range of staff with different experiences and perspectives. The policy has also been controversial, however (see 3.3.2). During the course of my ethnographic fieldwork, Junior Professional Officers often told me, that they knew that they would never be employed after their term was up because their country was over-represented[83]:

> As a Dutch person, it is almost impossible that I will get a permanent job with the Organisation as there are so many of us already working there (pers. comm.).

Such positive discrimination is revealed in a web advertisement for recruitment to the ILO's young professional training scheme: 'Preference is given to nationals from ILO member States that are not represented or are under-represented' (http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/pers/vacancy/ ypcep.htm, 05.02.2001)

The recruitment process was even described by one official as 'a game':

> It's a big game, this person talking here, and another lobbying there. It's a strategy. (...) There are loads of people who are not doing much here (..) Also if you look at personnel lists, people don't get sacked. Even with fixed-term contracts, they just get renewed, there is extremely low turnover. That is not normal.

The issue of management and staffing is one to which we return in the Chapters 4, 6 and 7[84].

Finally, it is important to remember that the structures in place are firmly based in the history of the Organisation. The structures are thus 82 years old. While there have been modifications to the Constitutional arrangements as well as further recommendations for

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[83] Junior Professional Officers (JPOs) are young professionals, funded by their governments to work for UN agencies for a defined period, usually two years. The geographical proximity of the Geneva-based Office is one important reason why many North European countries are over-subscribed.

[84] The issue of political appointments in the UN is not unknown. In a speech to the Rockefeller Foundation in New York, Clare Short, British Secretary of State for Development, publicly stated that in the UN recruitment system 'competence should be put above considerations of nationality' and that the UN should be searching for the 'brightest and the best, not just the politically connected' (DFID 2001: 8).

change, which have yet to be implemented, there are points of controversy which have yet to be resolved. This can be attributed to the 'determination of some members and entities to protect their individual and collective interests' (Osieke 1985: 141). This self-interest, within the universalist agenda, has led to many of the problems facing the Organisation. Has it led, however, to a situation where the self-interests of the 'North' have led to their imposing a particular vision of childhood? In order to answer this question, we will explore the debates and processes leading up to the adoption of the latest child labour Convention, No. 182.

3.4 ILO Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour: Formal and Informal Adoption Process

To gain an accurate understanding of the various mechanisms of the decision-making process, it is useful to take a concrete example of the passing of a piece of legislation. I propose to take the example of the most recent piece of child labour legislation: Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999, in order to explore the various processes at work in developing a particular 'construction' of the 'child labourer'. It was seen above that the ILO had a significant number of Conventions and Recommendations prior to the adoption of 182. Why, therefore, did it need another one? What were the motives behind its introduction and what vision or 'construction of childhood' was it in fact exporting? Finally, what formal and informal processes led to the eventual adoption of 182?[85]

[85] My primary sources of information here were ILO documents and discussions with ILO officials. The documents are mainly official minutes of meetings, published as committee reports. They are therefore summaries of the debates and do not provide detailed information of participants other than their nationality and whether they are from tripartite or other groups. The reports are however extremely valuable in that they are do provide the actual wording of written submissions as well as an as accurate as possible transcription of verbal communications during meetings. The reports are for administrative recording purposes as opposed to for publicity or other purposes and are therefore, I would argue, quite reliable. What they lack, however, is the passion and emotion of the actual debates, an issue to which I shall return in Chapter 4.3.

A combination of events led to the recognition of the need for a new child labour convention. By the mid 1990s, the question of linking trade policies to human rights was becoming more and more prominent (Klein 2000). There were growing concerns as to the negative impact of increasing trade liberalisation[86] for poorer groups in society. Child labour was one concern which grabbed the attention of North American and European media, consumer groups and other non governmental organisations. Politicians were quick to latch on to this highly emotive issue and child labour soon found itself high on the global agenda, linking as it does the free trade agenda with the growing poverty elimination agenda of major donors and multilateral aid agencies, including the World Bank and the ILO. 1994 was the year of the Uruguay Round- the most comprehensive round of multilateral trade negotiations ever. It was through these negotiations that the World Trade Organisation came into being: its task to implement and enforce the wide ranging multilateral agreements negotiated during the Uruguay Round (http://www.southcentre.org/papers/wto/wtotasks-01.htm; Hirst and Thompson 1999: 210). The agreements were not without controversy, however, and the opening of world markets led to many commentators arguing that international differences in environmental and labour standards and regulations, such as child labour, distorts the world trading system and creates unfair advantages in favour of countries with lower standards[87]. On the other side of the debate, many poor countries have argued that the requirement for higher standards is simply a protectionist ploy on the part of rich countries (Beynon and Dunkerley 2000: 263-264). In 1994, the ILO set up its first Working Group on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalisation of Trade which would work towards ensuring that member states could meet their WTO and ILO commitments to a parallel development of trade liberalisation and social progress (http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/96-9.htm) as well as to attempt to address some of the concerns expressed above. According to an informant, one conclusion of the above discussions was the recognition of the need for a new Convention on child labour. With the acknowledgement by the Copenhagen Summit on

[86] For a useful analysis of recent developments in the global economy and trade relations see Hirst and Thompson 1999.

[87] Similar arguments were used by British wool manufacturers in the 1800s, see 2.1.

Social Development of the elimination of child labour as a fundamental principle and right at work, the case was further strengthened. I would also argue that in view of the above controversies linking trade standards to protectionism a Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour would prove far more acceptable to ILO member states than C. 138[88] (the high ratification rate of C.182 noted in the introduction to Chapter 2 seems to indicate that this is true; see also ILO 1996a).

Having briefly explained a few of the events leading up to the recognition of the need for a new instrument it is time to return to the ILO procedures for adoption of new legislation[89]. Once a need for legislation is recognised, the GB requests the Office to prepare a comparative study of the laws and practices of member states relating to the proposed issue. The GB then makes the final decision as to whether or not to continue with the process. With regard to the worst forms of child labour, the GB felt that it should continue and in 1996, it put the development of a new instrument onto the Conference agenda. Once the new instrument is on the agenda, the Office is requested to develop a more detailed law-and-practice report as well as to outline the proposed text, in the form of a questionnaire (Standing Orders, article 39). In the case of the worst forms of child labour, the Office produced a document called 'Child Labour- Targeting the Intolerable', published in 1996 and later to become Report VI (1), 6th Item on the Agenda of the 1998 ILC (ILO 1996a.). The report and questionnaire were sent out to all member states, who were expected to consult worker and employer groups in drafting their reply.

The replies to the questionnaire were analysed by the Office's TRAVAIL department, and were then compiled into another report- Report VI (2) on Child Labour (International Labour Office 1998c.)- which was then circulated to the governments

[88] An obstacle to greater ratification of Convention 138 has been that some member States view the text as too complex and too difficult to apply in its entirety.

[89] The events leading up to the recognition of the need for a new instrument could form a thesis in themselves so it would not be possible to detail them here. The above summary is useful however in highlighting the key events.

prior to the ILC[90]. Out of 175 member states, 108 had submitted replies by the time the report was compiled[91], a figure which was seen by staff informants as well as official ILO documentation as an indication of overwhelming interest in the new instrument:

> The interest in new standards on child labour is evidenced by the record number of member States replying to the questionnaire; the governments of 108 member States replied, and there was an almost equal number of additional replies from employers' and workers' organizations. The general observations reflect a consensus that the persistence and seriousness of the child labour problem warrants renewed international action, including new instruments specifically focused on intolerable or extreme forms of child labour (International Labour Office 1998c: 9).

The 'record' number of states that provided comments clearly included non-'Northern' nations with their own culturally distinct practices and ideologies of child raising and yet there was an overwhelming 'consensus' as to the need for renewed international action. To say that the view of 'Northern' nations was imposed on those in the South is to deny the latter agency. Most comments on the questionnaire were from the South- not just from governments but from workers' and employers' organisations. An exploration of these replies reveals the degree of freethinking and agency which non-Northern delegates expressed. Of the 105 responses to the first question as to whether there was a need for a new instrument there were only two negative responses; from Cameroon and Bahrain[92]. When one thinks that the answers were drafted in the relevant offices within the member State, it becomes harder still to accept that there was any 'imposition' by 'Northern' states. It could also be argued that the latter were educated in the 'North' and had therefore been influenced by the 'Northern' construction of childhood, but as far as the people I met in Tanzania were concerned, this was only the case in exceptional

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[90] In 1997, three conferences were held to provide inputs to the new Convention: The February Amsterdam Conference (see http://www.ilo.org/public/english/comp/child/conf/amsterdam/background/htm.), the June Trondheim conference and the October Oslo conference.

[91] It is extremely common for replies to arrive after deadlines, which are usually flexible in view of this. Replies which arrived after compilation of the report could, however, be consulted by delegates at the conference (International Labour Office 1998c: 1).

[92] Cameroon was in fact in favour of a new instrument abolishing the 'most intolerable forms of child labour' and was merely disagreeing with the 'broad reference to the elimination of child labour' (International Labour Office 1998c: 12). Bahrain's comments are not included in the document.

circumstances. Interestingly, one of the few countries which often replied in the negative was New Zealand, a 'Northern' nation![93]

Once all the questionnaire analysis was compiled, the ILC appointed a tripartite committee to examine the proposals and the agreed text was then submitted to the plenary of the Conference, with a resolution to place the question on the agenda of the following year's Conference with a view to adoption. What was significant regarding these meetings was the general consensus regarding issues (International Labour Office 1999c: 5). The tripartite committee originally comprised 181 members but attendance fluctuated over the 18 sittings (International Labour Office 1998d: 1-2), because of members attending other meetings scheduled for the same time[94]. It is apparent from the report of the committee meetings that the Global March on Child Labour was extremely influential:

> This unprecedented manifestation of the concerns of ordinary people, of local and international media, of activists, of NGOs and of children themselves demonstrated the high expectations that had been raised and hence the importance of the Committee's work (International Labour Office 1998d: 4).

While the Convention would have no doubt been approved anyway, the impact of the March was substantial. The Global March, started in 1997, was the first time in history that civil society around the world had agreed to a common platform on the issue (www.globalmarch 1999: 12). To return to our central question regarding the 'Northern' construction of childhood, it is important to note that the international secretariat of the Global March is in New Delhi, India and that the key activist behind the March is

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[93] The most controversial question appears to be the one of the age of 'child'. The report maintains that 83 replies were affirmative as to the age limit of 18 but detailed scrutiny revealed this in fact to only be 81. 17 countries answered that the age limit should be lower, all of these were countries from the 'South' except New Zealand. Analysis of the answers, however, reveals substantial confusion surrounding this issue. For example, Eritrea felt that 18 would be inconsistent with Convention 138 but 138 itself defines 18 as the age limit for worst forms of child labour. New Zealand felt that 'there needs to be a more flexible approach to take account of national differences' (International Labour Office 1998c: 39). South Africa, Ghana, Slovakia and Slovenia all argued that 18 was too high as the age limit for compulsory schooling was considerably lower.

[94] Conference only lasts a few days and many meetings are held, which often leads to timetable clashes.

Kailash Satyarthi, an Indian national[95]. At this point, it is important to bring up the influence of the NGOs themselves on the decision-making process. In 1997, the Amsterdam Conference on Child Labour was held to discuss, amongst other things, the proposal for a new Convention. NGOs were actively involved and a group of child labourers were invited to present their views (New Internationalist 1997). NGOs were then formally consulted in 1998 about the new Convention through the NGO Group for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sub-Group on Child Labour. NGOs from over 50 countries replied and 85% responded that there was a need for a new instrument on the worst forms of child labour (Anti-Slavery International 1998). NGOs were involved in the drafting process on a 'consultative' basis, as provided for in the ILO Constitution. NGOs based in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe were involved in the Committee meetings as was a representative from the Global March (International Labour Office 1999c: 16-17). NGOs were also influential through formal lobbying of their government representatives as well as informally through discussions with the government, worker and employer representatives. The Global March, for example, 'worked hard to maintain public attention on the issue of child labour and lobby for specific improvements on the Convention. The Global March identified access to education, children in armed conflict, and the direct participation of child labourers as key issues and these became the main topics for discussion' (www.globalmarch 2000: 13).

During one of the Committee meetings, Worker members suggested that the instruments might refer to 'worst' forms of child labour, instead of 'extreme' forms (International Labour Office 1998d: 5). This was an important step as there had been long debate regarding the wording. According to one informant who has worked with IPEC for many years:

> Extreme gives the impression that other forms of work are not extreme, intolerable gives the impression that some forms of labour are tolerable so 'worst forms' was chosen. We didn't want to say that other forms were acceptable (Male ILO official, pers. comm.)

[95] An excellent report is available from the Global March web site which answers many questions relating to the Convention and Recommendation. See www.globalmarch.org/worstformsreport/info/q-a.html.

After the Conference a third report was developed, which included the proposed text of the new Convention and Recommendation. The text was circulated in July and August 1998 (International Labour Office 1999a). The final replies were to be submitted by November 1998 and were compiled into a fourth report (International Labour Office 1999b). The governments of 83 member states replied, 35 of them having no comments to make. Most other replies were favourable. Issues which gave rise to comment included whether the instruments should refer to 'worst' or 'extreme' or something else (see comments from Bahrain, Portugal) as well as the time-frame referred to by 'immediate action'[96]. Previously the Convention was to deal with 'immediate suppression of all extreme forms of child labour' (International Labour Office 1998c: 173) and then the 'prohibition and immediate suppression of the worst forms of child labour (International Labour Office 1999d: 5) but the protests of many countries from the South led to this being changed to 'the prohibition and immediate action for the elimination of the worst forms of child labour' in the final text. This again reveals that the voice of 'Southern' countries is powerful and not systematically subject to the views of the Northern countries pushing for immediate suppression.

Regarding children's participation there were very few comments, indicative of the adult-centred bias of the majority of commentators and the belief that adults know what is best for children (see 3.1)[97]. Turkey commented that 'the views of children affected by child labour and of their families must be sought and included in future action programmes designed to prevent child labour' (p.16). This was supported by the Irish trade unions (p. 81) and the New Zealand government and trade unions (p. 72). These were the only comments, however, regarding involving children in the decision-making process. Article 6 of the Convention does provide for 'consultation with other groups, as appropriate' with regard to the design and implementation of programmes of action but not with regard to the definition of worst forms. This means that children and their

[96] Jordan, Mexico, United States- with the US arguing that 'immediate' means 'without delay' and the other two countries stating that that would not be possible.

[97] Boyden (1997: 22) points out the irony of the CRC which lays down the right of children to participate in decisions affecting them and yet children did not formally participate in the drawing up of the document supposedly designed to further their best interests.

families may be consulted, if governments, employers and workers feel it to be appropriate. Whilst it is clearly not appropriate to consult children at all stages, I would argue that it is important to recognise their role as primary stakeholders and therefore to consult them where appropriate (according to the particular circumstances) if there is to be any chance of designing effective and sustainable policy and practice. This is normal practice when discussing the labour activities of other working groups who are represented by their worker organisations and I firmly believe that this right should be extended to child and young adult workers.

The Recommendation (which is not binding but is merely a proposal for recommended action) takes a different approach to the Convention with regard to children's participation, arguing that programmes of action must take into 'consideration the views of the children directly affected by the worst forms of child labour, their families and, as appropriate, other concerned groups committed to the aims of the Convention and Recommendation'. The emphasis is therefore on always consulting children and their families. The 'as appropriate' applies to 'other concerned groups'. This is more in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child which calls for children to be consulted in all decisions affecting them (Articles 12 and 13). It is important to note that children's participation was strongly pushed for by the NGOs but one commentator argues that 'it was felt to be impractical' to always include working children in the decision-making process (Crawford 2000: 14). In fact, 'other concerned groups' were only included at the final committee stage, the previous texts referring only to consultation 'with relevant government institutions and employers' and workers' organisations (International Labour Office 1998c: 174, International Labour Office 1999b: 81). This could be due to the success of the Global March, which had impressed delegates (as shown above) and shown them the power and commitment of 'other concerned groups' in the fight to eliminate the worst forms of child labour.

This fourth report (International Labour Office 1999b) was then sent to all governments at least three months before the 1999 Conference. The draft was then once more examined in Committee which had 20 sittings, revealing the lengthy debates which occurred before final submission to the plenary of the Conference for approval (International Labour Office 1999c). Whilst the first set of meetings in 1998 had been

relatively straightforward, the first meeting of the 1999 session started with a three hour and thirty seven minute debate on the title of the Convention. According to a Global March informant:

> While this showed that everyone had a chance to express their views, it certainly was very frustrating and tedious. With a thick stack of proposed amendments in front of them, it looked doubtful whether the committee could realistically finish before its deadline of Friday, June 12. At this point, the Committee adopted a new tactic of having the key players (the workers' representative, the employers' representative and leaders of different government groups) hold informal meetings to negotiate package agreements covering the main issues (..) The situation became a bit uncomfortable for other members who felt excluded from the open discussion process they were used to at the ILO, and it wasn't clear that the discussions wouldn't just end in stalemate. Fortunately, the working group succeeded and produced a proposal that settled the most contentious issues (www.globalmarch 2000: 10).

This is revealing of the informal processes adopted when the formal processes are too lengthy or unfeasible. The official report of the Committee, Provisional Record 19 (International Labour Office 1999c: 2), refers to these 'informal meetings to negotiate package agreements' as a 'Drafting Committee', illustrating the way in which an informal decision became formalised within the reporting process.

The Committee incorporated a number of changes requested by members before adopting its final report[98]. Once again the process was harmonious, in the words of the Employer Vice-chairperson:

> We worked together to achieve a truly practical, truly realistic instrument. Many representatives sacrificed their ideal solutions to achieve a genuinely consensual document. No votes were taken, no representatives were intimidated, *all* views were heard in the interest of finding solutions to enable ratification by *all* member states.(International Labour Office 1999e: 2; emphasis in text)[99].

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[98] A detailed exploration of the changes is given in International Labour Office (1999c: 18-70).

[99] To assess the extent to which this statement is true it would be useful to explore factors such as constitution of the group, process involved and the success of using the break-away group further. Unfortunately, this data was unavailable. I do believe, however, that the nature of the issue was the key factor leading to such a consensual outcome.

This illustrates that the Convention and Recommendation dealt with issues which all member states and employer and worker groups could agree upon and was built with a sense of consensus and compromise. This is revealed by the way in which African and Asian governments pushed for 'immediate suppression' to be changed to immediate action to 'eliminate', their position winning over in the end. The US and UK governments, in turn, pushed for the Convention not to include the involvement of children in armed conflict as their national legislation allowed 17 year olds to be recruited on a voluntary basis. They won their case despite the African and Latin American government groups, the workers group and some IMEC governments pushing for there to be a complete ban on children being involved in armed conflict. Some commentators argued, however, that the Americans did not plead their case with compromise in mind:

> In the end it became a serious game of power politics, with the United States cranking up the pressure through all its available channels. The stakes were high since President Clinton was scheduled for an all-star appearance at the Conference and he was prepared to give the Convention his personal endorsement if the United States could ratify it (www.globalmarch 2000: 11)[100].

In the end the terminology referred to 'forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict'. The use of children as soldiers can still, however, be considered to be work which is likely to 'harm their health, safety or morals' and could therefore still be prohibited under article 3 (d). The US and UK did not therefore entirely win their battle.

Although the general attitude to the decision-making process was one of compromise and consensus there were thus dissenting voices regarding specific issues. To return to the central theme of this chapter- the exportation of a 'Northern construction of childhood' – it is important to consider the various voices with regard to the overall

[100] It is worth noting that the Clinton administration was extremely committed to the reduction of child labour, making the US the primary IPEC donor. It remains to be seen whether this commitment will be sustained by the new Administration.

'vision' embodied in the new Convention. Such an exploration reveals that the overall vision was a universal one[101], which consisted of protection of children:

> The Government member of China underscored the importance of addressing the worst forms of child labour and confirmed the importance his government attached to the protection of children (International Labour Office 1999c: 7)

> The Government member of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that children represented the future and hope of mankind and that they had to be protected to respect their integrity (International Labour Office 1999c: 11)

of the need for a new Convention which would be ratifiable by all;

> The Government member of Japan (..) stressed that a new Convention should contain only those principles which were essential to eliminate the worst forms of child labour, so that it would be ratifiable by as many countries as possible (International Labour Office 1999c: 8)

and that international organisations should help countries to develop programmes;

> The Government member of the Islamic Republic of Iran considered child labour to be a dominant issue of our time (..) International organisations, and the ILO in particular, should provide assistance to countries struggling with child labour problems and help them develop comprehensive programmes (International Labour Office 1999c: 8).

The vision being exported was therefore a simple one: children need protecting from the worst forms of labour and the international community can and should do something about this. I would argue that this vision is not 'Northern' but 'humanitarian'. The desire to protect children is not the sole domain of the rich nations but is relevant to all societies who have adopted the new instruments. To deny this would be to deny the

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[101] The only difference of opinion came from Venezuela who suggested that 'the governments and civil societies in countries where poverty is seen as making child labour necessary should devise forms of child labour that are culturally based, such as theatrical activities and other activities that develop the child's artistic talents and skills' (p.18). There is no guarantee, however, that such 'cultural' forms of child labour would not contravene the provisions of 182.

agency of all the committed activists in non- Northern contexts who fought very hard to draw attention to the issues and to ensure that the Convention and Recommendation were as strong as possible.

The process leading to adoption of a particular Convention is thus a lengthy one, which involves extensive consultation with tripartite partners from 175 countries as well as NGOs. With regard to C.182, it was three years before the final document was submitted to Conference, where both Convention 182 and Recommendation 190 were unanimously adopted. Informally, however, the process took much longer and it was seen that by the time of the 1994 Uruguay Round and of the 1995 Copenhagen Summit the need for some new instrument had been strongly recognised.

3.5 Chapter Conclusions

This chapter has revealed that the need for a new Convention had been expressed by the world community on a number of occasions. The motives behind the introduction of a new Convention were that Convention 138 was not providing sufficient protection for children most in need, i.e., those engaging in the worst forms of child labour although activists working with child labourers in the field were focusing more and more on the worst forms (see Chapter 4).

The above discussion has been revealing of the inter-linked issues of power, agency and resistance[102]. Boyden suggested to us that one particular vision of childhood, a 'Northern' vision, had been constructed and then exported to and imposed in radically different cultural contexts through international organisations, such as the ILO. This argument was rejected in 3.1 in favour of a less simplified perspective which recognises the two dominant visions to which children labouring in poor countries are exposed: the vision that children should not have to work under particular circumstances and the capitalist dream of large international corporations such as Coca-Cola. To obtain the

[102] Issues to which we shall return in Chapters 4, 6 and 7.

dream they must work, no matter what the circumstances. Boyden's text has, however, successfully drawn our attention to the issue of power within the development of policy. Policy in the ILO, and other UN agencies, is developed through a complex and lengthy process, although the ILO is more representative than other UN agencies due to its tripartite structure and therefore involves even more complex negotiations. Different interest groups have different claims, each attempting to use their power and resources to gain the best possible outcome.

This chapter on the formal decision-making processes of the Organisation has revealed that the ILO constitution lays a number of checks to minimise the domination of one particular group over another. The Constitution is very clear about the importance of including all nations equally in the decision-making process, the eventual aim being to make the ILO a truly universal organisation. Non- governmental bodies - the workers' and employers' groups- were jointly given an equal voice to that of government and provision was made for NGOs to play an active role in the decision making process, as discussed in Chapter 3.3.1 and 3.4. Where there was a conflict of power and interest it was shown that, at least with regard to the development of 182, there was a spirit of consensus and compromise, revealed by the way in which two dominant groups (G-77 and the US and UK) succeeded in getting proposals changed in their favour. The complexity and length of the process has revealed that it is extremely difficult to impose one particular set of view points or 'Northern construction of childhood'. Finally, it is important to note that at the end of the day, States choose whether or not to ratify a Convention. If they feel that the text is inappropriate, they are less likely to ratify, let alone implement the provisions. The power relations between countries and the Organisation are, however, complex and we return to these in Chapters 6 and 7 on the ILO in Tanzania. In order to ensure that countries can ratify, the ILO has clearly made provision for different States to select appropriate age limits, for example, or to determine themselves what they feel to be the 'worst forms of child labour' in their country. To take the 'Northern construction of childhood' argument too far in this case would therefore be to argue that there is no resistance to the power of 'Northern' nations and to deny agency to the many non-Northerners who participated in the decision-

making process[103]. Such an argument is in fact reminiscent of structural dependency theory, which placed the developing countries in the periphery and developed countries at the core of the global system, with the peripheral countries fully bound by and subject to forces at the core. I have argued in this chapter that not only are the 'peripheral' countries not straight-jacketed by external 'core' forces but they have in fact played a vital role in shaping the way in which child labour policy has been and is being developed.

[103] A similar critique can be made of those that argue that 'Development has been and still is the *Westernisation of the world*' (Latouche 1993: 160, cited in Pieterse 2000: 178). This clearly denies the agency of majority world countries in owning development. For further critique of this and other 'post-development' arguments see Pieterse (2000).

4. Voices of the Policy Implementers in HQ

> Organizations get likened to many things- machines, armies, garbage cans, theatrical plays, the human body, and so on. We find the analogy of a river helpful. Like a river, an organization may appear static and calm if viewed on a map or from a helicopter. But this says little about those who are actually on or in the moving river, whether swimming, drowning or safely esconced in boats (Gabriel, Fineman and Sims 2000: 2).

The previous two chapters revealed the 'vision' behind ILO child labour policy. But what of the practice? This and later chapters will argue that it is not the vision per se that is flawed but the power relationships and bureaucratic procedures which take over and become more important than the achievement of the vision. What is it that sustains the external and internal power relationships in a way which hinders success? The International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), currently known as the InFocus Programme on Child Labour: IPEC, is officially responsible for all ILO child labour activities. I propose to examine the processes which lie behind the interpretation and implementation of the voices of the formal policy makers, as explored in Chapter 3. This chapter focuses solely on the Implementors at HQ, i.e. Geneva, level. Chapters 6 and 7 explore the interpretation process in Tanzania. First of all, I introduce IPEC as a programme within the wider Office framework, briefly exploring its development from an 'idea' to the 'flagship programme of the ILO'. I then explore the formal and informal discourses which surround IPEC action, prioritising the experiences of those 'who are actually on or in the moving river'.

4.1 IPEC: The Evolution of a 'Flagship' Programme

In Chapter 2.3, the historical development of IPEC was briefly introduced. Here we explore the evolution of the programme, from a small technical co-operation programme to its current status as the 'flagship' of the ILO, in more detail. It will be shown that the programme has evolved through an ongoing dialogical process, which involved both external and internal developments.

It has been seen that child labour has always been an ILO concern, drifting in and out of fashion as an issue of importance[104]. Up to the late 1970s, early 1980s, ILO child labour action was characterised by international standard setting. In the 1980s, there was more of an emphasis on documenting the problem and developing appropriate advocacy and policy responses. In 1990, the Government of Germany proposed to make a special annual contribution of DM 10 million a year to help finance the ILO's programme on child labour, following the then DG's decision 'to make the elimination of child labour a major theme of integrated and concerted Office-wide action' (ILO 1991:1). In 1991, the DG, Mr Hansenne, made child labour one of the three inter-departmental projects of the 1992-1993 biennium budget[105].

INTERDEP was put into place prior to the approval of IPEC[106]. Although funds had been allocated to what would become IPEC, the bureaucratic process which precedes project approval is lengthy and it would appear that the ILO wanted to place greater emphasis on child labour intervention as soon as possible. INTERDEP consisted of each

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[104] For a discussion of fashion and organisations, see Czarniawska (1997: 116-117).

[105] It is important here to remember the context in which INTERDEP was set up. The late 1980s and early 1990s were the years of the development and ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which sparked off an unprecedented debate surrounding the issue of childhood. Many donors and NGOs found themselves rushing to jump on the bandwagon of children's rights and I am sure that the ILO and the German government were not immune to this.

[106] There is no space here to enter into an evaluation of INTERDEP activities but for an internal evaluation report, see ILO (1992).

relevant ILO department (such as NORMES, ACTRAV, TRAVAIL[107]) assigning one person to work on child labour to develop tools and instruments for action and to 'create wider public awareness of the ILO and its principles' (ILO 1991b: 140-14).

IPEC became operational in 1992, when six countries (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Thailand, Turkey) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the ILO. IPEC formed a technical co-operation branch under TRAVAIL, the overall ILO department responsible for developments in labour practice.

From its inception, IPEC has been highly politicised. As one informant advised me:

> If you do such a study you will have to focus on the politics, right from the top. Many of these things are decided by the donors, regardless of the Conference, Governing Body or whatever. You must focus on politics (ILO Official, pers. comm.)[108].

This clearly applies to any organisational ethnography and throughout this chapter the issue of politics arises with great regularity. At this particular point, it is important to note that the dominance of German funding led to a dominance of German management. The German donors insisted that a German take the job of manager and until 2000 all managers were German[109]. In recent years, this has changed as the development of alternative sources of funding has led to the decline in German dominance. The Americans in particular are looking to replace the position of the Germans, as seen below.

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[107] NORMES is the legal standards department, ACTRAV is the workers' group and TRAVAIL is responsible for overall developments in labour practice.

[108] It is important to see the ILO as working within a wider global system of international development policy. Within this system there is a clear hierarchy of power as will be explored in full in Chapter 7, when the relationship between the ILO, DFID and the World Bank in Tanzania is analysed.

[109] Kleish (German), Habernicht (German), Stoikov (German), Blenk (German), Roselaers (Dutch), Ouedraogo (Burkina Faso), Ng. Gek-Boo (Malaysia).

According to one informant, the early days of IPEC were full of confusion and staff members experienced hostility from other departments:

> INTERDEP were still working on child labour. There was a lot of confusion, who does what and not me, not me. In IPEC only Bonnet had experience on child labour. The main problem was confusion. I could not tell anyone where I was working as people didn't like it. It had too much money. People would come to IPEC to milk it of its money. It was pretty hostile. I don't know why. Getting offices and furniture was not easy, we paid for our own furniture. Projects was another thing, most people were under TC (Technical Co-operation) funds, the ILO did not want to contribute anything. There was a lot of hostility, it was a new concept developed between Assefa and Kleish[110]. Everything was urgent, urgent, urgent and internally there were many problems as it was so new. People don't like change in the ILO. (..) People took time to adapt, now everyone wants to work for IPEC. At the same time as the hostility, child labour was the in thing. The Germans were giving so much money. I can't understand why in IPEC everything was such a struggle. The Director[111] didn't get any help because he was from the outside, he didn't know how to do things. When Stoikov came it was a godsend as she was from the inside and she struggled and she was a strong woman. You can put up with the workload but not with the hostility (female ILO official and ex IPEC staff member, pers. comm., gloss added).

It is useful to consider a number of points made by the informant. She refers to the confusion surrounding IPEC. Not only was it a new programme but only one staff member had experience of child labour issues. On top of this, the programme had a lot of money which led to hostility from other departments. It must be remembered that the ILO is wholly dependent on donor funding, which has been declining over a number of years, and departments are often in conflict over financial allocations. The fact that this new programme was taking an innovative approach and receiving a lot of attention due to the prominence of child labour in the international arena did not help to appease the hostility. This was compounded by the fact that the manager was an 'outsider' and

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[110] Assefa Bequele is the man seen by many long-term IPEC staff as the 'spiritual father' of the Programme. Kleish was the first Director of IPEC, a German member of ILO staff who was nearing retirement and who negotiated the funds with the German government.

[111] My informant is referring to Hebernicht, Kleish's successor, who came in from the German government 'with no experience of the ILO or of child labour'.

therefore did not have his own networks of 'friends' who could help smooth things over, nor did he have insider knowledge of the Organisation. Furthermore, his 'outsider' status could have been seen as threatening by many who feared that he would bring in 'new' approaches. The arrival of an 'insider' as manager helped things along but the hostility remained. The management of IPEC has remained an issue to this day, with a number of managers dying or leaving due to stress related illness and others seen as less than satisfactory by a number of informants. The appointment and dismissal of managers has also been controversial[112] and I will leave that point with the words of one informant: 'Things happen behind closed doors that we do not know about.'

It is useful to explore further what the informant meant by the 'new concept' that was IPEC. The unique nature of IPEC - a short term 'project' that in fact served as an 'international programme' and proposed to work with and beyond the traditional ILO tripartite framework- meant that it was set up to as a semi- autonomous entity within the ILO:

> It was set up as semi-autonomous for a variety of reasons. It was a new programme which needed to experiment, it was developing fast so it needed flexibility in management style and financial and administrative regulations. Our view was that although it was semi-autonomous, it still needs to have a clear direction in terms of accountability (senior ILO official, pers. comm.).

> The way IPEC was set up was to avoid bureaucracy, it set up steering committees, a broad framework, finance direct to the country, no red tape, we worked quickly, the MoU and the steering committee allowed us to do so (ex-IPEC, female ILO informant, pers. comm.).

This was clearly controversial within the more traditional ILO framework and may help to explain some of the antagonistic feelings towards the Programme that were expressed

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[112] It is not appropriate to enter into detail about the personal traits of various managers as most of this is founded on gossip and I need to protect my informants from unsubstantiated comments which could have serious consequences for their careers. We will discuss current management issues further in 4.4. The heavy workload mentioned by the informant also remains pertinent (4.4.6).

above. As the informant told us; 'People don't like change in the ILO' and IPEC did represent change in quite a dramatic fashion - a highly innovative programme which was attracting large sums of money, as detailed below.

Furthermore, the different approach was also problematic from an administrative point of view:

> It was evident from the start that an innovative and unique programme as ILO-IPEC would pose a number of challenges to existing ILO structures and procedures. The characteristics required for the effective implementation of the Programme, such as flexibility, fast trouble-shooting and problem-solving, grass-root activities, risk-taking and experimenting are sometimes difficult to accommodate within the procedures of an international organization and call for continuous adjustments and fine-tuning (ILO 1996: 5).

Such issues have yet to be resolved, as seen in Chapters 4.4.5 and 6. What is clear is that the recipe seems to have worked, at least as far as the donors have been concerned:

> What is very special about IPEC is that it started with a small research package from the ILO but then we started to get the confidence of the donors. Even now our regular budget is extremely weak but this is being discussed to increase the regular budget (ILO official, pers. comm.).

In Chapter 2.3, we saw that the regular budget of IPEC was only around $7 million for the 2000-2001 biennium whereas the technical co-operation budget (money from donors specifically for IPEC) is $77.5 million. This highlights the sub-text in the above quote which reveals that as so much of the funding is extra-budgetary, IPEC is almost entirely reliant on the whims of the donors, discussed further below.

The initial time frame for IPEC was five years during which time the Programme aimed 'to mobilise new actors in the fight against child labour, to conduct a legal review, to strengthen political commitment and develop experimental action and then to mainstream action within national government budgets' (ILO official pers. comm.). As more donors came on board (Belgium in 1992, France, Norway, Spain, Australia and the US in 1995 and then Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands in 1996 and others such as

Denmark and the UK since then) IPEC moved to a 10 year framework and now operates in a non-specified time framework, i.e. until the money runs out. In 1999, a new Director-General, Juan Somavia, was appointed and one of his first tasks was to restructure the Organisation, in the process transforming IPEC into the InFocus Programme on the progressive elimination of child labour.

Somavia streamlined the activities of the Office under one concept, that of 'Decent Work' (ILO 1999). Under this umbrella, he created four sub-programmes: Standards and Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Employment, Social Protection, and Social Dialogue. The InFocus Programme on the progressive elimination of child labour: IPEC is one of the four areas covered by Standards and Fundamental Principles at work[113]. Its placing as one of the primary InFocus Programmes reveals the high profile nature that child labour had gained since the late 1970s: from the initial work of one man on child labour, to INTERDEP, to IPEC and finally to a core ILO InFocus Programme. It could also be argued that this illustrates the efforts of top management to bring IPEC back into the conventional folds of the Organisation. As one of the core programmes, IPEC was no longer given as much flexibility as before: it was now a major, if not the major, ILO activity and was therefore to be placed under increasing scrutiny[114]. The InFocus Programme was to link all of the Office's child labour work under one initiative as prior to this different departments, such as NORMES (legal standards) and ACTRAV (workers' group), were also working on child labour issues :

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[113] The other three are International Labour Standards, the InFocus Programme on the Declaration and Relations, meetings and document services.

[114] The main reason the project was allowed to be semi-autonomous was that it needed to be responsive and flexible (see above). Initially a small project there was scope for such autonomy. As the project is now one of the largest ILO programmes it is under increasing international scrutiny and the ILO management probably want to maintain a 'panoptical' gaze (Foucault 1977) over action. The personalities of the various managers are also, I would argue, highly relevant. The first managers were not afraid to set the project up as semi-autonomous whereas current managers seem happy for the project to become more 'mainstream'. However, as mentioned above, for ethical reasons I have chosen not to enter into discussion about specific personality traits of managers.

> Officially it is called the InFocus Programme (IPEC). IPEC was the technical co-operation office but there was also research, NORMES etc. When InFocus was set up it incorporated these but wanted to keep the same name as a brand name but structured in the way of InFocus programmes (ILO official working on IPEC, pers. comm.).

The choice of word 'brand' (see 4.2) is interesting but as discussed IPEC was an innovative and unique structure and successfully managed to carve out its own niche within the overall ILO framework. Although the name was changed to InFocus Programme, it is still referred to as IPEC by most people in the ILO, both in HQ and in the field. I will therefore use 'IPEC' and the 'Programme' intermittently when referring to the InFocus Programme.

The success of the IPEC 'brand' is evidenced by the rapid growth in interest and support of its campaign against child labour. From a small programme involving fewer than 10 countries in 1992, it had increased almost ten fold to a global alliance of 99 participating countries by early 2001- 51 countries of which have signed an MoU with the ILO, 23 countries associated with IPEC in a less formal way (i.e. IPEC has preparatory activities in these countries but no MoU has been signed yet, which means that there is no formal commitment from the Government apart from the preparatory activities agreed upon) and 25 donor countries and contributing organisations providing financial and political support to the Programme (ILO 2000: 6, see also Box 4.1a and Box 4.1b below).

Box 4.1a The IPEC Donors

Germany, Belgium, Australia, France, Norway, Spain, United States, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, European Commission, Italian Social Partners Initiatives, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Austria, Finland, Japan, Poland, Japanese Trade Union Confederation, Sweden, Comunidad Autonoma de Madrid, Hungary, Ayuntamiento de Alcala de Henares.

Such a broad funding base is important to ensure that there is not one dominant donor as this may lead to imposition of particular ideologies and practices. There is concern, however, with the growing dominance of the US[115] (see 4.4 on informal discourses).

Box 4.1b IPEC Participating Countries (taken from ILO 2000a: 6)

	Countries that have signed the MoU	Countries associated with IPEC
Africa	Benin, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia	Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Malawi, Namibia, Cote d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Zimbabwe
Arab States	Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen	Syria, West Bank and Gaza
Asia	Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nepal, Mongolia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand	China, Viet Nam
Europe	Albania, Romania, Turkey	Bulgaria, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Ukraine
Latin America and Caribbean	Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela.	Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay.

The rapid growth in funding[116] has been problematic for the Programme, illustrated by its low 'delivery rates' i.e. the percentage of allocated funds actually spent in the given financial period. Expenditure has consistently been below allocation and in 1999 IPEC

[115] The US pledged $29.5 million to the 1999 financial year, a similar amount for 2000 and a pledge of $45 million is anticipated for 2001 (ILO 2000a: 7).

[116] From just over $10 million in 92-93 biennium to over $70 million for the current 00-01 biennium (ILO 2000: 7). The rapid growth in funding does not apply to the ILO as a whole which has seen funds declining, mainly as a result of decreasing UNDP budgets. In 1997, 29% of all ILO expenditure was from the UNDP. In 1998 this was 26% and in 1999 had dropped even further to 18%.

delivery rate was only 33%. This low figure was of particular concern to the Americans who put pressure on the Programme to increase its delivery and an ambitious objective was set to double delivery in the 2000-2001 biennium. Programme management expect that this objective will be met (ILO 2000a: 7) and have placed considerable pressure on the field offices to ensure that it is. The issue of delivery is controversial, however, as the spending of money does not reflect the quality of spending or the results of the spending and there is considerable pressure on field offices to develop programmes and to spend money. These time pressures have meant that field staff have had little time to strategise and carefully evaluate (see Chapter 6).

In the next two sections we will be exploring the current functioning of the Programme further but at this point it is useful to explore the success of the Programme, as the 'brand' which has become the 'flagship' of the ILO.

4.2 Why has the IPEC 'brand' been so successful?

So what has led to the IPEC 'brand' attaining such a level of 'success' in selling its particular brand and attracting not only recipient countries but also donors. There is a long queue of countries hoping to sign MoUs with IPEC, more than there can ever be funds for, and all the major donors are involved in supporting the Programme, even the Americans who have long been reluctant to support UN initiatives. 'Success' in these terms does not necessarily imply impact as there has been no effort to measure global IPEC impact[117]. The Programme is now often called the 'flagship' programme of the ILO, i.e., the Programme which attracts most publicity for ILO work. How, therefore, did the programme go from idea in the early 1990s to flagship in 2000?

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[117] This would of course be an extremely difficult task: can you measure the numbers of children who have not entered into child labour through mass media and sensitisation campaigns, for example? Fortunately, it is not my task to do this but merely to point out 'success' in the terms stated above.

4.2.1 Internal Organisational Factors

According to one ILO informant:

> IPEC is the flagship now, the publicity for the ILO. That is for sure. It gets a lot of money although there is all this chaos. I can't tell you why (female ILO official with extensive experience of working with IPEC and other ILO departments, pers. comm.).

The 'chaos' element is one which we shall be discussing further below. Another informant provides a more detailed response:

> What is it that made this so successful? Looking at the internal dynamics it was the right time, the right people, the right DG, a lot of luck- I don't want to minimise that. But if you look at it from a programmatic point of view (..) if there was one critical thing it was the fact that we used international labour standards, research, statistics, advocacy, policy and programming in an integrated way. The international labour standards were extremely useful as they provided the framework within which we viewed the problem and the objectives. The research and statistics gave us the vital information we need about the problem (...) We use that information to give visibility to the world. The media picked up on this human, moral, social and economic problem. We used research for advocacy purposes, at the same time documenting programmes around the world by NGOs and governments, putting together the necessary information and action. An integrated approach was used so it was a very respectable programme. This is extremely important. You don't get success right away, there has to be persistent, sustained work (..) we could have failed if it weren't for a) technical officials and b) committed managers in the organisation who are prepared to support the programme and third, a very good rapport which developed between the Office, the international media and child rights groups (Assefa Bequele, Senior ILO official and one of IPEC founders, pers. comm.).

This quote picks up five very important factors: timing, the development of an integrated approach to programming, committed management, a good rapport with outside actors, and luck. Timing was important as IPEC was developed just after the CRC so public attention was firmly focused on child issues and the momentum had already been created outside IPEC. The integrated approach was very important and, as a practitioner, I would argue that programmes must take a holistic perspective and be based on well founded research if they are to have any chance of success. The way in which it was

rooted in particular countries was also participatory and has led to a feeling of national ownership (see Chapter 6). The rapport with outside actors was also facilitated by this participatory approach, with NGOs and other groups involved right from the start. The media was quick to pick up on the 'attractiveness' of the issue (discussed further below) and IPEC fed them frequently with press releases. Luck is clearly important but the combination of the above factors created the luck as much as anything else. It is perhaps also useful to contrast Bequele's 'respectable programme' with the first quote in this section which refers to the 'chaos' element of the Programme. This no doubt reflects the perspective of each informant: the first was a former IPEC staff member who has nothing to lose by referring to the chaotic nature of the Programme, while the second informant was one of the key people to set up the Programme, and therefore has more self-interest in promoting its image as highly organised and systematic, as opposed to chaotic. Also the second informant is referring more to the organisational design of the Programme, whereas the first is referring to the practical, day-to-day reality of implementing the organisational design. This highlights the fact that however systematic the design, the reality of implementation often leads to a more 'chaotic' situation, not necessarily a bad thing if one consider Peters' (1989) best-selling management manual 'Thriving on Chaos' in which he argues that in the modern business world chaos is now the norm: 'The true objective is to take the chaos as given and learn to thrive on it. The winners of tomorrow will deal proactively with chaos, will look at the chaos per se as the source of market advantage, not as a problem to be got around' (op. cit.: preface). Although this refers to the business world, an important lesson can be drawn for the public sector: instead of following rational models of organising which suggest that there can be control through bureaucracy, it is important to recognise the reality of chaos and work with it instead of battling against it. This is not to say that bureaucracy should be done away with but that it is important to work from the reality as opposed to the ideal[118]. Perhaps IPEC managers were particularly innovative (Burns and Stalker 1961) in recognising the importance of allowing chaos to occur in order to further the development of the project, instead of hiding behind bureaucratic rules and regulations?

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[118] Chapter 4.4.3 and 7.3.2 argue that Bureaucracy is a valid and valuable form of public sector organising.

The above factors are mainly internal to the ILO but what of the international context- how important was this for the success of the Programme? According to Assefa Bequele, the international framework was important but more important was the internal ILO leadership which was prepared to take the risk of supporting an otherwise controversial initiative:

> The power and the coherence of the international framework was extremely crucial but that is not the whole story. It's not enough, supposing the chief was not interested then it dies or if the DG refused. It was a subject that no-one wanted to touch. I went to our technical co-operation branch and said to the guy, a good friend, do you think that you can get money for the child labour project, and he said no, child labour is not a sexy subject. Those words I won't forget. Governments did not want to touch it, they were mocking us. So the DG could have said no but there were people with vision at the level of leadership (Assefa Bequele, senior ILO official, pers. comm.).

He goes on to emphasise the importance of individuals within the organisation:

> Individuals can make a difference within an organisation. I am very appreciative of the fact that the organisation backed me, through individuals of course. I personally do not believe that bureaucracy is a problem. It has never been a problem for me in the ILO, neither has money. Ideas are important and the extent to which people are receptive to those ideas (pers. comm.).

It is interesting that child labour intervention was seen to be so controversial, as today more and more governments are becoming involved in the fight against child labour. The controversial nature of child labour intervention is confirmed by another senior ILO official:

> When I started work in the mid-80s, I was told that child labour was a very delicate subject. You couldn't talk about child labour to governments as it is too sensitive. In the mid-80s governments had proposals from NGOs to work on child labour (..) a number of donors expressed interest and the Germans said they would provide funding. It was a major breakthrough. HQ said it would be too delicate. Assefa was funding modest research and then the Indian Ministry of Labour had a meeting, this was significant as it gave the green light to donors. The Indian government is important on the GB so the green light was significant (Female, senior ILO official, pers. comm.).

This account is slightly different from Bequele's in that it reveals that HQ was also cautious about getting involved and only gave support once it had become clear that the Indian government would be supportive of further intervention. It is clear, however, that the support eventually given by HQ management was extremely important to the success of the Programme, particularly in the early stages of its development when it had limited funding and a lower profile.

Another important factor, briefly mentioned above, was the way in which IPEC works not only within the ILO tripartite framework but also with NGOs:

> What is our strength? I don't really know. For the ILO at least, we expanded the partnership to NGOs, this was a big issue. Flexibility and pragmatic in funding, trying out different projects. The ILO's strength- workers, employers and governments- in practice was very important (ILO-IPEC official, pers. comm.).

The role played by NGOs in IPEC's success cannot be underestimated. NGO partners have been invaluable in developing alternative, innovative and flexible action programmes in a way which IPEC's traditional partners were unable to do. NGOs are often based in local areas and are therefore more aware of the issues which may lead to programme success or failure as well as to the particular needs of individual 'communities'. They may also be less politically implicated than the traditional ILO partners, although it can be argued that the recent growth in NGOs[119] has made them a major player on the international and national political arena. The issue of flexibility will be discussed further below.

Appropriate staffing is also identified by one IPEC staff member as an important factor contributing to the success of IPEC:

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[119] Stirrat and Henkel (1997), cited in Crewe and Harrison (1998), estimate that there are now around 30, 000 international NGOs as well as countless local, community and grassroots organisations. For a further discussion on NGOs, see Crewe and Harrison (1998).

> It is a young programme. There were a lot of people who wanted to prove they could do it. It is difficult to get a job with the ILO, young people get employed in IPEC with a high level of responsibility. It was felt that anyone could deal with it as it only needs a very general background, if you were prepared to work hard, it is not difficult to be committed to this cause. Young people, that is a strength (ILO-IPEC official, pers. comm.).

While I would disagree on the basis of my evidence that working with IPEC only needs a general background (4.4.7 below) young people have been a key strength of IPEC. IPEC is fortunate in having an extremely young, experienced and committed staff who are prepared to put in long hours and hard work (see 4.4.6).

The issue of appropriate staffing brings us to another factor behind the success of IPEC: the visionary style of its early leadership. According to informants who had worked with IPEC from the early days, IPEC greatly benefited from the ideological vision of one man, Assefa Bequele. Leadership is not the same as management and this distinction becomes important below (see 4.4.7; 7.3.3). I would argue that without the vision of this one man, IPEC may not have been where it is today. According to Peters and Austin in their book *A passion for excellence* (1986), cited in Albrow (1997: 103), success requires vision and values. Vision starts with the single individual and: 'It must come from the market and the soul simultaneously. It must be felt passionately before it is published'. IPEC provides a strong example of this equation: the passion and the vision were there, embodied primarily in Bequele but also in the colleagues who supported him, whilst at the same time the changing market and developing societal values were ready to hear the message.

Finally, it is important to discuss the issue of flexibility raised in the quote above. IPEC stands out in ILO programming, largely due to its flexibility within a more rigid, bureaucratic structure. IPEC developed as it gained empirical experience. Partner organisations were encouraged, particularly in the early years of the Programme, to develop and implement innovative activities. Successful components were then brought into larger projects (ILO 2000a). Research has always been an important element of the Programme although funding was scarce until recently:

> Research in the ILO has been constrained by many factors. We are at a new beginning, for the first time we will have appropriate resources for research. In previous years lip service was paid to research but there was no money. Donors didn't want to pay. Projects give more visibility for taxpayers' money spent. (IPEC research co-ordinator, pers. comm.; gloss added).

Furthermore, the emphasis on particular types of action has changed through time: from an early focus on withdrawal, to one of 'providing alternatives' and now to the 'worst forms'. While the pattern was clearly not so linear and different country programmes implement their programmes in different ways, the fact that IPEC has been open to different approaches has been important in allowing it to develop in a pragmatic way.

4.2.2 Marketing and the commoditisation of 'the child labourer'

The attractiveness of 'child labour' to the donors must also not be discounted:

> Child labour as a concept has been a very powerful tool to get visibility to the issue of children, to put pressure on government, human rights groups and others (Bequele, pers. comm. gloss added).

'Child labour' has therefore been a powerful tool, acceptable to many different groups and an issue which many donors want to buy into. In the words of one informant:

> The ILO produces 'conscience'. The donors buy this, it makes them feel that they are doing something good (ILO official, pers. comm.).

Child labour has been a particularly strong 'brand' of 'conscience' and IPEC has been particularly successful in capitalising on this in order to market and sell its 'product'. In fact IPEC itself uses marketing language, referring to its various actions as 'product lines': for example, the 'Education and Social Dialogue Product Line'. This vocabulary shows the importance given to 'marketing' the 'brand'. The glossy brochures and heart-tugging videos produced by IPEC have been extremely well produced to sell its product: 'conscience'. Helping children is one issue which has always been a fundraiser, no matter what the context. The interesting issue with child labour, however, is that it is not just a

social issue but is one firmly implicated in current drives towards economic liberalisation. This makes it easy to sell to the business and worker groups as well as humanitarian groups. According to Czarniawska (1997:34) :

> It is its (organisation) tendency to *dramatize* certain chosen problems in order to gain the attention of the public. The number of issues the spectators are able to identify and attend to seriously is limited, regardless of the degree of their sincere interest. The issues that become the topics of discovery and discussion are those presented in a dramatically appealing fashion (italics author's own; gloss added).

IPEC leadership was aware of this, and the package has been sold in a suitably dramatic 'appealing fashion', making it one of the key 'conscience packages' sold by the ILO. It would appear, however, that the 'packaging' of the 'product' needed further development, as revealed by the recent introduction of 'marketing speak' within the day-to-day functioning of the Programme, i.e. the re-naming of the different activities as 'product lines'[120]. The implications of adopting this particular language is worth considering briefly. The use of new language can facilitate the 'selling' of the 'package' to the donors - not only by giving the impression of a more 'exciting' and 'innovative' approach but also by giving an appearance of 'efficiency' in that the Programme is aware of the latest developments in business and management thought. I would argue, however, that it is important to be aware of the more negative impacts of such an approach. By turning child labourers into 'product lines' they are being de-humanised[121]. Such de-humanisation may serve to give the impression that it is possible to advocate a set of rational 'solutions' to child labour, in much the same way as a factory uses one fixed

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[120] I attempted to find out where the language came from but it appears that the language had entered so gradually into the IPEC consciousness that no-one could inform me as to its origins.

[121] Klein (2000) refers to the way in which companies no longer market a product, i.e., trainers but the brand, i.e., Nike. Could branding become the next step in international development management? Instead of taking child labour in Tanzania, for example, as the starting point, donors 'buy-in' to the IPEC brand? In a way, this has happened already, with DFID developing an understanding with the ILO that child labour support should be provided through IPEC (DFID: 1999b). Is branding, therefore, a natural consequence of 'partnership'? It would be too early to decide on this, as IPEC branding is a very new phenomenon, but it will need addressing in the future.

'recipe' to produce a conveyor belt of identical and perfect items. Children are not products but individuals, each with their own experiences, needs and desires, and cannot be targeted by one single 'recipe'. Child specialists are well aware of this, as shown by the development of a 'new sociology/anthropology of childhood' which takes a social constructionist perspective to argue that there is no one childhood but multiple childhood*s*, each located within a specific socio-cultural context (Chapter 3.1; James and Prout 1997 [1990]; James, Jenks and Prout 1998) and which, in turn, has led to the development of a more participatory approach to working with children (for example Johnson et al. 1998). It is in fact disturbing that IPEC has not taken this particular language of 'participation' more seriously, as discussed in 3.1. I would therefore argue that while the use of marketing 'speak' is important in the short term to attract donors, it is detrimental to the development of appropriate and sustainable action to working with child labourers in the long term. Such action must be based on extensive and sensitive participatory research work, which takes a social constructionist approach. In the rush to satisfy donors (4.4.5 below) this is often not done which leads to a situation where, at best, children ignore the project, and, at worst, children are banned from an industry only to be forced into one which is much worse, more underground and harder to tackle, as the Bangladeshi case taught us[122].

4.2.3 Conclusion

The success of IPEC can thus be attributed to the way in which it was packaged and sold, in a post-CRC climate where increasing attention was being placed on the rights of children, as well as to factors internal to the ILO such as leadership, support from the DG and others, its particular integrated and holistic approach to child labour, its flexibility, timing and participatory approach.

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[122] The threat of a US Bill to ban imports of goods made by children led to the sacking of all children under 14 by Bangladeshi clothing manufacturers. Deprived of a much needed income, children were obliged to find alternative employment in industries which were often more hazardous such as prostitution. See O'Malley (1997).

It is important to note, however, that none of the ILO HQ informants attributed success to the work of IPEC outside of HQ i.e. field offices, National Programme Managers and other national staff, despite the fact that they are the primary focus of action in the field, as explored in Chapters 6 and 7. This is an important omission and reflects the centralised nature of the Organisation.

4.3 IPEC Now: Formal Discourse and Practice

This section will explore the formal discourses and practices employed in the implementation of the policy determined by the policy makers (Chapter 3). While policy provides the overall framework for action, formal discourses and practices are the specific ways in which the Programme is structured in order to facilitate the translation of policy into practice.

This section focuses mainly on written sources. These illustrate the formal discourses of the Programme but it is important to remember that each source is written by one person or group of people on behalf of the Programme, and field work revealed the distinctive experiences, talents, styles and ideologies of different staff members. Therefore although it might appear that Programme literature is a homogeneous body of 'formal discourse' this could never be possible. Written documents are the outcome of complex processes which aim to provide a cohesive and collective statement. They may be developed to fulfil a particular bureaucratic function (for example, mid-term reviews written in technocratic language), for promotional purposes (glossy brochures written in simplified, generalised form), for political purposes (to gain support) or for financial purposes (to obtain money).

4.3.1 Programme Goals and Philosophy

According to Albrow (1997: 113) 'statements about organizational objectives are notoriously slippery as focal points for organizational analysis and yet traditionally have had a privileged place'. He bases his argument on the fact that rational models of ends or

goal-oriented behaviour require behaviourally defined targets 'to permit mutual orientation to a common goal by a multiplicity of actors' (ibid.: 114). I would argue that organisational analysis *must* explore organisational objectives for exactly that reason. Programme or organisation goals or objectives are revealing in that they do 'permit mutual orientation to a common goal by a multiplicity of actors'. This is a considerable achievement considering the diversity of actors within an organisation. One key factor behind IPEC's success has been its ability to unite diverse groups under the one objective of abolition of child labour. An exploration of the goals of the Programme is also illustrative of the underlying philosophy of the Programme to which staff are expected to buy in. It is also important to note the purpose for which goals are set, such as clarity, to gain financial, political or public support or to promote a particular ideology. Furthermore, goals are not fixed. In the ILO, the overall goal of abolition of child labour has remained the same through time but the goals required to achieve the overall goal and the language used to convey the goal have developed as new experiences have been taken on board (2.3; 3.2).

The aim of the Programme is well defined in the literature and consists of ensuring the:

> progressive elimination of child labour by strengthening national capacities to address the child labour problem and by creating a world wide movement to combat it. Recognising that the child labour problem cannot be solved overnight, IPEC gives priority to action which will bring an end to extreme forms of child labour (ILO undated: 18).

Breaking this statement down is revealing of the philosophy of the Programme. First is the assumption that countries are capable of effectively formulating policy and implementing programmes for the progressive implementation of child labour, with particular emphasis on the worst forms. To do so, however, national capacities need strengthening and the Programme aims to help in this. A world wide movement is also needed to combat child labour and IPEC can assist in developing this through the introduction of legislation, policy and programme development, information dissemination to increase public awareness and to change social attitudes and finally

through calls for action. The Programme encourages countries to ratify both Convention 138 and 182 (see 2.3) and assists them in developing measures to ensure that they are in a position to do so. The Programme recognises that child labour can not be stopped overnight and that elimination is a progressive process. It therefore prioritises the elimination of the worst forms of child labour. These need to be detected and prevented and then children need to be withdrawn from these forms of work as a matter of urgency.

The focus on the worst forms of child labour is not a new one although many commentators have the impression that it is an emphasis which came about with the recent adoption of Convention 182:

> We have always been focusing on the worst forms. Before it was called 'hazardous and exploitative work' but since 1996, 97, we have been focusing on 'worst forms'. There has been an increase in action programmes, not just from the field but also there was a push from HQ (ILO official, European male with long term experience of working with IPEC, pers. comm.; see also International Labour Office 1998e: 12).

In order to understand the philosophy further it is important to briefly highlight why it is that the Programme is campaigning against child labour:

> In the long run, child labour results in scores of under-skilled, unqualified workers and jeopardizes future improvements in the overall level of skills within the workforce. The worst child labour abuses take place, basically, among the most vulnerable socio-economic groups in society. Their children do not attend school because of social stigma or simply because they cannot afford to forego the children's contribution to the family income (ILO 2000a: 4).

Long term societal development and the need to protect child labourers from abuse are therefore, according to the quote, the two primary motives for intervention. The choice of order is interesting although it would not be appropriate to read too much into that as for the majority of ILO informants the primary motivation for action was the need to protect children from abuse. The long term impact of child labour for societal development is, however, an important one as child labour can perpetuate child labour

with future generations of children of child labourers also being caught in the vicious cycle of poverty and labour.

4.3.2 Programme Structure

The structure of IPEC has been constantly changing and evolving and any documents written on this theme soon become out of date. It is therefore important to note that this analysis is valid up to November 2001[123]. The Programme chart (Box 4.3.2) is useful in summarising a highly complex structure[124]:

[123] For an earlier review of IPEC see Lansky (1997).

[124] The Programme is based on three operational pillars: Knowledge, Service and Advocacy (ILO 2000a: 5). The Knowledge pillar focuses on legal standards, research on policy issues and statistical development for policy and programming. The Advocacy pillar aims at leading 'the global campaign aimed at urgent and widespread ratification and proper implementation of 182 and other relevant conventions'. The Service pillar works to 'assist constituents and other implementing partners in translating into action their political will to abolish child labour, giving priority to its worst forms' (http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/publ/pub99/index. htm.). The Director of Operations is responsible for the Service pillar which means that he oversees desk officers, evaluation unit and newly appointed Sub Regional Co-ordinators and the National Programme Managers who must be nationals of the implementing country (6). The Director of Policy and Advocacy is directly responsible for research, advocacy and statistics activities at HQ level. Fieldwork revealed, however, that in practice there is often an overlap with staff in Operations also developing policy research documents to feed into programming.

Box 4.3.2 IPEC Programme Structure Chart



The current InFocus Programme: IPEC management framework involves three Directors: one overall Programme Director who reports directly to the International

Steering Committee, one Director of Operations and one Director of Policy Development and Advocacy. Many informants believe that it is useful to have more than one Director, as different Directors have different skills, i.e. one is seen as politically sensitive and able to impress donors and another is seen as a good manager. The Directors have very different backgrounds and it could be argued that the selection process was very 'politically correct'. One Director is a near end of career white European male, another is a middle-aged Asian male and the other is a mid-career black, female Francophone African. Although this is a 'representative' selection, informants have argued that there are often internal conflicts and discord as a result of the management structure:

> We are working in parallel lines. There is internal conflict with (one) doing his own thing, unaware of what the others are doing, and another feeling marginalised (ILO official, pers. comm.).

We will return to the issue of management in 4.4 on informal discourse and practice.

At the HQ level, the Programme Director is responsible to the International Steering Committee (ISC), a representative group of ILO constituents responsible for monitoring the work of the Programme. This was an innovative feature of the Programme and aimed at making it more directly responsible to the constituents than other conventional ILO programmes. At a national level there is also a national steering committee to which the national programme is accountable for decision making and which is explored further in Chapter 6. The ISC meets once a year for approximately half a day to consider the biennial budget as well as policies and strategies. I attended an ISC meeting and it became very clear that there was not enough time for the meeting and moreover it was more of a 'rubber stamp' to predetermined proposals than a forum for active debate. This concern was also raised in the external audit (see below): 'the ISC is not in a position to exert strong control over IPEC activities nor does it receive sufficient information to hold IPEC management fully accountable for implementing the approved programme' (External Auditor 1999: 3). This concern had not been resolved by the November 2000 ISC during which one constituent expressed frustration with the process, arguing that future meetings should discuss future directions rather than just review what was put to

them by the Office: 'a steering committee should steer and give guidance, not just review' (pers. comm.). These frustrations have in a way been an inevitable result of the rapid expansion of the Programme: what was once a small committee of participating countries has now turned into a major event with at least one hundred participants. For this reason the external audit has suggested that the function may best be performed through the usual ILO channels, i.e. the GB and the Technical Co-operation Committee (which meets during the GB meetings).

Field work revealed a number of problems with the day to day functioning of the Programme, many of which were picked up on by the external audit conducted in 1999. The DG commissioned the audit in view of the rapid growth of IPEC, the aim being to examine the extent to which the Programme had met its objectives and to make recommendations for future action. The report was presented in May 1999, and the DG decided that all 24 recommendations should be implemented and an action plan was prepared with target dates. These recommendations are clearly laid out in Annex 2 of the IPEC Highlights 2000 (ILO 2000a), although a number of issues are brought up in the next section. It is important to note, however, that the Programme has taken serious measures to address the recommendations, committing itself to deadlines as well as to reporting on progress to the International Steering Committee.

One of the main conclusions of the Report was that the Programme's operational structure had remained broadly the same since its 1992 inception, although the work of the organisational units had evolved through time. This had led to confusion with regard to the roles and responsibilities of staff, the result being overlapping duties and duplication of work. The first recommendation was therefore that the roles and responsibilities of staff and organisational units be clearly defined. A new Programme chart was drawn up and a review of job descriptions, both in HQ and in field offices, has begun (ILO 2000a: Annex 2).

This section has thus shown us the official structures and philosophy behind IPEC, the ILO programme which was designed to implement the Organisation's child labour agenda in the 1990s and then beyond. Organisations do not, however, function merely through having appropriate structures and philosophies. In daily practice there are a

number of bureaucratic procedures and individual personality traits and experiences which allow the Organisation to function either in a constructive or a less constructive manner. The next section therefore considers the day-to-day voices of those responsible for implementing the formal discourse of IPEC.

4.4 IPEC Now: InFormal Discourse and Practice

> Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is 'dehumanized', the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation (Weber 1978: 975, cited in Albrow 1997: 93[125]).

Weber's account of rational bureaucracy has dominated organisational theorising but recent commentators, notably Albrow (1997), have taken Weber's other work on motive and meaning to argue for the inclusion of emotion into social theorising of the organisation. Albrow (1997: 113) argues that 'organizations, viewed as webs of action and interaction, are emotional entities as much as they are rational units'. This is supported by my fieldwork which revealed that it is impossible to separate affectivity, i.e. feelings and emotions, from the day to day functioning of the ILO and for this reason it is important to consider the informal discourses and practices of staff working in HQ. While the formal discourse explored in the previous section revealed the overlying structures and 'philosophy' of the Programme, i.e. the 'dehumanized' business to be accomplished, this section provides evidence for the argument that no-one can work in a void, free from emotional needs and desires.

It is important to recognise that emotions are fundamental to both the success and the failures of bureaucracy, and particularly to the functioning of the Programme within the ILO, a value-driven Programme within a value-driven Organisation.

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[125] For a fuller exploration of Weber and bureaucracy see Albrow (1970) and Albrow (1997).

In this and following chapters (6 and 7), I therefore consider the human actors within the Organisation in an attempt to counter the image of human beings as rational decision makers and to explore ways in which a recognition of human organisational life can be used to improve practice.

4.4.1 The De-humanisation effect

It was seen above that according to Weber "Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is 'dehumanized'" (1978: 975). It is useful to explore this idea further, using the ILO as a pertinent example of a 'dehumanised' bureaucracy. In Chapter 3, it was noted that official reports tend to hide the passion and emotion of the discussions upon which they are based. It is therefore important to read between the lines but for those not present at the meetings in question it is all too easy to view the decision making process as harmonious and emotion free. This de-humanisation serves to perpetuate the belief in 'The Organisation' as a homogeneous, non-human entity, which in turn hides the fact that it is composed of people and therefore subject to the emotional and ideological conflict experienced by any group. Those within the Organisation will be fully aware of and part of this conflict, which is expressed in meetings, over coffee or in scribbles on official documents circulated around the office. These scribbles are then filed and the document is once more 'de-humanised'. What are the reasons behind this de-humanisation? I would argue that de-humanisation is a necessary part of sustaining the myth of the rational Organisation, above human error. As long as this myth is sustained, however, organisational flaws can only continue. Once the human input is recognised and 'managed' in a more realistic way then large bureaucratic organisations, such as the ILO, can restructure themselves more progressively (7.3.3). Of course, admitting that human emotions determine the success or failure of your organisation is not the perfect way to get a donor to fund your multi-million pound programme as donors are looking

for the rational, scientific model approach[126] but I would argue that these donors in turn must admit the non-rationality of their own decision making processes. The power of the individual in blocking or sanctioning a particular action or idea is only too strong (7.3.3). Conflict of personality is something which anyone working in an organisation has experienced, despite the best attempts of bureaucratic structures to prevent such occurrences. The contrary effect is that where the personality of a staff member is particularly appreciated by a manager, the former may be given greater opportunities than would otherwise be the case.

Czarniawska (1997: 40) argues that de-humanisation is important in maintaining the illusion of control in a situation where no one is or could be in charge. She also provides an alternative way of viewing the organisation- as a superperson:

> Despite the claim that machines and organisms are the most popular images of organization (Morgan 1986), there is another metaphor that is as popular but whose metaphorical character has been almost forgotten, so taken for granted has it become. This is the organization as super-person, as a single powerful decision-maker, personified in a leader or leadership group or expressed in the notion of the organization as a collective. The assumption of *Homo collectivus* or Organization Man, can be seen lurking behind this conceptualization. (1997: 41).

The ILO is a perfect example of this. The DG represents the Organisation and all official documents are seen to be written by him, although a large number of people are responsible for writing his documents and oral presentations. Somavia is seen as the frame of reference for much staff decision making and his name comes up regularly in both formal and informal meetings. The result of this *'homo collectivus'* is that the Organisation is seen as consensus-based. While this is a useful image to bear in mind, I would argue that this vision is more commonly found within the Organisation and by those working closely with it. From an external frame of reference, the 'de-humanised' model appears to be a more relevant and common approach to portray and perceive the

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[126] While some donors, such as DFID, are paying lip service to being favourable to a more participatory, process approach, in reality this is extremely rare and is more dependent on the particular programme officer fighting on a personal level for this approach than one coming from policy and management.

'Organisation'. I therefore propose to continue to use the de-humanised model as my theoretical frame of reference.

4.4.2 A Cacophony of Voices

In addition to the de-humanisation effect, an exploration of the formal discourse and practice of the Programme or of the Organisation, as undertaken in 4.2, may also lead the reader to believe that there is a polyphony of voices within the Organisation, all working harmoniously in a rational and mechanised fashion towards the same goal. Fieldwork revealed, however, that this polyphony is more of a cacophony (see also Chapter 6). It is important to note that within IPEC there are a number of different informal discourses and practices and so any conclusions are bound to be affected by my informants. There is no one informal discourse, just as it was shown above that there is no one formal discourse. As Czarniawska argues:

> Every organisation hosts a multitude of small narratives, multiple interpretations, plural realities. These stem from ideological differences, professional variations, or generation and gender differences. Actors are forced to choose one version of the world to act upon, but this does not make any particular version permanent or valid for the future (Czarniawska 1997: 161-2).

This important statement reminds us of the fluid nature of organisations and the difficulties faced by those conducting any form of organisational analysis. The picture is one of continual flux, with people's narratives being constructed and reconstructed through time. Bourdieu (1977) and De Certeau (1984) argue that social agents do not simply enact culture but reinterpret it and reappropriate it in their own ways. I saw this time and time again, with informants giving me quite different data depending on their mood at the time of our conversation. On particularly stressful days the more negative aspects of life in IPEC would be revealed, whereas more positive aspects would be discussed on days when there had been an inspiring meeting, for example, and staff felt valued. Informants occupying different positions in the bureaucratic ladder also gave me access to different types of data. In IPEC there are a very large number of actors: administrative support staff, different professional grades within the formal ILO structure, JPOs who work in the UN system for an average of two years, National

Project Managers, National and International Steering Committee members, consultants, donors and of course the 'beneficiaries'. These numerous stakeholders clearly have different interests and agendas and there is therefore a continual negotiation and re-negotiation of ideas and proposed actions.

In order to gain a clear picture of informal discourses and practices in IPEC HQ, it was important to use a range of sources, both oral and written. In 4.2 it was seen that sources have their own background and are expressed in particular ways, for particular purposes. Different sources are therefore revealing in different ways. Written memos, for example, have a range of stylistic cues which convey feelings, such as hostility, esteem, approbation and insecurity, and for this reason require meticulous care in preparation and interpretation (Albrow 1997: 121). Meetings involve much more than data exchange and are complex occasions: forums for expression of emotion (Albrow 1997: 121). As one informant told me after a meeting, which I had found frustrating as no-one appeared to 'say' anything of particular value:

> You need to decipher the code behind what people are saying. There are many things going on under the surface (Young, male ILO official, pers. comm.).

In this section it was thus seen that it is important to recognise the multitude of narratives within IPEC and to attempt to understand what lies behind these.

4.4.3 Bureaucracy, Personality and Bureaucratisation

Having argued for the existence of multiple narratives, it is important to return to the issue of individual personality and affectivity (see also 7.3.3). According to Merton, bureaucracy requires, and tends to produce, a certain type of 'bureaucratic personality'. The bureaucratic emphasis on precision and reliability can be self defeating, with the following of rules, designed to facilitate the achievement of organisational goals, becoming an end in itself. The graded career structure may encourage staff to 'keep a low profile' and not speak out when mistakes are made or when innovative ideas are proposed (Merton's 1940, cited in Albrow 1970: 55). Bureaucracy can therefore produce

rigid thinking which is unsuitable for periods of rapid change. Albrow (1970: 55) points out, however, that: 'The official has characteristics as a social being beyond those which the administrative code specifies. Like other men he has interests, prejudices and fears. He forms friendships and cliques'. Despite the gender insensitivity typical of the time at which Albrow was writing, his words remain pertinent. While bureaucracy may encourage a bureaucratic personality it is also important to remember that each staff member has his or her own biography and is embedded in particular social relations. Behaviour is therefore not so easy to regulate. It is useful to remember the informant in 4.1.2 who told us that the second Director of IPEC struggled as he was an 'outsider' and 'didn't know how to do things'. This meant that not only did he not know the bureaucratic procedures but he did not have his 'friendships and cliques' within the Organisation to help him side-step certain bureaucratic constraints.

Many IPEC informants were not 'bureaucratic personalities' and one of their main complaints was the highly bureaucratised nature of the ILO, which they try to resist in particular ways (4.3.8). Although it was seen above that IPEC was developed to allow for flexibility and innovation, staff are still working within the rigid bureaucratic structure of the ILO which, many claim, slows down action and leads to frustration and the feeling of being continuously blocked:

> People who come in from the private sector only stay one or two years because everything is so slow here. People do try but there are blockages at every level and then we become bureaucratised ourselves, then we become slower (male, ILO official, pers. comm.).

This last statement is an interesting reflection of the bureaucratisation process. Even people who enter the Organisation full of energy and commitment find themselves having to leave or slow down in order to survive. The structures of the Organisation may therefore have a demotivating effect with staff feeling stifled, uninspired, unchallenged but at the same time overworked. Interviews revealed that when people arrive from in IPEC from the field they feel their 'field identity' very strongly, as did I when I first arrived. In a relatively short time, however, the 'field identity' (where the primary focus

is on intervention) is transformed into a 'bureaucratic identity' (where the primary focus is on fulfilling bureaucratic procedures). I will return to this in 7.3.3 but at this stage it is important to note how routine and structural elements of bureaucracy, such as set procedures and working patterns and the need to sustain a particular life style, can lead so easily to the 'bureaucratisation' of staff.

Linda Nelson and Frank Burns (cited in Management for Development Foundation 2000: 5) identify four types of organisational management styles: reactive organisations (focused on the past and struggling to survive), responsive organisations (focused on the present), pro-active organisations (focused on the future) and high performing organisations (focused on flows, from past via present to future). I would argue that the ILO is a responsive organisation and its management style is therefore one of short term planning. This is partly to do with the fact that the Organisation works by biennia and funding is never guaranteed. This has the impact, however, of attracting traditional management techniques in terms of planning, authority and a structured approach. The result is the current focus on input rather than output and on process rather than on goals. In a rapidly developing policy climate, however, these management skills need to be modified to take into account the needs of an environment which requires flexibility, speed, inspiration and results.

It is interesting to note how 'bureaucracy' is used by many informants and commentators. The term has obtained a popular understanding as a 'dirty word' rather than as a valid and valuable form of public sector organising. Bureaucracy is commonly associated with red tape and delays but it is important to remember the valuable role played by bureaucracy in preventing unsavoury practices such as corruption and nepotism (Du Gay: 2000; 7.3.2). As seen in 7.3.2, bureaucracy can often be used as an excuse for inaction of to hide incompetence. Perhaps it is useful at this stage to take the words of Assefa Bequele, one of the innovators behind the alternative approach taken by IPEC (4.1):

> I don't believe that bureaucracies don't work, they are subject to defamation too. There is no link between bureaucracy and inefficiency. What creates the dilemma is something else, it does not mean that public bureaucracies are inevitably condemned to being inefficient (pers. comm.)

It is to this 'something else' that we shall return in Chapter 7 in order to understand what it is in bureaucracies that can lead to inefficiency.

4.4.5 Spatial distribution

According to Crewe and Harrison (1998) spatial separation and segmentation is a key factor leading to the impracticability of the Weberian ideal:

> Segmented bureaucracies (...) do not function as Weberian integrated wholes. Rather policies are reinterpreted according to the rationales, predelictions and positions of the individuals concerned. Equally, those creating the policies, even if they have had 'field experience' at some point in their careers, are physically, as well as conceptually, separated from those charged with carrying out their policies (1998: 190).

The issue of spatial distribution and segmentation was an important one during field work: the spatial divide between the field, the field office and HQ, the mental and philosophical divide between staff in the field and at HQ and the physical divide within the Office.

At HQ, one of the most frequently cited complaints was the structuring of the different departments:

> This building is too big. It is not humanly organised. You don't know what other people in different parts of the building are doing (male ILO official, pers. comm.).

The physical geography of the building is important and as Baldry (1997: 367) argues sends out important signals to non-occupants as well as to occupants. The building is an enormous arc-shaped, grey cement structure. Visitors enter through electric glass doors, and are then overwhelmed and humbled by the grandiose but sparse stone reception hall.

Most staff do not use this entrance but enter instead via the functional concrete underground car parks or from the bus stop entrance, through one of the three canteen entrances. They then enter one of the eight sets of lifts at either end of the building and then go up to one of the 14 floors. There are a further four sets of internal staff lifts (not including those for messengers). Each floor is identically laid out with offices on either side of the building separated by an inner ridge of storage rooms and meeting rooms. Photocopy machines and water fountains are spaced out at regular intervals along the 224 metre corridor. Newcomers are often found coming out of the lift the wrong way as all corridors look identical and it is difficult to get one's bearing for the first few weeks. The office was therefore not designed in a particularly human friendly way but in a 'rational, bureaucratic' way: everything ordered to look similar to promote an impression of efficiency and, I suggest, to ensure that human emotions such as jealousy would not come through. This clearly has not worked, however, as the views from both sides are different: from one side there are the magnificent Alps and Lake Geneva and from the other a field and some hills. Competition for one particular side of the building is therefore important. More 'emotions' are also created by the fact that different grades are allocated different numbers of windows: administrative staff have one or one and a half windows, medium level professional staff have two windows, high level staff three and Directors four. Window space allocation is therefore deliberately ordered to illustrate the hierarchy and power relations within the Organisation.

Gupta and Ferguson (1997: 36) argue that 'notions of locality or community refer both to a demarcated physical space and to clusters of interaction'. It is therefore important to see that the notion of belonging to the ILO or to IPEC is not just referred to by a demarcated space but also by clusters of interaction. This is important when one considers the extent to which the Organisation is compartmentalised, not just by physical space but by a lack of interaction between different departments, for example. Departments are also spatially compartmentalised on different floors or ends of the building. This can hardly be avoided but has led to a situation where individual departments do not know what is going on in others. More seriously they often find

themselves in competition with each other. This is due not only to spatial distribution which leads to a feeling of 'otherness' but is also to the scarcity of funding and the way in which different departments are responsible for finding extra-budgetary funding. With a limited number of donors, each department is responsible for packaging its own product in the most attractive way to ensure funding. Furthermore, the promotion structure means that individual managers need to prove how successful they are at running their department, which leads to further competitiveness.

According to one informant one of the greatest weaknesses of the ILO is the departmental compartmentalisation:

> One of the weakest aspects of the organisation is that there is no proper co-ordination between departments and units. I think it's becoming too compartmentalised and in some cases competitive and there are no appropriate policies to help overcome this situation (female ILO official, pers. comm.).

Senior management must therefore take greater responsibility for ensuring greater co-ordination between departments and it would appear that the Director General's policy of reducing the number of departments was aimed at facilitating such co-ordination. In reality, however, the number of activities has not been reduced:

> I do understand Somavia's approach, we need to work on visibility and not spreading ourselves too thin. The rationale is for a single concept- decent work, with four sub concepts but they haven't reduced it from 39 to 4. They are not doing away with all the other activities (male, ILO official, pers. comm.).

Within IPEC itself there is also a compartmentalised approach with Operations responsible for certain actions and Policy development and Advocacy for others. It was seen in 4.2.2 that this leads to staff feeling that they are working in 'parallel lines' and that there is conflict between the different directors. While it is important for activities to be allocated in a clear manner, it is also important that each member of staff feels that he or she is fitting a piece into the larger puzzle and that the final picture is clear.

There is also a spatial separation from child labourers:

> I saw from the administrative side, child labour was just a subject. You're not in contact with the child labourer, that's how people see it, there is no real contact with the subject. When people come they think they will but then get bogged down in the administrative things rather than the research work. I think when people come to IPEC they do have the kids in mind but this is washed away when they realise it is just administrative work (female, ILO secretary, pers. comm.).

This is supported by a professional grade informant who was disturbed at how little involvement he had with people working at field level:

> I thought that my job would be supporting people on the ground. When I got here I realised that everyone always looks upwards and not downwards. Do this as a service to the DG or to the Cabinet. It's not necessary to wonder that some of the old crocodiles are a bit cynical (male, ILO official, pers. comm.).

This quote again reflects the political nature of the Organisation: looking 'up' to those in power instead of 'down' to those in need of empowering.

This is further supported by the spatial distribution of the Organisation. The ILO has been decentralised since the late 1940s when field offices were opened up (2.3; 6). The Organisation does remain, however, extremely centralised:

> Whichever way we turn we are an extremely centralised organisation (...) MDTs (multi-disciplinary teams based in the field), half the posts are vacant. Everyone wants to be at HQ, so they send the junk out (ILO HQ official, pers. comm., gloss added).

My experience of the ILO Area Office (AO) in Tanzania did not support the argument that only the 'junk' was sent out as the AO Director was extremely competent (Chapter 6). It is true, however, that the most 'prestigious' and solicited posts are in HQ and that the competition to gain promotion in HQ is strong. This furthers the impression that the HQ is the central point for policy making and means that many innovative and successful approaches taken in the field are not taken on board in HQ.

The built environment and spatial distributions are thus extremely important elements of organisational analysis although these are elements which commentators do not seem to have taken on board. It is high time that this is done as the links between space and performance are important.

4.4.5 Political framework

Having discussed the importance of individual personality and emotions within the Organisation as well as problems of spatial segmentation, it is as important to note that the Organisation does not function in a void but is located within a global capitalist system geared to profit, value for money and quick results, with less and less money being invested in 'social' organisations such as the ILO. Managers must function within this wider political framework and are often faced with the dilemma of whether or not to abandon one good but controversial idea for 'the greater good' of the Organisation. This issue came up often with regard to the use of participatory methodology. During fieldwork my participant persona pushed frequently for the importance of adopting a long term process approach based on a participatory methodology. The official response from both DFID and the ILO was that this was not suitable. From the ILO the justification was that 'the donors would not approve, they want immediate results' and from DFID it was 'our new policy framework has moved away from that' or 'that is what we are doing' although I would disagree strongly that this was being done. It is not my purpose to enter into details here but rather to show that there are wider motives behind individuals rejecting particular approaches.

Crewe and Harrison's (1998) study of the aid industry reveals a similar reluctance on the part of donors to conduct pre-project work:

> Donor agencies tend to shy away from giving funds for pre-project work, for example carrying out research to discover what local needs are. They need a mechanism for decision-making and aim to give the impression of rationality and coherence in their choices (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 191).

IPEC informants add the donors' need for quick results to Crewe and Harrison's need for 'rationality and coherence'. They argued that pre-project work, in the form of the use of participatory methodologies, was rejected as the donors wanted quick results:

> Try asking donors for money for participatory methodologies, the Americans just want things done quick, quick, quick (ILO official, pers. comm.).

This opinion is supported by the pressure placed by the Americans on 'delivery rates' (4.1). They have made it clear that they want quantifiable results, mainly verified by the spending of all money allocated, as opposed to a long-term process based on extensive participatory research.

The reason for the ILO's acceptance of US dictate is related to its financial contribution. In a time of declining funding, money means power :

> Power is where the money is. Poor countries pay small membership fees but then have very little say. The Americans are putting money in two places- into IPEC and the Declaration (ILO official, pers. comm.).

The impact of donors on programme activities was briefly discussed in 4.2 (see also Chapter 7). I would also argue, however, that the power of donors can be overemphasised and used as an excuse for inaction and lack of innovation. The ILO is in a position to negotiate with the donors, who need the ILO as much as the ILO needs them. Donors have budgets which need to be spent: there is therefore room for debate and if the ILO can provide a well justified argument for its approach then donors will be open, as they have been in the past, to IPEC's innovative approaches. The fear of the donor was reflected in an informal conversation with a senior official responsible for ILO-donor relations regarding the rapid influx of money to IPEC. I was arguing that there did not seem to be a logic to the fact that IPEC was receiving so much more money than other programmes in countries where non-child labour issues may in fact be more important and yet be receiving very little money:

> ILO official: If IPEC receives more money than other InFocus programmes even if it is not necessarily the most important one in-country then that is a failing of the ILO. The country Director has failed.

Interviewer: But who can say no to funding?

ILO official: We can say no.

Interviewer: Really?

ILO official: But there would be political implications of rejecting US money if they specifically wanted it spent on a particular issue.

The conclusion of the conversation was that the ILO would not say no to money and therefore to US dictate, due to the wider political implications.

Often, however, the wider political framework can be brought in as an excuse: many people in Organisations feel that they do not have the answers. They are not allowed to express this, however, and so hide behind 'the framework', the 'donors', the 'managers'. There must be wider recognition of the fact that answers are not always easily found and innovative approaches must be considered. Other times people are overworked and don't have time to think strategically, they therefore feel the need to hide their 'failures'. I would argue that this is not a personal failing but an organisational failing. In IPEC people are overworked and this is no secret to management:

> There are lots of options but little spare capacity to play around with. If you see the workload people in IPEC have. I am amazed they still have time to think of IPEC product lines despite their incredible workloads (Programme Director IPEC during a donor meeting, pers. comm.)

4.4.6 Overwork

While the political framework is of key importance to the wider functioning of the Organisation, overwork was an internal factor which came up repeatedly during field work, although interestingly enough it was usually a matter of pride rather than complaint. The organisational culture promotes the ideal of working long hours as illustrative of a 'hard worker', despite the fact that the ILO is meant to be promoting the right of workers to 'decent work'. During my first week in IPEC Tanzania, the National Programme Manager asked me if I would be working Saturdays as 'we all do'. I soon

found out that not only did the National Programme Manager and others work Saturdays as a matter of course but often Sundays and holidays too. The words of IPEC staff informants reveal the extent to which they are overworked:

> We all work 11, 12 hour days and often weekends. It is a value driven organisation so people are committed and stay late. Only two are regular budget staff, all the others are just on annual contracts. (This refers to 'Operations', Female IPEC staff member, pers. comm.).

The level of overwork was substantiated by participant observation in HQ. If I were to walk through the corridors of the ILO late in the evening, any night of the week, the only department where all the offices would still be lit up would be those of IPEC. Many other departments are in fact under-worked, as illustrated by the high numbers of people 'at coffee', no matter what the time of day. According to one informant it is the fact that IPEC staff are in such precarious positions that leads to overwork:

> The safer the job, the less people seem to do. In IPEC most people have insecure jobs so they have to work very hard. If people have to work weekends though there is something wrong (IPEC official, pers. comm.).

For those who do not see overwork as 'normal', the pressures of the heavy workload contribute to the high turnover within IPEC:

> There is a very high turnover of staff because of the heavy workload. People can't cope. The funding isn't stable and it is difficult to keep people on (Male, IPEC informant, pers. comm.).

The vast majority of IPEC staff are not funded under the regular budget[127] but under project funds. This means that they are not permanent ILO staff but occupy posts created for the project alone. Although they may have worked for IPEC for years they have no job security or associated perks:

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[127] The problems facing European staff in accessing regular budget ILO jobs were discussed above (3.3.3)

> There is a high turnover in IPEC because there is no security of employment, they can't enter competitions, only external ones but if they come from a country, like Belgium, they have little chance (Male, IPEC informant, pers. comm.).

Morale is therefore low for many who feel that their overwork is not compensated for in any way other than their love for the job and their belief in the work that they do. The issue of overwork is illustrative of the informal ways in which the Organisational culture can exert pressure on staff in order to gain maximum utility from them. It is also another example of the paradox which sees the International Labour Organisation advocating the rights of workers throughout the world and yet not ensuring the basic work rights of its own staff[128].

One of the primary reasons for overwork has been the limited numbers of staff. These have been growing rapidly, however, with the recent influx of US funds. The exact staffing numbers remain secret, however. At the November 2000 National Steering Committee meeting, the question of exact staffing numbers was raised on three separate occasions. The response on each occasion was evasive and no conclusive number was given. When I asked IPEC informants after the meeting why the numbers should be secret I was told it was because other departments would be jealous and create problems. This shows that resentment (4.1) continues.

The problem of overwork is compounded by the lack of adequate management:

> The management of IPEC has always been shambolic. It is easy to criticise but if you do not give the necessary resources... Most people are looking for a way out. Overwork is one thing but non-management is another (IPEC official, pers. comm.).

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[128] It is important to remember that we are discussing the International *Labour* Organisation, the body responsible for international labour standards and currently emphasising 'Decent work' as a priority. Overwork and short term contracts extended over long term periods are contrary to any decent work principle. The strange hypocrisy of the Organisation is further revealed by the fact that until recently ILO staff were not allowed to be unionised, this from the Organisation promoting the worldwide right of workers to join unions!

I would also suggest that overwork is more common than in other departments as IPEC staff are particularly value-driven. Many were highly committed child rights activists working in poor countries before joining IPEC. In other departments, it is more common to find staff who are career international civil servants[129] and who are perhaps therefore motivated to work in different ways. It is important to recognise that there are different groupings within the ILO itself, each with its own collective identity. This is also highlighted by the way in which ex- trade union representatives, for example, were introduced to me with the prefix: 'He was a trade unionist' or in which trade unionist identify themselves with the same prefix, may be to affirm that they are not career civil servants.

4.4.7 Leadership and management[130]

We saw that the vision and values of IPEC leadership in the early days were key to its 'success' (4.1). Albrow (1997) cites Peters and Austin (1986) who argue that values and vision are followed by love and empathy and love is equated with loyalty, teamwork and respect for the individual. While 'love' is perhaps too strong a word, fieldwork did reveal that a strong liking for a leader and empathy lead to commitment, passion, enthusiasm and job satisfaction, which in turn leads to improved output. IPEC management has often been less than satisfactory and was one of the biggest complaints of informants, and I would argue that this is primarily because it has not always been successful in inspiring 'love and empathy' from staff. This is supported by current management thinking which rates 'Emotional Intelligence' (EI)- the ability to understand and control your emotions and to recognise and respond to those of others- as the single most effective business skill of the new century (Goleman 1996, 1999).

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[129] For a text on international civil servants see Lemoine (1995).

[130] Leadership skills require the ability to inspire and motivate staff to follow your lead whereas management skills require the ability to direct staff as to how best to do this. A person responsible for a department or Programme should have both leadership and management skills.

It would appear that all too often the 'value-driven' nature of IPEC staff has allowed management to ignore the importance of providing inspiring leadership. This has led to the departure of extremely talented and committed staff, causing high turnover, institutional memory loss, wasted time in training up new staff, and confusion for social partners who find it difficult to place the face to the action and spend valuable time re-explaining things to the new face. All this affects the atmosphere of the working environment which in turn affects the product or output (Albrow 1997: 119).

Visionary leadership is therefore extremely important in maintaining staff morale and dynamism, although it would appear that there is currently little such leadership in IPEC. In addition to visionary leadership I would add the importance of charismatic, authoritative and dynamic leadership. As IPEC currently stands, low level IPEC staff such as JPOs often have a higher level of child labour experience than their managers, be it in or outside the field. While experience may not always be the most important requirement of a manager, in a context where specific management skills are weak, experience is essential. According to ILO informants, two of the three current directors have no previous experience of child labour work. Child labour is a highly technical field, which I (unlike the informant cited in 4.1 above) would argue, on the basis of my evidence, requires a specific form of expertise and experience of what does and does not work with working children. The ILO's bureaucratic structures mean that managers should be generalists who are advised by the specialists but where there are multiple managers working in a hierarchical system this becomes complicated and does not necessarily work in the 'rational' way that it should.

Management issues do not just affect IPEC but the ILO as a whole. Many informants complained about the management structures and the lack of importance given to the training of good managers:

> There aren't good managers. Management is not looked at as a profession, a post. There is no training on the art of management, people are selected for their political and technical competencies, not their management (male, ILO official, pers. comm.).

Not only is management not seen as a profession but even more concerning is the use of promotion as a way of disposing of people who are not performing as they should:

> Here if you don't perform you probably get promoted because people want to get rid of you, send you to the field and give you a P5 (male, ILO official, pers. comm.).

I came across this same issue in discussions with other UN staff, indicating that it is not just an ILO problem. The issue of people being given jobs because of their nationality was also discussed in Chapter 3.3.

4.4.8 Informal Resistance Strategies

As much as people are subject to Organisational processes, they are also responsible for constructing and reconstructing them. As Foucault informs us, power permeates all levels and resistance necessarily accompanies the exercise of power. The instruments and techniques of disciplinary power are therefore "always liable to forms of re-appropriation, reversibility and re-utilisation not only in tactical re-alignments from 'above' but in counter-offensives from 'below'" (Gordon cited in Foucault 1980: 256). IPEC HQ staff are not therefore mere subjects to the bureaucratic procedures but are active participants in resisting and re-appropriating them.

During a discussion about the critical literature on IPEC one informant informed me that many IPEC staff are in fact 'resisting' the bureaucratic structures and trying to change how the Organisation works:

> There are many of us who fight from the inside, unlike those (pointing to the list of critics) who just criticise from the outside (pers. comm., gloss added).

While there are those who try to change the functioning of the Organisation, the majority is simply trying to 'survive' in a highly regulated environment which makes the achieving of results a slow and tedious process.

With regard to the spatial compartmentalisation seen in 4.4.4 above, staff develop their own informal networks for getting things done:

> Here everything is done through informal networks, who your friends are, who you trust, that is how it works. You exchange information with those you trust (male, ILO official, pers. comm.).

Staff also resist the impersonal structuring of the office space (4.4.4). People personalise their own space with plants, photos and other items designed to 'tell observers a little bit about us as people: I am a name and not a number' (Baldry 1997: 367).

Another common resistance strategy is avoidance:

> Avoidance, I avoid everyone. I try to help those in the field. I avoid the managers in particular (male, ILO official, pers. comm.).

Often avoidance would simply consist of going for coffee, especially in HQ. Other times people would put their answering machine on even when they were in the office. I would also argue that meetings are often used as an avoidance strategy. Meetings are extremely frequent which means that responsibility can be diverted to the group as a 'group decision' or time can simply be wasted on endless discussion.

A section from my field notes written after a discussion with ILO colleagues over canteen lunch reveals the impact of the bureaucratisation process on myself as 'participant' and the various survival strategies I was contemplating at the time:

> In big organisations, you lose freedom, you get lost in the big system, stepping stones up, always fighting till you end up resigning to it as a survival strategy or resigning full stop. In a system you are part of it and yet you are also fighting against it, i.e. fighting against a part of yourself, there is a constant re-evaluation of self, more obstacles in front of you. People in your system who are supposed to be helping you are actually making things harder for you. It is a comfort zone, you sit in your department saying, this is not my problem, not my responsibility, go and ask over there.

A classic example of this was the two month contract I had at HQ to build a bibliographic database. I needed a particular software package and I put in the order as soon as I arrived. Ordering equipment is a lengthy process and it has to go through the various levels of bureaucratic procedure. Had I ordered the package privately it would have taken 24 hours. Instead, however, the package arrived at the end of my sixth week. This left me with just over two weeks to complete the activity for which I had been recruited for two months. Not only was six weeks of taxpayers' money wasted but a considerable amount of time was spent chasing people up that should have been spent in a more 'rational' way, i.e. doing my job. This is an extremely small example but a common one, illustrative of why multi-million dollar development programmes take so long to come off the ground (see 7). The process also illustrates how responsibility is passed around in a bureaucracy and how the system facilitates this, i.e. the administrator shops around for the package and applies to the IT department who processes the request and then forwards it to Procurement who insists on using a particular stockist, eventually ordering a more expensive package from a store which did not have it in stock, the order then goes back to IT for processing and eventually the software is delivered). In such a system, each person blames the other for 'not going through the proper procedure' or for 'sitting on the demand order' or for 'being on holiday' or for a number of other excuses which I heard almost daily during the six week period.

4.4.9 A point on gender

Throughout the fourteen months of fieldwork, the issue of gender within the Organisation was almost invisible in conversations with informants. In fact, it only came

up with regard to the frustrations expressed by one male member of staff that a particular woman had only been promoted because she was female. Whether or not this is correct, it is clear that the level of gender stereotyping in work allocation remains pervasive within the Organisation. Despite promoting equal rights at work, the ILO has been unable to put gender equality into practice. Management positions are clearly male biased, and gender stereotyping is obvious, with secretarial jobs still held by women and messengers being men. There is, however, a growing group of young, ambitious and professional females and it will be interesting to see whether they manage to burst the glass ceiling[131].

Such gender stereotyping continues to influence the issue of sexuality at work. According to Hearn and Parkin (1987) cited in Savage and Witz (1992: 48-49):

> Enter most organizations and you enter a world of sexuality.. This can include a mass of sexual displays, feelings and fantasies, and innuendoes, as part of everyday organizational life, right through to sexual relationships, open or secret, occasional sexual acts, and sexual violations, including rape.

The authors express their surprise at the 'booming silence' about sexuality in the literature on organisations, which give the impression that they are 'inhabited by a breed of strange, asexual eunuch figures'[132]. I would argue, however, that the 'booming silence' may not be so surprising after all. Reference to gender and sexuality is still taboo within Organisations and therefore obtaining data is not so straightforward. During fieldwork, the issue was only talked about on two occasions: once when sexual harassment was gossiped about but not substantiated, and once when a male official implied that another official had only been promoted as she is female, discussed above. The issue of sexual harassment is one which management still tend to 'brush under the carpet' although the

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[131] Helle Poulsen at the University of Copenhagen is currently undertaking a PhD in gender mainstreaming within the ILO.

[132] Moss Kanter's (1977) landmark text was one of the first books to break the 'booming silence' and to explore the impact of corporate power on women. Witz and Savage (1992) provide a useful overview of the literature on sexuality and gender in organisations.

issue of female promotion is one which the Organisation is taking seriously, at least in rhetoric[133].

The way the Organisation relates to its staff in terms of gender and sexuality is important in terms of day to day practice. Gender discrimination will affect policy development, for example, as policy makers will mainly be men. To date, all but two IPEC programme directors have been male, which I would argue has led to a more 'masculine' style of organising. Hofstede (1994) lays down four factors which impact on Organisational culture, one of which is the extent to which masculinity, as opposed to femininity, is pervasive[134]. Gender roles are of course socially and culturally determined and Hofstede makes clear that he uses the terms 'masculine' and 'feminine' in a relative as opposed to absolute sense. According to Hofstede (1994: 81-82), masculine positioning tends to emphasise certain indicators of success- earnings, recognition, advancement and challenge- whereas feminine positioning tends to emphasise the importance of relationships, co-operation, living area (living near home) and employment security. While men can have feminine characteristics and women can have masculine characteristics, Hofstede's framework provides a useful perspective to explore how male dominance of power within the ILO and IPEC affects practice and programming. If male managers emphasise advancement, challenge, recognition and high earnings then it can be argued that they will focus more on developing programmes which are high status and innovative and lead to rapid and identifiable results, which if successful will lead to promotion, pay increases and recognition. A female manager may be more likely to focus on programming which is more centred on building relationships, i.e. conducting participatory action research. Hofstede goes on to argue that certain cultures are more masculine or feminine than others. On his masculinity-femininity index, Germany rates

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[133] A Report entitled 'Breaking through the Glass Ceiling: Women in management' has just been completed. See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pkits/pdf/glassceiling.pdf. Writing reports in one thing but gender equality remains elusive within the ILO, despite being one of the ILO's primary goals.

[134] Hofstede's other categories will be explored in Chapter 6.

as a strongly 'masculine' country, as opposed to Denmark, for example, which is more 'feminine'. It has been seen that in IPEC there has been a number of high status and innovative initiatives and a reluctance to engage in more long-term processual and participatory research and programming. There has also been little emphasis on building relationships with staff, e.g. by fighting for more equitable contractual terms. It could be argued that this is due to the 'masculinity' of IPEC management systems, caused by sexual discrimination and stereotyping as well as by the domination of German managers.

4.5 Chapter Conclusions

This chapter has explored the various discourses and practices behind the 'vision' laid down in Chapter 3. Furthermore, it has introduced a number of important theoretical issues to which we will return in later chapters.

It has been shown that although the ILO portrays itself as a 'de-humanised' entity which functions in a rational, non-emotional and mechanical way it does in fact constitute a multi-dimensional body of thought and practice which functions according to the various interactions and power relations between staff and the outside world as well as among staff within the Organisation. Albrow's theory on the importance of including emotion in social theorising of the organisation was used to build on arguments by Weber and Czarniowska and to reveal that 'de-humanisation' is an important tool used by management and others to portray the organisation as a rational, homogeneous machine, free from human error and the ideological and emotional conflict necessarily found in any group of people. These issues are considered further in Chapter 7 where I argue that 'people' related issues such as emotion and personality are central to the failure of matching development rhetoric with effective practice.

It is therefore useful to take a Foucauldian perspective to view the Organisation as a site of contestation or web of power relations rather than as a rigid and 'de-humanised'

structure. If practice is to be improved the organisational culture must reflect the value of each individual staff member. This is supported by Ramsay and Parker (1992) who propose the 'neo-bureaucracy' model and argue that an Organisation must 'capture the hearts and minds of members in order to ensure its functioning', exercising control through consent and common purpose. The ILO is already at an advantage in moving towards such a model. As a value-based organisation, it can be argued that the ILO, especially IPEC, often has the hearts and minds of staff before they even join the Organisation. Bureaucratic procedures (explored further in Chapters 6, 7 and 9), however, lead to the unfortunate situation where the hearts and minds are often lost and people leave to work for NGOs, the private sector or work as freelance consultants for the Organisation which means that they can buy in to its heart and mind without being constrained by the bureaucratic nightmare.

The private sector is already taking the issue of managing relationships on board and is placing increasing emphasis on Emotional Intelligence (4.4.7), as a key management and leadership skill. The public sector has traditionally been slow to pick up on innovative developments from the private sector. In this rapidly developing world, however, where competition for resources is strong and where scepticism vis-à-vis social change is growing, organisations such as the ILO can no longer afford to rest on their laurels and must adopt efficient management techniques. The tragedy appears to be, however, that instead of learning from the success of the innovative approach taken by IPEC it is attempting to bring it back into the folds of the Organisation which will inevitably lead to bureaucratisation and the stifling of further innovation and change.

5. Child Labour in Tanzania: A historical and local perspective

Box 5. Map of Tanzania

In previous chapters, the term 'child labour' has been used in a more or less abstract manner, with little explanation of what actually leads to children labouring in particular countries or how children and others feel about child labour in a national context. This thesis could clearly not be complete without an exploration of such issues, which were in fact the starting point of my research. My primary concern while preparing for field work was the importance of using a participatory approach to gain an understanding of the situation from the perspectives of children and other stakeholders. It soon became clear, however, that it was impossible to explore the issue of children labouring in a purely local and contemporary context. IPEC is only the most recent development in a long story of historical changes in child work practices. The historical context behind child labour in Tanzania must therefore be explored as well as the national framework which was developed to tackle the issue before IPEC was set up. What was the situation prior to the entrance of IPEC and what was it that led the Government of Tanzania to ask the ILO for assistance in tackling child labour? In this section, I will be attempting to place current child labour practice in Tanzania within its historical context as well as outlining the development of national policy to tackle child labour before the introduction of IPEC in 1994. I will then introduce the historical development of Mirerani, the mining township which is the subject of Chapters 6 and 7 on IPEC Tanzania intervention, attempting to place this local history within the wider historical context explored in the first section of this chapter. Finally, I will attempt to outline the human and economic geography of Mirerani in order to provide the backdrop to the child labour situation which is explored in Chapter 8 through the use of participatory research with the children themselves[135].

[135] The placing of the chapter on children's voices at the end of this thesis is not accidental but is a reflection of the positioning of the realities of children's lives within organisational practice. In the following chapters I argue that child labourers as embodied subjects with voice are almost invisible in the wider machinations of the ILO, replaced instead with 'the child labourer' as an abstract and disembodied construct.

5.1 Child Labour in Tanzania[136] : A Historical Overview

This section originates from a desire to understand the role of children's work in Tanzanian society through time in order to contextualise contemporary arguments for 'eliminating child labour' (Ministry of Labour and Youth Development 1997) and therefore for the introduction of IPEC. My data reveals that the roots of today's attitudes to child work are firmly based in historical developments. This supports Hendrick's argument (2.2) that:

> the numerous perceptions of childhood, which have been produced over the last two hundred years or so, can only be fully comprehended within the context of how different generations and social classes have responded to the social, economic, religious and political challenges of their respective eras (Hendrick 1997: 35)[137].

Wallman teaches us that the concept of 'work' can be introduced into a culture or transformed through time (Wallman 1979). I thus propose to consider the ways in which cultural, political and economic developments have shaped people's lives and their perceptions of the role to be played by child work[138].

5.1.1 Pre-Colonial History: Child work as a form of socialisation and learning

Writing on the pre-colonial history of Tanzania generally and of Tanzanian childhood specifically is difficult due to the dearth of available literature (Mpangala 1992). Goran

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[136]This section will consider only mainland Tanzania, called Tanganyika during the colonial era. This is because the islands of Zanzibar, which united with Tanganyika in 1964, have a distinctive history which it would not be possible to analyse within the scope of this proposal.

[137]Hendrick was writing on British childhood and his task was greatly facilitated by the extensive literature available (Aries 1986 [1960]; DeMause 1976; Cunningham 1995b). Unfortunately, very little has been written on childhood in Tanzania (Sumra *et al.* 1999: 42) and almost nothing on the developments in child work through time. Therefore, in view of the limited resources, I in no way claim to be constructing a definitive historical overview of child work.

[138] For a differentiation between child 'work' and child 'labour' see Chapter 1. I use the ILO definition whereby labour is work which is exploitative or dangerous to the child. Although this is clearly a subjective definition, as discussed earlier, it is the most useful working definition for my purposes. Child work can lead to child labour and it is therefore important to explore both of these.

Hyden informs us that, in Tanzania, 'History began with the white man's arrival on the black continent' (Hyden 1980: 38). According to Mpangala (1992), the earliest form of economy in Tanzania was hunting and gathering although the transition to crop cultivation and pastoral economy started as early as 500 B.C. (1992: 3). The first available reference to children is that made by Mpangala in his discussion of nineteenth century societies. He informs us that the communally based, nomadic Masai pastoralists of central and north-central Tanzania divided labour activities by age and sex, with 'children between the age of eight and eighteen specialised in grazing cattle' (1992: 5). This would suggest that children formed a labour group in themselves and that there was no gender division of labour for children, unlike today where, as seen below, child work is clearly gender divided (see also Chapter 8).

Kayongo-Male and Onyango's (1984) study of the family division of labour in pre-colonial society supports Mpangala's comments regarding the division of labour by age group 'children' as opposed to by gender, although they suggest that work does become gendered from the age of eight to ten:

> Children began helping at very early ages. They were not overworked but were expected to contribute through performance of tasks geared to their age and sex. Before the age of eight to ten years, there was little sexual differentiation in the duties given to children, tasks being sexually differentiated after that period. Children learned persistence, co-operation and many other values in addition to the skill in performing a task. By the age of seven most children were capable of caring for younger siblings while the mother did other work like farming or trading (1984: 24).

Age was therefore an important component in the division of labour and children had clearly defined roles within the group. According to Koponen:

> there was no society which did not at least informally recognise age grades such as 'childhood', 'adolescence', etc., and few societies which did not formalise some of the grades and generate more or less elaborate rituals to mark the transition from one grade to another. This was necessary because age was a major factor in the allocation of roles within the groups of production and consumption (1988: 288).

Age also played an important role in the social and ideological organisation of pre-colonial society (Mpangala 1992: 8-9; Koponen 1988: 288). Age-set seniority systems were developed within kinship institutions, with the youngest at the lowest level in the hierarchy. Furthermore, a number of groups also used a system of age-sets, with those of the same age passing through age grades in the company of their set mates (Koponen 1988: 289; Mpangala 1992: 6).

It would therefore appear from the literature that in pre-colonial history children had clear work roles and functions within their kinship group. They were expected to perform light tasks, which would develop as the child matured, as would the division of tasks according to gender. The child thus contributed to the survival of the community at the same time as developing vital life skills[139].

5.1.2. The German Invasion and the introduction of 'child labour'

It has been argued that the German colonisation of Tanganyika put an end to the prosperity of the pre-colonial economies (Hyden 1980: 41)[140]. The fragile relationship between people and environment, which had been carefully balanced by the indigenous peoples was rapidly disrupted by ill thought out colonial policies which sought to maximise profit. The arrival of the colonisers[141] was disastrous with loss of life through fighting and out-breaks in epidemics such as smallpox and rinderpest, which wiped out 90% of the cattle in most parts of the country (Coulson 1982: 28). It is clear that the consequences of famine, disease, forced migration and fighting must have been damaging for children's welfare in that their survival and development were under

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[139] It is important to qualify the literature review, however, with the observation that it is difficult to generalise about the division of labour by gender or age on the basis of the study of a small number of social groups as there may have been huge variations depending on the local political economy. It is also important to note that pre-colonial times experienced slave trading and various inter-ethnic wars (see Koponen 1988) as well as slave trading, which clearly impacted on the lives of children.

[140] By the end of the nineteenth century, important iron, textile and salt manufacturing industries had already been developed in Tanzania, an aspect often ignored in the colonialists' attempts to justify their presence as bringing 'Africa out of backwardness' (Hyden 1980: 38).

[141] Although the term 'colonisers' is used it is important to note that these were not a homogenous group of people but a mixed group which included missionaries, settlers, misfits and undesirables from Europe, progressive officials as well as bureaucratic technical officers.

continual threat. Furthermore, the introduction of a cash-economy disrupted the traditional subsistence economy. The Germans imposed a cash taxation system, which meant that many had to seek paid employment on colonial plantations in order to meet tax demands; failure to make cash payments led to forced labour (Coulson 1982, Hyden 1980). Forced labour was particularly disruptive to family farming, with members of the household, generally men but also children, being withdrawn from the farms for long periods, leaving women and children to take on the work of the absent men (Kayongo-Male and Onyango 1984: 25).

According to the commentators, it was during colonial rule that children were first drawn into exploitative non-family labour, working on plantations, in mines and as farm and house workers[142] (Kayongo-Male and Onyango 1984: 25; Rwegoshora, Mbeo and Amma 1997: 32). This is particularly distressing in that whilst colonialists were engaging Tanzanian children in such exploitative and hazardous work, legislators were passing laws outlawing such practices in Europe (Fyfe 1989; 2.2). According to Nyerere, this was also the time that the term 'worker', in the capitalist sense of 'employee', was first introduced to Tanzania (1968a: 6). This supports Wallman's claim that work is a concept negotiated and transformed through time (1979).

It is often argued in favour of colonial policies that the colonisers provided an important contribution through the development of basic infrastructure. In Tanganyika, German rule led to the introduction of formal education systems and by 1914, there were 60 primary schools and 9 post-primary schools (Coulson 1982: 41) in addition to the mission schools which had established themselves since the 1840s. Furthermore, a network of hospitals and roads was developed in areas of German settlement. I would argue, however, that while better than nothing, such developments were marginal and due to the limited numbers I would doubt whether they had any impact for the majority of children working in Tanzania[143].

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[142]The paradox is that plantation, mining and domestic work are currently the three targets of international attention in Tanzania as these are seen to be the most hazardous and exploitative forms of work.

[143] For those African children who did access schooling it is useful to consider Serpell's (1993) argument that many young Africans emerge from Western style primary schooling with a sense of frustration and lowered self esteem.

The German invasion was thus responsible for dramatically transforming pre-colonial work patterns and it is during this period that children became engaged in waged and forced labour. The consequences of famine and disease were detrimental to children's welfare and although there were developments in basic infrastructure, these were minimal and had little impact on the welfare of most Tanzanians.

5.1.3 The British 'Invasion' [144]: Growing poverty and the entrenchment of child labour

Although child labour first developed under German rule, the situation became more acute under British rule. The war between the Germans and British left the already weak colonial economy in a desperate state. Between 1920 and 1946, Britain administered Tanganyika under a League of Nations Mandate which stated that the colony was to be administered in the interests of 'the material and moral well-being and the social progress of its inhabitants' (League of Nations Mandate quoted in Coulson 1982: 45). It would appear from the literature, however, that during this period there was little social progress and that the material and moral well being of the inhabitants came second to the profit of Western plantation owners. Children were often used in plantation labour and no effort was made to legislate for their protection (Rwegoshora, Mbeo and Amma 1997: 32). The world depression of the 1930s hit Tanzania's primary product export industry hard and wages for plantation workers collapsed, with many unskilled labourers earning half of the 1927 rate in 1940 (Coulson 1982: 46). Tax rates were not reduced, however, and many people found themselves having to produce double the amount of crops to pay their taxes, with the threat of forced conscription for those who could not pay[145]. While there is no information available as to how peasants succeeded in increasing production so successfully, I would suggest that it was essential for all family members, including children, to work extremely long and exhausting hours. The colonial focus on the production of cash crops also led to a decrease in subsistence farming and

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[144]I use the term invasion as the result of the British administration was at least as destructive and invasive as the German invasion had been.

[145]During the war years, labour conscription increased over 27-fold, from 960 in 1941 to 26,200 in 1945 (Orde-Browne 1946 quoted in Coulson 1982: 49).

consequently to a series of famines. The result of colonial policy was thus clearly not one of encouraging the well-being of inhabitants but of increasing the dependency of small-scale producers, not only on world markets for cash crops but on the British government for famine relief, a situation which unfortunately has hardly changed since.

After the Second World War, the country become a 'trusteeship territory' of the United Nations, whilst remaining under British governance. Instead of facilitating a transition to independence, the British now adopted an open policy of forcing small farmers to change their agricultural techniques; local know-how was ignored and foreign 'experts' told peasants how they should work their land. According to Coulson (1982), new crops were introduced, ineffective 'conservation' policies were imposed and peasants were told when and how to work. Farmers who refused to accept 'modern' methods were seen as conservative and lazy and the possible reasons for their refusal were ignored. Time, however, proved them to be right with many policies leading to severe environmental degradation (Ibid.).

It would thus appear that colonial policies not only stimulated the current 'child labour' phenomenon through employing children in exploitative and hazardous conditions but placed many peasant farmers in an economically and environmentally precarious situation in which family survival depended on the contribution of all family members, including children. Employers could therefore justify employing children on the basis that it was helping family survival : 'Thus the very 'evils' of the system created by the colonialists had become in turn the justification for perpetuating the 'evil' of child labour' (Shivji 1985: 224)[146].

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[146] Just before the end of British rule the Employment Ordinance Cap. 366, 1955, was passed, prohibiting the employment of children under the apparent age of 12 (section 77). This Ordinance remains one of the key pieces of national child work employment to this date. Under the Ordinance children between the ages of 12 and 15 are allowed to engage in light agricultural, horticultural or plantation work as long as this work is not hazardous or dangerous. No person under the age of 18 can engage in hazardous or dangerous work (s. 2). The penalty for breach is a fine not exceeding T.shs 3,000 (£3) and/or three months imprisonment. Unfortunately, enforcement mechanisms are weak and many children fall outside the ambit of the Ordinance which refers to 'employed' children i.e. those with an employment contract. Most working children in Tanzania are, however, self-employed or do not have a work contract. It would thus appear that the Ordinance is of more symbolic than practical value in that it does not really provide effective protection for working children.

Furthermore, the education of Tanzanian children was extremely low on the British colonial agenda. The total allocation to education was below 1% of total recurrent expenditures between 1919-1925 and around 5% between 1930-1945 (Buchert 1994: 23). Furthermore, the few educational institutions were concentrated in areas of cash-crop production, trade and administration and white settler areas. Consequently, these schools were primarily accessible to European and Indian children, who lived in closest proximity to these areas[147]. The British introduced a triple system of education, with different schools for White, Indian and African children. According to Buchert, the British 'Education for Adaptation' policy:

> applied only to the African population and was provided for males rather than females. It aimed at the provision of basic reading, writing and accounting skills in support of the indirect rule system, the transfer of vocational agricultural skills to develop peasant agriculture and the transmission of Western civic values and Christianity to 'civilise' and mute certain traditional values and customs (1994: 30).

It would therefore appear that British educational policy was more geared towards supporting the colonial system than to promoting the educational rights of Tanzanian children[148], particularly those of girls. Furthermore, according to Kayongo-Male and Onyango, the introduction of European schools and churches was particularly detrimental to traditional family life, offering both new sets of values and new sources of authority (1984: 26; see also Varkevisser 1973). Hendrick also argues that the British schooling system created and imposed an altogether new construction of childhood:

> It threw aside the child's 'knowledge' derived from parents, community, peer group, and personal experience. Instead it demanded a state of ignorance. Secondly, it required upon pain of punishment, usually physical, a form of behaviour, accompanied by a set of related attitudes which reinforced the child's dependence and vulnerability (1997: 46).

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[147]Fortunately, some unassisted village schools also developed in more remote areas and continued to operate outside formal government control (Buchert 1994: 30).

[148] This argument is further supported by the fact that education for Africans was primarily elementary with only 3% of African students continuing with schooling past the elementary level between 1931 and 1946, for example (Buchert 1994: 26).

The contrast between the British and local education systems is illustrated in Raum's classic 1940 ethnography, *Chaga Childhood: A Description of Indigenous Education in an East African Tribe*[149] which provides an extremely useful and detailed description of the cultural and educational development of Chaga children, from conception to adolescence. Raum details the importance of work as part of an informal process of teaching:

> Agricultural work thus not only enforces a uniformity of synchronised behaviour throughout the tribe and a close co-operative union of family members but it also activates the ties of kinship (1940: 210).

Children were sent to assist kin in times of sickness or need, without reward or wage, and were so taught the importance of social interdependence and economic co-operation. The education received by Chaga children was thus a general one in contrast to the one-sided scholastic education favoured by European style schools. Raum also details the role of children's work within the Chaga division of labour:

> girls and boys during the first five or six years are occupied in similar work. Younger boys take part in the domestic work of girls (..) This disregard for the traditional division of labour is strongly marked when the eldest child is a son who has to do duty as a nurse, or a girl is the only child and therefore has to pasture the cattle (..) The older a boy grows, the greater the temptation to play the truant at work that he never sees performed by his own sex. (..) Gradually the boy is introduced to the kind of work which traditional division of labour has assigned to men, viz. gathering banana leaves and plants suitable as fodder, and cutting them up, collecting grass for the goats, pasturing cattle, the difficult tasks of constructing a hut, the butchering of animals, the brewing of beer, and the preliminary clearing and tilling of a hitherto uncultivated plot (1940: 179-180).

Raum's text displays similarities to pre-colonial accounts of divisions of labour, although children in his account started working at an earlier age. This is interesting in that it reveals that although colonial policies introduced exploitative, non-family 'labour', the age and gender divisions of household labour remained much the same.

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[149]Raum was a British anthropologist whose father had been a missionary among the Chaga in Northern Tanzania for forty years.

It would thus appear that colonial governments were more interested in promoting their own economic interests than in promoting the welfare of Tanzania's children. In fact, the evidence suggests that children's welfare deteriorated under colonial rule, with the introduction of forced labour, exploitative work, insensitive education policies and environmental and agricultural policies which created famine and increased household poverty.

By the 1950s, unrest was spreading and in 1954, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was founded. Four years later, TANU had won a general election and there was little left for the British to do but leave. Tanganyika mainland finally gained independence from Britain in December 1961 and united with the islands of Zanzibar in 1964 to create the United Republic of Tanzania.

5.1.4 Independence: The rise in 'child labour'

The twin legacy of under-development and dependency[150] on Britain became one of the key challenges for Tanzania's first President, Julius Nyerere. To ensure equitable and rapid development, the new government adopted a policy of African socialism or *Ujamaa*, which involved large-scale nationalisation programmes and forced resettlement of peasants in communal villages. The policy appeared successful with record progress in education and health. Compulsory primary education was introduced and resulted in a noted gender balancing: women and youth were guaranteed access to land in their own right, communal labour-sharing and child-care facilities were provided in *Ujamaa* villages and human rights were strongly advocated at policy level (Mukangara and Koda 1997: 20). Furthermore, the controversial colonialist poll tax was abolished (Hyden 1980: 124). With regard to child work, Nyerere made his position clear, as outlined in 3.1, arguing that everyone who was physically able to work must do so with the exception of small children (Nyerere 1968a: 15). All workers must, however, receive a just return for their labour and that no one has the right to exploit others (Nyerere 1968:

[150]The economic crisis facing Tanzania has meant that it has been unable to reduce its dependence on foreign assistance despite Nyerere's vision of 'self-reliance' (1968a: 25).

15). Unfortunately, the retreat away from subsistence farming, so actively encouraged by the colonialists, continued despite the government's efforts to increase food production through villagisation, market organisation, forced production of certain crops and price policies (Havnevik 1993). While there is no specific data on the impact of these policies on children, food shortages must have been particularly damaging to children's development and survival and presumably the use of children in extra-household work continued. The 1970s was also a time of rapid urban growth, with the majority of those moving to urban areas remaining unemployed or joining the informal sector and a few joining the swelling ranks of the civil service or the new Tanzanian entrepreneurial class (Coulson 1982: 196, 203). In contrast to colonial urban migration patterns the majority of new migrants were 'youngsters and youth' (Ishumi 1984: 94), which goes some way to explaining the rising numbers of 'street children' in urban areas (Mdoe 1997).

Throughout the 1970s the standard of living of many Tanzanians fell and factors such as falls in commodity prices, severe droughts and a costly war with Uganda meant that by the mid- 1980s the country found itself on the verge of bankruptcy (Tanzania High Commission 1998: 11). Since 1986, Tanzania has undergone a process of rapid economic and social transformation, moving towards a more liberal development environment which has involved political pluralism, free markets and the greater participation of stakeholders[151]. The introduction of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) has had negative consequences, however, with many basic social indicators declining. Primary school enrolments, for example, stood at 93% of the relevant age group in 1980, declined to 72% in 1985 and to 63% in 1991 (Gibbon 1995: 15). According to recent United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) figures one third of Tanzanian children do not attend primary school, 95% do not attend secondary school and only 1% of the cohort attend one of the three Tanzanian universities (UNDP 2000: 1). Social sector under-funding is a gross problem and Tanzania remains, in economic

[151]The transition to multi-party democracy in mainland Tanzania has been smooth despite the fact that Tanzania is multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi-religious. The first multi-party elections were held in 1995 when the former ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) was returned to power and formed the current national government. They also won the 2000 election. In Zanzibar, the process has been less smooth, with allegations of corruption and regular political violence.

terms, one of the poorest countries in the world with a GNP per capita income of only $210 in 1997, which is far lower than the dollar a day poverty line (UNICEF 2000: 86). Furthermore, Tanzania's relative position on the Human Development Index (HDI) has been declining, from 126th in 1992 to 150th by 1998 (UNDP 2000: 30) and to 156th out of 175 countries in 1999 (UNDP 2000: 1).

One of the most glaring consequences of Structural Adjustment Policies[152] has been the marginalisation of women[153] and children (Mukangara and Koda 1997), a symptom of which could be the increasing numbers of children said to be engaging in hazardous and exploitative work. The issue of child work in Tanzania has been of concern to both the national government and the international community, as revealed by the introduction of the ILO-IPEC and the signing in March 1994 of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Tanzanian Government and the ILO to implement a child labour programme. Accurate statistics of child labour are difficult to obtain but according to the ILO-IPEC, 'the worst forms of child labour appear to be in the plantation industry, where children are exposed to chemicals, machinery, hard physical work and long working hours, and, to some extent, in mines and manufacturing industries' (ILO 1996b: 1)[154]. Furthermore, about 30% of 10-14 year olds are out of school and children under the age of 15 constitute about half of the urban informal workforce (ILO 1996b).

It is important to consider these concerns in the context of children's daily lives. Has hazardous and exploitative child work really increased? If so, why? Has there been a transformation in the work patterns that we explored in pre-colonial and colonial times and which were an important part of children's socialisation and learning?

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[152] The obvious failures of SAPs have led to a new World Bank approach: PRSPs or Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Tanzania is one of the 'pioneering' or 'experiment' countries for the PRSP, which is developed through extensive consultation with Tanzanian people, be they in villages or in organisations. The Paper is thus meant to be a poverty reduction strategy based on the needs of 'local people'. It is currently a new process and yet already it has been controversial. See Chapter 7.3.1

[153] A useful study of the impact of modernisation on traditional life-styles and women is Aud Talle's 1988 study of Masai pastoralists. Talle argues that the move from subsistence to market oriented production has placed a larger control of family resources in the hands of the Masai men which has led to declining autonomy for women (Talle 1988: 5).

[154] The Tanzanian economy is heavily dependent on agriculture which accounts for 57% of GDP although mining is a growing sector, increasingly attracting foreign investment (CIA publications 1998: 5).

To answer this last question it is useful to compare a recent 1995 UNICEF report with the findings of the pre-colonial and colonial literature which we have examined. In fact, it would appear from the UNICEF report that little has changed with regard to division of labour by age. The study of Tarime in Tanzania reveals that boys as young as three or four are given a small club and encouraged to participate in herding the animals whereas girls are given a small pot and accompany their elders in the search for water and firewood (1995: 25). As they get older, girls are expected to do all the work inside and around the house, such as preparing food and caring for siblings, as well as working in the *shamba* or farm. Boys sometimes help with *shamba* work but are more concerned with work outside the house such as building, herding and hunting (1995: 32). It would therefore appear that within the domestic sphere the divisions of labour by age and gender have remained relatively stable through time, except that there are now clear gender divisions for very young children. The report also reveals, however, that the girls' workloads have greatly augmented with increasing household poverty, as has the problem of child domestic workers. Raum's 1940 ethnography revealed that children were often sent to work for their grandparents, free of charge. This practice has since been extended, with children, mainly girls, now being sent to distant kin, living in predominantly urban areas, in the hope that they will receive an education and an escape route from the poverty of their home areas. The reality for many has been quite different, however, with children working in very difficult conditions, often vulnerable to physical and emotional abuse and often unpaid (TAMWA 1996; Sumra *et al.* 1999). The difficulty here is that these employer-employee relationships are hidden as kinship relationships and there is therefore little protection for these child workers who are described as family members rather than as employees.

The decrease in subsistence farming and the new expectations brought about by modernisation and a cash-economy have meant that many households have been unable to satisfy their needs. Children have thus been facing increasing pressure to work in excess of what was traditionally expected (see also 8.1.1). A number of other factors, such as family breakdown, cost sharing, the HIV/AIDS phenomenon and consumer pressures have further compounded the problem.

The introduction of cost-sharing has meant that many families are unable to send their children to school which has resulted in children engaging in waged employment to pay for their education or dropping-out of school altogether. A recent survey revealed that 73% of child workers interviewed worked out of economic necessity, 35% of these to finance their schooling (Rwegoshora *et al.* 1997: 22). These figures are higher than my own (8.1.1) which found that 47% left home to work because there was 'no money at home', with a further 18% leaving because there was 'no money for school'. The income contribution of children has become an essential survival strategy for many families who see little value in an expensive, low quality education which does not appear to provide their children with necessary survival skills. Price liberalisation and the removal of subsidies has also reduced families' purchasing power and has meant that more and more children are required to contribute to the family income (Mukangara and Koda 1997: 21).

The breakdown of the extended family has also led to an increase in child work practices. Traditionally, the extended family was an important support network which could provide child-care for working parents or assistance in moments of poverty. Its breakdown has meant that elder siblings, usually girls, have taken over child-care and other domestic responsibilities or have been forced into employment to provide financial support in desperate times. Furthermore, the increase in female-headed households has had important consequences for child work patterns. Research has shown that children from female-headed households are more likely to be absent from school, which was linked to the fact that these households have hardly any access to land and will consequently 'supply as wage labour any able-bodied member, including school-aged children' (Sender and Smith 1990: 62). My fieldwork revealed that even where families had access to land, the effects of the drought as well as the undesirability of a life on the *shamba* led many children to choose to enter in wage labour (Chapter 8).

AIDS is another important factor which has affected traditional divisions of labour in Tanzania. No figures are available specifically on the number of children living in families affected by the virus but in view of the recent estimate that 10% of the population may be HIV+ (Tanzania High Commission 1998: 8), children must be very directly affected. Children may find themselves responsible for caring for sick family

members, working to pay for expensive medication or even running and supporting the household. There are an estimated 730 000 'AIDS' orphans in Tanzania (UNICEF 1999), most under 18 and either living with a single parent or relatives. The number of child-headed households is also increasing and there have even been cases of extended family members claiming the inheritance rights of the children and then abandoning them (Groves and Warioba 1999). Many orphans have thus found themselves obliged to abandon their education and to engage in income-generation (Kaijage and Tibaijuka 1998).

A final factor affecting contemporary child work patterns is one which many forget to mention: the global consumer culture. This was explored in Chapter 3.1 and I therefore propose to do no more than to remind the reader of the powerful influence of consumer pressure as a result of mass advertising (from which there is little respite in Tanzania) which has led to some children and young people feeling that it is as important for them to obtain the necessary *kinds* of clothes and other possessions as it is to attend school, for example. They therefore opt for gaining a cash income as opposed to spending valuable family resources on a low-quality education, especially in a country with high youth unemployment among school leavers (8.1.1). The most recent UNDP report on Tanzania paints a bleak picture of youth unemployment:

> In 1999, 53% of the population was below the age of 18, an estimated 600- 650 000 job seekers entered the labour market in 1998 while only 33 000 wage sector jobs were created. Even with a sustained growth rate well-above current projections, Tanzania will be able to create wage sector jobs for only a tiny fraction of the labour force. Just to *maintain* the current high unemployment rate, it is estimated that Tanzania's economy must grow by 7% per annum (UNDP 2000: 1)

The opportunity to gain a cash income is therefore not easy to reject, as discussed in Chapter 8.

This historical analysis has shown that child work as a concept has been transformed through time and that the response of different generations to 'the social, economic, religious and political challenges of their respective eras' can assist us in understanding today's attitudes to children and child work. In pre-colonial times, child work was an

essential part of community survival strategies as well as an important part of the informal learning and socialisation process. The colonial era introduced the cash-economy and the employment of children in hazardous and exploitative non-family work, a trend which has continued to this day. Within the domestic sphere, the gendered division of labour has remained much the same, with a particularly negative impact on girls who are kept within the home and prevented from attending or succeeding at school, thus sustaining the status quo of female subordination. Age and gender have therefore remained the basis for the social division of labour although it would appear that children's workloads have increased as part of family survival strategies. In contemporary Tanzania, children make important contributions to both national and household economies through their work[155], engaging in domestic work, unpaid subsistence farm work, waged labour and informal employment (see also ethnographic evidence in 8.1.2.1). The value of children's work is seldom acknowledged, however, and the lack of data has meant that their contributions have remained invisible and that children are in fact seen as a net cost to national education, health and welfare budgets (Sumra *et al.* 1999: 71). Ignoring the value of children's contributions leaves children more vulnerable to exploitation and places them in a weaker bargaining position.

5.2 The historical development of child labour in Mirerani, a mining township in Northern Tanzania.

Having explored the overall development of child labour in Tanzania, this section will consider the development of child labour in Mirerani, a mining township which became the target site of DFID supported IPEC intervention (Chapters 6 and 7).

[155] A survey of the divisions of labour in agricultural production in Rukwa region reveals that the labour inputs of children were 33%, of women 35% and of men 24% revealing that work traditionally assigned to men being passed on to children (UNICEF 1995).). This situation is similar to that in industrial revolution Britain (see Chapter 2.2).

Mirerani is located in Northern Tanzania in the Purana hills[156]. It is in the Simanjiro district of Arusha Region and is famous for being rich in Tanzanite gemstones and more infamously for being 'wild west country'; reputed to be one of the most dangerous places in Tanzania and rife with criminal activity[157]. Only 35 years ago the site, which now houses a rapidly expanding township based on a single industry, that of gemstone mining, was bush, frequented only by Masai pastoralists passing through on their way to more productive grazing land for their cattle[158]. This makeshift settlement sprang up out of 'Tanzanite fever' and retains a marginalised status to this day. National, regional and local maps fail to place the site and even the spelling of its name is under dispute. Tanzanian pioneers to the area claim that the site was named by the Masai after the Olmelela trees which grew there. Masai elders claim, however, that 'Olmelela' is *Kiswahili* and not *Kimasai*[159] and that they named it *Esere* due to the grasses which grew there. Foreign mining companies and gemstone texts (Keller 1992; Kimambo 1984) refer to the site as Merelani whereas locals use the names Mererani or Mirerani interchangeably. Whilst the most common pronunciation of the site is M*e*rerani, for the purposes of this written text I will be referring to the site as M*i*rerani as this is the spelling used by the village government officials I was dealing with.

Gaining an accurate history of the area is even more difficult than gaining an accurate spelling of the name of the township, with different parties claiming the accuracy of their version over that of others. To gain a thorough understanding of the history of the area a literature review was conducted and oral histories were collected during interviews and focus group discussions. The literature review and discussions with relevant people revealed that there has been no extensive documentation of the history of the area. As will be seen the texts I did find presented short and conflicting accounts

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[156] Whilst many claim that Mirerani is to be found in the Leletema hills Masai informants told me that this was inaccurate, the mining area is in fact located in the next range of hills, the Purana hills.

[157] The issue of the reputed criminality of the area is returned to below.

[158]There is debate as to the spelling of Masai but Masai I interviewed living in and around Mirerani claim that this is the correct spelling. The issue of terminology is a complex one and my use of certain terms and spellings is based on the terms and spellings used by my informants. I am therefore not claiming that these are in any way definitive as Masai in other regions, for example, may very well use different spellings.

[159] *Kiswahili* is the official language of Tanzania and *Kimasai* is the language used by the Masai.

which were not clearly referenced (Keller 1992; Kimambo 1984). This history is thus primarily based on oral histories. My dependence on oral history meant that it was important to gain histories from as many different sources as possible, particularly in view of the often conflicting evidence presented by interviewees. Interviews were thus conducted with elders[160] from two different Masai groups in neighbouring villages; with the first inhabitants of the township, who have gained notoriety and respect for their role in the creation of the township; with other early inhabitants who have played a less political role in the area and with a number of other relevant parties from government, mining companies, religious groups and Mirerani township.

The first known name of the area was *Agata-ongishu*, a Masai name which means cattle passage and which reflects the main activity of the area at the time; Masai pastoralism. According to the Masai history of the area, as provided by focus group discussions with two elders of the Masai village located within the Mirerani township, the first non-Masai to come to the area was an *mchagga* (from the *wachagga* tribe, based on Mount Kilimanjaro) named Salimu, a politician who arrived in 1952 to do farming by the river. He was soon followed by *wameru* (people from Mount Meru) who recognised the fertile potential of the area. The farmers diverted water from the river for irrigation purposes, preventing the flow of water to the Masai settlements, and closed off the farming land, preventing the Masai cattle from grazing in their traditional pastures. This land-use conflict between Masai pastoralism and the economic activities of the settlers persists to this day, despite the adaptability of many Masai to the new gemstone trade, a large number of whom engage in the profitable activity of brokering (middle men who sell stones on to the dealers). Other than Masai pastoralism and small-scale *shamba* farming, there were two plantations producing sugar cane and sisal a few miles from the current site of Mirerani which were owned by *wazungus* (a term used to refer to all non-blacks except Asians) and which were closed down in 1967, as discussed below.

Before continuing it is fundamental to introduce the gemstone whose discovery led to the development of the area from bushland to a modern, thriving township:

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[160] One 'elder' interviewed was born in 1903 and the other two were in their 60s.

> Tanzanite is the ultimate prize of a gem safari. Its rich purples and blues often have the depth comparable to the finest sapphire. Paler Tanzanite has a delicate periwinkle colour like the eyes of Elizabeth Taylor. It is supremely rare, coming from only one place in the world, the Merelani hills of Tanzania, in the shadow of Mount Kilimanjaro (Gemsdirect 1999).

This short excerpt vividly illustrates not only the beauty of the stone but its marketability as a popular, sought after gemstone. It also helps us to understand the lengths that individuals generally and children and youths specifically are prepared to go to mine and sell the stone.

Tanzanite is a variety of *zoisite* and was named by Henry Platt of Tiffany & Company after the country in which it was found[161]. The gem is slightly soft and is unusual in that it is trichoic, which means that it has a different colour down its three axes; sapphire blue, yellow-brown, and purple-red. When heated, the stone becomes a more uniform blue-violet. The darker the stone, the more valuable. One gramme of dark violet Tanzanite, for example can fetch between TSH 250-300, 000 in Mirerani, increasing to between TSH 350-400, 000 by the time it reaches the main towns having changed hands a large number of times and then being sold onto tourists at further inflated prices. In the United States, one carat of Tanzanite sells for around $300 per carat (they do not buy in grammes but one gramme can equal two or three carats). It is important to note that prices fluctuate on an almost daily basis.

The details of the discovery of Tanzanite are disputed (see Appendix) but what is clear is that the discovery of Tanzanite meant that the number of prospectors in the area increased rapidly and by 1969 over 60 mining claims had been pegged (Kimambo 1984: 200). Claim holders hired employees and alluvial stones were found with relative ease so there was no need for deep mining. Other miners soon started to apply for claims but

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[161] The Tanzanite deposit that has been claimed thus far is a rectangular area approximately 4 kilometres long and 1 kilometre wide. There are officially one hundred claims of 900 square feet, since subdivided, which makes a total area of 90, 000 square feet. While Tanzanite has been found in other parts of East Africa it has not been of gem quality. It is believed that the Tanzanite deposits originated approximately 550 million years ago when heated ground waters dissolved minerals from surrounding rocks and re-deposited them in open spaces (Keller 1992: 62, 66).

the government limited the numbers of claims sold. Consequently, smuggling became rampant with employees stealing *mauwe* or stones and selling them on. D'Souza estimated that up to 80% of his production was being stolen by the miners before he had a chance to see it (Keller 1992: 69). This was confirmed by a broker who at the time made his living through buying stones smuggled from employees and then selling them back to the mine owners (pers. comm.). Tanzanite was also smuggled to neighbouring Kenya which had a well developed gemstone cutting and polishing industry and which offered high prices (Kimambo 1984: 106)[162]. The vast sums of money to be made attracted large numbers of people to the area, all hoping to make their fortunes (at the time 5 grammes of Tanzanite would fetch TSH 6000, equivalent in today's terms to around £5, considered to be a lot of money at the time.)

When one of my informants, Samuel, built his house in 1968 in what has now become the Mirerani township, there were only four other houses and a small Catholic church built by the first residents. The first known resident of the township was Alphonse, a doctor working with the local Masai. He is now dead but his family still resides in Mirerani, working as brokers. Samuel opened the 'Zaire bar' for the miners and dealers who were working in the area although living in neighbouring villages or at the mining site itself. The township has since been known as Zaire by locals, which another informant told me was the common name used when discussing the area in public to deflect unwanted government attention from the illicit activities going on and to prevent them from discovering the location of the site[163]. According to a Masai informant, the name 'Zaire' in fact came from the mispronunciation of *Esere*, the Masai name for the site (see earlier) but this version is denied by Samuel, again revealing the conflicts between different land users. Mirerani was seen as a good site for settlement at the time as there was a good water supply and plenty of animals (a situation radically transformed since with severe water shortages and the absence of wildlife, due to

[162] Kenya remains the world's primary exporter of Tanzanite, although it has no reserves. In 1998, Tanzanite sold at a total retail value of $500 million worldwide and yet only $6.8 million worth of Tanzanite was officially exported from the country. This is a dramatic indication of the extent of smuggling (Mirelani Mining Ltd., pers. comm.).

[163] This may also help to explain its non-appearance on any maps.

drought and environmental degradation). The scramble for Tanzanite also meant that the township grew rapidly and in 1970 the first school was set up; a nursery school for 4-6 year old children who were being abandoned during the day as their parents mined for stones. The discovery of Tanzanite also had an impact on the Tanzanian mining industry and when its legal export commenced in 1969 it accounted for 15% of the total value of gemstone exports (Kimambo 1984: 202). Illegal trafficking of gemstones led the Government to introduce the Gemstone Industry (Development and Protection) Act 1969 and the Mining Ordinance was revised giving the President full control of all minerals in Tanzania. To prevent further pegging of claims in Mirerani[164], the Government closed the area to all further prospecting whilst it carried out its own geological examinations (Ibid.: 202-203).

In 1971, the Government again took radical action in the area as part of its nationalisation programme[165], cancelling all claims and establishing the National Development Corporation, which in turn formed the State Mining Corporation (STAMICO) in 1972 as the only licensed mining body. Mine owners were consequently evicted without compensation and STAMICO declared the mines (all 10km2) to be a 'closed area' and no-one was permitted to settle near the mining area. In 1974, the Government set up the Tanzania Gemstone Industries Ltd. (TGI), to act as the sole licensed gemstone dealer[166]. Nyerere's villagisation programme reached the region around 1973 and although Mirerani was never formally villagised, people were encouraged to group together as this would entitle them to seek government assistance to build schools, hospitals and other facilities. A non-government informant revealed that this 'encouragement' was slightly more forceful, with the government bringing truckloads of people to Mirerani who settled in the township, returning to their farms to work the land during the day. At this time, the government also used to search residents' houses to ensure that no-one was accumulating wealth, i.e., gemstones (Mirerani resident, pers. comm.). Green's (2000) study on the Tabora region revealed that at this

[164] Between 1968 and early 1979, 78 claims were pegged (Zonal Mining Officer, pers. comm.).

[165] Having closed the plantations down in 1966.

[166] TGI went into liquidation in 1998.

time there was also a decline in the price of crops, which led to a number of people moving out of family based agriculture. This, combined with the forced resettlement of people could explain why there was a sudden increase in the numbers of people coming to Mirerani to engage in mining related activities. With a decrease in family based agriculture, out-of-school children were also left without a means of contributing to family survival and may have felt increasingly obliged to start working in the mining sector. Ironically, however, the villagisation programme was seen by STAMICO as a key weapon in the fight to combat illegal mining and in the 'Daily News' of 2nd May 1977 it recommended that people should be organised into *Ujamaa* villages, that the groups should be licensed to engage in mining and that stringent security measures should be enforced to prevent illegal residents and transactions (cited in Kimambo 1984: 112).

STAMICO was an ill-thought out operation and was unsuccessful in extracting Tanzanite. It lacked resources and trained personnel, facing operational problems from its inception. National production declined dramatically; from TSH 2, 966, 000 in 1970 to TSH 799, 600 in 1971 (Kimambo 1984: 104). By 1975, STAMICO was only active in Mirerani and Umba and in 1983 it accepted failure in Mirerani, withdrawing from the area with TGI taking responsibility for maintaining government interests and security in the area. The Ministry of Mines then allowed a private American company 'Bermuda', run by a *mzungu* called Ferguson, to prospect the area[167]. Throughout this time, the informal mining sector was booming. As TGI owned all the surveyed land, people were stealing and smuggling stones from the TGI mines at night, which was risky but profitable work. The employees were generally low paid and were active participants in the smuggling of gemstones, which included 28 gemstones other than Tanzanite. These smugglers were known as *Wana Apollo*, or the people of Apollo, after the famous

[167] Discussions with informants revealed that Ferguson was widely disliked by the people of Mirerani as he shot dead a trespasser and threatened to kill any others. It is also claimed that instead of prospecting the area he was in fact looting it and was smuggling stones out of the country. The miners put pressure on the government to get rid of him but it was not until it was discovered that he held a South African passport (in addition to his American one) that the government immediately expelled him from the country (Interview with ex-government official, pers. comm.). He had claimed to be American but in fact was South African (South Africans were not tolerated in Tanzania during the Apartheid period).

American space mission. This name referred to the fact that the sand smuggled out in big bags looked like moon-dust and that if asked where they were coming from the smugglers would answer 'From the moon'. The miners still refer to each other using this name.

The town continued to grow fast with people from all over Tanzania arriving to smuggle gemstones and to set up supporting businesses (catering, hotels etc.). It was at this time that Mirerani gained its sinister reputation as a town which attracted murderers and other criminals and in fact the rate of criminal activity was high, with large numbers of reported thefts, rapes and even murders. This reputation still prevails with many Tanzanians, including those with whom I worked in Dar Es Salaam, too afraid to venture near the site, despite the drastic reduction in crime and the creation of a police station and an active militia. It could be argued that this vision of Mirerani actually works in residents' favour as it discourages many would-be miners and competitors from venturing into the area. What is interesting is that other mining sites in Tanzania do not suffer from such a negative reputation. Informants claim that this is because Mirerani grew very rapidly before services such as the police station and the court-house were established to maintain law and order. Furthermore, Tanzanite was worth more than gold and other gemstones so it attracted a large number of people from all parts of Tanzania and neighbouring countries, all looking to make money quickly. When it proved less simple to mine than was expected frustrations often led to conflicts. Another reason for the apparent influx of criminals on the run was its proximity to the large towns of Arusha, Moshi and Nairobi. It was simple for criminals to come to Mirerani and 'disappear' into the mines and surrounding bush.

Between 1982 and 1990, TGI virtually stopped activity in Mirerani, leaving watchmen in the most profitable locations. People moved into the other areas and began to mine informally, eventually taking over the whole site. In 1984, a Ministry employee, Angelo Mpangala, surveyed the area, dividing it into 100 claims of 900ft2. The Ministry then divided this into 4 blocks which they floated for tender in 1985. Four Tanzanian companies were provisionally accepted but no land was allocated to the small-scale miners, who had been mining the area for over 25 years. The miners took action and the community leaders and the new miners' association, the Arusha Regional Miners'

Association (AREMA) went to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in protest. The tenders were consequently rejected and the miners continued to mine illegally until 1989 when the government once again expelled all the miners and floated another tender (Government of Tanzania 1989). The land was again divided into four blocks but Block D (the least profitable site with hard clay which made mining extremely difficult) was granted to 55 small-scale miners under one licence, held by AREMA. Block B was granted to an Israeli company, Building Utilities, and Block A was granted to Kilimanjaro Mines, a joint venture between a Tanzanian and an Australian company. Block C was granted to TGI who then formed a joint venture with a Tanzanian mining company, based in Britain, African Gems and a British company, SAMAX. This joint venture took the name of Graphtan Mining and was subsidised by the African Development Bank. One of the conditions of the granting of the licence to Graphtan was that the company would contribute to community development through providing facilities such as roads, electricity and water. The project provides a clear example of commercial pseudo-development, whereby a foreign private sector company lays claim to a poor country's resources on the pretext that it will be better able than a local company to bring development to the area. 'Pseudo' was definitely the key word in this case as the only development that did occur was for the primary benefit of the plant owners, i.e., electricity was brought as far as the plant, bore holes were built next to the plant and a temporary road was built from the main road to the plant. The road was built for the primary benefit of the mine managers who were commuting from Moshi, a nearby town, and is now practically impassable. Mirerani is approximately two kilometres from the plant and yet no attempt was made to bring the water, the electricity or the road to the township. This understandably led to resentment against the foreign owned mine, which had received development money on the pretence that it would bring development to the township. This resentment is one which persists to this day, as explored further below.

The allocation of land to the small scale miners was, however, seen as a small victory as their right to the land had finally been recognised. In October 1994, the small scale miners made an official complaint against the owners of Block B, Building Utilities, who were not meeting their licence obligations, which included using modern machinery. Tensions in the area led to violent clashes with a reported 21 miners shot

during the ensuing violence, apparently by Building Utilities (Maunya 1994: page unknown). In an attempt to resolve the conflict, the government expelled Building Utilities and gave the land to the small scale miners, citing violation of its contractual agreement with the government (Maunya 1995: 5). In January 1995, the government revised its previous position granting Simanjiro District Council exclusive rights over Block B, which they were to manage on behalf of the local community (Maunya 1995: 5). This was supposed to resolve the bitter conflicts over ownership of the mines but in fact served only to fuel the fire. The plans were eventually dropped, however, as legally district councils are not allowed to have their own business ventures. The small-scale miners were thus allowed to lay claim to Block B.

During the same period, there was also conflict over ownership of Block B (see Plate 5.2b below) and in November 1994 the Minister for Water, Energy and Minerals barred AREMA from direct involvement in mining activities and gave Block D to individual licensed miners (Maunya 1995: 5). Under the new system, the biggest claim would be 50m2 and there was a fee of TSH 50, 000 for a claim application and a fee of TSH 20, 000 to renew claims on an annual basis. The Regional Mining Office in Arusha was to be responsible for granting claims which meant that there were no local people involved to ensure that local interests were safeguarded. The reasons behind the expulsion of AREMA are disputed. Members of AREMA argue that this is because they became too powerful and were attempting to block moves by international companies to take over the land. Central government, they maintain, had too many interests tied to the international companies and thus refused to renew the AREMA licence. Others claim that AREMA was a corrupt organisation, with leaders pocketing a large proportion of the fees they requested from members (10% of profits), a proportion of which were supposed to be used for community development[168]. According to ex-AREMA informants, it was after the expulsion of AREMA that children started to be found working in the mines, either with their families or independently. During AREMA time

[168] During the three years AREMA held the licence, the only tangible contributions to the community were the provision of school desks to local schools. AREMA members claim that they had few resources as only four mines were producing in the three years AREMA had power. Critics of AREMA attempted to take the task force to court but the case was thrown out due to insufficient evidence.

there were strict rules against employing children. AREMA would interview the children, give them food, try to help them and send them home. Members would donate money and office funds were used to assist the children and to give them bus fares home. Others say that children were working in the mines during the few years that AREMA was responsible for the area. It is claimed that children were used as informants by mine owners to check that minerals were not being stolen and as messengers to go in and out of the mines on errands.

Plate 5.2b A view of 'Block B'

During this time the township continued to grow rapidly and the community set up a road toll to raise money to build a secondary school, power supply and police station. Each house was also required to contribute a fixed sum. In 1998, electricity was installed and a police station was built. The school remains half built, waiting for more funds. In April 1998, severe flooding in the area left 100 miners dead (Business Times April 24 1998). International and national media attention meant that the government could no longer ignore Mirerani and consequently there was a government crackdown and a by-

law was passed imposing stringent conditions on mine claim holders. Use of children under 16 was banned, with the consequence that the number of children in the mines was drastically reduced for a short period, with children returning once the heat was off. Children and owners remain wary and no-one will admit to having children employed while children mostly claim to be 16 or over. With the value of Tanzanite increasing daily, making it the second most popular coloured stone in America in dollar terms (Business Times 1999), it would appear that the township can only expand.

The controversy over Block allocation continues to this day. In 1997, SAMAX's $22 million outfit was declared bankrupt. In July 1998, after floods hit the mines, the President of Tanzania visited the area and when asked by the small-scale miners if they would be allowed to lay claims to Block C, he promised to look into the situation. He failed to report back to the community and in 1999 the claim to Block C was given to a joint venture between a South African mining company, AFGEM, who bought the assets for $5 million, and a Tanzanian company. The joint venture is known as Merelani Mining Limited (MML) and the conditions of their being granted the licence was that they would contribute to community development. 30% of production and 3% of profits are paid to the government in tax. MML claims to be committed to community development and is currently setting up a 'community development trust', although whether anything will come of it remains to be seen. Granting the claim to a foreign company gave rise to further tensions in the area, with miners occupying and mining part of the land in February 2000. Production in the occupied area was high, leading to more miners attempting to occupy the land. Police were brought in by MML and the miners were evicted once again[169]. Kilimanjaro Mines still occupy Block A but are waiting to be granted a mining licence by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals. The small-scale miners are currently attempting to lay claims to this land[170].

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[169] Arrests of trespassers mining on MML land are still made on a regular basis.

[170] It seems unlikely that they will be granted any such rights, the argument made by the Ministry of Minerals being that some claims in Block D and B are still not being exploited (pers. comm.) although the small scale miners would argue that that is because those claims are not considered to be productive whereas Block A is.

Tensions in the area are not solely between the *mzungu* mine and the small scale miners. It is important to note that there is no one homogeneous group of miners. Instead there are a few large mine owners with important and powerful interests, small-scale mine owners attempting to mine with limited resources and finally the miners (see 8.1.1). Within all these groups, there are different sub-groups, with different affiliations and different interests. This was revealed on the 15th and 16th February 2000, when violent clashes erupted between members of the Luo tribe and Masai.

What is clear from the above discussion is that both the colonial government and the Tanzanian governments have directly and indirectly contributed to the development of a socio-economic framework in which the growth of child labour in the mines was inevitable. The main economic activities in the area prior to government intervention in the 1960s were Masai pastoralism, sisal plantation labour and game-hunting for the colonial occupiers. Nationalisation led to the closing of the plantations and the departure of the British led to the end of employment for the game-hunters. Families were thus forced to look for alternative employment and this was found through the discovery of Tanzanite. The Government then pegged off the mining land, forcing the miners into the position of 'criminals', i.e. illegal miners. This was the beginning of Mirerani gaining its reputation as a dangerous site, rife with criminal activity, when to start with it was occupied by people legitimately trying to make a living, their other sources of income having been removed by political processes. Nyerere's villagisation programme also contributed to the rapid growth of the area and children found themselves taken from family based agricultural activity or from plantation work, into which they had been forced under colonial rule (5.1), into an environment which had not yet developed enough schools to provide an alternative activity. Many were therefore drawn to the mines, as a natural means of contributing to family survival in an uncertain economic climate. The Government policies of war with Uganda, of villagisation, of SAPS, and of the introduction of school fees, amongst others (5.1) all led to a worsening economic position for many Tanzanians. At the same time, the lures of the 'globalised' consumer world led to new aspirations which demanded large sums of cash in order to be fulfilled. Many children thus found themselves in a situation whereby both they as individuals and as members of a family needed money. When this could not be found locally, many chose to migrate in search of their fortune, leading to the current situation in Mirerani

(see Chapter 8 for voices of children which confirm these findings). The actions of politicians, British or Tanzanian, therefore played a significant role in the growth of child labour in Mirerani.

5.3 Mirerani: Human and Economic Geography

An exploration of the historical background to Mirerani has revealed how the area has developed from a deserted bushland to a dynamic township enshrouded in myth and drama. It is now appropriate to provide a brief background of the human and economic geography of the area in order to contextualise child labour. Mirerani grew out of a single economic activity: gemstone mining. All inhabitants, except of course the indigenous Masai, migrated to the area and there is consequently a diverse ethnic and economic mix of people. Transect walks revealed that the settlement is organised in a somewhat random fashion. The oldest residents built their houses in the west of the settlement and the township grew from there. The 'town centre' consists of two parallel roads, containing most of the main shops and services as well as the 'Tanzanite market'.

In his paper on gold mining, Chachage (1993: 101) argues that:

> Many mining camps are highly organised (..) Once a camp is established, within weeks there follows a chain of entrepreneurs. The organisation of the camp embodies considerable social differentiation. Even the nature of means of transportation reflects the same segmentation, from bicycle taxis to landrover buses to four wheel drive vehicles in varying conditions, from decaying to top of the range with air conditioning.

I agree with Chachage as to the level of social differentiation in Mirerani but I did not observe that Mirerani is highly organised in terms of the physical development of the settlement. Transect walks revealed on a number of occasions that next to a mud hut with a thatched roof there could be a two storey mansion with a large garden and three cars parked in front of it. Most residences are rented accommodation in locally manufactured concrete terraced housing. Informants accompanying me on the transect walks claimed that there is no division of area by ethnic group, wealth status or occupation. This was confirmed by further participant observation. Mine owners live

next to commercial sex workers who live next to gemstone dealers who live next to miners. The ethnic makeup of Mirerani is diverse:

> Here is where all the Tanzanians and all the tribes of the Great Lakes are, Kenyans, Ugandans, Zambians are here and all the 127 tribes of Tanzania are resident here. You can't say there is a dominant group in Mirerani, it is an international place (Mirerani resident, pers. comm.).

It is interesting to note, however, that there are no Indians or *wazungus* residing in Mirerani[171]. It is also not quite accurate that there are no dominant groups in Mirerani. The Masai are clearly the largest group, although the majority of these do not actually reside in Mirerani village, just work there, returning to their neighbouring villages in the evening. The Luo claim to be the second largest tribe in Mirerani, numbering around 3,500 followed by the Chagga (Mirerani residents, pers. comm.).

Social differentiation in Mirerani in terms of wealth levels is considerable. Tanzanite mining is an economically risky activity, with some people making extreme fortunes, able to buy new cars, houses, businesses and other luxuries, and others living in desperate poverty after years of mining for no income. It is useful to briefly outline the various economic activities in Mirerani in order to understand who benefits from mining activities.

According to Chachage (1993: 101), who is referring to gold mining:

> The fortune makers in this process are firstly the claimholders. These basically comprise the rural bourgeoisie and village leaders (who are in a position to register claims at local offices and Ministry), some syndicates of small scale miners, some Asian and Greek businessmen, employees of the official mining sector and urban party and state bureaucrats. Secondly come the dealers and merchants, it is these who smuggle out gold and recycle the foreign exchange earned from it through importation of consumer goods, these groups are the main beneficiaries of the liberalisation measures, which have partly formalised these activities.

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[171] I apparently was the first and only *mzungu* to live in Mirerani. Other researchers would come in from the near by towns of Arusha or Moshi, not staying in Mirerani itself or spending more than a few days on their study.

A similar process can be observed in Mirerani where claimholders and sponsors are the primary beneficiaries if a mine produces. If it does not produce the losses are substantial as running costs (which include purchase of water, firewood, food, compressors, explosives etc.) start at around TSH 70, 000 per day (around £60). Pits can be operational for years without production. Most mines have sponsors who are usually Indian Tanzanians, although there are a few *wazungu* sponsors. Participant observation revealed that there is in fact a two tier system of sponsorship with Indians sponsoring Tanzanian middle men, resident in Mirerani, to act as official sponsors. This is because of the high rate of theft from mines which Indian sponsors could not monitor due to being out of Mirerani. There is also significant resentment between the African and Indian Tanzanians for various historical and economic reasons[172] and consequently relations are probably better between African Tanzanian sponsors and the miners. Whilst the claim holders in the mines described by Chachage are the village leaders and the rural bourgeoisie, in Mirerani this is not the case, as described by one informant:

> In Mirerani, anyone can have a claim, there is no tribalism here, if you want a claim you can get one, whether you are a farmer, a politician or a businessman (Mirerani resident, pers. comm.).

Another expanded on this explaining that:

> Before there were claims people were mining illegally, all types of people from everywhere, they had their own pits and knew each other. Then the government decided to give the land to the indigenous people and asked the miners to register the pits where they were working and pay for their claims. Neighbouring pits would confirm that this was your land, where you had been mining. Then the non-pegged land became available and business people with capital, from Arusha and other cities started pegging their claims (Mirerani resident, pers. comm.).

Claim holders in Mirerani thus come from a variety of economic and social backgrounds. More and more newcomers, however, are wealthy business people with

[172] During the nationalisation programme, Indian businesses and lands were confiscated. The Indian community remains, however, one of the wealthiest in Tanzania and many African Tanzanians feel that they are taking all their profits back to India instead of investing them in the Tanzanian economy.

money to invest in their mines. Mining is an expensive business and those with most capital are able to run their mines daily and have greater chances of producing whereas less well-off claim holders can only afford to run their mines infrequently when they have the money. A number of claim holders therefore also work as dealers or brokers, their profits subsidising the running costs of the pits[173]. Plate 5.3 below shows brokers and dealers bargaining in the Tanzanite market in the mining site.

[173] Brokers are the middle-men in buying and selling Tanzanite, negotiating between miners and dealers. The government issues brokering licences but the vast majority of brokers (and dealers) work illegally. Brokering is also a risky enterprise as although substantial profits can be made, it is not uncommon for brokers to overestimate the value of stones they buy and then be left covering the difference. Dealers may buy stones from brokers or from the miners. Their licence is more expensive than the broker licence but they have an export licence, which is where large sums of money can be made. Furthermore, dealers tend to have greater experience in gemstone identification and more capital to buy bigger stones which are going to generate higher profits. Most brokers in Mirerani are Masai but a large proportion of Mirerani residents try their hand at brokering. The Masai also engage in dealing but the majority of dealers in Mirerani are middle class Tanzanians and in the main towns most of the dealers are Indian Tanzanians.

Plate 5.3 The Mirerani Tanzanite Market where Tanzanite is bought and sold

In the mine itself, there are number of jobs in which people engage. Any profits are then divided up according to activity. The claim holder and sponsors clearly get the majority share to cover costs and their profit share (around 80-90%, with the remaining share divided between the workers). Next comes the foreman, who is known as the *steling* by the miners (the term comes from the English, 'steering' and refers to the one who leads). Next come the skilled machine operator and the blasters, known as *nobels* after the brand name of the original blasting product used. *Nobels* will usually have an assistant who is often a *nyoka* or 'snakeboy'. Next on the 'pay scale' are the drillers or *wachorongaji* which means 'those who drill'. There are usually between four and six drillers to a small mine. Last on the scale are the sand carriers or *wasomoaji* who are not permanent employees but who move around from pit to pit, withdrawing the earth from the pit to the surface after blasting. This is a particularly exhausting task but the carriers are then allowed to sort the sand where they may find small gemstones. Also on the lowest scale are the errand boys who take things up and down the pits, 'Father Ration' (the cook who is always male and is responsible for producing two meals per day for the miners) and the 'communication' operators. By law, pits must be equipped with a radio

communication system and two radio operators but many do not have such a system and continue to use *nyokas* for this work (see Chapter 8).

Each mine has its own way of distributing profits, which of course depend on the levels of supervision as sponsors may not even know that their mine has produced if they do not remain well informed. Miners do not receive a salary, just food and medical costs[174]. Often, however, they have an agreement with the brokers and dealers that if they find any stones they will give them to the broker or dealer in return for small sums of money to pay for transport, showers, beer and sex. Occasionally it is possible for men to get casual labour for one or two days cleaning the sand out of a pit after blasting. The total payment for this intensive labour is TSH 5000 and *nyokas* are not employed in this form of work 'as we are too weak and our health is too bad' (*nyoka*, pers. comm.). There is a more sinister form of labour, that of press-ganged labour which I thought was no more than a rumour until an incident in July 2000 when a mine was attacked by a group of men and set fire to. In this mine there were a number of men who had been forced to work in the night under the threat of being macheted. Usually the men are released the next day but on this occasion they were kept for a few days with no food or water. Their friends were concerned at this disappearance and set up the rescue operation. The day after the rescue the mine was still working and no-one reported the incident to the police[175].

In addition to Chachage's list of beneficiaries, it is important to note that while mining is the primary means of livelihood in the area, there are considerable economic opportunities for entrepreneurship in the associated service industries. It was seen from the transect walk that bars, or 'groceries' as they are called to obtain cheaper business licences, are the predominant buildings after residences. The bars provide *pombe* or local brew, other forms of alcohol, food, commercial sex workers, a radio and sometimes a television for viewing. The bars are usually busy at any time of day and

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[174] There are no fixed work times but usually Sunday is a rest day, which means that there is no blasting but the miners may still continue working. Sometimes funds for blasting run out or machines are broken and then the pit may remain inactive for weeks.

[175] It must be noted, however, that authorities are conspicuously absent in the area and it is common knowledge that in order to obtain services payments must be made.

until the early hours of morning. There are also *mama ntilies* or food sellers, water sellers and petrol and diesel sellers, pharmacists and clinics, hairdressers and barbers. Income is also provided for neighbouring farmers, who come to Mirerani market to sell their produce[176]. Other forms of employment are provided in the government jobs; teachers, local government and police. There is also an active militia in Mirerani. With more and more miners bringing their families to settle in the township, the service industry can only grow. Mining, however, continues to be perceived as the most profitable activity, illustrated by the fact that most government workers and other service providers are often to be found at the mines, both in and outside of their official working hours.

A substantial income is also generated for local government from granting service licences and for central government through income tax, royalties which consist of 3% of exports, claim fees and renewal fees (TSH 20, 000 per year), broker and dealer licences and miner mining licences (claim holders must pay around TSH 5000 per year per miner employed). The issue of local government income inevitably brings us to the issue of corruption, a phenomenon so insidious to daily life in Mirerani that people never use the word, saying instead *mradiwao* or 'it is their project'. The situation has even got to the point that :

> If you do not steal, they do not take you seriously here, if you do not put money in your pocket, they do not listen to you (miner, pers. comm.).

Despite numerous interviews, I was unable to gain information about the actual revenue earned by the local government, as informants claimed that there was no data available. Observation reveals, however, that not all of the income it is used as it should be: there are no public services in that the streets are never cleaned, there is no public health service, no secondary school. The services that do exist were built through other contributions by the community[177]. When asking a member of the village government

[176] In Mirerani itself nearly all the farming land has been sold off for property development.

[177] Again revealing the inadequacy of the authorities in providing services for the area.

about what happens to all the money collected in taxes, the answer was clear and speaks for itself:

> It is swallowed, it goes to Tumboni St[178] (miner and government official, pers. comm.).

The economic benefits to be had from the small-scale mining industry are clearly substantial. The way it is carried out does, however, have a number of negative implications for residents. The mining site itself is something of an environmental disaster, with massive land erosion and deforestation. Empty pits are not filled in and there is shallow mining on all available pieces of land, even the roads. The physical health of people living in Mirerani is extremely poor (see Chapter 8 for health status of *nyokas*). The number of diseases arising from unhealthy sanitary conditions is high, as are pulmonary diseases caused by continuous inhalation of graphite dust. The high levels of alcohol consumption, the high rates of unprotected sex with commercial sex workers and other partners[179] and the relatively high number of mining accidents combine to ensure that miners have a low life expectancy. The main hospital in Moshi screens all Mirerani residents who go there for treatment and have termed Mirerani as a High Transmission Area, with over 40% of patients diagnosed as HIV+. Funerals of young men take place regularly, as confirmed through participant observation. When I asked the District Health Officer why the government was not providing health facilities to the area his answer was:

> I don't know, they know we have no services, they don't care. They think people in Mirerani have money so they can pay for their own health. This should not be the point as people are suffering a lot. They are dying but even statistically you can't classify because people here in Mirerani are not staying, they are here to earn and when they are infected or sick they leave (pers. comm.).

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[178] This translates as In the Stomach Street, which speaks for itself. Although I collected a substantial amount of data, corruption is not an issue I want to enter into except to ensure that its impact is borne in mind when analysing the data.

[179] Polygamy is common in the sense that many men have more than one 'wife' although they may not be legally married to any of them.

This leads us to the issue of statistics. Obtaining accurate statistics as to the human geography of Mirerani has proved a highly complex, if not impossible, task. Each government department has different figures, which often do not remotely reflect reality. According to the 1988 official census (the 1998 one has been postponed to 2002), the population of Mirerani was only 3, 159 (1, 827 men and 1, 332 women), one third of whom were under 15 (Takwimu 1988: 412). An unofficial census by the Divisional Commissioner in 1998 revealed that the adult population was 15, 422 with 2, 972 children under the age of 18. This five-fold increase in population over a ten year period would appear to confirm informants' statements that the town grew dramatically during the past decade. This figure, however, has been seen by my informants as a clear underestimation and they would suggest that the figure was much higher and more like 100, 000. Another report claims that in 1997 the total population of Mirerani township was between 78, 000 and 80, 000 (Kijo-Bisimba 1997: 6). Yet another report places the population at 60, 000 with 10, 000 permanent residents (Alli 1997: 1). The difficulty of obtaining accurate figures is enhanced by the highly mobile nature of the mining community, who follow mining booms across the country and even across borders (see 8.1.1 for the migrant nature of child labourers in Mirerani). Furthermore, a large number do not live in houses, sleeping instead at the mining site and are therefore difficult to capture in an official census.

The same problems occur when trying to enumerate the numbers engaging in mining activities. According to the 1988 census, there are only 300 miners, a gross underestimate to anyone who visits the site. The Zonal Mining Office statistics are equally questionable as they only note registered claims, highly problematic in an industry where most miners are working illegally or informally. Thus only 2 dealers are registered with the Zonal Mining Office (Zonal Mining Office, pers. comm.) and a local Masai informed me that there were at least 2, 000 Masai dealers and brokers, and this does not include all the other dealers and brokers, although Masai are the predominant group. Even more difficult is trying to estimate the numbers of children engaged in mining activities. According to Kijo-Bisimba (1997: 6) between 2, 800 and 3, 200 children are directly involved in mining activities, all of whom are male. The total number of children involved in activities related to mining activities (selling food, drinks and other items, carrying water, self-employed brokers and commercial sex workers) is

19, 515; 15, 606 of whom are female. This contrasts with the Divisional Commissioner's census which revealed that there were only 2, 972 children in the town. Alli's report claims that there were over 150 boys working full-time in the mining site (1997: 5). The findings of both these reports are questionable in that they are so different and in that the researchers were not from the area and only remained in town for a few days. What is interesting is that they both visited in the same year and their findings should therefore be more consistent. My findings would indicate that the numbers of children working in the mines falls somewhere between the two extreme figures provided by Alli and Kijo-Bisimba. I conducted semi-structured interviews with one hundred children in Block B using a snowballing method as well as having informal conversations with many, many others (Chapter 8). It was relatively easy to find children to interview which would indicate that there are many more children than I could interview, especially as a number of children would have been down the pits when I was interviewing. Furthermore, a large number of children reported to me that their friends would not be interviewed out of fear that I would report them to the authorities or try to remove them from the mines[180]. The boys are highly mobile and often inaccessible as so many are underground at any one time. Any attempts at enumeration can therefore only provide inaccurate data. When I asked the *nyokas* themselves how many of them they thought there were the response was always one of laughter and *mingi sana* or 'very many'. Their estimates were over 500 in Block B and around 1000 in Block D. It is clear that that the number of *nyokas* has increased substantially over the years and is still increasing.

5.4 Chapter Conclusions

The historical analysis has shown that child work as a concept has been transformed through time although age and gender remain the basis for the social division of labour. It has been shown that Tanzanian children make important contributions to both national

[180] Rumours were circulating that I was going to force them into school, that I was going to arrest them and even worse that I was going to kill them with one boy reporting that 'I do not want to be killed just for clothes'. This comment was brought about by the fact that I was providing interviewees with an item of clothing each in compensation for their time as each interview took around 45 minutes.

and household economies through their work. The value of this work is seldom acknowledged, however, which leaves children more vulnerable to exploitation and places them in a weaker bargaining position.

The juxtaposition of the generalised historical analysis with ethnographic evidence from Mirerani has revealed that both the colonial government and the Tanzanian governments have directly and indirectly contributed to the development of a socio-economic framework in which the growth of child labour in Tanzania was inevitable. Government policies of war with Uganda, villagisation, SAPS and the introduction of school fees, amongst other factors such as the AIDS pandemic, environmental climate change, growing poverty and the breakdown in family support structures all led to a worsening economic position for many Tanzanians. At the same time, the development of the cash economy and the consequent pressures of the global consumer market led to new aspirations which demanded large sums of cash in order to be fulfilled. Many children thus found themselves in a situation whereby both they as individuals and as members of a family needed money. When this could not be found locally, many chose to migrate in search of their fortune, leading to the current situation in Mirerani, which will be explored in greater depth from the perspectives of the children themselves in Chapter 8.

In view of the increasing numbers of children engaging in labour the Government of Tanzania approached the ILO for assistance, which eventually led to the adoption of IPEC, as seen in Chapter 6 below.

6. IPEC Tanzania

In Chapter 3, it was shown that the development of child labour policy involves a complex process of negotiation and re-negotiation between government, employer and worker representatives. Other organisations, such as NGOs, are also involved. The ILO Constitution has a number of safeguards to ensure that no one country or group is dominant in dictating policy direction and therefore the over-simplified argument used by a number of 'Northern' anthropologists that organisations, such as the ILO, impose a 'Northern' construction of childhood' was refuted[181]. In Chapter 4, an historical approach was taken to explore the development and application of the ILO's child labour programme- the InFocus Programme on the elimination of child labour: IPEC. Participant observation was used to explore the different formal and informal discourses and practices within the Organisation and it was shown that there needs to be a greater recognition of the role of affectivity within organisational analysis as well as a greater emphasis by management as to the role of the individual person in making an action succeed or fail. While Chapter 4 focused specifically on the application of policy at Geneva headquarters level, this chapter will consider how the various discourses, rules and regulations of IPEC are applied, modified and employed in the national context of Tanzania.[182].

[181]Although Chapter 7 will explore the way in which a particular country can use its power to influence the development of particular projects.

[182] No comprehensive study of an international Organisation in a country such as Tanzania should ignore the fact that any action taken is embedded in the development of a complex, multi-billion pound industry: the 'Aid Industry'. I do not propose to enter into a detailed exploration of the Aid Industry in Tanzania as there are many texts which do so- most valuable is Rugumamu's 1997 'Lethal Aid'.

In the first part of this chapter, I use oral history and secondary sources to introduce the history of IPEC intervention in Tanzania. The second part explores the formal discourses and practices of the Tanzania Programme, on the basis of participant observation conducted. The final section examines informal discourses and practice.

6.1 History of IPEC Tanzania

This section is based on oral histories, from Tanzania as well as HQ, and relevant documentary sources. According to the IPEC National Programme Manager (NPM) it is important to see the arrival of IPEC in Tanzania as a lengthy and complex process:

> It's a whole process; I came on board somewhere along the process. It starts with consultations between the government and the ILO, I think discussions started around 89, 90. At that time the government expressed the wish to collaborate with and seek support from the ILO to address child labour problems. At that time IPEC was just being created in Geneva and also at that time the German government expressed interest in supporting child labour initiatives in various countries. Consultations between the government and the ILO led to a national workshop in 1992 and before that a number of NGOs had already begun to address child labour problems through small pilot studies, seminars. The workshop must be seen as part of the whole child rights' concern, the CRC was coming in, the launching of IPEC should be seen in this context. I did two small consultancies for the ILO on child labour. When the national workshop came up in 1992 I was asked to prepare the draft country programme document. At the end of the workshop the Ministry of Labour formed an inter-ministerial task force on child labour and I was a member, although it was called inter-ministerial. It invited NGOs, UNICEF and others as well (NPM, pers. comm.).

It can be seen from above that the process leading up to the eventual signing in 1994 of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government of Tanzania and the ILO, to adopt IPEC was a lengthy one, dating back to the late 1980s. Moreover, the ILO has been active in the country since 1962. This reveals the extent to which the process was not simply 'imposed' into the Tanzanian context, as some commentators have argued (3.1), but was instigated and driven by the Government of Tanzania, with the support of the ILO.

In fact, discussions between the Tanzanian Government and the ILO regarding child labour first took place in 1989 at an Organisation for African Unity (OAU) meeting in Ethiopia. Child labour was one of a number of issues discussed and during the meeting the Government of Tanzania acknowledged the existence of child labour in the country and requested that the ILO send a mission to Tanzania to examine the situation. In 1991, the ILO sent a mission to the country and through discussions with tripartite partners and others it was established that child labour was prevalent in a number of sectors. The National Programme Manager tells us in the above quote that in 1992 a workshop took place in Tanzania to strategize on the child labour issue. The 'National Seminar on Child Labour in Tanzania: Policy and Programme Options' was a five day event organised by the ILO, under its Interdepartmental Project on the Elimination of Child Labour (4.1), in collaboration with the Ministry for Labour and Youth Development. There were 23 participants from different Ministries and representatives from 5 NGOs, the University of Dar Es Salaam, the National Social Welfare Training Institute, the National Planning Commission and UNICEF.

The objectives of the seminar were to:

> Identify policy options, strategies and practical measures to reduce the incidence of child labour and improve the conditions of working children and to heighten public awareness and promote action against child labour (Interdepartmental Project on the Elimination of Child Labour 1992: 37)

The objectives were clearly very broad, targeting not only child labour but also 'improving the conditions of working children'. The focus since has been primarily on reducing the incidence of child labour and heightening public awareness and promotion of action. The issue of improving the conditions of working children has, however, been relatively ignored in the development and adoption of different action programmes, as seen below.

During the workshop, strategies and a National Programme of Action were developed. The National Programme of Action focused on three particular areas of intervention: legislation and enforcement; education; and community mobilisation and information campaigns. Within the specified actions, however, there were no measures aimed at

protecting working children, although the Summary states that 'legal protection be extended to other sectors of known child employment' (op. cit.: 6). The primary focus is on keeping children in schools and withdrawing them from labour. As a priority the report proposes that 'urgent attention be given to the prohibition of work by the youngest and most vulnerable and the removal of children from hazardous occupation and industries.' (op.cit.: 6). Again it becomes clear that despite the stated objectives, 'protection of working children' is not a priority (2.3).

Although the workshop was held in 1992, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the government and the ILO was not signed until 1994 and programme activities did not officially start until 1995. During the intervening years the ILO and the government were liasing, trying to get donor approval and funding as well as the full commitment of the social partners. The MoU itself is a standard ILO document but it was scrutinised by the government who, according to the National Programme Manager (NPM), had no problems with its format and signed the first draft. The current NPM was appointed in 1994 after the signing of the MoU and the inter-ministerial task force became the 'National Steering Committee' (NSC).

The process leading up to the adoption of IPEC Tanzania was thus a lengthy one and the development of a strategy, focusing primarily on education and withdrawal of children from labour, involved many different partners.

6.1.1 A 'top-down' imposition?

This exploration of the introduction of IPEC to Tanzania raises a number of pertinent issues concerning the extent to which the process was 'top-down', imposed as it were by an international organisation exporting a 'Northern construction of childhood' (see 3.1). It does not appear that IPEC imposed its presence on the Tanzanian Government. On the contrary, IPEC's presence was the result of a lengthy *process*, instigated by the Tanzanian Government. The process was therefore dialogical rather than simply imposed by the ILO.

This is confirmed by the NPM, who was involved in discussions from an early stage:

> The government initiated the process, they were involved fully and were actually leading the process. It is not possible to bring IPEC into any country if the government does not accept the problem and the need to address it. The understanding of the government was that something needs to be done, whatever it is (NPM, pers. comm.)

as well as by another informant from the Tanzanian government:

> The Government did instigate the process. During the OAU meeting they requested ILO to come and verify the situation. It was not an ILO meeting but an OAU meeting. ILO had been invited to attend and presentations were made. When the MoU was drafted and brought to the Government of Tanzania the government had to understand it and study it. No changes were made, it suited us and we could work perfectly to meet the objectives of the programme. There was a technical meeting with lawyers present to discuss whether the vision was suitable, it was agreed that it was and the MoU was signed by the government (Ministry of Labour official working on child labour issues, pers. comm.).

My question as to the extent to which there had been an 'imposition' of western values, as argued by some Northern academics (Chapter 3) with regard to child labour was clearly one which had already been given considerable thought by Tanzanian practitioners:

> There have been a lot of discussions if we swallow wholly western cultural values of what is child labour; we have different cultures and socialisations. It has been very selective and not imposed. We knew the MoU was drafted by the ILO but caution was made to implement the concerns of Tanzania, not the concerns and interests of others. There was a suiting to our interests. Child labour is a problem, some in the community may not understand that hazardous child labour is wrong. We try to make people understand this and to address causative factors. We can't say there was imposition of the programme (Ministry of Labour official working on child labour issues, pers. comm.).

While I would maybe dispute the above assumption that 'some in the community may not understand that hazardous child labour is wrong' (see quotes in 3.1 and discussion in Chapter 8) this Tanzanian Government official is clearly expressing his personal, as opposed to 'imposed', viewpoint. The assumption that poor people do not understand certain issues is often attributed to Northern donors or experts and it is therefore

interesting to hear the same view expounded by a Tanzanian official, illustrating the difficulty in attributing certain ways of being to 'Northerners', for example. Fieldwork revealed that it was not that people 'in the community' did not understand that hazardous child labour is wrong. On the contrary, every one that I spoke with expressed concern at the fact that there were so many *nyokas*; the problem was that they did not know what could be done to stop children engaging in mining, particularly in view of the worsening poverty situation in Tanzania (see Chapters 5 and 8).

The IPEC Programme Officer for Anglophone Africa was also present at the original workshop and was vehement in her disagreement with the argument of an imposition of western values:

> I completely disagree. The process itself makes it impossible to just impose a programme (..) the ILO has such a tight tripartite structure that there is no way that anyone can make that argument (...) How can anyone argue that child labour is OK? What is the damage of IPEC coming in? (...) It has such unanimous support with the new Convention, so no-one can say that it is bad. Part of these statements come out of ignorance, from people who come from a 'western' background and don't know the difference between child work and child labour. They haven't been to the field to see the impact (IPEC official, pers. comm.).

While the process was therefore not simply 'imposed' upon the government and other national institutions involved in the process, to what extent was it imposed upon the so-called target group, those children engaging in child labour? To what extent was the need identified by those affected by the issue? According to the NPM there was no consultation by IPEC with children or their families specifically:

> When it comes down to international cooperation, I don't think that any government consults with the villages, it isn't practical. At this national workshop all the data and information available was brought together and discussed till an understanding was reached (NPM, pers. comm.).

Clearly, it would be inappropriate to take participation too far before introducing a programme to a country but it is important to remember the hesitancy expressed by ILO conference delegates with regard to the extent to which there should be participation by children and other stakeholders in developing appropriate policies and programmes with

regard to Convention 182 (3.4). As seen in Chapter 8, the children I spoke with were very favourable to receiving assistance in the form of IPEC intervention (although they did not know what this would entail in reality as the programme had not started). At the end of the day, if children do not want to take part in direct intervention programmes they do not have to (See Crewe and Harrison 1998 on project participation).

The issue of imposition becomes more complicated, however, when one considers the indirect impact of IPEC action or the national legal framework which IPEC has helped develop and which is applied in a generalised fashion not taking into account individual situations. For example, after IPEC sensitisation workshops in the Arusha region, a large number of policemen were sent to Mirerani to round up any children found working in the mines. The children were then taken home in buses or dropped off in the nearest town. Mine owners were threatened with imprisonment if they were found to have children in their pits (see Chapter 8). The result of this 'imposition' (as the children had no choice) was that the children returned a few days later and continued to work, either secretly or on a freelance basis. Freelance work is often more hazardous than employed pit work (8.1.1), so the indirect impact of IPEC action was detrimental to the immediate well-being of the *nyokas*.

IPEC has been a highly dynamic programme, with action changing through time (Chapter 4). This was also reflected in the development of the Tanzania programme:

> There have been changes at different levels. When IPEC started the strategy was evolving and changing as new experiences came in, way back in 92, 94 we didn't have all the answers. Methodologies and strategies are changing in the light of emerging experiences. It is very clear that IPEC has provided for country grown innovations. All along they have been very keen to have overall strategies adapted to country specific situations, they are very keen on that (...) In the case of Tanzania we felt we needed to start with awareness raising and sensitisation to bring an understanding across society that putting children to work at the expense of their education is a problem and is not acceptable. There is no strict structure. Geneva gives a broad framework of interventions and the individual countries decide where they want the emphasis (NPM, pers. comm.).

This makes it clear that the actions developed by Geneva were adapted to the local context in Tanzania, at least from the viewpoint of the NPM. In fact one of IPEC's key strengths is the extent to which it is nationally owned:

> I think that they have developed a foundation, there is no one way to apply across the board. In the Tanzanian case, they have worked to establish an incredibly strong foundation. I have no doubt that after IPEC leaves the work will continue here. It depends on the country. I think that everyone involved in the workshop worked very hard to create a sense of ownership, there was a lot of open discussion and dialogue so that when IPEC came they knew where to focus (ILO official, pers. comm.).

National ownership can therefore lead to greater chances of sustainability: not only will the chances of the project continuing after the donors leave be strengthened but project design and management will be more 'in tune' with national realities, as opposed to 'Northern' theories (Crewe and Harrison 1998; Chapters 7 and 9). If one looks closer at the situation, however, it becomes clear that this 'home grown' characteristic applies principally to action programmes, responsibility for which lies with the country programme itself.

There are also, however, a number of interventions instigated by Geneva. Out of the total budget for Tanzania of $6 million over the next 5 years, the core budget for action programmes in the 2000- 2001 biennium is only $806, 000[183]. The rest of the money is spent on extra-budgetary activities, for example, the Time-Bound Programme (TBP)[184], DFID activities, SIMPOC (statistical programme), the Sub-regional commercial agriculture project, the Education project and the Promoting Linkages between Women's employment and the reduction of Child Labour project. These areas of intervention are usually identified by donors. For example the Norwegian government initiated the Education project and DFID heavily influenced the Mirerani mining project (7.1). IPEC in country then set up a national project task force which is responsible for

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[183] The core budget for 1998-1999 was $800, 000.

[184] TBPs are the next step in IPEC's approach and are aimed at accelerating the process of eradicating the worst forms of child labour within a given time period, see ILO (2000a: 5). Tanzania is one of the three pilot TBPs, along with El Salvador and Nepal.

identifying activities, which must then be approved by the National Steering Committee. It thus becomes clear that 'ownership' is a complex issue. While the donor identifies the area of intervention, it is IPEC that recruits the project co-ordinator and it is then the project co-ordinator along with the task force who selects which activities to conduct. Finally, the National Steering Committee has responsibility for approving the choice of activities.

IPEC Tanzania thus developed through lengthy negotiations with different partners and was based on a consultative process as opposed to a 'top-down' imposition. Consultation was, however, with those in the upper echelons of power: government officials, trade unions, employer groups, academics, some NGO representatives based in Dar Es Salaam. There was no consultation with poor families or child labourers themselves. This is very much to do with the organisational, as well as national, culture. Both operate in a hierarchical fashion on the assumption that those in power have the knowledge and right to speak for those without such power. In this case the idea of 'Northern' domination and imposition over the weak and subordinate 'South' has been shown to be over-simplified. More relevant would be the notion of the domination of 'uppers', in this case educated government, trade union, employer organisation, NGO and ILO bureaucrats, be they Tanzanian or 'Northern', over the 'lowers', in this case child labourers and their families (Chambers 1997)[185].

6.2 IPEC Tanzania: Formal Discourses and Practice

It is important to emphasise that while IPEC's discourse is undoubtedly based on the European and North American experience of development, it cannot be assumed it is

[185] Although many 'lowers' would agree with the 'uppers' that child labour in mines is not acceptable (see 5 and 8), the former would argue that such labour is a necessary survival strategy. Furthermore, consultation with 'lowers' also revealed different strategies for tackling the situation than those identified by lowers. For example, children argued that IPEC should provide them with cash so that they could set themselves up in business. Something that 'uppers', such as IPEC informants interviewed, are unlikely to do.

wholly generated in these countries (see Chapters 3 and 6). As shown in 6.1, countries interested in combating child labour must first approach the ILO, expressing their interest in joining the Programme. If this is approved by the ILO a Memorandum of Understanding between the national government and the Programme is signed[186]. A National Programme Manager, who must be a national of the implementing country, is then selected and the Ministry of Labour selects the National Steering Committee (NSC), which consists of representatives from the trade unions, employers' associations and government and other interested parties and is responsible for strategic input to the Programme. The Ministry of Labour then sets up a Child Labour Unit, which is the Secretariat of the NSC and is responsible for co-ordinating the roles of the various implementing agencies. The NPM is IPEC staff and is responsible for providing technical support to the NSC. In this way the Programme is said to be locally owned and therefore free to generate its own national child labour discourse. It could be argued, however, that while the NSC members and the NPM are Tanzanian nationals a significant, if minority, proportion of them have been educated in Western universities and therefore exposed to the Western 'child labour' discourse. To leave it at this would, however, be to simplify the role of agency. People within organisations do not simply follow the dominant discourse blindly but interpret it, resist it and apply it in different ways (4.4.8; 6.3). This section will explore the formal structures, discourses and practices of IPEC Tanzania. 6.3 will then examine informal discourses and practices.

6.2.1 In the Office

IPEC Tanzania is based in the ILO Area Office for Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia and Kenya in Dar Es Salaam. From the outside, the Area Office is a particularly grand and somewhat intimidating building (Figure 6.2.1), located on one of the main roads leading out of the city, with many other UN agencies and embassy buildings.

[186] The MoU was drawn up by the ILO and was approved without amendment by the Tanzanian government.

Figure 6.2.1 Photo of ILO Dar building, surrounded by lush gardens



The location of IPEC within the ILO building is unusual in that ILO projects are usually located outside the Area Office. IPEC was, however, a highly visible Programme, supported by powerful donors, from the outset (see 4.1) and it could therefore be argued that it was important for it to be located within the Area Office. According to one informant:

> IPEC should be in the Area Office, wherever the Area Office is. It should never be separate. The Area Office should focus more and more on IPEC, now that it is an InFocus programme. I think that the IPEC budget is well over 50 % of the ILO budget. I think that IPEC has created more visibility for the ILO because it is getting support from powerful donors. Consumer interest and media has made it a shining issue (IPEC staff, pers. comm.).

This is also confirmed by the Area Office Director who argues that:

> A lot of people think that IPEC is outside the ILO but no, it has been projected in the past as if IPEC is a programme of its own, independent of the ILO. Mostly from within. When it took off it was one of the ILO's major programmes and people considered, and rightly so, that it shouldn't be stifled by internal rules, to

> have an independent face. But this doesn't mean that IPEC's work should be divorced from the overall ILO objectives. If it stands alone then it can lose so much but if it complements ILO actions then it can make a great impact. The wrong message was given when trying to make the administration independent. In many Area Offices it started separately without integrating. When I came, I changed that. The role of the Area Office is to support IPEC, to give it the ILO stamp and the necessary political and administrative support. It is an ILO Programme although it was launched and conceived as stand-alone (pers. comm.).

The fact that IPEC is located within the Area Office gives rise to a number of issues. IPEC was originally set up to be semi-autonomous (4.1). This means that for some purposes IPEC functions independently within the Area Office. For example, it orders its own supplies and has its own budget. On the other hand, it is firmly planted within the formal organisational functioning, i.e. all letters sent out must be signed by the Director. In the words of one informant:

> The problem with IPEC is its relation to the rest of the ILO, as it is still perceived by some ILO people as being different, not part of the ILO. In the Area Office, we have our own computers and things. When IPEC was launched, the only way to have efficiency in a structure like the ILO was to have a high level of independence but then it was perceived as something different. There was a high risk that IPEC was becoming an independent structure inside the ILO, like UNDP, UNFPA[187] were programmes originally. In the last two years there has been a big effort to have it back in the family (IPEC official, pers. comm.).

This sheds light on the discussion in 4.1, revealing further the current drives to bring IPEC back within the fold.

The above quotes reveal an interesting conflict in ILO support. IPEC is responsible, for example, for all its equipment, down to the last paper clip, yet staff cannot send out official correspondence, however minor, in their own name. All letters must be signed by the Area Office Director[188]. This means that if he is absent, all correspondence is on

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[187] UNDP is the United Nations Development Programme, UNFPA is the United Nations Population Fund.

[188] This practice is in fact common to most UN agencies.

hold until he or his stand-in can sign so it can take days for a letter to be sent out, causing unnecessary delays. The situation can also be demoralising for staff who were used in previous jobs to being trusted to write and sign their own correspondence. The argument is that the Director must be aware of all activities as he is ultimately responsible but other agencies, such as DFID, do not employ this practice and yet function suitably. In the ILO Area Office, all incoming mail must also be addressed to the Director, who will read it and then assign it with follow-up action to the relevant staff member. To the outsider, this appears an amazing waste of valuable time. Surely the Director must have more important functions to conduct than reading mail and assigning individual tasks as a result? Most interesting, or should I say disturbing, is the origin of this practice. In his memoirs, Archibald Evans, who had worked in the private office of the ILO's first Director, Albert Thomas (Chapter 2), reveals the extent to which the ILO's current organisational structures date back to the system put in place by Albert Thomas- in other words, back to 1919:

> Thomas (..) followed the French system of government, in which instructions flowed from the top ministerial level, trickling downwards to the officials responsible for carrying them out. (..) The end result of the "French" approach was that, Thomas, arriving early at the Office, saw all the mail of importance (other than routine matters) and by 9:30 a.m. or thereabouts had issued massive flutters of "papillons" (literally butterflies) containing instructions as to the relevant sections of the Office on the action to be taken arising out of the daily mail (Evans 1995: 9).

Thomas' 1919 practices are therefore still followed in 2001. The Organisation was clearly much smaller in those days and it may have been a useful method but with the current mandate of the Organisation it appears to be a diversion from more important issues which a Director should be tackling as well as an inefficient use of his or her time. It also does not provide staff[189] with the opportunity to take responsibility and therefore ownership of the decision making process. A Foucauldian perspective might suggest that the Director is exercising his panoptical reproductive power over his staff through the

[189] Staff have developed their own resistance strategies to this through using e-mail, which, for practical reasons, does not have to go through the Director (6.3.5). E-mail is, however, mainly used for internal organisational correspondence. External correspondence is still primarily through conventional mail.

tight regulation of all mail (Foucault 1979). I prefer to take Hofstede's (1994) perspective on uncertainty avoidance which provides a useful framework for exploring organisational culture (see also 4.4.9 and 6.3.3). One of his analytical dimensions is 'uncertainty avoidance', which he defines as 'the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations' (op. cit: 113). He suggests that this feeling is expressed in various ways, such as nervous stress and a need for predictability, actualised through the need for rules. I would argue that the organisational culture of the ILO promotes a high level of uncertainty avoidance. As in any bureaucracy, there is a strong need for written and unwritten rules. By examining every letter personally, the Office Director is avoiding uncertainty, as required by the Organisational culture. As Hofstede argues, however, such an emotional need for laws and rules often leads to the establishing of rules or rule-oriented behaviours which are 'nonsensical, inconsistent, or dysfunctional' (op. cit: 121), such as, I would suggest, the ILO Director's need to examine all correspondence.

In terms of funding, the primary IPEC Tanzania donor is Germany but this situation is currently changing, with the US government increasing its contributions and it is expected that these will exceed the German contribution for the next biennium. Although exact figures remain confidential it is expected that the US contribution for the Time Bound Programme will be in the billions. Norway and Britain have also made contributions to IPEC Tanzania. To date, the bulk of funds have been allocated from HQ but the Tanzania office is currently trying to attract funds directly from donors in country. The DFID Tanzania office, for example, is one donor with whom the Tanzania office is attempting to build a direct rapport (DFID HQ is already allocating funds directly to ILO HQ for IPEC). This fits the moves towards greater decentralisation, currently found in both agencies.

Since it started in 1994, IPEC Tanzania has been expanding in terms of resources and, more recently, in terms of staffing, from an allocation of $600, 000 in the 1994-1995 biennium to $806, 000 for the current 2000- 2001 biennium. The advent of the Time Bound Programme (TBP) has meant a renewed interest in Tanzania and consequently in funding. There has also been an expansion with regard to staffing. Until January 2000, the NPM, the secretary and a part time accountant were the only members of staff, with

extra technical support from ILO HQ in Geneva, mainly from Operations (Box 4.2.2), and from the Regional Office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In January, a new JPO, funded by the Italian Government, arrived to replace the previous JPO who had left eight months previously in May 1999 and in May 2000 a new Programme Officer for Anglophone Africa, funded by the US Department of Labour, arrived. From being staffed by Tanzanian nationals, IPEC now has two expatriate staff, funded by their respective governments. When I asked the NPM if he felt that there was a role for international staff within IPEC Tanzania his answer was suitably diplomatic:

> In terms of capacity, I wouldn't say that we are self-sufficient yet, yes there is still a role (NPM, pers. comm.).

It is expected that by the end of 2001 there will be 11 staff in total, most of whom should be Tanzanian. The Director attributes this expansion to the success of the Tanzania programme:

> Expansion is to do with, they feel that generally what they call success stories, like Tanzania, have chances for increased impact if the programme expands. Interventions on child labour through IPEC are expanding at global and field level, more donors are coming in, countries are demonstrating increased support and political commitment (ILO Director, pers. comm.).

The Director attributes another reason for the influx of staff- decentralisation:

> I have been asked to take on all the financial and administrative responsibilities. I said no in May unless it was accompanied by a transfer of human resources. We are negotiating how many people we need for the Programme. We are expecting to grow to twenty people. There is no wisdom in IPEC expanding when it is not structurally prepared. That will make or unmake IPEC. They need to respond positively, it is their biggest challenge (pers. comm.).

This is a particularly interesting example of resistance to HQ. The Director was aware that his staff was overworked already and it would be unsustainable to agree to take further responsibilities. His refusal paid off as the donors have agreed to pay for more staff. It is worth returning briefly to the point made in 4.4.5 that the ILO must not be

afraid to stand up to the donors. The ILO Director in Tanzania, however, seems to be one of the few prepared to do so and yet his proposal made sense to the Americans. At the end of the day, donors want to fund successful projects and implementing agencies must be prepared to argue the case for the necessary inputs instead of selling themselves short, which, I would argue, can only lead to failure in the long run. In the words of the Director:

> You must not be scared of the donors. You can't implement miraculously without a budget for support staff. You will fail if you do that. There must be competent people who can push the issues. (...) They want money but they don't want to ask the donors. They are timid. I told them, if you don't put up a good fight you won't get it (...) I talked to the American woman leading the discussion and she agreed. Some of the bureaucrats had a shock when I said no but I had to (pers. comm.).

The internal structures of IPEC are thus relatively dependent on the ILO Area Office, despite its semi-autonomous nature. IPEC Tanzania is currently in a state of transition, due to a rapid influx of funding and consequently of staff. This growth is set to continue in the near future and will no doubt have an important impact on the formal structuring and practice of the Programme.

6.2.2 IPEC outside the office

IPEC Tanzania acts as a 'middle-man' between the National Steering Committee (NSC) and other social partners and the donors and beneficiaries. A 13% agency or 'management' fee is charged to the donors by the ILO. This fee covers administration costs and other overheads. IPEC staff in the Office are responsible for providing administrative support to the Child Labour Unit[190].

The Child Labour Unit (CLU) of the Ministry of Labour is the secretariat to the NSC. There is one permanent project manager, one secretary, one driver, all funded by IPEC, and one assistant project manager paid for by the Ministry of Labour. The Government pays for meetings in terms of venue, stationary, and food as well as for service and

[190] Support is also provided to other social partners although these are not official members of the NSC.

maintenance costs, such as photocopying, typewriter, computer and the car. There is currently a proposal that the Tanzanian Government should contribute a proportion of the project manager's salary.

One IPEC social partner describes the relationship between the NPC (old term for NPM) and the secretariat:

> ILO-IPEC is having an NPC who is the watchdog of the process, to advise the government and to intervene if the objectives set by the government are not being followed. All project proposals should come to the secretariat who presents them to the steering committee. ILO provides technical support (pers. comm.).

This would appear to be the 'idealised' version as the Ministry of Labour Project Manager describes his role in more realistic terms:

> I am the government eye on implementation, so they (social partners) should bring proposals and projects to me to refer to (the IPEC National Programme Manager) but because they know the ILO has funds they go directly to the ILO Director. (The NPM) then refers them back to the Child Labour Unit, pending for discussion. Most members are supposed to discuss with me first but many go to the NPM first and then he comes back to me (pers. comm., gloss added).

It would thus appear that, in reality, social partners try to circumvent bureaucratic structures, approaching those with the money, and therefore the power, directly. Fortunately, the NPM is aware of the structures and does not seek to abuse his power, referring all requests back to the Secretariat. This is a case where bureaucratic rules and procedures are a positive thing (7.3.2). In a country as corrupt as Tanzania (Tanzania was cited by Transparency International[191] (1999) as one of the most corrupt countries in the world) it would be easy for procedures to be circumvented in a negative fashion. The ILO's strict rules prevent this from happening, as much as is possible.

[191] Although it is not appropriate to detail the report it is important to note that it was drawn up by an international body and the methodology used is questionable as is the definition of 'corruption' used.

The CLU is responsible for organising NSC quarterly meetings, where issues relating to programme implementation are discussed. During fieldwork, however, it became clear that meetings were not held on a strictly quarterly basis, but as the need arose:

> The last meeting was in March, now we are in July and we haven't had another one. Most programmes haven't started for 2000-2001 so there are no urgent cases to address (CLU Director, pers. comm.).

The selection of programmes to be supported is made by the National Steering Committee which consists of representatives from Government (5), NGOs (2) and employers' (1) and workers' (1) organisations as well as one ex-officio member from IPEC and one from UNICEF. The NSC is thus composed of a relatively wider range of national 'partner' organisations.

6.3 IPEC Tanzania: Informal Discourses and Practice[192]

Britan and Cohen (1980) use the term informal systems to refer to practices which influence how individuals and groups within an organisation relate to each other and influence the formal system:

> People are not roles or offices. Personal interests, emotions, affinities and situations bring them into closer contact than formal duties demand, leading to consultation, friendships, and intimacy, as well as to factionalism, competition and hostility. Formal organisation forces people into sets of rule-regulated relationships. Within those relationships, 'natural' factors of interest, association and history produce alignments of co-operation and competition that may parallel formal structure, but are not necessarily congruent with it (1980: 16)

[192] In this section, informants will generally be referred to with minimum detail in order to preserve their anonymity. All staff cited, except two, are male, reflecting the gender bias of the organisation (4.4.9). Where necessary the distinction will be made between expatriate and local staff.

During fieldwork, I collected a wealth of data regarding informal discourses and practices of Tanzania staff. In fact, I often felt that my office was a 'consulting' room with a regular flow of people coming to talk to me about their frustrations with the Organisation[193]. The data is therefore used in a way which informs my debate while respecting the confidentiality of individuals. Throughout this section it is also important to bear in mind that it is impossible to explore IPEC without considering the wider ILO Area Office structures within which it functions.

6.3.1 The ILO: A Learning based Organisation?

Recent thinking in organisational development theory has introduced the idea of the 'Learning Organisation' (see Garratt 1994). Rondinelli (1993:166-169) argues that it is of central importance for an organisation to have a learning-based process of planning and administration which allows for errors, innovation and change as most Weberian style bureaucratic structures are in fact designed to suppress mistakes, to standardise, routinise and limit individual discretion. The bureaucratic structures of the ILO were discussed in Chapter 4 but specific interviews were conducted with IPEC Tanzania staff to explore the extent to which they felt that the ILO was a learning-based organisation.

According to the NPM, the ILO is a learning organisation:

> It is impossible to cover up mistakes. When it comes to the quality of output my own experience is that the ILO is obsessed with quality outputs. If you cover up it would come back to you. There is a very strong, rigid, learning culture, even to the extent of having to delay delivery, therefore they are very keen on quality. As a donor agency we deliver maximum quality (pers. comm.)

While the above informant is referring to internal admission of mistakes, a contrasting viewpoint is given by another informant with regard to external recognition of mistakes:

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[193] This is revealing of how free staff felt with revealing data to me. This is partly due to the fact that the Director was so open to my research and had told staff to assist me in any way possible. People therefore did not feel as threatened by my presence as they may otherwise have felt.

> We always admit our mistakes but not on paper, that is the ILO approach. When you work you know all your weaknesses, for example, administration problems, EPAs (budget forms), but we can't admit that on paper. If you are working with donors it is stupid to put your mistakes on a report so you must always say that your project is a success (IPEC official, pers. comm., gloss added).

This quote confirms the point made in 4.4.5 that it is not good 'business' sense to admit to mistakes if more funds are needed from donors. What about the IPEC audit discussed in 4.3? No-one in Tanzania, not even the Director, had seen this report:

> After the auditing of IPEC, I have seen a lot of messages referring to it. I have never seen the report. It was made for HQ. (IPEC official, pers. comm.)

Internal audits are usually conducted to help with organisational learning and it is therefore counter-productive not to ensure that all field staff are fully briefed as to its findings. The fact that they were not reveals the top-down nature of the Organisation (6.3.8). Another explanation could also be that one key audit recommendation was to improve the abysmal contractual position of field staff (6.3.3.) The findings were considered serious enough, however, to have led to the re-structuring of IPEC that is currently underway (4.2.2).

Another ILO informant reveals the extent to which the 'risk-adversity' of the Organisation prevents organisational learning:

> People are so risk adverse that they will at any cost avoid mistakes which is why they spend so much time on monitoring. They always want to protect their own position. So making a mistake is really a mistake. If you take a risk to improve things and then make a mistake you really are in trouble. The people who don't really want to stay in the Organisation take risks. They are the ones who criticise openly the way things are. The bureaucrats get very uncomfortable. If you don't ask questions and just perform, then fine, but if you do, you must avoid to think about what the ILO is doing, then you get frustrated or fired (ILO expatriate staff, pers. comm.).

This final point illustrates one of the many survival strategies employed by ILO staff, as discussed in 4.4.8 and 6.3.5.

Fieldwork revealed that a key constraint to learning and strategising was the overwork and time pressures faced by IPEC staff (4.4.6). In the Area Office, following of bureaucratic procedures and responding to continual demands from HQ has led to a situation where actual 'thinking' and 'learning' from experiences is always pushed back to 'later':

> If you have to deliver you simply do the urgent things, not the most important (IPEC expatriate staff, pers. comm.).

One of the main factors which prevents the Organisation's learning is its relatively high turnover. The Area Office, for example, is disproportionately staffed with JPOs. In fact, all but one of the technical staff are JPOs. JPOs stay for a two to three year period and then leave. There is usually no handover to the next JPO as the period until the arrival of the next one can be years. For example, it took 19 months from the date of departure for the gender JPO to be replaced, despite the Director requesting a replacement one year before the contract of the previous JPO expired:

> There is no institutional memory. If I go, who will take over my work? Maybe the Area Office can help but that is a big weakness (ILO expatriate staff, pers. comm.).

This issue is difficult to resolve as there is limited funding for staffing so the ILO is dependent on governments sending JPOs. JPOs can also choose their field and country from a list of vacancies so there is no guarantee that posts will be filled as necessary. ILO permanent professional staff often do not want to work in the field but stay in HQ which means that JPOs who are in theory trainees find themselves in high positions of responsibility:

> I am a trainee. The grey hairs all want to stay in Geneva. They are talking about decentralisation but it is not really being done. Anthony is the only professional staff in the Organisation plus the two bosses and then the Associate Experts[194] (ILO JPO, pers. comm.).

It would therefore appear that internally the Organisation regards learning as important, although staff shortages and time constraints mean that learning is often left on the 'to do later' tray. The Organisation is not, however, open about sharing its mistakes and learning with the outside world, mainly due to the wider culture within the aid industry of covering up mistakes and for donors to only fund 'successful' projects without allowing for learning and consequently for improving practice (see also 4.4.5).

6.3.2 The ILO: A Responsive Organisation?

To what extent is the Organisation responsive to the diverse problems and conditions within Tanzania? Is there scope for IPEC Tanzania to modify policy in the light of the culturally acceptable practices and behaviour of different groups of people or is Geneva dictated policy written in stone?

> IPEC is very responsive. IPEC is designed in such a way. There is a lot of latitude in the programming for adapting to local practices. I don't see any rigidity when it comes to responding to local realities, it is very accommodating. In many instances we are advised to see and to indicate the ways in which certain principles can be adapted (NPM, pers. comm.).

Another informant, however, argues that IPEC is not as responsive as it could be, mainly due to lack of time allocated to 'thinking' strategically:

> There is a very low possibility, occasion, interest in thinking about theory, what we are doing and why. There is no occasion to think about what is really good for child labourers, there is more interest in good action programmes, good indicators. (IPEC expatriate official, pers. comm.)

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[194] Associate Expert is another term for JPO (see 3.3.3). IPEC now has one extra professional staff member- the Sub-regional Co-ordinator but she is on a two year contract, funded by the US Department of Labour.

The ILO functions according to the Weberian bureaucratic model (Chapter 4). Tanzanian society, however, functions in ways which are often quite distinct. This can make it difficult to follow such a rational, de-humanised model. To what extent, therefore, are Tanzanian forms of organising incorporated into the formal ILO-IPEC structure in Tanzania?

> I don't think that we have Tanzanian forms of organising but the level of Tanzanian adherence to organisation principles is probably lower, organisational principles overall are the same globally (...) Standards have to be there. Different societies have to strive to meet these. For example, if you take the element of time, if a meeting starts at ten then it should. This has a lot to do with cultural traditions (NPM, pers. comm.).

While the informant did not want to expand on the particular cultural traditions to which he was referring, he does highlight the need to recognise the impact of culture on the way in which an organisation functions.

The NPM raises the issue of time which is one particular cultural phenomenon worth considering. Expatriate staff soon realise that their North European time-keeping rigidity is quite out of place in the Tanzanian context where meetings never start 'on time'. There are unspoken rules, however, as to timing and, for the culturally aware practitioner, these do follow their own logical path:

> You also learn how late meetings are going to be. For example if you have a meeting with donors you know that the meeting will be 15 minutes late, if you have a mixed meeting with government and donors then maybe it will be 30 minutes late and if you have a national meeting or workshop then it will be one hour because people don't arrive on time, only 20% of people will be there on time and the more important the meeting the more important the guest of honour and the higher the chance that person will also be late (ILO expatriate staff, pers. comm.).

It is therefore possible for meetings to start 'on time' in the Tanzanian cultural sense. Once the initial frustrations of dealing with a new cultural form of organising are overcome, expatriate staff can come to find this method of holding meetings quite useful:

> As long as you know, it can work in your advantage because if you are doing something you know that you can be late, if you are early then you can talk to people there which is sometimes more useful than the meeting itself and if you are preparing the meeting you have more time to prepare a little (ILO expatriate staff, pers. comm.).

The Organisation can therefore be seen as responsive to local conditions, although mainly this is because it does not have a choice. Where there is a choice, informants argue that HQ will choose to continue along the rigid, bureaucratic path, rather than taking local conditions into consideration:

> Geneva tends to lose touch with what is happening on the ground, not by chance but by choice. They deliberately refuse to comprehend what is going on the ground so they don't deliver on the requirements of constituents. It is business as usual. It is a bureaucracy and they don't want to change now (ILO Local staff, pers. comm.).

6.3.3 Staffing

It was seen in Chapter 4.4, that the precariousness of staffing arrangements in IPEC HQ is quite particular within the wider ILO system where more people are on permanent arrangements, although there are still a large number of people on two year renewable contracts. In Tanzania, the staffing situation is similar.

The contractual position of the NPM is as precarious as that of many staff in IPEC HQ. The Tanzania NPM is on a one year renewable contract, which offers little job security. Again the paradox of this in the Organisation responsible for ensuring workers' rights internationally is worth flagging up. Even more concerning than having been on a one year renewable contract for seven years is the fact that contracts often aren't renewed until the last minute. I was shocked, for example, when leaving for my Christmas break in mid- December, at the response I received upon saying 'See you next year' to the NPM:

> I may see you in January but I may not, my contract still has to be renewed (NPM, pers. comm.).

The Office closes down over Christmas and it was clear that the NPM would not find out if his contract had been renewed until starting work in the New Year, although his contract expires on the 7th January of each year.

Research reveals that one key problem is that the Organisation in general and IPEC in particular does not invest in its staff:

> IPEC does not invest in human resources. US Department of Labour has given over $100, 000, 000, 13% of that is [195]$13, 000, 000 but no-one knows where that has gone. It is not being spent on human resource development (ILO official, pers. comm.).

This could be because IPEC is a Programme and therefore has a limited life. Management may therefore feel it is not worth investing resources into staff development, if those staff are not going to remain within the Organisation in the long term. It could also be related to the fact that there is a wider trend within the public sector not to invest in people[196]. Human resource departments are usually marginalised within Organisations and are generally not invited to attend organisational strategisation meetings, despite the fact that effective investment in, and management of, staff is key to the success of any organisational strategy (Brown 1995: 130-141).

What about the difference between local staff and expatriate staff in the ILO Tanzania office? The distinction is quite dramatic, but this is by no means confined to the ILO but to all international agencies working in Tanzania[197]. Expatriate staff live a life of luxury which they would be unable to do at home: UN staff have tax free allowances, housing allowances, transport allowances, health care and private education provision for their

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[195] The term 'human resource' is problematic in itself in that it detracts from the fact that it is dealing with 'people'- another example of the potential de-humanising effects of bureaucracies (4.4.1). By de-humanising the 'resource', we are in fact negating the importance of affectivity within the wider functioning in the organisation (Chapter 4).

[196] Although DFID, for example, currently holds the British 'Investors in People' award.

[197] DFID staff, for example, get free housing, travel allowances, servants salaries, cost of living allowance, 'hardship' allowance and other perks which as ordinary civil servants working in the UK, they would clearly not be entitled to. The extent to which the level of these perks is justifiable is a question in itself and is one which many are questioning, especially in view of the fact that they sustain power imbalances and cause resentment.

children. Local staff are on far lower salaries than their expatriate colleagues who may very well be doing the same work and are not entitled to the various perks of expatriate staff. The material distinction between expatriate staff and local staff is therefore blatant. To what extent, however, is this due to racism or merely to the fact that expatriate staff are living away from home and that local staff would receive the same perks were they to be seconded? Crewe and Harrison (1998: 22) argue that:

> Racist stereotyping, although different according to who is constructing and being constructed, underpins much development policy and practice.

The authors consider how racist stereotyping dictates the way in which 'white' developers interact with poor 'black' aid recipients and why few black staff are to be found in positions of power in international aid agencies. Commenting on the former would be a thesis in itself but it is important to point out the extent to which my experience with the ILO differs from the findings of Crewe and Harrison. The Director of the ILO Tanzania is a 'black' expatriate, the Deputy Director is a 'black' expatriate and the NPM of IPEC is also 'black' but a Tanzanian. Furthermore, only one of the three IPEC HQ directors is white and the Director General is from Chile. Crewe and Harrison's own stereotype does not therefore match my experiences of the ILO. Having 'black' people in positions of power has, however, led to its own controversies such as claims that promotion was too dependent on being non-'white' (3.3.2.4; 4.4.9).

Those in positions of power are therefore not only 'white'. But let us return to local administrative staff. According to a 'white' expatriate staff member, local staff are treated differently to expatriate staff:

> I think that there is a big difference in how different staff are treated. I know that people are afraid of our management (..) Local staff are treated most differently. Let's face it we have different cultural, educational backgrounds. When people are on mission. It is not so much racism but cultural background. The management tells local people what to do, not so much asking for their opinions. It's a common habit in African countries. Africans are used to that kind of management style whereas Europeans are not (ILO expatriate staff, pers. comm.).

In view of what we saw above, the main issue may be the distinction between expatriate and local staff as opposed to being 'black' or 'white'. The informant brings up the interesting issue of culturally different management styles, arguing that the African Director employs a 'top-down' approach to management, telling local staff what to do as opposed to asking for their opinions. I would dispute the extent to which this is a specifically 'African style of management' as many European managers use the same approach, particularly in a bureaucratic system[198]. It is worth highlighting the fact that this particular informant used to work for the private sector in Northern Europe and was therefore accustomed to a far less bureaucratic system.

Another expatriate informant also referred to the 'African management style':

> I find this is a very, very African management style. The Director is driving around in a saloon car with flags on. There is a lot of attribution and weight put on the position of someone. The title you use, the car. It is very important that letters go from one Director to another, not between the responsible persons. It is all very formal (ILO expatriate staff, pers. comm.).

Again my findings would dispute whether this is an African, as opposed to a bureaucratic, management style. The head of DFID and many other international agencies, as well as government officials, also drive around in big cars with flags and place importance on position, title and car[199].

On the one hand, therefore, the formally bureaucratic management style is a form of access to Tanzanian government officials who are used to, and expect, such a style but on the other hand it can serve to perpetuate a system where power distance is extremely large. Hofstede provides a particularly useful framework for understanding power distance within national and organisational cultures[200]. He defines power distance as 'the

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[198] One informant who had also worked for the previous female, European ILO Director claimed that her management style was more formal than that of the current 'African' Director.

[199] Although, internal management practices may be different. For example, DFID staff can sign their own correspondence.

[200] Hofstede's (1994) five dimensions of national and organisational cultures are: power distance (extent to which less powerful members of institutions and organisations expect that power is unequally distributed), femininity versus masculinity (4.4.9), collectivism versus individualism, long-term versus short-term

extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect power to be distributed unequally' (1994: 28). In a large power distance culture, people expect that power is distributed unequally and those in power therefore expect to have access to all the trappings that come with power, such as the big car and the top-down management style.

The issue of lack of staff rights was one which came up frequently, particularly with regard to short term contracting and the hypocrisy of the Organisation. It is perhaps useful to quote the Director-General, Mr Juan Somavia:

> A global economy in which people do not have the right to organize will lack social legitimacy. People organizing themselves to make their voice heard exercise a fundamental human right and the most important development right (ILO 2000: 1).

In view of the fact that the first collective bargaining agreement within the Organisation was only signed in 2000, it can be argued that the ILO lacked 'social legitimacy' and that staff were, until recently, denied their 'fundamental human right and most important development right':

> For the first time since 1919 the workers managed to sign a collective bargaining agreement with the managers of the ILO and here we are lecturing others on the advantages of collective bargaining agreements. Isn't that funny? (ILO local staff, pers. comm.)

Local staff still do not have the right to bargain with their employers:

> I honestly believe that for local staff there should be scope for negotiating with the employer. It has never been brought up in the office, only in the staff union but we never got feedback (ILO local staff, pers. comm.).

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orientation and uncertainty avoidance (6.2.1). The extent to which a culture has these dimensions will affect the form of organising well as the way in which nationals tackle problems.

When I asked the informant why he did not chase up the issue, the answer exposed the power dynamics used by the Organisation to ensure that local staff do not fight for their own rights as workers:

> When I look where I was before joining here I am much better off so I wouldn't now. It wouldn't be worth ringing the bell (ILO local staff, pers. comm.).

The fact is that conditions for local staff are far better in the ILO than in the Tanzanian government or any other local institution. This is controversial in itself as it means that some of the best Tanzanian capacity has been poached from national institutions to work for international organisations. Local ILO staff salaries, while considerably lower than those of expatriate staff, are far higher than those of other locally employed Tanzanians. They also receive numerous perks such as staff family allowances and medical allowances (deducted from salary). Furthermore, their salary is exempt from tax. One of the biggest differences between local staff and expatriate staff salaries is that local staff salaries are not pegged to the dollar, which they claim means that they lose out on exchange rates.

One particular incident over the salaries of cleaning staff, was particularly revealing of the hypocrisy of the Organisation:

> The ILO is not practising what they are advocating with regard to local staff. They use the labour market as it is to have employment policies they like, which is exactly what they are trying to prevent. If you are the Director, you can make sure that people have decent wages and contracts. The cleaners get paid TSH 30, 000, there are four, but every month we pay TSH 320, 000 to the contractor and they hardly ever have any soap to clean with. (Some others) raised this issue in a weekly meeting and said couldn't we contract these girls individually or ensure that the contractor pays them more and (the Director) said it is none of our concern and it was left. The ILO wants to have an impact on relations between employers and workers and then it says that it's none of our concern! (ILO expatriate staff, pers. comm., gloss added.).

The lack of promotion and staff mobility opportunities were also important frustrations for local staff:

> There is a kind of non-equality of treating between professional staff and local staff. To be professional staff your grade should be at least P1. (..) They say it has to do with the UN common system but this is not fair. The ILO should be at the forefront of fighting this anomaly as it works for workers' rights. What is sad is that other UN agencies can be ahead in terms of workers' rights. People at HQ are very conservative, maybe they have been there too long. They are reluctant at implementing change (...) There should be local staff mobility, transfer to other offices, this should pave the way for career development. It is difficult to develop a career from our level to P level. In other agencies, such as UNICEF, they can do this. I am on a two-year renewable contract. There are some local contracts without a limited time but after you have worked more than 10 years (..). We are lucky that our director used to be a trade unionist for many years. He shares our concerns (Local staff member, pers. comm., gloss added.).

The Director did in fact bring with him a new approach to local staff: inviting local financial and administrative staff to weekly meetings (previously the domain of technical, and therefore mostly expatriate staff) and, more recently, sending local staff on missions. He has also been trying to raise money for local staff training. In the words of one informant: 'he is investing in us'. The Director also organised a 'Retreat' for all staff to get together to discuss issues related to the Office. All staff felt that this was an important 'bonding' exercise and that their complaints were taken on board[201].

Overall local staff were extremely favourable to the management of the Area Office and considered themselves to be fortunate to have such a good and open manager:

> It is good that there is a lot of transparency. If staff have complaints you can go to higher authorities. I am referring to the system in the field office (ILO local staff member, pers. comm.).

It is interesting to note that expatriate staff felt that the Director was hard on local staff. By contrast, local staff themselves were extremely positive about him. This could be because they feared giving me the information but informants did make a number of complaints and I do feel that the issue could have been brought up, even informally over lunch but it never was. This could be because their experience of past employers was

[201] A report was produced by external consultants. The extent to which report recommendations will be implemented remains, of course, to be seen.

more negative. It could also be related to the guilt felt by most expatriate staff regarding the low pay of local staff, which made them particularly sensitive as to how local staff were treated.

Hofstede's (1994) power-distance matrix, discussed above, provides us with a useful framework for understanding this apparent contradiction. For example, expatriate staff see the Director as too 'top-down' i.e. as having a too much of a power distance, whereas local staff see him as very approachable i.e. as having a small power distance. This perception is clearly based on people's cultural values and norms. Just as important, however, is the wider organisational culture which does not value human resource management, be it for expatriate or local staff members.

6.3.4 Procedures: Inefficiencies, delays and constraints[202]

One of the primary procedural problems brought up by social partners and IPEC staff alike is the issue of delays within the ILO system (4.4.8):

> At the level of the office in Geneva, a 15 month project you expect to do in 20. Most of us have problems with delivering at the planned time, the process of scooting through IPEC and the ILO Geneva is not predetermined, you can wait four months without any information (TACOSODE[203], pers. comm.)

Another social partner explained the detrimental consequences of such bureaucratic delays:

> We sent a proposal to IPEC in 1997. In 1998 it was agreed. The money was not coming to IPEC so there was a period of waiting which caused anxiety to the children and to the social workers. There was a six month delay half way through the project. There was no dialogue that there would be a delay, if there was a dialogue (we) would have done something, talked to teachers. IPEC did not tell

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[202] We return to Procedures in greater depth later when the impact of procedures on a specific case study will be explored in depth (7.3.2). For the purposes of this Chapter, however, it is important to discuss procedures more generally as this was one of the primary issues brought up by informants, both within and outside of the Office.

[203] TACOSODE is a social partner: the social development NGO umbrella organisation.

> us how long the delay would be, and the social workers just waited (Social partner social worker, pers. comm., gloss added).

Delays can therefore lead to the dangerous situation where the support given to children is put on hold, leading to frustration and bad feeling as well as the risk that children will need to return to work while waiting for the support to arrive. The result may be that children lose faith in local staff and do not return to the project even when the funding eventually arrives. The 'bush telephone' is also very powerful and rumours may fly that the money has been stolen by staff or that it is a waste of time to take part in the project. Such rumours are remembered in the long term, which can lead to a loss of support for and faith in the project.

The ILO's centralised nature, which leads to a lack of 'synergy' at a national level, was also considered problematic:

> The NPC's office is not empowered enough in terms of setting the pace in the national programme. There is a lot of bureaucracy, reporting systems to Geneva, it creates gaps in terms of responses. The NPC should have more scope for approval and getting things done. Geneva must say OK. In terms of national co-ordination, co-ordination is not very effective. There is no synergy. There is duplication, omissions, some of the partners are condemning the employers, they are misinformed, using emotive and subjective assessments and there are no intervention strategies which would entice employers. Condemning departs from the main principles. It is a question of synergy between all actors (ATE[204], pers. comm.).

Another issue which became a concern to me during fieldwork was the lack of (effective) evaluation of projects. Evaluation is an important administrative function within the wider project cycle but evaluations were difficult to find and often quite weak. This is confirmed by an ILO staff member who, when asked as to whether evaluations were conducted, answered:

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[204] ATE is a social partner: the Employers' Organisation.

> Yes there are but they are a joke. There is an evaluation, different levels. Projects need to self-evaluate on a yearly basis. This often doesn't happen. Also there should be a baseline before evaluation. On the four projects that I am working on only one has a baseline and an evaluation. If the project is higher than a certain level there needs to be an external evaluation. The question is that often these are regular ILO consultants. The ones I have seen are all extremely positive, maybe too positive. It is a business- if you write a positive evaluation you will get asked to do a job again. Evaluation reports are written under time pressures, there is no time for details (ILO expatriate staff, pers. comm.).

The lack of evaluation is not just simply due to a lack of rigour on the part of the ILO but also to a lack of importance placed on it by donors:

> Little evaluation has been done in the past because the donors wouldn't pay for it. For example, Tanzania. The German government wouldn't pay and said it would have to come from regular budget funds but there weren't any (ILO HQ official, pers. comm.).

Related to the issue of over-centralisation is the problem of field dependence on the desk officer sitting in Geneva. Before action can be taken, there must be approval not only at national level but also from the desk officer. As seen in 4.4.6, HQ staff are incredibly overworked which can only lead to delays in responding to field staff. Furthermore, the political nature of the Organisation is also frustrating to many field staff:

> The objective is not efficiency, the level of technical capacity is not the first priority, the ILO is a political organisation (ILO expatriate staff, pers. comm.).

For staff who came from 'outside', be it from private or non-governmental sectors, where efficiency and technical capacity are generally of primary importance, this can be a shock. This shock is counter balanced, however, through the adoption of a number of daily forms of resistance and appropriate coping strategies, as shown below.

6.3.5 Motivation, coping strategies and resistance

One central concern which came up during field work was how staff coped with the heavy workload and never-ending flow of administrative tasks:

> One way I try to use is to set priorities for the day, for the week but these priorities keep shifting because new things keep coming in. In my experience I set two or three things to deal with in a day and allow for unexpected things. If visitors come you must see them, phone calls you have to talk, things come in from Geneva, again you have to prioritise these, within the framework of my own work-plan. In the morning I write my priorities for the day, I don't usually end up finishing my list of priorities (...) IPEC in Tanzania has generated a lot of curiosity both from within and outside the organisation, it is on the increase (NPM, pers. comm.).

The NPM thus identifies one of the reasons behind the phenomenal work load: IPEC Tanzania's success. The Programme has come to be seen as a 'success story' (6.2.1). There is therefore a continual flow of consultants from HQ assessing particular aspects of the work and Tanzania has now been chosen as one of three pilot countries for the Time Bound Programme (TBP) on child labour (6.2.1). It was seen above that IPEC Tanzania was based on a careful and well-thought strategy, involving different stakeholders. The rush to move the TBP forward has led, however, to a situation where there is no time to strategise carefully and significant time is spent on administering success, i.e. through report writing and entertaining guests. Success can therefore be self-defeating. The IPEC Tanzania experience thus confirms Chambers' (1983) argument about the self-defeating nature of project success and how project fame can push managers into public relations as well as turning particular projects into self-sustaining myths.

Another important motivating factor used to overcome day-to-day frustrations with procedural issues is the overall philosophy of IPEC:

> I don't agree with all operational procedures, I can't say which ones but I have my own reservations and dislikes. In every organisation members don't agree with all the procedures. I agree with the broad priorities. IPEC priorities are shifting in terms of lessons, priorities, new innovations. Some may not seem appealing, some are questioning. (NPM, pers. comm.).

Belief in the importance of the wider objective is therefore essential to sustaining adherence to frustrating bureaucratic procedures.

Another issue which arose was resistance. It was seen in 4.4.8 that HQ staff used various resistance strategies in their day to day work practices. It is therefore useful to explore the forms of resistance occurring both within and outside of IPEC Tanzania. How do these problematise or overturn dominant discourses? In IPEC Tanzania, for example, the arrival of a new JPO inspired a new approach and discourse, at least as far as the individual himself and those with whom he worked directly were concerned. The JPO was an 'outsider' in that his main experience was with a Latin American NGO and he therefore had quite alternative views to those usually heard in the office[205]. The arrival of the new Programme Officer for Anglophone Africa, seconded from the US Ministry of Labour, also heralded a different approach. The Programme Officer was very much an 'insider' in that her mother used to be the ILO Tanzania Director and she herself had worked on the initial workshop which led to the adoption of IPEC Tanzania. Her discourse was very supportive of the IPEC approach whereas the JPO was more sceptical. This meant that their approaches were distinct although the tasks which each had were also distinct and it is therefore difficult to compare how their individual discourses affected their work. I would also argue that no matter what the individual's particular ideologies, the administrative overload means that in reality 'ideas' are not as important as how forms, for example, are filled in. Overwork due to administrative overload could therefore be seen to be a particularly strong bureaucratisation, as well as de-humanisation, technique (see also 4.4.1; 4.4.3). Individual personalities and opinions could be covered over by standardisation of procedures and jumping through bureaucratic hoops. In this sense, ideological resistance is difficult. Procedural resistance is also difficult in view of the short term contract problem (4.4.6). Those who do not follow the correct procedures do not have their contracts renewed. This, however, seems to be a fear rather than a tested theory as informants had all followed the procedures and therefore had their contracts renewed. The fear is particularly strong among local staff

[205] The Latin American movement of working children for working children has been extremely influential in advocating the need to recognise the voice of the children themselves and the importance of seeing child labourers as labourers and therefore entitled to labour rights, such as trade union protection. This viewpoint is controversial within the ILO as the trade unions are vehemently against the inclusion of children in trade unions, because they believe that children should not be working in the first place and therefore have no place in Unions. While based on an ideologically sound argument, the practical situation is that children do work and do need protection.

for whom the ILO is a 'dream job', being much better paid than other administrative jobs (6.3.2). UN 'local' staff in fact gain higher salaries than those working for individual donors, although these are still far, far below those of expatriate staff.

One of the key motivations of staff was the value-driven nature of the subject area. Many felt a strong moral belief in removing children from labour:

> I am a social worker and within the social work profession my interest is focussed on social work with children and this brought me to the issue of street children and UNICEF and then to working children and the ILO and then eventually to IPEC. I feel some kind of obligation and commitment to contribute to the cause of children and I find IPEC as offering prospects for advocating the rights of children, working children. That's my personal professional work point of view. Secondly I like challenging work, I am not scared, I'm not saying it is extremely pleasant but I enjoy the challenge (NPM, pers. comm.).

This comment reveals another aspect leading to motivation: personal satisfaction with the challenging nature of the work. It is also interesting in view of Hofstede's 'masculinity-femininity' model, which placed 'challenge' as one of the key criteria for job satisfaction on the masculine axis (4.4.9).

Although staff are clearly motivated by the cause of child labour, they do not necessarily support all ILO procedures. Practitioners in the field often 'resist' top down approaches, developing their own methods and informal practices or what Scott would term *metis* (Scott 1998). The current approach towards child labour is being challenged, with practitioners arguing for a better understanding of child labour and for more attention to be paid to the opinions of the children themselves (Johnson *et al.* 1998). Experience has shown, however, that *metis* is often re-appropriated by development discourse and codified into, to use Scott's term once again, *techne* (a legible set of technical and generalised rules). This is clearly shown with the so-called 'participatory approach' to children in development. This started as an alternative methodology but has since been appropriated by international development organisations with the usual consequences of using rigid and generalised sets of 'rules' cross-culturally and cross-sectorally.

Scott's (1990) 'hidden transcripts' and Ackroyd and Thompson's (1999) 'Organizational *Mis*behaviour' also provide us with a useful framework for exploring staff resistance to

the power structures within which they must work. Staff use 'hidden transcripts' or '*mis*behaviour' to resist the power structures on a daily basis through practices such as doing work they are interested in, leaving less agreeable work to the bottom of the in-tray or through use of gossip. Lunch conversations, for example, often centre on frustrations about particular procedures, especially financial procedures, which were often subject to lengthy delays. The young ILO and IPEC expatriate staff formed a 'community' which would lunch and socialise together. During these times, they would gossip about other staff and criticise the system and its procedures in a bid to illustrate their autonomy from it and to vent their frustrations. Another form of resistance relates to the anachronistic letter signing mechanism (6.2.1). This mechanism is circumvented by the advent of e-mail: in a world where organisations need to act quickly, letters are often a thing of the past and people in different organisations or within the same organisation often need immediate responses. E-mail is therefore a primary form of communication and this cannot be monitored to the same extent by the Director. Some form of autonomy can therefore be sustained, although within the ILO e-mail is primarily used internally. External communication is still predominantly conducted through conventional letter, and therefore signed by the Director. Telephone is also used as a way of contacting people informally and directly.

Resistance is often limited, however, by the need to maintain and sustain the high quality expatriate life-style. This need becomes a self disciplining mechanism (Foucault 1977). While staff may criticise the system and express acute frustration, many admit that the life-style in an important motivating factor.

6.3.6 Power relations: Inside v. Outside the IPEC Office[206]

Power relations are clearly important (see also 7.3.1). Although IPEC has been set up to ensure national ownership, with the Ministry of Labour, through the Child Labour Unit,

[206] As with procedures, we will return to Power relations later (7.3.1) when one case of the impact of power will be explored in depth. This should not detract, however, from the importance of considering power relations inside and outside of the office, in terms of more general, day-to-day practice.

officially responsible for the Programme, who really has the final say where there is a conflict of opinion, for example, as to whether or not a project proposal should be approved? Is the rhetoric of 'partnership' simply a mechanism for ILO-IPEC to legitimise the imposition of a particular discourse? Or do government opinions supersede those of other social partners? Who ultimately has the power to dictate action? The National Steering Committee is officially the supreme decision making body and it is therefore useful to consider and contrast the views of the different groups within it:

> There has never been any conflict in the NSC, usually there are debates and arguments and so on so I wouldn't know what would happen if there was a conflict. If there is I suppose the matter would have to be referred to the Ministry and the ILO (NPM, pers. comm.).

This is confirmed by another informant:

> There is no bulldozing in the NSC, they have equal powers (..) You can't imagine, we expect NGOs and the employers to be so vocal and demanding but there is always common thinking, setting the same vision. There is no confrontation. The argument is technical, no-one dominates the other in terms of discussion, you can't rule out those that talk more, that is the right to speak (Ministry of Labour spokesperson, pers. comm.)

and yet refuted by many others:

> It depends on the agencies and who is heading them. Some will say yes, yes to get the money, other won't. If the co-ordinator is strong and has drive and commitment they won't. ATE (Employers' Organisation), CHODAW (Domestic Workers' Union), TAMWA (Women's Media Association), certainly are not doing this. Information services, labour inspectors are (Social partner informant, pers. comm., gloss added.).

And another:

> The government tends to think that it knows better than everyone else, it takes the driving seat and we are the passengers. Sometimes the driver falls asleep and doesn't wake up till we crash. This is contributing to the lack of synergy (see below) (..) all partners are trying to wake up the driver. Government wants control. (..) My problem with the trade unions is that there is low technical capacity. They are very enthusiastic but down on the ground there is a lot of trial

> and error (..) They have over enthusiasm to show off although there is no preparation, they want to impose themselves and lack a systematic approach (ATE, pers. comm., gloss added).

The background of the informant is clearly important. While the Ministry of Labour argues that all works harmoniously, as they must in view of the fact that they are the Secretariat, there are clearly conflicts among the other groups. The government is criticised for being too slow, whereas the trade unions are criticised for 'showing off'. These are all of course personal opinions and the meetings I attended were always resolved harmoniously in practice.

According to the NPM:

> The NSC meets quarterly, it depends on the agenda, can be reporting, reviewing, discussion. The Secretariat sets the agenda, the secretariat is the manager of the child labour unit, in collaboration with the chairperson who is the permanent secretary and the partner agencies. All project proposals get presented to the NSC, if they are not in line with the country programme objectives then they are rejected (NPM, pers. comm.).

When asked whether a project proposal, which is clearly not in line with the country programme objectives, would be presented by the NPM the answer was:

> I will still present it so there is consensus in rejecting it so that people know it was not just my decision. This is for transparency (NPM, pers. comm.).

The quote below reveals the discrepancy between the NPM's idealised version of events and the reality:

> The Child Labour Unit is there but all in all we do not know what they are doing, I even ask myself the NPC[207] is for Tanzanians and the child labour unit is for Tanzanians how do they work? But all in all it is a place for getting information from other organisations and to share ideas, to see who is doing what, where and how. The Child Labour Unit needs to have its capacity built, he is just alone, we rarely meet, he also has to go around. We are supposed to meet every quarter,

[207] NPC or National Programme Co-ordinator is the old term for NPM.

> when we started we used to meet but since last year we haven't. Maybe he is overloaded, maybe he needs an assistant (Domestic workers' union, pers. comm.).

According to the informant, the situation is less clear cut than the NPM would have us believe. The activities of the Child Labour Unit are unclear to some of the social partners, and meetings are less frequent than quarterly, called more on the basis of need than regular timing (6.2.2). For example, there was a NSC meeting in March 2000 but by July there still had not been another one.

6.3.7 Successes

Interviews with informants revealed not only the weaknesses of IPEC (see above) but also its strengths. An informant from the Ministry of Labour provides a useful insight into the successes and limitations of IPEC:

> There have been positive results. Before people didn't know about child labour, now society is all informed that child labour is a violation of children's rights, there has been an integration of child rights activities through UNICEF and ILO. Of course now it is possible for the government to develop guidelines to define what child labour is and what strategies are appropriate, this has come about through IPEC. With time things would have happened but IPEC has been catalytic in fastening the process of change. Without the Programme we wouldn't have had 138 (Convention 138)[208]. Along with awareness this is a great success. Employers are aware, trade unions are playing a pressure role, workers and parents themselves feel bad for child labour, NGOs and government from grassroots to national level are playing a part. The review of existing legislation has been a success although adoption is slow. The problem remains, having instruments in place does not mean that the problem is solved. Society is very poor and parents send children out to work, not out of choice but poorness. This makes the problem persist despite guidelines, radio programmes, all programmes. If people are not economically empowered, that has not been a success although that is not the concern of IPEC but of the Government (pers. comm., gloss added).

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208 The Government ratified Convention 138 (see 3.2) in 1999. With IPEC assistance, the Tanzanian government is also currently making moves to ratify Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour.

This reveals the valuable role that IPEC has played regarding awareness raising and acting as a catalyst to change. However, it also reveals the limitations of the Programme. As is pointed out, IPEC alone cannot remove poverty and must therefore be integrated within wider government programmes. This is the approach currently advocated by the TBP (6.2.1).

IPEC's financial contribution is also important :

> If you count the money given by IPEC, it is not money that Tanzanians could have had but it works with many NGOs so IPEC has assisted Tanzania on a budget that Tanzania could never have. IPEC has made Tanzania get involved in issues it had never thought of (TASWA, Social Workers' Association, social worker, pers. comm.).

Awareness raising is also brought up by an NGO informant who also points to the need to incorporate IPEC into wider poverty reduction strategies, as well as the important role played by IPEC in terms of capacity building, involving the communities themselves and expanding the ILO partnership to NGOs:

> First they helped in awareness raising, before there was awareness but it was mainly the concern of the labour department. Now all others are involved, especially NGOs are involved. Mainly after IPEC. IPEC helped build capacity especially at the Ministry level. The Ministry of Labour developed capacity and helped spearhead the ratification of Conventions. It has also helped communities themselves to get involved. Also it has expanded ILO partners beyond trade unions, employers and government. It has also started reducing the magnitude of the problem with the withdrawal of children. Maybe if there was not this initiative the numbers would be larger. The elimination of child labour also depends on poverty reduction. The level of income of the majority has gone down, in consideration of the value of the Tshilling that is why poverty is increasing. IPEC can only work within its mandate. Alone it cannot address the child labour problem so multi-sectoral linkages are important, it is good that IPEC is taking this way (TACOSODE, social development NGO umbrella organisation, informant, pers. comm.).

The direct one-to-one support provided by the ILO is also important:

> I have been meeting many people from ILO-IPEC, they are wondering how is IPEC doing but we are the implementers, we are selected as ILO-Tanzania, invited to Malawi, Washington (..) The thing is I like about the ILO here is that they are not very bureaucratic, you can just go in and they will support us. Maybe individual people I can call them and ask for help, this is what I mean. They are bureaucratic in terms of finance but when it comes to technical assistance you can ask for help. We are very free in their office, that is good, they are working closely with the partners (Domestic workers' union, pers. comm.).

IPEC has also contributed through the provision of literature and other promotional tools:

> Materials such as leaflets, booklets, we have been able to produce these and to use these through IPEC. We can use these when talking to unions, government, to persuade them to be involved in these activities. It has been valuable. Also we attend seminars to discuss child labour issues, to set strategies, exchange experiences and are involved in the development of policy (Mining and construction workers' union, pers. comm.).

The way IPEC has been developed to be 'nationally owned' and therefore accountable to the social partners and others is also seen as important:

> It is nice to work with international organisations because they report to you, you give them an implementation report, they see the success and failures. With government it is all lies, you can't see the truth (Social partner, pers. comm.).

6.3.8 A 'Top-down' Process?

We saw that the introduction of IPEC was not a 'top-down' imposition by the ILO on to Tanzania (6.1.1). What of the day-to-day practices within the Organisation, however? To what extent are these top-down?

According to one informant, the Organisation itself works in a top-down way and therefore policy comes down from Geneva rather than up from field experiences:

> The agenda is set by Geneva but is then filtered in the IPEC office but IPEC by nature is not very participatory. It is top-down which is to do with the fact that the ILO is top-down. We were screaming and shouting HIV-AIDS and child labour for years. The partners were telling us that this was a key issue, we were

> telling Geneva that we wanted to act but they just said that they had the answers already, it was too tricky for them. IPEC Geneva has a satellite way of working, in the field we are dependent on the desk officer (ex IPEC expatriate Tanzania official, pers. comm.)

This appears to contrast with the views expounded by informants (6.1.1) who argued that the process is very participatory and not top-down (see also 3.4 and 7 on participation). I put this to the informant quoted immediately above and she answered:

> From a Tanzanian perspective it is very participatory but to me Tanzania is a top-down system. When people talk of participation in Tanzania they are talking about being 'participative'. If you sensitise people by gathering all the people in a village that is participation. (The DFID consultant) has a European concept of participation which can be dangerous in Tanzania where participation means different things. You need to find somewhere in between. IPEC is moving towards this, it is not just about lecturing in villages but also about how to make people talk, I am not sure that mapping and focus group discussions are always right if people are just being 'participated'. You need to recognise that this is tricky but some partner agencies are succeeding in making people talk, how then to get the partner agencies to take people seriously? That is where IPEC can play a role. You have cases where findings are taken back. When CHODAW started in Iringa they wanted to do sensitisation, people said we know all this we want income generation. They did this on a small scale and it worked (pers. comm.).

While it has been shown that there is in reality a consultative process it is perhaps useful to briefly consider the representativeness of those on the National Steering Committee. One important issue in Tanzania is that most NGOs and other 'representative' bodies are based in Dar Es Salaam and are mainly constituted by middle class Tanzanians, some of whom have received education outside of the country, often in Britain or the United States. To what extent can they truly represent the opinions of those in poor communities? This issue faces most representative organisations, whatever their nature, as pointed by the NPM:

> Membership of the NSC comprises of all the tripartite partners, when you say a certain trade union is represented you don't expect a representative from Mwanza to attend, you expect them to represent their members. Personally I don't see any cause for alarm that the committees are based in Dar (pers. comm.).

6.4 Chapter Conclusions

The above discussion has revealed the dangers of using terms such as 'top-down' and 'imposed', in the context of North-South relations, which only over-simplify a complex situation. The 'top' itself is varied and context dependent. IPEC may be the 'top' vis-à-vis government officials in Tanzania, but the government and other élites in turn represent the top to their own citizens[209]. In the context of child labour in Tanzania it is perhaps more relevant to refer to Chamber's (1997) concept of 'Uppers' and 'Lowers' (6.1.1), when referring to power relations. It is also useful to return to Hofstede (1994: 140) who argues that :

> Organizing always demands the answering of two questions: (1) who has the power to decide what? and (2) what rules or procedures will be followed to attain the desired ends? The answer to the first question is influenced by cultural norms of power distance; the answer to the second question, by cultural norms about uncertainty avoidance.

This section has used the work of theorists such as Hofstede (1994), Chambers (1997) and Scott (1990) to show that the power to decide what happens in IPEC lies on two levels: the rhetoric and the practice. In rhetoric, power to decide lies within the National Steering Committee but in reality power lies where the money is, as National Steering Committee members revealed through their practice of going to the National Programme Manager before going to the government's Child Labour Unit. At the next level along, the current decentralisation rhetoric would appear to suggest that power lies in the field office but in practice the power remains at HQ. This is revealed by the large power-distance between HQ, Area Office directors and staff, exemplified by the need for HQ approval at all stages, the need for the Area Office Director to examine all correspondence, and the large discrepancies between expatriate and local staff. While individual personalities can play an important role in bridging this gap, as shown by the Director's efforts to involve local staff in decision-making and to provide them with

209 Development institutions have already absorbed this point in that they use alternative way of saying the same thing: stakeholder analysis.

training opportunities, the Organisational culture of minimising uncertainty has led to the development of a set of wider bureaucratic procedures, such as checking letters and financial procedures which require HQ authorisation, which ensures that the power-distance framework remains firmly in place, despite the development of certain informal resistance strategies.

The next chapter will take a specific case study of the development of a child labour intervention process in the mining sector to explore the issues raised in this Chapter further. A power-procedures-people framework will be used to consider what it is in particular that contributes to the success or failure of development intervention.

7. The Intervention Process: The Mirerani Child Miners' Case

> It is a mixture of top-secret story, real assessment, bad jokes and self esteem that leads to the birth of a new project! (ILO official, pers. comm.).
>
> This is not a normal IPEC project. This is being written for DFID (ILO official, pers. comm.).
>
> We will not get very far as long as we focus on personal intentions, especially if the ritual aspect of bureaucracy is recognized. Nor (...) is there any point in perpetuating the stereotype of the autonomous 'system', for that does nothing more than provide an ethical alibi for those who are indeed indifferent to the pleas of the different. (Herzfeld 1992: 183).

Having examined the general functioning of the office in Chapter 6, it is useful to explore how a particular intervention strategy is developed. The case study is of a process initiated by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997 and which has yet to be resolved, over four years later[210]. The donor agency has retained a strong influence throughout the process; sending in its own consultants and staff to provide 'technical support' as well as dictating procedures. This illustrates how the need to attract funds can lead to the donor's ideas and policies being adopted, sometimes over and above those of IPEC Geneva. It also illustrates how the supposed beneficiaries of the project can be practically ignored in the process, despite the strong rhetoric,

[210] The ethnography is based on fieldwork in Tanzania to September 2000. Contact with DFID, the ILO and local community members in Mirerani revealed that as of November 2001 no substantive progress in terms of resource allocation or project approval had been made since September 2000.

particularly in DFID, of 'participation'[211] (3.4; 6.3.8), a theme considered further in Chapter 8.

In this chapter I use ethnographic evidence to consider the intervention process itself (7.1; 7.2) and draw out key factors responsible for hindering or facilitating the development of the intervention programme (7.3). I group these under three sub-headings: Power, Procedures and People. Through focusing on these three categories, I am taking Hertzfeld's (1992: 182) 'dialectical middle ground', avoiding the reification of either the person or culture, but attending 'to the play of ideas about both'. I thus attempt to step between institutionalised procedures and power relations, and individual personalities in order to attend to 'the play of ideas' in the development of the ILO-DFID intervention programme.

7.1 The Process Itself

Firstly, it is useful to outline the process from inception to the present. This is summarised in Box 7.1 below. The data were obtained by examining DFID and IPEC Tanzania files and conducting interviews with staff involved in the process as well as with key stakeholders in the partner organisations and in Mirerani, the target site for intervention.

[211] See Cornwall (2000), Rahnema (1992) for further discussion of 'participation'.

Box 7.1: Timeline outlining the process of developing a DFID/IPEC intervention strategy

1997	
	ILO-IPEC conduct situation analysis in Mirerani
	DFID express interest in IPEC Tanzania
	IPEC approaches DFID with proposal for sectoral programme on child labour
1998	
Feb	DFID say will support proposal but want to send consultant to work on collaboration programme
Mar	DFID consultant visits and recommends working with IPEC and conducting baseline survey on child labour in Tanzania
Aug	Consultative meeting with social partners re baseline survey proposal
Sept	Draft proposal submitted informally to Geneva and DFID for comments
	Geneva return few comments, DFID many
Oct	DFID SDA recommends funding for baseline survey
Nov	Submission approved- start date 25/01/99, for three and a half months.
	DFID agree to pay £58, 000 for baseline with possibilities of funding larger programme identified through baseline.
1999	
Jan	MoU signed by DFID - budget in DFID version higher than in ILO version due to confusion as to payment in US$ or £. DFID APO visit to IPEC to discuss internship
Feb	Start date delayed due to IPEC failure to sign MoU due to budget confusion
Mar	Original MoU signed by IPEC with covering letter indicating extra money to cover design phase and new start date.
May	Contract for baseline consultants drawn up- to be completed 30/09/99
	First instalment paid by DFID
June	First baseline progress report submitted
Sept	DFID APO arrives, brief to assist in development of Project Memorandum for potential DFID support.
Oct	Baseline study progress report submitted, still far from complete.
2000	
Jan	Final baseline study submitted, almost 10 months overdue
	Consultant recruited for design of Mirerani Project Memorandum (PM). Participatory research carried out.
Feb	Consultative meeting held in Mirerani. Participatory research continued.
Mar-Jun	Budget confusion- IPEC Tanz. trying to get hold of funds to pay consultants. Delays ILO HQ and DFID.
Mar-Sep	PM designed and redrafted. Negotiations continue with DFID...
2001	
November	Negotiations continue...

While the box above provides a simplified illustration of the timeframe, it is important to see the process as multi-layered and complex with a number of factors both within and outside the organisation impacting on the development process.

In early 1997[212], IPEC Tanzania conducted an assessment of child labour in the Tanzanite mines in Mirerani, a mining township in Northern Tanzania[213]. The report concluded that the situation facing children was particularly problematic and IPEC consequently became interested in developing some form of action in the site. In August 1997, a workshop in Nairobi led to an informal discussion between a social development advisor (SDA) in DFID and a new IPEC associate expert (AE) or JPO in which the DFID SDA revealed that DFID was interested in supporting IPEC and would consider any project proposals. This coincided with IPEC's desire, based on the 1997 assessment, to develop interventions in the mining sector. IPEC Tanzania consequently drew up a project idea for intervention in the mining sector, which was presented to DFID in Nairobi.

DFID consequently sent a consultant to assess IPEC Tanzania:

> (The consultant) came to talk to IPEC Tanzania and partners to find out what to do. She was very serious and did a huge report. We didn't agree with all her conclusions, it would need a very theoretical perspective to draw those conclusions but nevertheless her report was discussed (...) and it was agreed that the first activity would be a baseline survey on child labour in Tanzania as there wasn't enough research. In line with (the consultant's) conclusions the survey would be very participatory, all mapping and focus group interviews, very ambitious. We identified local consultants through UNICEF. Then the problems

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[212] Prior to DFID involvement, IPEC had conducted awareness raising and sensitisation workshops on child labour for parents, teachers, workers' organisations and community leaders in the Arusha region. A video on child labour was produced and footage was televised nationally and screened at a special meeting for Dar Es Salaam based social partners. There was no special screening for Mirerani residents, which considering that most residents do not have a TV guide informing them of forthcoming programmes, let alone a television, is indicative of the common attitude amongst donor agencies of coming into an area, extracting information and the leaving, often with no follow-up. This was also indicated by the fact that IPEC and another NGO had conducted surveys of child labour in Mirerani yet never sent copies of these back to the village government.

[213] The research process was not particularly participatory as consultations were limited to government, trade union leaders and other community leaders. There was little if any consultation with other community members, miners or children. Annex 2 does provide three case studies of child labourers but the information given is limited to a few lines per child (see Alli 1997).

started. Everyone could see it would take forever. Then (the new DFID SDA) came along and wanted something short and concise. She didn't want this huge piece of research. We tried to cut back the research plan in a more action oriented way. It took a long time just to get the paperwork done as so many people were involved and we didn't have a clue how to handle this, it went backwards and forwards between Geneva, London, Tanzania. It was dreadful and then the agreement was signed and I left (ex ILO expatriate official[214], pers. comm.; gloss added).

This quote reveals the problem of consultants from Headquarters, whose recommendations are often seen as 'too theoretical' and impractical. Despite the ILO's disagreements and the fact that 'it would take forever', the consultant's recommendations were acted upon and the baseline survey was designed. This comment also reveals the impact of the arrival of new staff, who bring with them different requirements, as explored further below, and the fact that often people really do not know what they are doing, and function on a hit or miss basis; 'we didn't have a clue how to handle this' (see also 7.3.3).

The signing of the agreement was itself a complex and lengthy procedure. Box 7.1 above reveals that the process from initial discussions in August 1997 to the signing of an agreement between DFID and IPEC Tanzania took one year and seven months; a chaotic start which was to mark the entire process.

The baseline survey contract was drawn up in May 1999, with a starting date of 01 June 1999, to be completed by 30 September 1999. The baseline survey was not completed, however, until January 2000, four months after the second deadline (and ten months after the first deadline, which had had to be put back due to failures to sign the Memorandum of Understanding). The delays were caused by several factors which included delays with payments by DFID but were mainly due to the failure of the consultants to produce adequate data. This meant that they were asked to return to the

[214] Most quotes in the following section are from this informant- this is due to the fact that the person no longer works for the organisation and was very keen to reveal information, in the hope that it would lead to positive change. She was also the key ILO link to the initial process.

field to collect more comprehensive data. The ILO's choice of consultants had been based on a recommendation by DFID, so even in this regard DFID was dominant.

While the baseline study was underway, there were important staffing changes in both organisations which caused further confusion and delays. The IPEC Associate Expert responsible for the project left and was not replaced for seven months which meant that the workload was on the shoulders of one member of staff. A new DFID SDA came on board with different ideas to her predecessor and more importantly, a sceptical view as to the added value of working through IPEC. Furthermore, I started working with IPEC as a DFID Associate Professional Officer, under the ILO title of 'DFID intern'. The changeover in staff also coincided with a dramatic shift in the DFID-Tanzania agenda, away from projects and towards policy 'influencing', although the Social Development Department in London was still pushing for DFID East Africa to work on child labour issues, through the ILO and IPEC.

In October 1999, the draft findings of the baseline survey were presented. Four areas of intervention were identified, including mining. This confirmed what IPEC already knew in early 1997 when discussions first took place with DFID:

> We were in no doubt that mining was the area. Mining is a political issue and it would need a courageous donor as the government and multinationals are so involved. It was our priority (ex ILO expatriate official, pers. comm.).

The baseline survey took nineteen months and $63, 092 to complete and served to confirm what was already known i.e. that mining was one of the most hazardous sectors for child labour. It had little other value in that both DFID and IPEC agreed that the findings were weak and did not really offer much. IPEC had, however, overcome DFID's third hurdle: the consultancy, taking me on and completing the baseline survey.

The mixed motives behind each stage of the process led to a situation of utter confusion, in terms of procedures, support and ownership:

> We did not know how to proceed and we got no backup from our superiors. Everyone wanted their fingerprint on this, DFID wanted an assessment of IPEC, the consultant wanted participation, I wanted mining. Geneva's agenda was to get DFID funding on board whatever. They wanted us to do anything. It was a very confused process from the beginning (ex ILO expatriate official, pers. comm.).

This confusion is symptomatic of the rigidly applied bureaucratic model: there are tight rules for those who follow the norm but when someone tries to do something outside the rules there is little back-up and no-one knows what to do, leading to confusion as opposed to productive creativity. The situation was rendered even more confused by the desire of each Organisation to retain ownership, and therefore power, over the process.

When I arrived in Tanzania, I was not aware of many details of the history between the organisations, such as the predetermination of the intervention sector as being mining. In fact, I had been clear in my research proposal that I would not consider mining sites as potential field sites due to the dangers involved of being a lone *mzungu* or white female in a clearly male dominated and dangerous mining site[215]. Upon arrival, it became clear that the SDA was interested in the mining sector although IPEC seemed less interested in this sector, as illustrated by the number of times the NPM asked me why I was not focussing on commercial agriculture. The issue of staff changes is once again relevant: while the ex-IPEC staff member was personally committed to intervention in the mining sector and the ex-DFID SDA was personally committed to the need for in-depth research, when they left their replacements were less committed to these issues and had very different agendas.

From this point on, the development of the intervention process became intrinsically linked with my choice of field site. DFID gave me a free reign to select the intervention area, although mining was to be the chosen sector[216], and IPEC only played a consultative role. The Project Memorandum would be developed for wherever I chose to go. Mirerani became my choice as IPEC had carried out a situation analysis and I had

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[215] Mirerani has a reputation for being the most dangerous place in Tanzania (5.2).

[216] This was justified by the preliminary findings of the baseline study, which saw mining to be one of the worst sectors for child labour.

been told that an active child labour committee was in place, demonstrating community commitment to the issue and that there was an active partner agency working there, the mine workers' union, TAMICO[217]. I was then to conduct research in the mining site, which would feed into the design of an intervention strategy. I presented this research to DFID and IPEC in January 2000 and DFID advised IPEC to recruit a consultant to design the Project Memorandum. Once again conditionalities were made in the form of 'good advice': the Project Memorandum should be developed according to DFID guidelines, participatory community based planning should be used, the Project Memorandum must fall under DFID's Strategic Area 4 'Sustainable Livelihoods' and the Project Memorandum must be replicable elsewhere. Of course, the advice could have been ignored but then it would have been more difficult to ensure funding and, as shown in 4.4.5, the ILO rarely says 'no' to donors.

The consultant was recruited under short time constraints in January 2000. ILO and IPEC decided that it should be a local consultant, although DFID suggested an international consultant. No available consultants were felt to be completely suitable but due to the time constraints, a Tanzanian woman with experience of working with IPEC although no experience of drafting Project Memorandums for DFID, was chosen. In this case, ILO's choice was accepted but this could be because the one suggested by DFID was unavailable. This illustrates the realities of setting up projects: frequently the ideal choice of resources, human and other, are simply unavailable, leading to a less than optimal choice.

IPEC called for a consultative meeting involving key stakeholders in Mirerani, the results of which would form the basis of the Project Memorandum. The meeting was 'convened' by the Child Labour Unit of the Ministry of Labour although it was actually organised by myself as I was living locally whereas the Child Labour Unit is based in Dar Es Salaam. Unfortunately, the date chosen coincided with three other local government meetings, even though there had been advance notice of the date. The week

[217] I found out six months into field work that IPEC partners had actually conducted a mining project in the ruby mines of Southern Tanzania. Distressed that this had not been pointed out to me before I questioned why. The answer was: 'You didn't ask'.

before the meeting there was serious rioting in the mines so the local government was preoccupied by this. Needless to say the District Officer was there and he summoned local government officials from their other meetings to attend ours, illustrating the power exerted by foreign development experts (see also 7.3.1). Our meeting was seen to be more important than tackling immediate and serious local problems. Also present was the DFID SDA and the ILO JPO. A group of officials from different child-centred NGOs and different government departments from Arusha (the regional capital) also attended. The meeting concluded that there was a need for some intervention and that local government would fully support any action taken.

In March, the IPEC Consultant, later to become IPEC staff, designed the Project Memorandum, using community based planning. Some community members were clearly committed to the issue. Development of the Memorandum created conflict within the village, however, with a lot of jealousy expressed towards the woman with whom I lived, who was also Chairwoman of TAWOMA, the women miners' union identified as a potential implementing agency by the Project Memorandum. Many villagers were convinced that she was benefiting financially from her involvement and would become rich through her contact with me. Clearly this was not the case as I only paid her nominal rent, which she refused to accept for the first few months. With regard to her involvement in the Project Memorandum, she was one of the only people to submit a proposal, despite the fact that many people were invited to.

In May, the draft Memorandum was submitted informally to DFID and IPEC. DFID expressed serious doubts about the content, an over-ambitious community development project. At the same time, DFID was heavily involved with the World Bank's PRSP process (7.3.1) and was making concrete moves to cut down on projects. Many old projects were axed and it was made clear that it would be unlikely that new projects would get funding. The consultant resubmitted the report after a briefing with IPEC staff during which a new, more realistic logframe[218] was developed. IPEC was still not fully

[218] The logframe or logical framework is a tool used by many development agencies for project planning and evaluation. At its best, it is used in a participatory manner with stakeholders which not only empowers them but gives them a sense of ownership. At its worst, as illustrated in this case, the tool is merely a

satisfied but submitted the report to the ILO Director and to DFID anyway, with the intention of modifying the draft at a later stage once funds were released. Formal submission was necessary so that DFID could release the funds to pay the consultant. The consultant had in fact been given a new job with the ILO Area Office but before she could start work she needed to be 'signed off' from her previous activities. Had this not been the case, she would probably have been expected to spend more time perfecting the Project Memorandum, which shows how rules can be bent when necessary. Once funds were released, the Project Memorandum was put on the back burner. This was mainly due to the arrival of the new Sub-regional Officer for IPEC, who needed full briefing, and pressure from HQ to work on the new Time-Bound Programme (6.2.1).

My direct involvement ended at this point, in September 2000[219]. By November 2001, four years after the start of the process, the Project Memorandum had still not been approved by DFID and discussions were underway to include the Project Memorandum in the TBP, which DFID are saying they may (or may not) support.

7.2 The voices of local 'partners'

It is useful in this section to invert our frame of reference. The above section explored the intervention process through the lens of the ILO-IPEC experience. What of people in Mirerani ? What were their experiences and opinions regarding the development of an IPEC intervention strategy? This section will illustrate the interpretation of events by a number of Mirerani residents.

One of my primary concerns throughout the process laid down above was whether or not the villagers felt that there was a role for IPEC intervention. Most respondents felt that IPEC did have a valuable role to play, for several reasons:

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compulsory hurdle which must be jumped over to have any change of obtaining DFID funding. For a fuller critique see Gasper (2000) and 7.3.2.

[219] I retained email contact with many informants while writing up the thesis.

> The need is there for IPEC, to help the children. If they will be there to help it is to facilitate the education of children, school fees, uniforms and if they can afford even to provide family support. The world is one, it is just a matter of boundaries, they should be involved. We want others to share responsibility (Mirerani village government official, pers. comm.).

This informant clearly believes that IPEC should help the children and that they also need to share responsibility for child labour as the 'world is one'[220], a point with which I fully agree.

Another informant reveals that IPEC has an important facilitatory role to play, not just to place additional pressure on government but also in providing advice on ways forward:

> When I first heard of your organisation, I did not know what it was but I was happy because we knew we needed support. We knew we didn't want children to work in the mines, the government used to come and say 'we don't want the children there', they would chase them but the children would just come to the town, begging in the streets, they wouldn't give any support. It was not a solution to chase the children away, it is better to have a centre where you can do everything well and teach the children. If you had not come, nothing would have been done. It is very good that you came. Because you can need something but you have no idea where to start, you don't know the way. You helped me to know what can be done and how to do it and how it is important to do it. IPEC should continue to try to help these children (Chairwoman of TAWOMA, women miners' association, pers. comm.).

Another of my concerns, primarily caused by my naive belief in the 'imposition of a Northern construction of childhood' argument (Chapter 3), was whether people felt that an outside agenda was being imposed by IPEC and DFID. When I asked this question, I was nearly always greeted with laughter:

> (laughter) maybe we agree with your position, it doesn't contravene human rights or our law, if you hadn't come it would be difficult to do it, we wouldn't have done it (Mirerani resident, pers. comm.).

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[220] An interesting slant to the common vision of 'globalisation' which sees the 'world as one' from a strictly economic as opposed to social point of view.

My academic naivety was further proven, when I presented the argument that aid is a form of neo-colonialism and was greeted with more laughter:

> (laughter) No it is not true that you are colonising us, you are teaching us (village official, pers. comm.).

This response of laughter was a powerful one, and was the turning point for my belief that the discourse imposition argument was not only naive but patronising. Local people are capable of resistance to 'discourses' imposed from outside: be it in the form of ignoring what the outsider is saying or of arguing clearly against it. Of course, power does come into the equation, especially when the outsider is offering money but in this case the issue did not come up as all informants agreed that action needed to be taken to reduce child labour and offer the children alternatives.

Regarding the process itself, many informants felt that the IPEC consultant responsible for developing the Project Memorandum (7.1) should have stayed longer, if she wanted to have any realistic opinion as to the reality of life in Mirerani:

> It is very good that you came for a long time. If someone like (Tanzanian IPEC consultant) had just come in for one week, we would not have understood her. You need someone for a long time to explain things properly (Village resident, pers. comm.; gloss added).

This confirms the long standing anthropological argument for the importance of in depth, qualitative research carried out over long periods of time (Malinowski 1961).

The issue of people coming in, extracting information and then leaving does not apply only to expatriate IPEC staff or IPEC consultants but also to Tanzanian NGOs and unions:

> Here people do nothing, they come here like TAMICO (miners' union), take money, do seminars, collect their money and then do nothing (...) What do people who come from Dar Es Salaam for few days know? They see only official people. The first meeting was very good but the process has been very slow and this is bad because if you start something you have to go quick, quick while it is hot (Village resident, pers. comm., gloss added).

This last point is an important one. As seen above, the process leading to the development of an intervention programme has been going on for years. By November 2001, DFID had still not approved intervention and my concern is that this will create frustration and disillusionment. Already, many people are saying that nothing will happen, just more promises which lead to nothing. The capacity building and empowerment conducted in 1999-2000 led to the creation of a local NGO, but this fledgling organisation needs support to maintain itself (see Fowler 1997): support not yet received from IPEC or DFID.

Another interesting point raised was the benefit of having *wazungu* support:

> It is our problem so we should be taking responsibility. People are happy when a *mzungu* comes because it means money will come. People take you more seriously if you are a *mzungu*, they trust you, they know a *mzungu* can't steal, can't lie (Village resident, pers. comm.).

False expectations are thus placed on donor staff before they even arrive in the village: the equation that *mzungu*= money and honesty, is obviously not always correct and such expectations can only lead to frustration and bitterness on the part of recipients and guilt and frustration or an unfounded superiority complex on the part of the donors. There therefore needs to be some recognition of the limitations of the power of the 'whitey'- this can only be done by donors and their consultants admitting their limited power instead of driving into villages with expensive cars, clothes, laptops and mobile phones[221], meeting mainly the most prestigious people, making lots of promises and then leaving the same day. The message given by such action is clearly one of unfounded superiority and of power to make change, which more often than not is illusory in reality.

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[221] Actor Network Theory (Callon 1999; Czarniowska 1997; Dugdale 1999; Latour 1999) teaches us that the Organisation is composed of both human and non-human actors, both tangible and intangible, all enmeshed in a web of relations. The use of expensive cars etc. thus creates the Organisation as much as do the human actors working within it. In this case, the power of the donor is established not simply through the perceived authority of the *mzungu* but also through the use of non-human symbols such as laptops and mobile phones.

Considerable frustration was also expressed with the corrupt practices of some Tanzanian village government officials, who have hindered the process even further:

> It is their responsibility but they are doing nothing. They know there is money coming here through your organisation, they thought it would be simple that the money would just come to fill their pockets, they didn't know we would do it like this, to build the centre. They just wanted the money, they are now delaying the process because they think the money is going to her (TAWOMA chairwoman), they just want it in their hands (Village informant, pers. comm.; gloss added).

> Instead of sowing the seeds to make a good harvest, they consume the seeds. One kilo of maize seed can make 25 bags of maize but if he takes the kilo to make stiff porridge he will never have 25 bags again. They squander the money before the project takes off. They eat the seed, they don't plant it (Village government informant, pers. comm.).

While corruption is clearly a fundamental aspect of life in Tanzania (it is almost impossible to go from Mirerani to Arusha without being stopped by traffic police asking for 'tea money': *'nipe chai'*; see also 5.3) There are other reasons for the failure of government officials to act, however, as illustrated by a regional government official:

> With financial resources we are not able (...) We enrolled 25 children at Mirerani primary school and sponsored 8 with school fees. What we lack is resources, you can't withdraw children unless you have money to supplement what was missing with the children. There has been no follow up, we have left the matter to the village government and to the Headteacher. The Ministry does not provide travel expenses for staff unless they give a written request to send you somewhere. A social worker earns an average of TSH 100 000. We can't afford travel from our salary. (Dept of Social Welfare informant, pers. comm.; gloss added)

This reveals failure by village officials to follow up action instigated by the Department as well as the desperate lack of resources. The salary of less than £100 per month is extremely low and if social workers or other public officials want to travel to communities, they must pay for this themselves, which makes follow-up difficult.

This section has shown that although Mirerani people felt that there was an important role for IPEC and although they shared the same value system with regard to child labour, the process itself clearly left a lot to be desired.

7.3 Finding the 'Middle Ground'[222]

The above sections have revealed a multitude of factors hindering the smooth development of the intervention programme: from wider contextual issues, such as the changing aid framework, to donor mis-communication and failure, to local corruption:

> You can't put the blame in one place. It is very difficult, there are always a million factors which can make things go wrong (ex ILO official, pers. comm.).

I have tried to group these 'million factors' under three sub-headings which summarise the key issues: power, procedures and people (Box 7.3). Through focusing on these three categories, I am taking Hertzfeld's (1992: 182) 'dialectical middle ground', avoiding the reification of either person or culture, but attending 'to the play of ideas about both'. In the next section, I will thus step between institutionalised procedures and power relations, and individual personalities in order to attend to 'the play of ideas' in the development of the ILO-DFID intervention programme.

[222] This chapter was influenced by discussions and debates surrounding a workshop, which I helped to facilitate, held in May 2001 at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex

Box 7.3 Flow diagram to illustrate the way in which direct relations between the ILO bureaucracy and child labourers are mediated by power, procedures and relationships.



7.3.1 Power

In this section, power is not just defined in Weberian terms (1948), i.e., as being obtainable through political structures, the securing of economic interests, style of life, caste or ethnic group membership, specialised knowledge and so forth but in the wider sense defined by Bourdieu (1977). While those holding the power in this case study obtained it through the political structures to which they belong, the economic wealth which they control, their prestigious life styles, their ethnic group membership and their specialised knowledge, Bourdieu (1977) extends our understanding of power through his idea of 'symbolic capital'. Symbolic capital, such as the prestige and renown attached to a family name (ibid.: 179), or the gaining of prestige, loyalty, obligation through the giving of gifts or loans (ibid.: 195) is socially recognisable as wealth, although its power lies in it being a 'disguised' form of economic wealth. Power is therefore not only

embedded in structural relations but is also constituted through language and everyday practice (Bourdieu 1991, Kingsolver 1996).

The use and abuse of power is present at all levels of the case study: DFID used its power to dictate to the ILO; HQ staff used their power over field staff; management over front-line staff; particular government ministries over other ministries; village politicians over other residents and so forth. One of the most striking elements of the case study is the power of the 'donor'[223] agency, DFID, to dictate ILO-IPEC practice regarding the development of intervention in the mining sector. As seen in 4.4.5, the ILO does not often say 'no' to donors, which can lead to a situation where qualified and experienced IPEC staff find themselves jumping through donor hoops unnecessarily. This display of power by DFID is reflected in its current move towards an 'influencing agenda', whereby DFID staff are 'sent forth' to influence other development agencies and national governments and encourage them to 'see the light'. The claim to be able to influence development policy is clearly based on DFID's perception of its own symbolic capital. As a donor, DFID has built up substantial symbolic capital in the form of prestige, loyalty and obligation. It must, however, conceal the fact that this originates from 'material' forms of capital and therefore portrays itself as a 'gift-giver', 'influencer' and 'adviser' (see also argument relating to the PRSP below).

On the other hand, a Foucauldian perspective informs us that power is not just a one way imposition, but a network of relations, a constructive force which produces reality (1977 194). The ILO must therefore also take responsibility for allowing itself to be taken through the hoops. In this case, the need for funds led to compromise and acceptance of all DFID's 'suggestions'. In the words of the NPM: 'This is not a normal IPEC project. This is being written for DFID'.

Frustration with DFID's exercising of power was also expressed by an ex-IPEC staff member, with particular reference to the imposition of the baseline survey (7.1):

[223] The ILO is itself a powerful donor in Tanzania but in this context is a recipient of DFID funds.

> It is difficult to preach participatory research in a country where 'participation' has a different meaning to London. It is *the* thing to do, it has been for the past ten years but it may not be the appropriate way of doing things in Tanzania (...) It is good to assess properly, I agree, but if someone who knows what they are doing who has been working in the field for years says there are problems in mining, why do you need to do a survey for Tanzania? (pers. comm.)

This question brings us straight back to Foucault's power-knowledge paradigm (1977, 1980) which sees power as both creating and created by knowledge. Why did DFID want a survey for Tanzania before it would accept the opinion of the ILO partners that mining was a priority sector? It could be argued that through requesting the baseline survey, DFID was holding onto its power through certain 'concerted strategies of control' (Foucault 1977), i.e., the ILO must do a, b, and c, as we tell it to; as well as through holding onto the decision as to whose knowledge is acceptable, i.e. the knowledge of the Tanzanian partners is insufficient, there needs to be further knowledge generation funded by ourselves. However, it is important to remember that the Organisation is value-based and the staff member who commissioned the survey was not simply an 'instrument' of power but an individual with her own agency who is committed to poverty reduction and who used her best judgement to decide that a baseline survey was needed. Furthermore, the issue of 'fashion' must be brought up. It is currently *en vogue* to conduct baseline surveys and this obviously had an influential role to play. As one of my informants told me: 'You have to admit this is a fashion-oriented business' (see also Czarniowska 1997).

The irony is that the ILO staff member cited above, who was so critical of the baseline survey, was the staff member responsible for administering the baseline survey. It would appear that the ILO recognised the power imbalance and agreed with the DFID proposal in order to guarantee much needed funding in the long-run. With regard to the validity of a national survey, I would agree with the informant. As mentioned above, I believe in the intrinsic value of baseline surveys and extensive research as a basis for effective action. In this case, however, it was not necessary to conduct a baseline survey to determine whether or not the sector should be mining, as detailed research had already been conducted in the sector by the ILO (Alli 1997) and both DFID and the ILO were committed to the mining sector. The baseline survey, however, had it been better carried

out, would have been an important documentation of the wider child labour situation in Tanzania and therefore valuable in itself, but I argue, as a separate exercise, not a hurdle to project funding.

Power was not just exercised by DFID over the ILO, but also by DFID management over front-line staff and by the World Bank (the most important donor in the aid hierarchy, along with the IMF) over DFID. It is important to remember that during the time of negotiations between DFID and IPEC, DFID was undergoing dramatic transformations, from a sub-office in Kenya to a large independent office in Tanzania. Furthermore, the wider aid framework also changed: from projects to supporting government development policy. Unfortunately, DFID staff were not adequately briefed on the implications of change and the period of transition was one of confusion. The World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)[224] process apparently came up overnight and left many advisers in turmoil. Added to this was the fact that the new head of DFID East Africa was determined to place the region at the 'cutting edge' which meant that, along with Uganda, Tanzania was one of the first DFID offices to wholeheartedly embrace the PRSP process. There should have been a clear statement from DFID that support would no longer be given to projects; instead there was a series of 'perhaps, if you do this and this'. This change is, however, a reality of the development industry as a whole: a new 'trend' or 'success story' comes onto the scene and suddenly everyone is in a rush to jump on the bandwagon. This case study is just one of many abandoned orphans, nurtured by the donor parent only to be dropped, just as it is about to walk, when a new, more beautiful baby arrives.

Bourdieu's theory of symbolic capital, discussed above in relation to DFID's 'influencing' agenda, is also useful here. Through advocating the PRSP approach, the World Bank and other donors place themselves as government 'advisers' as opposed to mere providers of funds, retaining even more power, although at the end of the day the primary reason that the Government of Tanzania accords them any power is that the

[224] The PRSP is a policy paper developed by the national government, with donor support, through a consultative process. Policy laid down in the paper will be supported by donors, the aim being that donors will all be engaging in co-ordinated action, led by the national government, as opposed to working piecemeal style on different projects.

donors can provide the debt relief and "economic" capital needed to carry out the country's development policy. While this perspective is clearly useful it is based on the assumption that agents such as DFID are driven by a simple desire to gain power, by whatever means. This assumption needs to be challenged in this context, where agents clearly seek to maintain the prestige of their Organisation but many are also morally and politically committed to the reduction of poverty and child labour, as well as wanting to gain personally from their work (see 7.3.3).

The development of the intervention programme was aimed at reducing the conventional power imbalance between community and donor through 'community empowerment', 'ownership' and 'capacity building'[225]. The philosophy was that the best project designers are often community members themselves as they are aware of the realities in which they live (Chambers 1983). Such an approach was being strongly promoted by the likes of DFID. Unfortunately, by the time the Project Memorandum was presented, DFID had already moved on, leaving the 'capacity built' and 'empowered community', just as it was about to walk, with no resources or further support. I firmly believe that such a move makes a mockery of community participation as in the final analysis the donor had retained the power i.e. the money and was as free as ever before to walk out, leaving nothing but broken promises behind. In such a case, donors must be careful about employing such grand vocabulary. NGOs have shown the value of 'participation', 'empowerment' and 'ownership' as effective development tools but this case study has shown the extent to which these strong words can be watered down and eventually abandoned without a second thought once they become institutionalised. During a training programme for DFID Associate Professional Officers (APOs), a 'hypocrisy' test was conducted on certain words currently 'en vogue' in development parlance. Those which ranked highest were: Partnership, Ownership, Participation and Transparency[226]. The hypocrisy behind the use of these words is perfectly illustrated by our case study - there was no real partnership (either between DFID and ILO or between the donors and

[225] For a useful discussion of 'ownership' and 'empowerment' see Cornwall (2000).

[226] The extent to which donor commitment to participation/ownership etc. remains rhetorical is shown by the fact that these issues are never included as indicators for monitoring and evaluation. Only once this has become regular practice can the rhetorical use of these words become a real commitment.

the Mirerani residents) and no true ownership, there was participation but it was irrelevant in the wider scheme of things and there was very little transparency by DFID as to its changing agenda.

The ILO uses the language of 'participation' much less than DFID but the organisation's rhetoric would indicate that a high emphasis is placed on adapting child labour intervention activities to local conditions:

> The struggle against child labour must be rooted in each society's own culture, institutions and aspirations. **Children and their families** are the first line of defence against child labour. That is why efforts are directed at identifying and implementing concrete measures to empower them through awareness, participation and organisation (ILO-IPEC literature undated; emphasis in original)

IPEC is naturally in a much better position to put this into practice than DFID as it works through national institutions- government, unions, employers and NGOs. The media campaign has been particularly successful in reaching children and their families in order to raise awareness (6.3.7). In practice, however, there has been little progress in terms of empowerment and participation beyond the awareness raising stage. The 'empowerment through participation and organisation' has received less attention. For example, it was shown above that sensitisation workshops were held for government officials in the Arusha region and a meeting was then held in Mirerani to form a committee. Most people invited to this meeting, however, were high level residents not 'children and their families'. The latter are usually far too busy to come to the township on a work day to attend meetings. One way of encouraging their participation would have been to show the video made or to share the research reports with them (7.1). Unfortunately, this was not done (as seen above) and the nice words expressed in the promotional literature cited above remain mostly rhetorical. Furthermore, it can be argued that the views of 'children and their families' are considered important as long as they do not conflict with the legislative norms laid down by the ILO. Where children indicate that they do not agree with these universal and generalised norms (see 8.1.1), it is argued that the legislators know best, and their views are therefore discarded in the interests of standardisation.

It has been seen that the powerful position of the donors (World Bank and DFID) means that they can dictate policy change. This also puts the donor management in an extremely powerful position over front-line staff. In DFID Tanzania, there was a lot of reluctance by many field staff to adopt the PRSP process so rapidly. Those that expressed this attitude were seen, however, by management as 'not with it' or 'foolish'. This meant that many felt unable to express their opinions, based on long-term development experience, during office meetings. They were made clear, however, amongst friends over dinner. The pressures of the Organisation were therefore such that dissent was penalised, at the expense of gaining the opinions of experienced, qualified staff who may have had very valid points to make.

ILO staff also found the continually changing policy agenda of donors extremely stressful:

> The changing policies of donors is also a headache, it is difficult to formulate interventions when donors are formulating their policies. You need to give priorities time to work not to keep reviewing and changing them (ex ILO official, pers. comm.).

It is front-line staff, as opposed to donor management, who have built relationships with people on the ground and therefore feel personally committed to the area. The managers, on the other hand, have no direct responsibility to the 'clients' and therefore have fewer ethical qualms about 'moving on'.

The way policies change illustrates the ranking of power within the industry- the World Bank changed its approach, DFID followed, leaving the ILO and IPEC, never mind 'poor people' and child labourers, behind in the race to get to the front. While learning from mistakes is clearly important, continual change which does not give sufficient time for mistakes to be learnt from and incorporated into better practice, can only be detrimental in the long term. Tanzania provides a clear example of the disastrous impact of rushing new policies through: the Child Labour Unit (6.2.2) was not even invited to the PRSP meetings, and so was not given the opportunity to put its issues on to the agenda. Donors see the PRSP as reflecting the Government's priorities and will therefore be less inclined to support activities not included in it. By not being included in the PRSP the reduction of child labour would not therefore be considered a government

priority by donors. As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, however, child labour is a government priority but the Prime Minister's Office, responsible for sending out invitations to the PRSP discussions, did not invite the Ministry of Labour and the Child Labour Unit. This reflects further the issue of power within the process: some government departments are more influential than others for a number of reasons, such as personality and resources, and their ideas are therefore prioritised. Child labour was eventually put into the final draft of the PRSP, only to be removed when another 'internal final draft' was put out by the Prime Minister's office.

It was shown above that 'Power' is also key to the relationship between headquarters and the field, both in the ILO and in DFID. For example, my internship was set up by DFID HQ as part of its 'partnership' with the ILO, laid down in its 1999 paper 'The elimination of poverty: working collaboratively to tackle child labour', and I had signed my contract before DFID East Africa had even agreed to have me. When I arrived in Tanzania, there was no budget for my work, clearly an impediment to effective action, not only in financial terms but also because if you do not have a budget your work is sidelined and not considered an office priority. This was clearly illustrated by my absence from the Tanzania office organogram. Therefore, although HQ asserted its power by sending me to the field, the field office had its own forms of resistance, primarily through sidelining my work.

Another example of HQ asserting its authority concerns the 51% delivery rate (see 4.1). Field offices have been put under pressure to spend more and to spend on time. This did not address the fundamental problems, which were caused by HQ:

> This is not because of the fault of field staff but because of bureaucratic delays because someone is blocking your money. Instead of resolving this they are just telling us to make sure we spend the money in time (ex ILO official, pers. comm.).

In an attempt to redress this power imbalance, the ILO has been following a policy of decentralisation but:

> They have decentralised responsibility but not resources, so this causes trouble in the field (ILO staff member, pers. comm.).

The ultimate test of relinquishing power is clearly financial decentralisation but this is something many agencies are not prepared to do, which means that decentralisation remains primarily rhetorical[227]. In the meantime, IPEC Tanzania is still subject to extensive delays due to waiting for financial approval from Geneva[228].

Use and abuse of power at all levels, be it financial, symbolic or other, is therefore key to understanding how the intervention process has developed in such an ad hoc and questionable way. The exercising of power is not the whole story, however. Understandings of how particular procedures are used and of the individual people who implement them are also crucial.

7.3.2 Procedures

> The nature of the rules is crucial here. The "rules" in the excellent companies have a positive cast. They deal with quality, service, innovation and experimentation. Their focus is on building, expanding, the opposite of restraining; whereas most companies concentrate on controlling, limiting, constraint. We don't seem to understand that rules can reinforce positive traits as well as discourage negative ones, and that the former kind are far more effective. (Peters and Waterman 1982: 322)

By procedures, I am referring to formal bureaucratic practices, rules or 'rituals' employed by organisations in order to function as effectively as possible. Although procedures are the back bone of any form of organising, a review of organisational and management text books reveals that they are the almost 'invisible' element of organisational theorising[229]. Following Du Gay (2000), I argue that bureaucratic procedures are a valid and valuable form of public sector organising (also 4.4.3), despite current drives to reduce them and follow more flexible, private sector forms of ad hoc entrepreneurship.

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[227] This also applies to 'partnerships' with other organisations and the emphasis on community 'ownership'. Until the financial processes are also 'owned' or at least shared there will be no true ownership or partnership

[228] Power and domination are also fundamental to the functioning of the intervention process at a local level. For example, during the participatory planning exercise in Mirerani, the majority of participants were CCM (the dominant political party) officials with their own particular interests and agendas.

[229] It is interesting to note that the only time I was restricted access to ILO documents was when I asked to see the procedures handbook.

Both the ILO and DFID have lengthy handbooks on procedures to be followed in the day-to-day functioning of the Organisation. When in doubt as to how to proceed, a staff member will refer to the handbook and will be able to justify action taken on the basis that they are 'following the procedures'. In this way, procedures form a safety net in moments of uncertainty, as well as setting a uniform pattern of action. At their best, bureaucratic procedures prevent corruption, nepotism and other unsavoury behaviours as well as laying down clear, acceptable modes of practice. At their worst, however, procedures can be abused and blamed for unacceptable behaviour. They can cause delays, frustration and inaction, with staff mechanistically using procedures as the *ends* of organisational action rather than as the *means* for effective action. This is often because procedures, as we shall see below, become institutionalised or ritualised (Hertzfeld 1992) and do not develop with the times, unlike policy which as shown above can be extremely fickle and flighty.

It was seen in Chapter 6 that the ILO has stringent communication procedures- incoming and outgoing mail must be monitored by the Directors of the relevant departments. The expressed purpose of this procedure is to ensure effective communication across and within departments. Many staff feel, however, that this procedure is more of a supervisory, 'panoptical' (Foucault 1977) mechanism. It thus causes resentment and the belief in staff that they are not trusted to 'do their job properly'. In DFID, communication procedures are more ad hoc and individuals are trusted to and expected to use their common sense in deciding what needs copying to management. Unfortunately, this case study reveals that neither procedural mechanism was particularly useful in ensuring effective communication and the lack of communication between different departments and agencies was shocking, leading to needless delays and misunderstandings.

Another procedural example was the use of participatory planning. DFID requested that IPEC conduct participatory planning, which it did. Once this was complete, however, DFID pulled out of the process for entirely unrelated reasons, which answers Robert Chambers' question as to the extent to which participatory planning is then acted on:

> Empowering poor people to conduct their own appraisal and analysis, and to present their realities, is one thing. Whether their voices are heard, understood and acted on is another (Chambers 1998: 197).

'Participatory planning' is an important project development tool, but as seen, can become yet another procedural hoop for practitioners to jump through, as opposed to a truly emancipatory tool. Green (2000: 68) provides a valuable critique of the development of participatory planning exercises, arguing that :

> despite the claims of participatory development ideologies to foster the empowerment of the poor, the interventions it promotes are premised on a denial of poor people's capacity to bring about change for themselves. Such approaches prioritise participation in terms of knowledge production rather than programme management and in so doing construct the target communities as passive agents waiting the emancipatory intervention of development organisations.

In favour of the IPEC case study, it is important to point out that participation was to be prioritised in project management and not just for the purposes of knowledge production. The fact that DFID changed its policy does not take away from the good intentions of the participatory planning exercise. The key all along was that poor people did have the capacity to bring about change for themselves, as illustrated by the way people were invited to put forward their proposals, which were then taken on board. This, however, was more due to the person responsible for developing the process, myself in this case, than to a specific IPEC procedural requirement of participation. As seen in Chapters 3 and 4, 'participation' is not a term commonly employed by IPEC. I would argue, however, that while ILO has perhaps been slower on the ball than DFID at employing 'sexy' language, it is a more 'participatory' organisation in that trade unions, employers groups, governments and NGOs are, in theory at least, representative of many people in their country and are therefore participating more in the development of ILO policy and practice. The vast majority of poor people, however, are not involved in any of these groups for obvious reasons and Green's argument is therefore relevant at this level. In the case study, poor people's participation was mainly seen in terms of knowledge generation: poor people and children were asked for information and advice but it was not expected that they themselves would manage the project. This would be left to more powerful elements of the community - in the end the consultant decided that the project would be managed by an Arusha-based NGO. The role of the NGO, however, would be to eventually hand over project responsibility to the 'community', once sufficient capacity had been build. The argument, with which I concur, was that, however much one might want poor people to manage their own projects, a DFID

funded project requires particular skills, which the vast majority of poor people do not possess, such as computer typed quarterly reports, stringent financial and other procedures. The fact is that DFID and other donors are accountable to the British tax payer and must therefore provide documented support for the legitimate nature of their expenditure. The ideal whereby money is given to poor people to manage by themselves is therefore not realistic for a public government body, particularly in the current context where written documentation is essential at every step of the process. This leads public donor organisations, seeking to reduce the exclusive nature of their work, to one of two divergent paths: firstly, they can invest more resources in 'capacity building', during which time poor people are trained in the 'right way' to fill in the forms; secondly, they can accept less regimented procedures and adopt the approach of the Swedish development agency, SIDA (see below), for example, whereby local partners are allowed to use their own procedures to administer projects. This saves a lot of 'capacity building' time and serves to break down the power-knowledge (Foucault 1977) hierarchy between donor and recipient in that it recognises the administrative procedures and capabilities of the recipient as opposed to trying to impose alien and often inappropriate procedural requirements[230]. On the basis of my data I would clearly recommend the second path.

With regard to the target community being constructed as 'passive agents waiting the emancipatory intervention of development organisations', it is important to note that the 'target community' in Mirerani was far from passive before and after the 'emancipatory' intervention of IPEC. They already knew there was a problem and people were helping children out on an individual basis (Chapter 8). What was missing was a concerted strategy and it was through facilitating the development of such a strategy that IPEC had a valuable role to play. What must be noted, however, was that the opportunity for a development organisation to have one staff member working with a community for 12 months is extremely rare and therefore the participatory planning exercise often becomes

[230] Action Aid UK is currently trying to adopt such an approach through its ALPS or Accountability, Planning and Learning System, which aims to 'liberate staff and partners from the tyranny of endless forms and writing lengthy plans and reports which mostly adorn some shelf or archive' (ActionAid 2001: 7). ALPS puts more emphasis on downward accountability to the poor as well as opening up space for greater participation during planning, monitoring and evaluation of programmes.

a one week hurdle to jump over as fast as possible, without the time to gain a real understanding of the issues in order to facilitate the process of community planning. Most often, a stranger walks in, demands participatory planning to be conducted in a few days, usually conducting relevant activities with local 'élites' (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 175), and then has to write this up into project memorandum (7.1). The problem therefore is not simply the potentially rhetorical nature of 'participatory planning' but the lack of resources allocated to it by the Organisation (also 3.1; 4.2.2). Furthermore, resources for particular projects have been predetermined in the annual budgets of most donors, so the 'participatory' aspect of planning is often constrained to fit within predetermined limits.

The Mirerani case is a clear example of the need to spend a long time in understanding the context before undertaking any form of planning. The site is visually distressing and most visitors are extremely disturbed when first seeing it. It is a challenge to all the senses: the sore, red eyes shining out of the filthy, dried up face of a small child, the smell of excrement and urine everywhere, the sounds of the explosives, the taste of the dust and explosives in your mouth, the smell in your nose, the feel on your skin. For many people the immediate response is the desire to take all the children into your arms and to 'remove them from child labour'. A deeper understanding of the situation leads you to see the child behind the shocking exterior and to see the wider context. Although mining is clearly a difficult and risky occupation, for many children it is a chosen alternative to life at home, on the *shamba*, where successive droughts mean food and cash is scarce (8.1.1). This revelation illustrates the need for a deeper analysis. When I presented my findings to the National Steering Committee, I was criticised for painting 'too nice a picture' of life in the mines. This reminded me of my own first impressions, where I had to find a private space to cry at the misery of these children. The impressions I took with me to the meeting, however, were of laughing children, proud to be earning an income and with a real 'joie de vivre.' What many of the children wanted was not charity but financial assistance to set themselves up in business, to pay for schooling or to buy mining equipment (8.1.1). Others, however, did just want 'out' of the mining life, but felt that they had no choice, illustrating the complexity of developing an intervention programme for 'child labourers'. There is no such thing as 'the child labourer', instead there are thousands of children, each with different experiences, needs

and desires. This is described fully in Chapter 8 but at this stage, I merely want to flag up the importance of long term community planning as opposed to short term consultancies, where consultants are forced to meet a checklist of procedures, e.g. logframes, participatory planning, SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analyses etc.

The logframe, for example, is meant to facilitate management and planning and to be effective it should be developed with stakeholders. In this case-study, the logframe was developed by the consultant, and revised by ILO staff and myself in Dar Es Salaam. The logframe was very much developed *for* DFID. It was clear that DFID would not even consider a Project Memorandum without a logframe attached. This is a very good example of how a valuable and empowering tool becomes a rigid and non-participatory *procedure.* The ILO do not use the logframe approach, yet for them to have any chance of gaining DFID funding they were obliged to develop a logframe. The assertive attitude of DFID is once again brought to the fore; the ILO had to develop a logframe, even though it is a complex tool which requires substantial training to be used properly. The logframe therefore ceased in this case to be a participatory tool but instead became a procedure forced upon the ILO[231]. As such, much of its value was lost and, once more, a mockery was made of the term 'participation'. Neither Mirerani residents not the ILO were in positions of sufficient power to negotiate whether or not it would be appropriate to use the tool, and instead were forced to accept a DFID imposed procedure. As we saw at the beginning of this section, procedures are meant to facilitate the effectiveness of an Organisation. Instead, in this case the logframe and other procedures became yet more hurdles on the path to potential DFID funding, which as we know was eventually withdrawn anyway due to unrelated policy changes in the wider aid framework (7.1; 7.3.1).

Procedures are therefore subject to abuse, particularly when they become bureaucratic ends in themselves, as opposed to the means by which to operate effectively and legitimately. Organisations should therefore be attempting to ensure that procedures are

[231] The Swedish donor agency, SIDA, is fully aware of the non-participatory nature of imposing the logframe and partners submit project memorandums according to the format that they feel is most useful.

employed as part of a wider process and that the goal, be it the elimination of child labour or the elimination of poverty, remains in sight at all times. In this way, procedures can become positive and dynamic tools for effective practice, as envisaged by Peters and Waterman (1982) in the introductory quote to this section.

7.3.3 'People' Issues

> Emotions are within the texture of organizing. They are intrinsic to social order and disorder, working structures, conflict, influence, posturing, gender, sexuality and politics. They are products of socialization and manipulation. They work mistily within the human psyche, as well as obviously in the daily ephemera of organizational life. Although we might know this, it seems to be uncomfortable knowledge. Writers on organizations have successfully 'written out' emotions, to the extent that it is often impossible to detect their existence (Fineman 1993: 1)

The above quote is the introduction to Fineman's ground-breaking work on emotions within organisations (see also 4.4). I propose in this section to 'write in' the emotions which imbued the case study used in this chapter. Such an attempt also helped me understand why emotions have been successfully 'written out' of the literature. Emotions are 'too close to home'; they require commentary on people that the commentator has worked with and got to know. Writing about these people in such a personal way as to comment on their emotions seems in some way a betrayal of the relationship (1.2). Furthermore, the interpretation of emotion can only be subjective and therefore counters the perception of the rational and objective researcher, it takes us into the domain of gossip and far too close to our own emotions and how they impact on our perceptions of the informant. Unlike the informant in a remote village, who does not read English, the informant from a particular organisation is quite likely to read the commentary and challenge the researcher's interpretation of their emotions. When the organisation you study is also one for which you work the task becomes even more controversial. The sense of 'belonging' to the organisation brings up my own emotions: guilt at referring to colleagues and friends; fears as to the consequences doing so may have for any future relationships with the Organisation; sense of loyalty to the Organisation and so forth. For these very reasons, my own emotions mean that I must omit a number of field experiences, for which I apologise in advance. I therefore take a deep breath and dive into the task of attempting to explore the impact of 'emotion' within the case study. I

have chosen to call this section 'People' rather than emotion in order to maintain the link with the people involved, as opposed to exploring emotion in a detached way, for detached is one thing that discussing emotion can never be, and 'people' are the units through which emotion lives and breeds. Furthermore, the term 'people' also embodies the issues of agency, motivation and unpredictability which are so central to the translation of vision into effective practice, as revealed throughout this thesis.

It was shown in 4.4, that affectivity or emotion is central to the success or failure of any organisational practice. Both the ILO and DFID are portrayed as and portray themselves as homogeneous monoliths or 'communities' of like minded people, all fighting for the same goal, be it poverty elimination or the elimination of child labour. The reality, however, is clearly different. Within each Organisation there is a multitude of discourses and practices, of motivations and aspirations and of forms of conflict and resistance.

Fineman (1993) uses two conceptual lenses to explore emotion in organisations: social constructionism and psychodynamic theory. The former teaches us how 'emotions shape, and are shaped, by the social arrangements, rules and languages used' (ibid.: 2) and the latter how 'a largely invisible world of personal anxieties, fears and yearnings can be seen to underpin some of the routines and rituals of work organization and behaviour' (ibid.: 2-3). One ethnographic example of this would be the introductory quote to this chapter in which an ILO informant refers to the important role played by 'self esteem' in the birth of a new project. Fineman's framework is therefore particularly useful in allowing the student of organisations to explore both the visible and invisible ways in which emotions determine the thinking and doing that establish organisational practice.

Both the Organisations in this case study are target based: the ILO's target is the elimination of child labour and DFID's target is the elimination of poverty. Within these organisations, however, individual staff members have their own targets, framed within country strategy papers. Performance targets are often framed in a relatively rigid way which does not reflect the highly dynamic realities of organisational life. For example, my DFID Annual Performance Development Plan (APDP) was developed on my arrival in Tanzania and revised half way through the year. The context within which I was working shifted dramatically between the first set of targets, the revised targets and the

final evaluation. Despite the recognition of my ability to adapt and of the tasks I undertook which were not in the APDP, one central conclusion to my APDP was that I did not meet my original targets. The impact of such performance targets is that staff tend to avoid innovative behaviour, to stick to simple, achievable targets and do not expect recognition for actions taken outwith the APDP framework. Performance thus becomes geared, not to achieving the overall aim of poverty elimination or whatever but to attaining one's personal targets in order to achieve a good end-of-year review and therefore eventual promotion. Emotion thus plays a central role in the practice of annual performance plans. Using Fineman's two conceptual lenses it can therefore be argued from a social constructionist view that annual performance plans shape the way in which staff behave and their emotional responses to their evaluations determine the way in which they perform according to their targets. From the psychodynamic perspective, it can be seen that the personal fears and anxieties of staff regarding meeting targets and therefore the gaining of a good review and future promotion opportunities underpin how the organisation functions.

In 7.1, it was shown that one of the primary problems in the development of the intervention programme was linked to staff changes:

> The process has been wrong from day one (...) One of the problems is that there are so many people in on it, people leave, there is no continuity and they don't talk, that is the point of the Mirerani thing, the (SDA) left (another) came in, then she came to Dar (from Nairobi as part of DFID decentralisation) then I left, then you came in and weren't informed of what had been going on (ex- ILO official, pers. comm.).

The lack of continuity and communication is largely related to the fact that little emphasis is placed, particularly in the ILO, on staff management (6.3.3). If there had been, there would have been better hand-overs as well as better briefing. The new policy framework also came into place over an extremely short time period with little staff consultation or briefing (7.1). In terms of emotion, continual staff changes meant that personal links formed between staff members were broken, which in turn meant that important links between the organisations were also broken, having to be re-built with each change, a time- consuming process, which in part helps to explain why what should have taken only a few months has taken over four years.

Staff changes also brought different personal priorities onto the agenda (7.1). For example, the ex-IPEC staff member was personally committed to intervention in the mining sector and the ex-DFID SDA was personally committed to the importance of in-depth research. Their replacements, however, were not so committed to either issue and had very different agendas (7.1). Personal preferences lead to prioritisation of work load: people are more inclined to focus on work that they are personally committed too. In an environment where staff have extremely heavy workloads, work which is not personally prioritised will sit at the bottom of the 'in-tray', which can go some way to explaining the delays. Recognition of different personal priorities is important in order to view the Organisation not as a homogeneous body but as a contested terrain in which different 'stakeholders' have different agendas, each stakeholder trying to influence outcomes in their own way (Phillips and Edwards 2000: 49).

Furthermore, overwork and insufficient staff has led to the logjam situation, particularly in the ILO (Chapters 4 and 6), as well as to conflict between HQ and the field office, with field staff often feeling misunderstood and over-stretched:

> Part of the problem is the non-realisation on the part of the donors and IPEC Geneva as to how orchestrated field staff feel, they are under funded, you can work 18 hours a day, seven days a week and not shift the work. IPEC Tanzania is seen as a success, everything is dumped here. (...) You end up working in an ad hoc manner and you don't have five minutes to think strategically, to do a comprehensive piece of work. The field office needs more staff. This is not realised by IPEC Geneva or they know but don't know what to do, the donors don't want to fund staff or equipment, they want the money to go direct to the children, this is a good approach but it isn't working, it isn't reaching the children (ILO staff member, pers. comm.).

In the rush to develop new policies, the organisational 'manpower', in terms of capacity and emotion, is often forgotten. Policies are developed mainly at a theoretical level, in HQ, with little consideration of available staff capacity resources, as in the case of Tanzania and the TBP (6.2.1). The feelings expressed by the informant in the quote above reflect Fineman's psychodynamic invisible world of personal anxieties, fears and yearnings. Staff felt overworked, under valued and frustrated by the way their work was hindered by factors like those mentioned. The section of the quote referring to IPEC's

success also takes us back to Chambers' (1983) argument as to the potentially self-defeating nature of success (6.3.5).

Field staff are also marginalised within the career structure and this came up on a number of occasions:

> There is an ingrained organisational culture that it is better to stay in Geneva if you want promotion than to go to the field where you may be forgotten. This is a huge problem (ILO staff member, pers. comm.).

High level staff are thus encouraged to stay in Geneva which acts a form of 'brain drain', where the most qualified and experienced staff feel little incentive to work in the field, although this is where most direct impact occurs (see 6.3.1).. The quest for status and power is, I would argue, an important characteristic for many people working within the ILO and DFID and is therefore central to understanding social relationships within the organisation (Fineman 1993: 22).

Another aspect of the quest for status and power is reflected in the issue of leadership (4.4.7); people's careers can be built on bringing in ambitious, new policies. This was particularly illustrated by the new Head of DFIDEA's desire to be at the 'cutting edge' and the pushing forward of the PRSP process. He revolutionised the office almost immediately upon his arrival, causing concern among staff members, particularly those with long term community experience and commitment who knew that fast is not always best. Within a few months of his appointment and his revolutionising of the offices, he had already applied for promotion and was given one within two years of his arrival. The management literature refers to these people as 'change agents' - brought into departments for short periods of time, during which they revolutionise the structures, and are then moved to other departments almost as rapidly as they were brought in (Buchanan and Boddy 1992; Cooper and Hingley 1985).

Du Gay writes of his concern with recent trends in the public sector to whole-heartedly embrace innovative management techniques. He warns of the implications of 'too enthusiastically harnessing individual enterprise to the achievement of public goals and the pursuit of public interests' (2000: 12). His argument is based on the fundamentally

different *raisons d'être* of the private and the public sectors. Public bureaucracies are meant to be custodians of a country's Constitution and of the interests of its nationals:

> Because a system of representative government requires officials to act as the custodians of the constitutional values it embodies, it cannot frame the role of bureaucrats as solely in terms of efficient management, performance, responsiveness and securing results (2000: 12).

I would argue that it is not the role of DFID to be at the 'cutting edge' of International Development. On the contrary, the Organisation has a responsibility to ensure that DFID policy is conducted according to the interests of the British electorate. These interests have been set down under the overall goal of 'poverty elimination'. It is therefore the role of DFID to provide the necessary administrative and advisory support to ensure that this takes place. The Tanzania case illustrates how processes were 'managed' in order to be at the 'cutting edge' despite the hesitancy expressed by many staff members. Rather than considering the World Bank strategy in depth and providing advice to ensure its ultimate effectiveness, management was pro-active in a way which even surprised the World Bank itself. As one World Bank informant told me, they had been expecting a bit more resistance and comment to the proposed Strategy Paper. One individual, however, had the power, personality and drive to push things through. It only remains to be seen whether or not this particular policy will successfully 'eliminate poverty', even though many valuable projects were dumped unceremoniously in the process.

Fieldwork also revealed the different personality cultures valued within the two Organisations. DFID appears to place an important emphasis on vocal and dynamic personalities, necessary if anyone is to take notice of its 'influencing agenda', whereas ILO staff tend to be far less dynamic, emphasising the following of procedures as opposed to the voicing of opinions. This is also reflected in the different organisational management styles and promotion structures: in the ILO, the primary function of the Area Office Director was to 'administer' the office, through reading mail and allocating roles, whereas in DFID the primary function of the 'Regional Head' was to shake up the office and place it at the 'cutting edge'.

People and their emotions therefore play a vital role in organisational life: be it in the form of social constructionism through the development of specific personality and

leadership cultures, or in the form of personnel management which can cause understaffing and consequent delays or lack of continuity through frequent staff changes and lack of handovers; or in the form of psychodynamic factors such as ambition, frustration, anxiety, fear or yearning. What does this signify for the practice of organisations such as the ILO? According to Putnam and Mumby (1993: 55), emotions can be managed as the means to instrumental ends, such as the desire to perform well and therefore to set conservative targets in your APDP, but also as positive ways to enhance 'community interrelatedness'. They argue that using the emotion frame exposes 'the myth of rationality', and produces 'information grounded in personal experience, mutual understanding, and community'. A challenge which, I would argue organisations such as the ILO and DFID should begin to take on board. Finally, recognising the importance of 'people' issues is an important step in that it places people firmly at the centre of organisational practice and change. This in turn places responsibility for the way in which power and procedures are employed with individuals themselves and takes us away from abstract and de-humanised critique, a theme to which I return in Chapter 9.

7.4 Chapter Conclusions

The development of an intervention process therefore involves a complex web of factors. At each level of the intervention process a combination of power relations, procedures and people mean that there is continual negotiation and re-negotiation between different agents. This illustrates the difficulties of referring to the 'Organisation' or the 'Donor' as a de-humanised, inorganic entity: instead there is simply a multitude of people trying to perform in a bureaucratic structure, employing often inadequate and antiquated procedures, and trying to find ways to simplify their tasks and to meet their personal ambitions and needs, within a complex network of global, national and local power relations. When I arrived in Tanzania, IPEC was very much riding the last wave of the project based agenda. By the end of my involvement, IPEC Tanzania was clearly no longer in the right place, right time or right agenda, at least as far as DFID was concerned. There are also conflicts within organisations as to

how to do things and in this case, the donor with the money and the strong personality culture was the dominant power. IPEC lacked the time, manpower and confidence to stand by its own ideas and practices and to challenge DFID on points of contention.

Green (2001) argues that the kinds of practices used to plan and to implement development are employed in order to transform policy vision into *manageable* realities through the social constitution of 'projects'. In this case study, the policy vision of 'reducing child labour in the Tanzanian mining sector' is transformed into manageable realities through an array of 'projects', such as conducting a baseline study, capacity building and empowerment, developing a project memorandum according to DFID defined guidelines. All these 'projects' are developed according to particular procedures, as seen above. The fulfilling of the procedures in order to ensure that the project is managed in a quantifiable and financially justifiable way becomes the end in itself. The 'projects' thus become separated from wider social realities, from the nitty-gritty, complex and emotional aspects of 'real life'. This explains how the child labourers themselves became almost invisible within the intervention development process.

The above leads to one simple question: Why do public organisations, such as the ILO and DFID, continue to function as they do, despite the repeated evidence that their approach is not only time consuming but resource consuming with minimum impact for so-called 'beneficiaries'? Organisations like DFID have tried to transform the bureaucratic model, by adopting private-sector management techniques, such as change agents. Such an approach is also problematic, however, as the public sector has very different responsibilities and needs to play more of a monitoring role rather than jumping onto whatever the next fashionable bandwagon may be, without adequate time for reflection and questioning. While the ILO could not say 'no' to DFID, DFID could not say 'no' to the World Bank. Both Organisations should have taken more time to reflect on the implications of following the more powerful organisation almost blindly. Both could have put forward valuable arguments and points for reflection. Instead they just acted: the ILO for money, and DFID for the prestige of being at the 'cutting edge'. In both cases, the last consideration was the best interests of the child. Short term Organisational interests came first.

Recent management thinking has shown that project implementation problems appear to 'lie with "people issues"', organization structure, and project leadership, not with traditional project management and control, or issues related to technical developments' (Buchanan and Boddy 1992: 4). Such a statement is supported by this study of the ILO and DFID in Tanzania, which shows that issues related to technical developments (such as the implementation of a 'participatory' or 'empowerment' approach to development) and to traditional project management and control (such as the project cycle[232]) were not the factors leading to failure to develop a project which would impact on the lives of child labourers. Instead it was 'people issues', in the form of staffing and personalities; 'organization structures', in terms of unnecessary bureaucratic delays and miscommunications; and 'project leadership' determined by power relations. 'Leadership' was never clear in the process: IPEC should have been leading the process and yet DFID used its power to lead the process in subtle ways. The result of these factors, which I have centred around the themes of power, procedures and people, was the unnecessary expenditure of energy, money and time at the cost of the development of appropriate and effective child labour intervention. It has been seen that the children themselves were the last consideration in the bureaucratic process, rarely mentioned by any of my informants. Furthermore, as revealed by this study, by the time practice reaches the children themselves the wider context may have changed leading to the abandonment of the intervention itself. The result in this case was the self-sustenance of two bureaucracies and the expenditure of almost four years, of over $140, 000[233] and of staff time and energy. The direct impact on child labourers, however, was nil.

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[232] The project cycle is a project management tool used by DFID and other donors, which involves problem identification, planning, implementation and monitoring in a continuous cycle.

[233] This figure includes the $91, 000 in the DFID-ILO Memorandum of Understanding for the baseline study and other activities which should arise, and the cost of my placement (in terms of salary, accommodation and other expenses). Added to this should also be the staffing and other relevant costs to both Organisations. I could not quantify these, however.

8. The 'Missing Link': Mirerani Child Labourers Contextualised

It was seen in the last chapter that the child subjects of international intervention, the child labourers themselves, become almost invisible within the wider machinations of the ILO and DFID bureaucracies. This chapter uses participant observation to focus on the voices of the children themselves and the circumstances in which they work or labour. This chapter, which could have been the first, thus becomes the last, and serves as a reminder of who it was that the ILO and DFID were in fact claiming to be trying to assist: not 'the child labourer' as an abstract and disembodied construct but 'child labourers' as embodied subjects, living within a particular reality.

This chapter will therefore use ethnographic evidence in an attempt to bring the 'child labourer' in Mirerani to life, exploring the realities of child labour in the Tanzanite mines and the cultural constructions of child work to which the children are subject. The first section will consider the voices of the *nyokas* themselves and their reasons for working in the mines as well as their opinions of their work. The following sections will explore the cultural constructions of 'child' and 'work' in Mirerani. We will consider the extent to which the constructed child labourer described in previous chapters matches the profile of the children working in the mines of Mirerani.

8.1 Child Labour/work in Mirerani

Until relatively recently, Mirerani was predominantly populated by male adults. There were few women in the township and those who were there were mainly traders such as female commercial sex workers and *mama ntilies* (mobile food sellers). Most miners were either single or had left their families behind in their home villages or towns. There were therefore very few children in the township. As Mirerani developed into a larger settlement in the mid to late 1990s with medical facilities, a school, electricity and a police station, more and more families with children started to settle there (5.2). The arrival of women and children clearly led to transformations in the daily work activities in the area. Different tribal and socio-economic groups were living together in one settlement, influencing each other's cultures and traditions. It is important to bear this in mind and understand that it is not possible to provide generalised statements about children and child labour and child work in Mirerani. This ethnographic study of children reflects their specific patterns of socialisation, which have been influenced by living in such a diverse and unique community.

8.1.1 'The child labourers'[234]

> When you watch them carefully you realise they are not real children... some have red eyes apparently because of the *bhang* (marijuana) they smoke ... they seem ostensibly guilty of an offence they will never admit to have committed..there is nothing like a sense of discipline or decency in the way they respond to questions asked by an adult. (Rioba 1995; gloss added)

In Chapter 3, 'the child labourer' as defined by international discourse was introduced. Having examined the local context in which children are engaged in Mirerani, it is appropriate to attempt to understand the reality of embodied child labourers. Who is the 'child labourer' in the context of Mirerani? What is the experience of the 'child labourer'? To what extent does the constructed child labourer, the 'victim' of adult

[234] The term is used in inverted commas to refer to the fact that this section is a critique of how IPEC uses the term in a way which homogenises what is in reality a diverse group, encompassing a range of ages, ethnic groups, personal histories and experiences.

exploitation, the passive labourer who suffers in silence, match the profile of the children working in the mines of Mirerani? Or is the profile given above by a Tanzanian journalist as 'not real children' more relevant? This section attempts to answer these questions and thus draw a picture of the 'child labour'[235] experience in the Tanzanite mines, using the voices of children and other township members themselves[236].

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with one hundred boys[237] in the mines using the snowball method (interviewees act as informants and links to other interviewees) and I had informal conversations with countless others[238]. I spent most of my days in the mining site itself conducting participant observation. Some boys also came to visit me at my home where I was living with a mining family, some would come just to chat and others would come for English lessons. Children from both Blocks B and D (see 5.2) were interviewed. The results challenged a number of assumptions upon which the international discourse construction of 'the child labourer' is based. It is important to note that I do not claim to be providing a definitive profile of children working in the mines. One thing which became clear during participant observation is that there is no such thing as 'the child labourer'. Each child has his own personality, history and reasons for working in Mirerani. Having said this a number of generalisations can be drawn on the basis of the interviews but these must be considered in the context of the wider findings of my research.

It is useful to highlight key findings in order to provide a baseline. Most of the children (75%) were under the Tanzanian legal age for mining, that is 16, and all interviewees were under the CRC and Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour minimum

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[235] In Mirerani, there a number of different categories of child labour which include domestic workers, informal sector workers and child commercial sex workers. I will be focusing on the mining children as this is the primary focus of IPEC intervention.

[236] Issues of methodology and reflexivity are discussed in Chapter 1.

[237] There are no girls to be found at the site, which does not mean that girl children are not involved in the mining industry- many are in processing and in the service sectors- but the focus of these particular interviews was children directly involved in mining.

[238] In view of the fact that 100 children were interviewed data will be presented as a percentage for the sake of clarity. It is important to remember, however, that these percentages are only based on 100 interviews.

age of 18. The majority were 14 and 15 years of age (61%) with only 15% aged 13 and under. The 'child labourer' is thus less a child than a young adult but falls under the ILO Convention 182 definition of 'child' labourer (2.3; 3.4).

With regard to schooling, 35% of interviewees claimed to have reached standard 7 level (terminated primary school). Only 11% had never attended school, which whilst high was lower than expected. This means, however, that most children had dropped out of school before reaching standard 7. Most claimed that their parents had no money for fees for them to continue, which is linked to the introduction of cost sharing, brought about through the adoption of structural adjustment policies in Tanzania (5.1.4). While fees should only be TSH 2000 (around £2), a number of schools charge much more and for a large family these fees added to the cost of uniforms and materials are just too much in view of the poor quality education[239] that many informants felt that they received. Some children were sent to school for a few years and then removed to allow younger siblings to attend. During informal conversations many boys claimed that they chose to leave school as they found themselves working for their teachers for no salary, being beaten without good reason or waiting for teachers who often did not attend. Others saw that children who had completed school often stayed in the villages without work while others saw people with secondary level education and even degrees working in the mines and argued that there was no point obtaining an education only to find yourself in a job you could have started earlier and been earning money for instead of 'losing time'(*nyoka*, pers. comm.).

It is interesting to note that only 3 out of the 100 interviewees came from Mirerani; the others had travelled to Mirerani in search of work from neighbouring districts of Arumeru, rural Arusha and rural Kilimanjaro (see 5.3 for the migrant nature of the mining community generally). One boy informed us that Mirerani had attained almost mythological proportions in the stories told by and to children as a 'get-rich quick' area, the lights of the township being visible from the slopes of Mount Meru and Mount Kilimanjaro. Only one boy was Masai (see below for comment on Masai children and

[239] For an excellent analysis of the education system and the impact of structural adjustment in Tanzania, please refer to Kuleana (1999).

mining) and 11% came from far distances such as Shinyanga and Tanga[240], hundreds of kilometres away. The words of an adult miner shed some light on the reasons why children are migrating from home:

> Things have changed very much, before you would not have found me here, I would have had to stay with my wife and parents. Stay home. Now people are lost, even children they can go away from home and stay away. This staying at home is going to finish I think as everyone moves around now because of the lack of land. (...) Before children were not allowed to leave home for a job before 18 years. (pers. comm.)

Changes in cultural expectations and socio-economic opportunities are therefore important explanations for the growing numbers of children migrating to Mirerani. These factors will be explored further below (8.1.2.1).

To continue on the theme of push factors, 47% of children cited *'hakuna pesa nyumbani'* or 'no money at home' as the primary factor, with a further 18% claiming *'hakuna pesa kwa ajili ya shule'* or 'no money for school' (see also 5.1.4). This was also reflected in the pull factors with 61% claiming to need money for food, clothes and to build a house, with a further 8 out of 100 wanting money for schooling. The need to obtain money for basics contradicts the often cited opinion that 'all they want is quick money to buy nice things', often heard in the township when discussing why the children are working, and reveals that motives are far more complex. Another interesting result was that all except four decided to come on their own accord, refuting the image of the 'child labourer' forced to work by exploitative adults. It would have been particularly useful, however, to have conducted a tracer study of all the children, to explore their home lives and gain the perspectives of people who knew them in order to confirm the extent to which their migration was their own choice, or suggested, encouraged or even forced by parents, other family members or peers. Socio-cultural norms such as family loyalty and obedience to elders may lead to children seeing themselves as voluntarily doing what people used to other norms may see as forced or coerced activity. For example, the school children discussed below (8.1.2.1) who did not see themselves as being coerced

[240] This finding that most of the children were migrants was one which the ILO took on board as it had important implications for programming.

into working for their teachers. Whereas I would have termed this an abuse of the teacher's power, the children saw themselves as being privileged. In this sense, the idea of the free, autonomous agent must be questioned although my evidence suggests that the children were not forced in the violent sense in which the 'exploited' child is often portrayed.

There is no space here to enter into the detail of kinship and domestic structures of the various groups involved in order to explore the impact of these on child labour but when I raised the issue of family loyalty and obedience to elders, a Chagga (one of the majority ethnic groups in Mirerani) informed me that:

> When the first born comes, then often the other brothers follow. The brother may go home and tell the others to come with him. Obedience to elders is not important, they just come because they can get something. Family loyalty is very low as a reason for the *nyokas* coming. The families know the situation is dangerous for the children, they know the children smoke cigarettes and have bad lives which is why families only send the child if an older brother is there to look after him (pers. comm.)

This implies contradictory messages in terms of who takes the decision: is it the brother who encourages younger brothers to follow, or the family who send the child or the child himself who takes the decision? I suggest that the situation differs for different children. Many children interviewed did not have brothers in the mines so this was not a consideration, other children did have brothers and claim that they decided to go and find them of their own accord, others claim that their brothers brought them.

Most of the children interviewed had only been in Mirerani for a short time, under one month, and only 15 had spent more than one year in the mines. There are several possible reasons for this. Firstly, the interviews were conducted in January and February. The end of the school year in Tanzania is December so those who had completed or dropped out of school would have been looking for work at that time. New arrivals may also have been more willing to be interviewed as they may have been less aware of the risk that outsiders pose in terms of expelling them from the mines. Others were suffering from the shock of arriving and experiencing the difficulties of the work and saw my research assistant and myself as assistance for going home, judging by the high numbers who asked for bus fares to go home. Those who had been working in the

mines for a long time may have been more hesitant about being interviewed, having gone through the process before with interviewers who made promises and never returned (Kijo-Bisimba from LAMP, a Swedish NGO; Alli from the ILO; the mining union TAMICO[241]) or they were established workers and therefore had little free time to spend on being interviewed.

Boys working in the mines are referred to as *nyokas* or snakeboys as they are said to be able to move rapidly down the narrow pit tunnels. In reality, however, many children never go down the pits (37%). They remain on the surface, sieving sand to extract small pieces of gemstone (Plates 8.1.1a-c). This process is known as *kuchekecha.* A common complaint of many of these boys was that mine owners would not employ them in the pits and so they had to work in what they perceived to be less profitable surface work. This refutes the idea that mine owners exploit children by forcing them to go down the mines. Instead, it would appear that many are refusing to employ the children which led to the scenario that I witnessed on many occasions of children making repeated and emotional pleas to owners to give them jobs. 63% of those interviewed do go down the pits, however. The most common job that they do is 'communications', which involves taking messages from the surface to the miners in the pits (Plates 8.1.1d and e). Other jobs consist of taking water down, running errands and bringing sand up from the pit to be sieved. Only 5 boys were involved in setting explosives, a particularly dangerous task, as one boy reveals:

> I don't like doing it. I get scared. I set the fires for the explosives. Many don't get out but it is an easier job for getting stones as you are near the blast' (15 year old *nyoka*, pers. comm.)

[241] I, as a DFID/ILO representative, may also be added to the list, if Mirerani does not become part of the Time Bound Programme (6.2.1). Although I never made any promises, my mere presence was enough to raise expectations.

Plates 8.1.1a, b and c Surface mining: These three photos illustrate the way in which boys work on the surface, exposed to the sun, sieving through the sand either from sacks from a pit or from digging small holes in the ground, to find small pieces of Tanzanite.

Plate 8.1.1a



Plate 8.1.1b

8.1.1c



Plate 8.1.1d and e Pit mining *nyokas*: The two photos illustrate the makeshift nature of the pits as well as the lack of protective equipment and clothing

8.1.1d



8.1.1e

It is often said that the children are exploited because they do not receive salaries. Alli informs us that 'The child labourers in the Mirerani mines are exploited because they are not paid any salary' (1997: 7) and that one of the 'workplace stresses' for children is 'Inequitable pay; the children, despite the arduous task they perform, are not paid' (1997: 18). Kijo-Bisimba also suggests a solution to the problem could be that 'there should be a just and fair salary which is directly proportional to the nature and amount of work which they normally do' (1997:25). Such statements contribute to the construction of the 'exploited child labourer'. It is remember that in Mirerani, no-one is paid for working in the mines (5.3)[242]. According to my observations, children are sometimes less exploited than adult miners, as they get certain privileges by virtue of their age, such as extra food and other assistance which adult miners may not obtain. The tasks they perform are also lighter and less strenuous than those of adult miners. Most boys also reported that they had a strong support network, either helping each other out or being looked after by an adult miner in times of need. Only 3 boys reported having been abused by adult miners

[242] Except for the occasional casual labourer. Miners, including *nyokas*, receive two meals a day consisting of *ugali* (stiff porridge) and beans. They also get medical assistance and a percentage share in any find once expenses are taken into account.

in the form of beatings or having torches stolen, another 2 claimed that their pockets had been slashed open whilst they were sleeping and the contents stolen. Whilst this does not mean that abuse does not happen regularly it does place a question mark upon the common view that children are regularly raped and beaten (England 1999)[243].

The situation is thus not as clear cut as some maintain. In terms of 'exploitation', my data reveals that child labour should be seen more as a 'class' or 'group' labour issue than as an 'age' specific issue (also 2.2). Having said that, the boys' work is hard and they are often expected to go up and down the pits on a continual basis, an exhausting task: 'It is very hard work and tiring but I must work. I have my problems' (14 year old *nyoka*, pers. comm.). To the observer, the working conditions are disturbing to all the senses. The pits go down to 200 metres and consist of very narrow, pitch black tunnels. There are places where there is just a rope to descend vertical shafts and in other places miners must crawl through the tunnels on their bellies. Miners have only a torch for light and wear no protective clothing (see plates 8.1.1 d and e). There are no sanitation facilities in the mining site, indicated by the all pervasive stench of human excrement, and physical hazards include noise, vibration, excessive heat, lack of shade, poor hygiene leading to bacterial infections, inhalation of graphite dust, gases, fumes and smoke. Alli (1997: 18) also claims that the psychosocial hazards for the children include 'occupational stress caused by over work and overburdening leading to lowered self-esteem, low work motivation and 'escapist' alcohol and drug consumption'. My research has not, however, revealed 'alcohol and drug consumption' as a key issue. Although one or two boys can be seen smoking *bhang*, local marijuana, Most children interviewed were vehemently against the use of alcohol or drugs. Water, however, is an important issue for many children. There is no adequate water supply and water used at the mines is brought by vans in tanks and sold to miners at exorbitant prices. The miners generally do not wash, coming into town occasionally for a shower. Lack of adequate nutrition also appeared to be a key problem with many children complaining of hunger and showing signs of malnutrition (lethargy, rotten teeth, underweight, thin arms and legs, small in relation to

[243] Adult informants also rejected this view. In the words of one miner: 'The children are forced to work hard by the leader of the mine but I have not seen any children get beaten or sodomised. It is not true, it is just stories.'

age, lack of desire to laugh or play, see Pryer, 1988). The general health of the children is very weak. In the words of the district health officer:

> The health status of the nyokas is very, very, very bad, they have no relatives here so they just die, they can't have water (...) Nyokas here do not have a balanced diet to maintain their immunity and because they are exposed to soot from explosions and graphite dust they are very vulnerable. (pers. comm.).

Another risk the boys face is that of becoming 'married'. I experienced this first hand when an acquaintance used my research to attempt to 'marry' one of my informants. Women, often desperately poor themselves, promise *nyokas* sex and other assistance, such as payment of school fees, if they bring them any Tanzanite found in the mines where they work. HIV infection is a very real risk, especially as most 'wives' also engage in prostitution and condom use is extremely rare in Mirerani. Generally sex is a one-off and the boys never gain any of the other promised benefits.

The children who do surface sieving are mostly self employed and are therefore not entitled to anything, but usually make a little money everyday to buy food, although some claimed they sometimes went up to three days without eating. Finding out about children's incomes was difficult as there are several reasons why they might under-estimate, over-estimate or even conceal their income. When asked about the total amount of money made during their time in Mirerani, 44% claimed that they had got nothing; '*hamna*'. When pushed they admitted that in fact nothing meant around TSH 500-1000 (50p - £1) per day which they made from selling small stones or which people gave them to buy food. This original under-estimation reveals that children are not in Mirerani to earn an income to meet their basic survival needs, indeed they do not even classify small sums which are enough to buy food as 'income'. 36% had got over TSH 10 000, 10% over TSH 50, 000 and only 3% got over TSH 100 000. Whilst the income was confirmed for one boy who had earned over TSH 100 000 by a fellow miner, it is possible that they would overestimate the amount earned to persuade me of the importance of their work in case I was linked to the government and trying to evict them (see 5.. Despite any doubts about the validity of their statements, when placed into the context that *nyokas* often work twelve hour days in the glaring heat or in suffocating darkness and under very difficult conditions, the rewards of mining are in reality low.

The expectations, however, are high and everyone knows someone who has made their fortune which serves only to fuel the dream. Two informants had made TSH 1 000 000 and TSH 500 000 respectively, setting up their parents in business and inspiring many others boys to follow their lead. It has been claimed that owners attract one boy by giving him a stone to sell in the hope that he will then bring more boys. This was strongly denied, however, by miners, owners and boys.

Interviews with mine owners were also revealing. A number of mine owners became friends throughout my stay and were surprisingly frank and open about employing children although they knew that I was working for the ILO which seeks to enforce the law banning the employment of children in the mines. Having said this, however, there is clearly no guarantee that I was not being told simply what informants thought that I wanted to hear.

Mine owners claim that there is *hamna faida* or no added value to using children as opposed to adult workers. Many argue that it is difficult to refuse to employ boys who come begging for work claiming that they have not eaten for many days and that they need money for school fees. I personally witnessed this on many occasions and, as discussed earlier, children often complain that mine owners will not employ them so they are obliged to engage in less profitable surface work. It is often argued by people who do not live in Mirerani that children are used by mine owners because they are small, nimble and rapid. One informant laughed when asked this, replying '*silazima kuenda haraka*', 'there is no need for speed'. Under new legislation, mines must have walkie talkie communications from outside to inside. There is therefore no need for 'quick children' to run around taking messages anymore. The only pits which don't have such technology are those which have not produced and those pits have no need of speed: '*hamna haraka, hamna production*'. This same mine owner argued that there fewer children work in pits now than before and most work on the surface. This contradicts research findings of my own which revealed that out of 100 children interviewed 63% go down the pits regularly with only 37% engaged in surface work alone. Those engaged in surface work are generally new arrivals who eventually find their way to the pits.

Interviews with another mine owner contradict the argument that mine owners employ children out of sympathy:

> I do not employ *nyokas* because it is against the law. It is not true that some mine owners employ children to help them because the children do useful errands for the owners, getting water, sodas and other things (mine owner, pers. comm.).

Again the findings refute a number of assumptions about mine owners who actively exploit child labourers because they are children. The situation is highly complex with owners having various motives for employing or not employing *nyokas*. Some mine owners refuse to employ children because there is no added value to employing them or because of the law whereas others employ children to help them out or because they will do work, such as running errands, that adult miners do not want to do. Conversations with *nyokas*, however, clearly revealed that in recent years it has been more and more difficult to get work in the pits. This could be because of the large numbers of adult miners fighting to get work, prepared to do any work necessary and providing better value for money because of their strength and endurance, or because many mine owners are not prepared to take the risk of employing *nyokas*. Time and time again boys expressed frustration with this:

> If you go down the mines you can one day make a lot of money and be rich, if you do sieving then you are just working for your food, nothing else. You cannot make good money (*nyoka*, pers. comm.).

As a rule Masai children do not engage in pit mining (only one child interviewed was Masai). Discussions with Masai elders revealed that this was because parents are strict with their children, refusing to allow them to go down the mines due to the dangers. Masai boys are also occupied with cattle rearing or school and therefore have no time to go to the mines. Elders did express concern that more children were wanting to go to the mines as it was seen as the only way of making money. This may be linked to the growing trend of Masai becoming mine owners as opposed to solely engaging in

brokering as they did previously. Masai children were also seen illegally sieving endings from Merelani Mining Ltd. (5.2) with their mothers[244].

Regarding income, all the children who have made money claim to have sent the money home, once they have bought themselves clothes[245]. It is then used to build houses for their parents or to start small businesses. This shows that children sustain kinship ties despite being far from their families:

> We believe that when you send something home to your parents you will be blessed. So everyone tries to help their parents. Or the child may have done a mistake, like staying away from home for a long time is a bad thing, so they may send money home so their parents don't think bad of them and so they don't get bad luck. You can buy a *kanga* (piece of fabric) for women or a blanket or coat and send food, sugar, meat, rice. (village resident, pers. comm.; gloss added).

This also refutes the common impression that children 'waste their money on motorbikes and fancy things'. This was not the case for any of the children I interviewed, although others may have done so. When asked what they thought of their work it was interesting to note that 62% said their work was '*nzuri*' or 'good', 5% said '*nzuri sana*' or 'very good' and only 24% said '*mbaya*' or 'bad'. This clearly conflicts with the paternalistic view of many international organisations who argue that mining work is clearly '*mbaya*' or 'hazardous and exploitative' for children. It must be noted, however, that when asked why the work was '*nzuri*' the majority said 'because of the money', though it has been seen that most do not make money. The hopes of getting rich are therefore the primary reason why the work is '*nzuri*' as well as that it provides a better alternative to life in their home village. It was interesting to note that it was not just those who had made money who said the work was '*nzuri*', as might have been expected. Even some of those who claimed to have found nothing liked the work. Of course, it could be argued that the children were telling me that the work was good in case I tried to expel them but those

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[244] Merelani Mining Ltd. has plans to formalise the procedures and give these women and children the endings to sieve and any stones found are to be sold back to the mine 'at a fair price'. To date, however, these plans remain rhetorical.

[245] Again, it would have been useful to conduct a tracer study to explore the extent to which money was sent home as well as it what it was used for.

that were interviewed did appear confident and not in the least afraid of me or of expressing themselves.

The answer to the next question: 'Do you think that children should be allowed to work in the mines?' appeared to contradict the previous finding that most interviewees said their work was '*nzuri*'. 71% said that children should not work in the mines despite having said that the work was '*nzuri*'. When questioned about this apparent contradiction, *nyokas* answered that the work was good for them because they had their own 'problems', which they primarily defined as the need for money, but that other children should not be allowed to work in the mines. The boys are therefore clearly aware of the gulf between the ideal childhood and their own experiences of it. A significant 29%, however, argued that children should be allowed to work in the mines if they want to. When asked at what ages children should be allowed to work there, most of the children divided their answers between surface mining and pit mining. An important 36% said that children under 18 should be allowed to work in the pits, in direct disagreement with international law. This is interesting as in the previous question only 29% said children should be allowed to work in the pits, which could relate to the fact that the previous question used the term 'children' as opposed to specifically referring to age. However, most said 18 should be the age limit for pit work with 14% saying it should be 20. Most also agreed that 18 should be the limit for surface work but 43% said the limit should be 16 for surface work. When asked why these ages were chosen common answers were that younger children should be at home helping their parents or at school (for further discussion on kin and domestic backgrounds, see 8.1.2.2). The choice of 18 is also interesting in that the majority of children did not know that international law specifies 18 as the minimum age for engaging in underground mining activities.

When then asked what they thought of the international law stating that children under 18 should not engage in labour such as underground mining (see ILO Convention 182, Chapters 2 and 3.4), 63% said that it was '*nzuri*' with 27% saying '*mbaya*' and that the limit should be lower and that children need to work as they have their 'own problems' and need money. When it came to aspirations for the future, expectations were very low compared to school going children interviewed. The most popular preferred occupation

was mining, with building a house and setting up a business next whereas school going children aspired to become teachers and civil servants, amongst other professions.

The interviews with *nyokas* thus appear to challenge several widely held views about child labour in the mining sector. Participatory research is thus an important tool for organisations such as the ILO if they are to base their work on the reality of children's lives rather than on assumptions. It was seen in the last chapter that one of the central issues for failure to translate vision into effective practice is the machinations of international bureaucracy in terms of the power-procedures-people dynamic. This chapter reveals that there is one more challenge: listening to children's voices and translating these voices into policy and practice. The findings of the Mirerani ethnography reveal a number of important questions that would need to be addressed if the ILO is to truly act in the best interests of the children. For example, the 'children' interviewed are more youths than 'children' with most between the ages of 14-16. Policy needs to accept this reality. Does the ILO really want to focus on this age group and if so should it not develop a strategy for tackling 'young people' specifically? Also what are the psychological implications for *nyokas* of the title 'children' when they repeatedly expressed their sense of pride in being a part of the mining community, of being 'men' as often expressed by the cry 'I am not a child, I am a man'?

Furthermore, over one third of *nyokas* had completed primary school and the work does not therefore interfere with their educational development, in terms of Universal Primary Education. For these children, work is the sensible option and they find it strange that they should be prevented from working when they have completed compulsory schooling. What can IPEC offer these young people in terms of alternatives, for example niche markets, such as lapidary training? Thirdly, 97% of children were not from Mirerani as originally assumed and there is a high mobility of boys with peaks around holidays, weekends, end of school year and droughts. This has important consequences for programming, implying a wider focus on prevention and cross-district/ region collaboration. Fourthly, one of the boys' primary complaints was that employers do not allow them to work down the pits as this is where the most profitable work is conducted. They are also guaranteed food, health provisions and a safer living environment than freelance surface miners. Does there therefore need to be a reassessment of the

definition of worst forms within each sector? Another issue is that the children do not suffer from 'inequitable' pay. None of the miners in Mirerani receive salaries. There is therefore a need to reconsider the issue of exploitation of children by virtue of the fact that they are children. This is a question of exploitation of all labourers in a context of poverty.

It is also important to recognise the children's support network, with peers and adult miners looking after those in need. How can these networks be built on instead of demonising those adult miners who may indeed be helping the children? Another consideration is the children's belief that they can make their fortune. Although the chance of this happening is slight the children believe that it is worth putting up with the difficult working environment. They believe it provides a better opportunity for 'making their own lives' than working in the *shamba* at home. The children send money back home which contributes to the local economy there and they seem to have an astute sense of investment, investing the money in worthwhile projects, contrary to popular belief. The question this raises for programming relates to the finding of attractive alternatives as well as the need to recognise the children's skills and contributions. When this is removed what are the alternatives for families? How else will children feel valuable?

In terms of information and awareness raising, over one third of interviewees said children under 18 should be allowed to work in the mines if they choose. Whilst this is not possible in a context of 182, more attention needs to be spent on informing children as to the rationale behind such policies as opposed to simple eviction. The priority needs identified by the children are: continuing with their education, either through the conventional education system or through vocational training, obtaining capital to set themselves up in business and money to buy food, shoes and clothes. This illustrates that they are well aware of the importance of investing in their future as well as of meeting their immediate needs. The need for capital for investment is one which needs to be considered further by programmers as is one that is rarely considered in programming.

This section has thus shown the importance of considering children's voices if programming is to be designed from their realities. In this way, children are more likely

to participate in programme implementation and their best interests are also more likely to be met.

8.1.2 The cultural construction of child work

Having examined the target group of IPEC intervention, 'child labourers in the Mirerani Tanzanite mines', it is appropriate to consider the work activities in which other children in Mirerani engage and how 'work' in general and 'child work' in particular are culturally constructed. While most children in the Tanzanite mines are migrants, not from Mirerani, I examine the constructions of work in Mirerani itself as it was not feasible to conduct ethnographic studies in the various parts of Tanzania from which they come. The wide range of informants from different ethnic backgrounds should, however, provide some form of representative sample. I also conducted participant observation with the children attending Mirerani primary school, as in theory these children are not engaging in one of the 'worst forms of child labour' and should therefore provide a useful comparison with the work activities of the *nyokas*.

8.1.2.1 'Work': Definition and Role

In contrast to the English language which distinguishes work from labour, in Kiswahili both work and labour are referred to as *kazi* and child labour is referred to as *kazi ya watoto*. In contrast to the expatriates with whom I worked in Dar Es Salaam, who defined work primarily in terms of self-fulfilment and the gaining of different experiences as well as in terms of financial reward, most informants[246] in Mirerani defined work in terms of survival and progress, as illustrated by some of the quotes below:

> *Kazi* is anything you do, cook chapatis and go to sell, carry water to sell, anything you do for money is kazi. What you do for nothing can also be kazi, for example, children who help in the home, they work hard for their family for nothing (female adult informant, pers. comm.).

[246] The responses from both men and women were similar. The majority of quotes are from women, however, as most of my time in the township, as opposed to the mines, was spent talking with women, who felt more comfortable approaching me.

Kazi is to get money to eat, to live everyday. (male child informant pers. comm.)

Kazi ni biashara. It is to bring up my children and to give them a good life. (female adult informant, pers. comm.)

Kazi is the work which makes me live, to give me a future and that I can get all my needs so that later I can get food, house, anything that can make me live. (male child informant, pers. comm.)

In Mirerani, work is therefore what people do, be they children or adults, in order to survive and to have a future[247]. Work is not defined in terms of pleasure or psychological self-fulfilment but as a responsibility. This contrasts to children interviewed in Britain by Mizen and Pole (2000) who were motivated to work by three themes: the ability of work to extend children's social networks, the need to gain independence and the desire for money to spend as desired.

Having provided some cultural definitions of work, it is important to consider the work of non-mining children. This may also help to shed light on why children migrate to the mines in search of work. Participant observation was therefore also conducted at Mirerani primary school. I sat in on classes, played with the children in breaks and often had conversations with children outside school. Interviews were conducted with pupils from standard three to seven, using participatory research tools[248]. Their purpose was to draw up a picture of the work they are involved in on a daily basis. Groups of six pupils were selected from each class with an even distribution of sexes. The Head-teacher was asked to make a random selection and he did this spontaneously by pointing to children sitting in the north, south, east, west and centre of the room.

After ice-breaking games and introductions, the children were asked to describe types of work done by school children at home and in school. They were also requested to describe types of work done by other children in Mirerani. During the pilot interview, it

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[247] *Kazi* is opposed to *kupumzika*, meaning 'to rest': '*Kupumzika* is doing what you are interested with which is not work, it can be watching television, playing football, going to the bar, visiting people. It is what you are not responsible for, what you do for pleasure' (male adult informant, pers. comm.)

[248] The headmaster felt that it was inappropriate to take standard 1 and 2 out of class as they were already under considerable time pressures with completing the syllabus.

became clear that children were uncomfortable using drawing to represent the work activities. I therefore gave each group the choice as to whether they preferred to represent the work through pictorial, oral or written methods. Standard 7 and 6 chose to write essays about their work activities whereas Standards 5, 4 and 3 chose to have a group discussion. The group were then asked to write each activity on a piece of card and to place these into piles according to whether or not they thought the work was '*zinazofaa*' 'suitable' or '*zisizofaa*' 'unsuitable' for children. They were then asked to place the cards according to suitable ages for each activity and were given time to discuss the placing of the cards and come to a consensus. At the end of the interview there was a groups discussion on how children who do unsuitable work could be assisted[249].

The main types of work conducted by these school children were: general cleaning of both home and school, fetching water, shopping, cooking, ironing, working on the farm, looking after cattle, planting trees, burning rubbish, collecting firewood and running errands for their parents and teachers. With regard to listing of activities they had seen other children in Mirerani conducting or which their friends conducted, the children were primarily referring to out of school children. The activities listed were: sieving sand for left over minerals, mining, begging, digging roads, fetching water for pay, selling small items, domestic work, collecting rubbish, washing vehicles and bicycles, selling stones, prostitution, loitering and stealing.

The school children identified work suitable for children (the suitable ages are indicated in brackets) as cleaning the compound at home and in school (age 10-12), cooking (14), washing clothes and utensils (10-14), fetching water (19-14), playing football (14-18)[250], errands for parents and teachers (12), ironing (12-14), studying (10), farm help (10-18), collecting firewood (10), planting flowers and arranging stones at school (8-12). Cards placed in the 'unsuitable work for children' pile included selling vegetables (14-16), mining (14-18), sieving sand (14-18), begging (10-12), stealing (12-18), loitering

[249] A wealth of data was collected, which would be worthy of at least a separate paper. Due to the constraints of this thesis I am only able to summarise the key findings here.

[250] This was interesting in that it was mentioned in three groups as a 'work' activity.

(12014), prostitution (18), working in hotel or bar (18), collecting rubbish for pay (10-14), washing cars/motorbikes/bicycles (14-18), working in a shop (18), digging roads (16), carrying water and farming for pay (14-18).

'Work' according to these definitions appears to include both paid and unpaid activities, within and outside the home. It is particularly interesting to note that the children did not mention activities conducted for teachers as work. When asked why this was so one informant told me; 'We must help the teachers because they help us to learn' (pers. comm.). Activities conducted for teachers include cleaning their houses in the evenings, fetching water and performing numerous other errands. Observation also revealed that children in school uniform were often to be seen during school hours shopping at the market, carrying very heavy containers of water and out on errands. When asked why they were not in school the children would answer that they were helping the teachers. Some children expressed pride in this activity and saw it as a privilege to be asked by the teacher to help. These were generally the older ones. Others, especially younger children, complained that it was very tiring to carry water and it made them late for school. The Minister of Education declared a ban on school based labour in 1996 and a circular letter was issued to all primary school authorities. The Government of Tanzania therefore considers school based labour to be detrimental to children even though most child informants seemed in favour of 'helping' their teachers during school hours.

Age plays a key role in determining work patterns in Mirerani. As the interviews with school going children indicate, the ages at which children engage in various forms of work are clearly set. They also differ from the ages children in Britain, for example, would be expected to engage in similar activities. For example, children in Mirerani are expected to engage in shopping and washing dishes from the age of 10. I suspect that most adults in Britain would not trust or want their children to engage in such activities at this age. As children get older, their work roles change. Those that attend school often find their work roles reduced with parents expecting them to focus on their schooling. Younger siblings therefore take over their tasks. Those who do not attend school are expected to contribute to the family income by working on the family farm, herding cattle or entering wage labour:

> Small children sweep the floor, wash pots and cups, fetch water in groups, between the ages of 5,6,7,8. After 10 they wash and iron their own clothes, they fetch firewood, go shopping, they can prepare tea and other foods. When they are big, 12 to 15, they can do everything, go to the farm, do gardening, everything. They can only start working for money when they are 18, 19 (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).

This informant is clearly expressing an ideal situation where children only start working for money at 18 or 19. All the children working for money in Mirerani, however, were far younger than 18 or 19.

Gender plays a clear role in determining work patterns with girls responsible for assisting their mothers in household duties or replacing their mothers when the latter are working outside the home, activities which are reproduced through the different generations, although the majority of homes in Mirerani employ house-girls who conduct most of the household chores[251]:

> All children are the same they can all work at home but girls work more than boys at home because girls will be *mamas* so they need to learn.(Female, adult informant, pers. comm.).

> Girls like to be with their mothers so they stay with the mothers to do mothers work, the boys can play making cars and sometimes following their fathers. (Female, adult informant, pers. comm.).

The one job boys and girls share is clothes' washing. All children are expected to wash their own clothes. Girls are also responsible for water and firewood collection; a labour intensive task in Mirerani where both are scarce. Boys' work consists of watering plants, looking after cattle and washing cars.

One woman who spent considerable time living with an Australian man, has different ideas, however, believing that her children should be brought up equally:

> I bring all my children up to do the same work whether they are girls or boys (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).

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[251] Housegirls are often overworked and underpaid, if paid at all. Child domestic labour is another example of a hazardous and exploitative labour activity for children but is not one that I am able to focus on here. See TAMWA (1996).

Regarding the role of kinship in determining work patterns, some informants felt that kinship was not relevant in Mirerani where most children are not living with their families (8.1.1):

> In Mirerani people do not live with their families, we have no kinship we are all survivors. The first born can command the younger children to work, they must do more work then. That is Africa. (male, adult informant, pers. comm.)

The last two sentences seem to refer to 'traditional' situations outside Mirerani and reveal that where children are within kin structures, kinship is an important determining factor. This is confirmed by other informants:

> Younger ones must do as they are told, they must fear grownups. Young sisters must do what older sisters tell them. (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).

Other informants argue that there are no set patterns of work within families:

> It depends on the family. Kind people do not make the difference, all the children do the same work. Sometimes one child refuses and other will do it. The personality of the child decides what work they do. My last born used to refuse to do any work so my second born would do everything. In others families, poor relatives are used as servants, treated badly, because they are poor, because they are giving them clothes and food they treat them as they like. (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).

The issue of ethnic group is also relevant:

> Kinship depends on tribal differences. With the Chagga, the first born normally takes care of the family. He is the head of the family, it can be a boy or a girl. The younger children must consult the first born if they want to do something. If the first born does not do well then the rest of the children will think they cannot do well. They follow their brothers and sisters. The last born male is responsible to take care of the family house and to look after the parents. He is not supposed to live away from there. Nowadays, sometimes they neglect this because maybe at the home there is nothing so they must go away to find money. Now most people go. Kinship is less important now than it used to be. (Male, adult informant, pers. comm.).

The changing socio-economic climate is therefore also important as it has led to a decline in traditional kinship patterns. Mirerani is a highly polygamous society, which I would argue also contributes to an increase in child labour:

> It is particular to Mirerani, in other towns people marry. When they come here men learn from men and go with many women. Men here they have a woman here, in Moshi, in Mombasa, everywhere. They do not know how to love, how to look after a woman. They just make children everywhere and then give no support. The wife works so hard but it is not enough, he must get more women. (Female, adult informant, pers. comm.)

Women are therefore left looking after the children but the father's income is not enough to support his many families. Often women are forced into prostitution, as one informant told me:

> Look around, nearly every woman in Mirerani has had to be a prostitute. It is our life. (Female, adult informant, pers. comm.)

Lack of income also means that children go to the mines to find money to support their mother and siblings. The fault cannot be entirely ascribed to the men, however. Many male informants argued that women only came to them for their money:

> Even the women themselves have many problems, they are after money, there is no real love here. If a man gets stones, many women come after him. She says build me a house, you do then when the money is finished the woman doesn't need me any more and she keeps the house and sends you away. (Adult, male informant, pers. comm.)

Having explored constructions of and motivations for work, it is useful to briefly explore the role of work in defining person-hood in Mirerani. According to Setel in his article on young men in Northern Tanzania (2000: 58):

> The labour activity with the highest social value is farming and the lowest is business (..) When I asked one woman what her brother did, she responded 'Oh, he doesn't work; he just does business'

The argument that farming has a higher social value than business is directly opposed to the views of Professor Murray (cited in Ndejembi 04.02.2000) who argues that in Africa farming is not considered to be a job, 'the most needed type of work has the lowest status in the social consciousness'. My experiences in Mirerani would also dispute Setel's argument. On a number of occasions, boys informed me that their mothers did not work, they just stayed in the *shamba* or farm, '*analima tu*' which means 'she only farms', reflecting the low value assigned to farming. Regarding aspirations, many

children wanted to set up their own businesses and when they did send money home it was for their parents to set up businesses. Many came to Mirerani to escape from the farming life where 'you have to work very hard for nothing' (*nyoka*, pers. comm.). It would thus appear that business is seen as a culturally superior form of work to farming. Most adult informants in Mirerani were mining to make money to set up their own businesses:

> Here you are much more respected if you are a business man or woman, dealing with gemstones. They respect the mining business more than any other business as all business here starts from the gemstone business. Farmers are not respected because they only have small farms selling maize and bean crops, they do not have big farms. (village resident, pers. comm.).

According to one informant the type of work you do does not define your personhood, the amount of money you make does:

> Here even if you work hard as hard as you can, if you are poor no-one will respect you. Even if a small boy makes a lot of money he is respected. If you are rich people will do anything for you, even wash your feet. Here people work hard and die but they don't care, they work hard to be rich, to be respected, to get the name, to buy cars, gold chains (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).

This was confirmed by several other informants:

> Here in Mirerani, people respect your work only if you have money, whether you are a teacher or a miner, even if you work so hard (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).

And only disputed by one:

> There is respect for teachers, they respect that work, people respect me much because I am a teacher. They respect me for teaching their children. I would disagree with her (above) because the respect I have got in this village is from teaching children. (female, adult informant, pers. comm.; gloss added)

In Mirerani, many people seem to work in order to get 'fast' money with which to buy into the Western life style (see 3.1), which has come to be seen as a mark of progress and social prestige, although many children do not spend their income on items such as motorbikes but send money home to their families (8.1.1). According to Khamsini (1978: 113):

> African miners spent their surpluses in the purchase of commodities such as bicycles, motor-cycles, lorries and cars. Ownership of these commodities was a significant symbol of their new economic power and of their new social status.

This observation is confirmed by one of my informants, referring to the situation in Mirerani:

> People here are not rich, they buy big things when they get money, like luxury cars to show off. Why buy these cars for here, for these roads you need a pickup to carry water or a tractor, not these cars, they just want to show off. (female, adult informant, pers. comm.)

Personhood in Mirerani is therefore defined by having money, as opposed to working hard. This money, however, must be used to help people:

> In Mirerani, if you have money and you have assets, a business, let's say a bus taking people to Arusha or a big shop, if people can see that you have a lot of money, or if you help people when they need money, then you will be known to everyone and everyone will say that is a good man. But if you have those things and you don't help people they do not respect you (miner, pers. comm.)

Money itself does not grant power and status, but the symbolic capital which it can be used to obtain does (Bourdieu 1977; 7.3.1). This cultural phenomenon is widespread in Tanzania and has led to resentment amongst the middle classes who feel that they should not have to support their most remote kin members and has even led to the situation where many informants in Dar Es Salaam said they did not want to return to the villages at Christmas because they would be approached by strangers asking for money and claiming to have kin ties with them. In terms of child labour, therefore, it becomes clear that it is important in Mirerani to have money as this is an important factor in defining personhood.

This section on work raises important issues for ILO programming. First of all work is defined in terms of survival and progress and any alternatives to labour must be able to address these concerns. Secondly, gender and age (see also Chapter 5) continue to play a central role in defining work allocation. Thirdly, it was revealed that the changing socio-economic climate has led to a decline in traditional kinship patterns which has not only affected the allocation of work according to kinship patterns but has also meant that

more children have sought work outside of kinship structures. Finally, personhood was also seen as being defined less by work activity than by the amount of money possessed which explains the desire of the children to earn cash as opposed to working on family farms with no financial reward.

8.1.2.2 'Child': Definition and Role

Having explored the cultural construction of 'work' in Mirerani, it is also useful to briefly explore the cultural construction of 'child'. We should first to remind ourselves of the introductory quote in 8.1.1, in which a journalist defines child miners as 'not real children'. Interviews were conducted with different groups of people in Mirerani in order to find out how they defined 'real children':

> In Mirerani, there is no age for a child, when a kid has strength to drive a motorbike or whatever they can work. (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).
>
> For us, a kid is one who goes to Kindergarten but here it is below 8, 10 after that you must work (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).
>
> A child is before the age of 9 or 12, after that they are adults working for their living (male informant, pers. comm.).
>
> A child is before the age of 15 (*nyoka*, pers. comm.).

In all but one case, therefore, 'child' is defined according to chronological age, a method of classification often attributed to 'Northern' constructions of childhood. One of the primary anthropological critiques of universal legislation based on 'Northern' constructions of childhood (3.1) is that such ideals of childhood accord ultimate importance to chronological age. Nieuwenhuys (1994), for example argues that anthropologists have long pointed to the many-sided aspects of age-classification systems and that age has a social and cultural rather than a biological meaning. It is argued that in non- 'Northern' societies such as Tanzania, cultural definitions of maturity may depend on passing through a series of initiation rites or attaining of stages of biological maturity rather than on chronological age (See Raum 1940; Omari & Mbilinyi 1997: 2). These quotes reveal, however, that Mirerani informants also define childhood according to chronological age. Such a vision cannot therefore be simply a 'Northern' construction but, as argued in Chapter 3, a 'dominant' vision of childhood.

One informant attempted to define childhood in terms of dependence, but was forced to distinguish between the ideal and the reality, as illustrated in the following excerpt:

> Informant: A child is a child, someone who is still dependent on their parents, who can't do anything without his parents.
>
> Me: But what of the *nyokas*, they are not dependent on their parents but are they still children?
>
> Informant: Yes they are children but they are children who do not have a choice.

This echoes the words of *nyokas* themselves (8.1.1) who argued that children should not work in the mines but that it was good for them as they had no alternatives.

Having illustrated local definitions of 'child' it is useful to explore the place occupied by the child in the socio-economic and cultural system in Mirerani. The economic value of children in Mirerani is paradoxical in that while children provide an important contribution to the economic development of the area, they themselves gain little in economic terms. In the words of one informant:

> Children are very valuable economically but they are not paid, they are not recognised. They sell stones, the child gets nothing, the system does. Some work as house-girls, prostitutes selling things. They have nothing to keep, they always give, what they have is little for eating but what they contribute is big. They cook and clean and look after their brothers and sisters, even the boys, when their parents go to work (pers. comm.).

This quote reveals the diverse ways in which children's work is valuable to the economic system. Children contribute to the mining economy through their work in the sector, providing stones for the market. Mine owners benefit economically from the labour of the children, as does the government in the form of taxes and royalties and local traders who benefit from any wealth generation. Children often sell the stones at prices well below the market value, again contributing to the local economy, with dealers and brokers making large profits from the children. Children also support the household economy. Their unpaid labour at home allows both parents to work. Furthermore, most children interviewed gave a significant proportion of their income to their parents. Other children in Mirerani also engage in employment, as domestic workers, petty traders and prostitutes. In this way they benefit their employers economically. This provides

ethnographic evidence for the statement in Chapter 5.1 that children make important contributions to both national and household economies through their work. The fact that the value of their contributions is ignored has detrimental consequences in that they remain in a weak bargaining position and are unequal within generational structures, not just in the household, but in the work place and in wider society. This in turn leaves them more vulnerable to exploitation[252].

In terms of their socio-cultural role, children in Mirerani are often seen to be of negative value, as seen by the relatively high rate of child abandonment. During my time in Mirerani, there were frequent cases of children being abandoned. Although no figures are available, this issue came up regularly with informants, as indicated in the quote below which is also a useful illustration of the implications for many women of having children:

> Here having a baby is the beginning of prostitution and death. If you need to feed your baby and a man asks you to bed you must and maybe he has AIDS. If a girl comes to Mirerani to be a house-girl she must be careful, most of the men here are bad. They like their babies but they can't keep them so they must throw them away, you can't blame them. They can get pregnant without knowing who the father is, that is why they throw them away. (female adult informant, pers. comm.)

Children can therefore be seen as a burden: conceived by fathers who then abandon them which may lead to the mother being forced into prostitution in order to feed her child which in turn may lead to further pregnancies or even to AIDS. Where informants did place a value on children, this was mainly seen in terms of long-term gain, as the child would be expected to support the parents in later life:

> A child is a gift who will help you when they grow up (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).

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252 It could also help explain White's (1994: 849) comment that although children are not the only group who are vulnerable to exploitation in the labour market they are the only one of all the other structurally disadvantaged groups whose exploitation is addressed by attempts to remove them from the labour market. Perhaps if the true value of their work was ignored it would not be so easy to argue for their removal from the workplace.

> Children will look after you when you are old, help you if you need help. Children in Tanzania have a duty to take care of their parents when they are old. (male, adult informant, pers. comm.)
>
> In Mirerani, a child is a profit for later life, *tegemezi la badai.* They will help you (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).
>
> For me children must be taken to school, then they will be valuable. There they study many things, they study life so that they can help themselves later even without their parents. (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).

A male perspective reveals the value of having a child in terms of the respect it affords to the parents:

> I like children, I wanted children and was ready for one. For me to have a child you get respect because you have responsibilities to look after your child. You change your life from bachelorhood to be a man with responsibilities (young miner, pers. comm.).

Value is also gender-differentiated:

> No value, no there is a value, let me tell you about it. There is a value, mostly for boys, as we depend on them to get stones for Mama and build houses for them, so there is a value for the boys but for the girls there is no value. When you give birth to a boy they say you have *wanapollo, wanapollo* (miner) and celebrate but when I gave birth to my girl, nothing. (female, adult informant, pers. comm.; gloss added)

It is also useful to consider the position of the child within the social hierarchy in Mirerani. I would argue that the 'traditional' position of the child has changed dramatically in recent years. Many children have decided to take their future into their own hands, migrating away from their homes, where more 'traditional' kinship and social hierarchical patterns oppress them or do not provide their perceived needs. As one adult informant tells us, life for children living with their kin in the township is difficult, illustrating perhaps why many children are choosing alternative and 'independent'[253] lifestyles (8.1.1):

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[253] Independence is not a straight forward concept, however, as many children become involved in alternative dependence or support structures with adult miners, or gangs of children and young people, when they arrive in Mirerani.

> They have no say really, they are beaten for nothing. There is nothing for children here, no games, they build and forget the children. They just build houses for grownups, there are no spaces for children to play so they learn ugly things, there is no-one to entertain them. Before, grandparents and their friends would tell stories in the evening, now no-one tells stories. Children are not allowed to choose their work. They receive orders only, they are like slaves, they do not give ideas or say no. Everyone orders them, not just the boss. (Female, adult informant, pers. comm.)
>
> The child here have no rights to say yes or no when there is a command from elders.(Male, adult informant, pers. comm.)
>
> Children are not allowed to decide matters themselves, they are not consulted to share their opinions, generally they make decisions when they get money and their parents have not much to say. (Female, adult informant, pers. comm.).

This perspective is not shared by all, however, illustrating once more the impossibility of coming to any generalised statement about child rearing and child work in Mirerani:

> Children sometimes have good ideas, you need to listen to them and learn from them. I don't know about other families in Mirerani but many families in Machame, where I am from, people sit with their children and listen to them and them compare ideas (Female, adult informant)[254].

The changing cultural constructions of childhood are also important. To understand why more and more children seem to be engaging in labour (Chapters 5 and 8.1.1), it was important to ask Mirerani residents what they felt were the reasons for the increase in child labour. One informant argued that it is the children themselves who have changed through their adoption of a new culture:

> The children have changed, they no longer follow local, tribal culture but all follow one culture 'tv culture'. They have a different culture to their parents, a culture common to all children. You cannot stop it. Children do not rush home after school to help their parents anymore. They wander around looking for stones everywhere they are. They want nice clothes, school bags, good things. The parents don't complain as their children bring money (Male, adult elder, pers. comm.).

[254] I did not myself witness any forms of punishment although children told me that caning at school was common.

Placing the blame on the children, however, is clearly too simple. There is also a perceived cultural shift, to more individualistic values:

> People are more individualistic now, there is no sense of *Ujamaa*. They want to do things themselves which is good, before people were being driven. *Ujamaa* is now dead. It was driven, it was Chinese socialism not African. The notion of community never existed. Before tribes had one thing in common. If they wanted to build a house, plow a field, they would make *pombe* (local brew) for everyone and everyone would then help you for one day (Male, adult, ex govt official, pers. comm.).

It is interesting that the above informant does not idealise the past as a time of 'community'. He argues that people worked together out of necessity. The contemporary economic climate, however, is increasingly individualistic and working together is perceived to be less important than before.

Growing poverty, declining education levels and rising divorce rates (Chapter 5) are also seen by many to be important in driving children to engage in labour:

> Poverty, there is more poverty now than before, I have seen it myself, there is no money (..) Some children run away from their mothers and fathers because they are poor, there is no money for school, divorced families, I don't know. Even we people have changed. Before mothers would fight to look after their children, now there is also AIDS disease, now they also let children look for their own food. So many women get divorced, become brokers and if there are no stones they go with men to feed their children, to buy gold earrings and things. There is more prostitution than before (...) TV and videos have brought bad things too, they think even fiction is the right thing, they believe everything (village resident and business woman, pers. comm.).

This section has revealed the diversity of 'childhoods' in Mirerani in terms of cultural constructions and expectations and has complemented the other ethnographic evidence regarding 'work' and 'child labour'. What is most striking is the high degree of change which is currently occurring in terms of the roles of parents and of children. This evidence supports the findings in Chapters 5 and 3. Growing poverty, the decreasing quality and increasing costs of education, the need for cash to purchase consumer items, urbanisation and family breakdown have all led to a situation where more and more children are engaging in labour that would have been considered unsuitable a few years ago.

8.2 Conclusions

This chapter has been revealing of a number of issues. Participatory research conducted with the children highlighted a number of flaws with the common assumptions surrounding 'child labour'. When I raised this with the ILO in Geneva, I was confronted with the question: 'Do you think that we should just do everything that children tell us to do?'. My answer to this is 'No'. While children clearly have expertise, we must question whether their recommendations are feasible or realistic, just as with any group of stakeholders (for a useful study on the benefits of child participation to project effectiveness see Phillips 2000). We should always try to obtain the broadest possible understanding before engaging in any action and should include all stakeholders within the process. The participation of children is therefore essential in challenging our assumptions (as shown in 8.1.1), but as no-one lives in a void, participation of other stakeholders is also important in order to develop more appropriate and holistic action. In this chapter, data collected from other stakeholders was extremely valuable in illustrating the wider structures within which child labour operates.

Child labour in Mirerani is a clear result of the changing historical, socio-economic, political and cultural context in Tanzania. Placing child labour within this context illustrates the complexity of attempting to tackle the phenomenon and could help to explain why so many Organisations choose to work with the disembodied, theoretical and universal child. To contextualise action on the basis of the individual circumstances of each child would clearly be impossible and would lead to even more stagnation than was observed in Chapter 7. It is important, however, for children to become more visible within the development and practice of intervention programmes. Children are not objects of intervention but active and critical subjects. The alternatives provided by intervention must at least match the perceived advantages of the labour in which the child is engaging. It is useful to liken Tanzanite mining to a gambling addiction, the possibility of winning and of making a fortune clouds the low probability of this actually taking place. Added to this is the real need for money: to pay for schooling, for food or for a chosen lifestyle. Placed together these two factors make successful intervention extremely difficult, although this in no way justifies the comedy of errors outlined in the

previous chapter. With most of the Organisations' resources spent on power plays, procedural problems and people issues, there is little time to consider the children themselves and how best to develop appropriate policy and action. The balance clearly needs to be redressed if the best interests of the children are ever to be met.

9. Conclusions

> The kind of complexity that ethnography highlights also gives good reason to be cautious of simple prescriptive recipes; and rather than aping much current practice, I think that anthropologists should be bolder in arguing for the potential helpfulness of their perspectives. (...) Not just highlight 'how things are' but also, crucially, 'how they might be otherwise' (MacDonald 2001: 93-94).

And so we come to the final chapter of the study. This thesis is the completion of a personal and therefore subjective journey. Objectivity is an elusive concept, especially for the anthropologist whose ethnography can only be based on a personal interpretation of events, despite our best attempts at objectivity. I have therefore taken you along the path which I chose to take, selecting the different signposts as I went along, in order to illustrate not just 'how things are' but also 'how they might be otherwise'. The reader will of course take from this study his or her own interpretations and perhaps even use them in their own path.

The journey started with two hypotheses: Firstly, that the ILO does not export and impose a 'Northern construction of childhood', as expounded by Boyden and others. This hypothesis has been confirmed and it was shown that the vision of childhood used by the ILO is based on a complex process of negotiation and re-negotiation between different groups representing different countries and different interests. Evidence from fieldwork confirmed my second hypothesis that it is not a particular vision or 'construction' of childhood which is responsible for failure to translate good intentions into successful programme implementation but specific bureaucratic procedures, power relations and human failings within the machinations of international bureaucracies.

It is perhaps time to take a step back from the ethnography itself and to place the two central hypotheses into a wider context by considering how these findings contribute to wider anthropological debates, knowledge and practice.

1. The ILO does not export and impose a 'Northern construction of childhood'.

Chapters 2 and 3 attempted to address the complex questions around the first hypothesis and showed that while the anti-child labour campaigns originated in the nineteenth century, the ILO itself was born almost a century and a half later, primarily out of post-war Europe, representing the first concerted international effort to provide workers, including children, with labour rights. Since then there has been a proliferation of similar initiatives, taken under the auspices of the United Nations, which aim to ensure that the fruits of 'development' can be shared by all. To date, however, these fruits continue to be enjoyed by a narrowing minority. Commentators have focused blame on a number of issues and with regard to child labour, one of the central criticisms has been the inappropriate 'vision' being promoted by the likes of the ILO.

Chapter 3 revealed that the stereotypes often employed to describe international development organisations are outdated and the situation is currently far more complex than a 'conspiracy' of white colonialists aiming to sustain a particular system and to promote a 'Northern construction of childhood'. I have revealed that there is no one vision as to 'the child labourer' but a number of ideals towards which the ILO and its members, be they governments, workers or employers, are fighting. Flexibility is central to current legislation and this flexibility gives us reason for hope. I suggest it is time to drop the stereotype of the Organisation as a monolithic, dehumanised and 'Northern' institution seeking to impose one vision onto the rest of the world. Following Gardner and Lewis (2000: 16), my ethnographic evidence revealed the need to recognise the importance of individual agency in the development of policy and practice as well as the power dynamics which occur when those with different ideas and backgrounds come together to find a common goal with flexible implementation strategies.

I suggest in Chapter 3 that it is important to recognise alternative 'visions' to which child labourers are subject. In addition to the vision that children should not work in particular conditions, child labourers are subject to the promotion of a far more powerful and destructive vision: the American inspired capitalist dream, visible in the smiling faces of happy children on the Coca-Cola boards which take pride of place in almost all public spaces in Tanzania. To obtain the cash to engage in the 'Coca-Cola' dream children *must* work, no matter what the circumstances. One of my primary conclusions is therefore that it is essential to place child labour within the much wider context of the globalisation of capitalism. The theoretical implications of this finding can be grouped into three areas.

Firstly, it is fundamental for development agencies such as the ILO and DFID to recognise the fact that they are extremely small fish swimming against the global capitalist tide, which has promoted reductions in public expenditures while tying the economies of poor countries to a global system which promotes the survival of the fittest. In a system where money is power, it is perhaps useful to remember that the United Nations only employs one third of the staff of McDonalds and has a total budget equivalent to five weeks British alcohol consumption. Only through recognition of these limited resources can pressure be brought upon richer nations to meet the UN aim of 0.7% of GNP to be spent on development initiatives.

Secondly, it is time to move out of the impasse caused by the right to work v. the right not to work distinction, discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, or what Lavalette and Cunningham (2001) term the liberationists v. protectionists distinction (Chapter 3) and recognise the limited value of both these approaches in the wider global economic system (Lavalette and Cunningham 2001). Protectionists, including groups such as Trade Unions and the ILO, argue that children have the right not to work, whereas liberationists, including writers such as Boyden and NGOs such as Save the Children Fund, argue that children have the right to work. These two groups have become increasingly polarised, each accusing the other of taking more extreme positions than either does in reality. 'Protectionists' do allow for children to work in certain conditions and 'liberationists' do try to protect children working in extreme conditions.

Lavalette and Cunningham (2001) point out the irony that these two groups are in fact working on an identical premise: that child labour can be dealt with in isolation from the wider social totality. Child labour, they argue in their seminal paper, must be seen as one of many symptoms of a global capitalist system which has seen the development of the inter-related issues of poverty, debt and growing global inequality. The authors suggest that the liberationist perspective is a pessimistic one which assumes that the problems leading to child labour are insurmountable and that through arguing for the right to work, the bigger picture of a global capitalist system which means that children *must* work, never mind choose to work, is lost. Choice, I would argue, is the clear issue here and is above that of the right to v. right not to work polemic. The vast majority of the *nyokas* with whom I worked had no choice as to whether or not they should work, although they did have a limited choice as to the type of work they engaged in, be it underground or surface mining or other forms of work. The concept of 'Rights' in this case was therefore largely hypothetical.

Lavalette and Cunningham (2001) also argue that the emphasis put by the protectionists on international agreement and social clauses has failed, since child labour exploitation is increasing due to factors such as labour market de-regulation and structural adjustment policies. In other words, while legislation could theoretically prevent child labour within an appropriate economic context, the wider system means that factors such as poverty, overburdened and under funded education systems, and the global consumer market are forcing more and more children into the labour market, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 8. Legislation therefore does not tackle the factors leading to child labour nor does the 'cultural relativist' argument of the liberationists. Lavalette and Cunningham do not propose a 'ready-made' answer but they do give us an alternative way forward, out of the theoretical and practical impasse within which liberationists and protectionists have found themselves, by forcing us to consider the bigger picture, rather than taking child labour in isolation: 'By asking the larger questions, by linking the single issue (here child labour) to other campaigns, the commonality of inequality and oppression under global capitalism shines through' (2001: 13). My research findings would support such an approach as I found the protectionist- liberationist divide particularly unhelpful in moving forward my theoretical and practical understanding not only of what makes children labour but also how to develop appropriate policy and practice. Seeing child

labour within the wider context of global inequality allows us to move beyond the focus on finding the cure for one isolated symptom and to develop a more holistic and long term prevention policy.

This leads us to a related factor also discarded by the protectionist and liberationist camps: the fact that children only remain children for a short while and therefore a more encompassing long-term poverty alleviation strategy is required. After 'childhood', most child labourers join the swelling ranks of other categories such as 'poor', 'marginalised', 'unemployed', 'underemployed', 'socially excluded'. Child labour must therefore be seen within the wider system leading to poverty or we may well find ourselves proudly advocating the fact that we have reduced 'child labour' while facing ever increasing numbers of 'poor', 'marginalised', 'unemployed', 'underemployed', 'socially excluded' 18, 19, 20 year olds.

The third theoretical implication of the answer to the first hypothesis relates to Gupta and Ferguson's (1997b: 50) argument that 'we need to theorize how space is being *re*territorialised in the contemporary world'. It is no longer appropriate to depend on physical location, i.e. North, South, Tanzania, England, as the only grid upon which to map cultural difference. Instead Gupta and Ferguson argue that we need 'multiple grids that enable us to see that connection and contiguity - more generally the representation of territory- vary considerably by factors such as class, gender, race, and sexuality, and are differentially available to those in different locations in the field of power' (Ibid.). My research enables us to consider these multiple grids more clearly and illustrates the extent to which anthropology is faced with an important challenge to its traditional 'culture as spatially bound' approach. It was seen in Chapter 3, that the 'distance' between Coca-Cola culture promoters in Tanzania and those in London or New York can be much shorter in terms of business interests than between the child labour activist and the business man in Dar Es Salaam, despite the fact that externally these would be viewed as living within the same cultural grid, i.e. 'Tanzanian culture'. By adopting a multiple grid perspective, we can see that certain factors may link Tanzanians territorially or in terms of language or religion for example but other factors, such as particular value systems, may link Tanzanian and British child labour activists in an alternative manner. For this and other reasons discussed in Chapter 3, I therefore argue that it is important to

abandon the cultural argument of North v. South constructions of child labour altogether and to consider alternatives to spatially bound distinctions, such as ideology. Social movements have themselves taken this issue on board, as revealed by the recent wave of anti-capitalist protests which have seen Mexican Zapatistas, Liverpool dockers, Phillipino workers, Canadian students, European road protesters, Argentinian teachers, Brazilian landless peasants and many other groups united within a similar ideological grid despite their spatially determined 'cultural' distance. The challenge for anthropology is to take this ideologically, rather than territorially, determined culture on board and to attempt to place this within the context of a globalising world, which sees one particular economic system determining the mutual future of very distinct groups of people.

2. **It is not a particular vision or 'construction' of childhood which is responsible for failure to translate good intentions into successful programme implementation but specific bureaucratic procedures, power relations and human failings within the machinations of international bureaucracies.**

The second hypothesis was far harder to prove. The Mirerani case study in Chapter 7 provided one example of how good intentions can fail to live up to expectations. The many factors which could lead to programme success or failure were grouped into three categories: Power, Procedures and People. It was shown that bureaucratic procedures, inappropriate use of power and the playing down of 'people' issues have led to a situation where the needs of child labourers have fallen by the wayside, even though resources are claimed in their name. While it would clearly be impossible for a public organisation to abandon procedures altogether, for power only to be used in positive and altruistic ways and for people to no longer manifest human failures, I would argue that a number of steps can and must be taken if we are to move forward in a world which is becoming increasingly cynical and individualistic. With falling aid budgets and aid apathy on the one hand and an ever-increasing divide between rich and poor on the other, Organisations such as the ILO must be prepared to look deep into themselves in order to move forward.

As shown below (Box 9), People are at the centre of what I have termed 'The People- Procedures- Power Dynamic'. People[255] create the Procedures as well as the Power relations. I therefore argue that it is important to 're-embody/ re-humanise' the Organisation and remember that people have created the procedures which have become so problematic and people have created the power relations leading to the marginalisation of child labourers and the activists fighting to improve their lives. I suggest that such a recognition provides an enlightening perspective, taking us down the Foucauldian line (1977), which sees power as not just repressive but productive. Resistance can lead to change and therefore people who work within and outside organisations such as the ILO can work for change. It is all too simple to criticise over dinner or coffee but People created the system and it is therefore People who need to change it to make it more effective in reaching its target of providing children with an alternative to labour. While this may seem like stating the obvious, the obvious does sometimes need to be stated and all my evidence suggests that this has yet to be done in the ILO and many other development organisations.

Box: 9. The People - Procedures - Power Dynamic



[255] When I use the term 'People' in this context I am referring not only to individual behaviour but to the impact of social relations between different individuals and groups of individuals upon organisational behaviour.

In terms of 'Power', it was shown that policy in the ILO, as in other agencies, is developed through complex and lengthy processes, although it is important to remember that the ILO is more representative than many other United Nations agencies due to its tripartite structure and policy-making and therefore involves even more complex negotiations. Different interest groups have different claims, each attempting to use their power and resources to gain the best possible outcome. Chapter 6 revealed the dangers of using terms such as 'top-down' and 'imposed', in the context of North-South relations, which serve only to over-simplify a complex situation. The 'top' itself is varied and context dependent. IPEC may be the 'top' vis-à-vis government officials in Tanzania, but the government and other élites in turn represent the top to their own citizens. It is perhaps more relevant to refer to Chamber's (1997) concept of 'Uppers' and 'Lowers' (6.1.1), when referring to power relations. This takes us back to our conclusion to the first hypothesis in this Chapter regarding the importance of recognising alternative grids to conventional distinctions based on spatially determined location. If we take Chambers' concept of 'Uppers' and 'Lowers' we can place the business men in Tanzania and Britain within one grid and the child labour activists and others who campaign from similar perspectives in another. The employer groups within the ILO probably have more in common with each other in terms of their shared search for profit than with the trade unionists within their own countries, for example[256]. Power, as well as ideology, as opposed to spatial distinction, are therefore central to determining the grid in which many people are found.

In terms of 'Procedures', an important conclusion relates to flexibility. My research has shown that while large, public organisations need to retain a certain degree of bureaucratic control in order to ensure that projects are managed in a quantifiable and financially accountable manner, it is important to ensure that fulfilling procedures does not become the end in itself. While such an approach may allow for detachment from the nitty-gritty, complex and emotional aspects of 'real life', it is important not to separate

[256] This of course is not to deny that different groups will share other commonalities by virtue of the fact that they are holders of the same nationality, religion, language etc.

the project or programme from the wider social realities, as was the case in this study where the child labourers themselves became almost invisible within the intervention development process.

One way of avoiding such a problem would be to improve evaluation systems. Evaluation is a part of the project cycle which is often neglected (6.3.4). Development of effective evaluation systems will facilitate greater continuity in projects that do work and create a system which allows for improved organisational learning and space for reflection. The adoption of a more processual approach to learning would also provide staff with the tools to consider 'bandwagon' ideas more effectively and avoid a situation where many good projects are dropped without being given adequate time to establish themselves. The challenge would be to ensure that process evaluation does not just become another bureaucratic hurdle but an effective tool for improved practice. This of course would involve recognising the fact that development takes time. Time, however, is one thing that public organisations, dependent on fixed parliamentary terms, do not have. For this reason, International Conventions are useful as they commit nation states, whoever is in power, although, of course different governments may choose to invest more or less or may even opt out altogether. It is also important to recognise that countries such as Tanzania are implicated in a global system which is highly dynamic and very different from that within which most 'developed' countries developed. It is therefore important to allow for innovative approaches to development and not to rely on previous models which may have served in a previous system but which are too rigid for the needs of this century.

Part of the new global order has been an increase in the visibility and networking of social movements, largely influenced by improvements in physical and electronic communication and the recognition that events in one part of the world impact on other parts. People are now expressing their desire to take part in the shaping of their own lives in a more organised and concerted fashion. Development initiatives have started to take this on board, with growing emphasis on 'participation' and 'ownership' but, as we saw, this is often more rhetorical than practical. Accountability and reporting should therefore be a two-way process. 'Clients' should be involved in developing success indicators and should be able to evaluate the work of the agencies themselves. Although

it is important to recognise the importance of public accountability to the taxpayers in donor countries, it is as important to consider downward accountability to the 'clients'. This would establish a greater system of trust and mutual respect and help overcome the 'gift giving' approach to development and would ensure that if projects are dropped the agencies have some responsibility towards the community to at least explain their actions.

It is now time to return to the central component of the diagram: People. Chapters 4 and 6 revealed the multiple discourses and practices of those responsible for implementing the ILO 'visions' at headquarters in Geneva in an attempt to explore what lies under the apparently rigid and 'de-humanised' organisational structures. It was shown that although the ILO portrays itself as a 'de-humanised' entity which functions in a rational, non-emotional and mechanical way it does in fact constitute a multi-dimensional body of thought and practice which functions according to the various interactions between staff and the outside world as well as among staff within the Organisation.

In recognition of the importance of 'people' issues it is important for organisations such as the ILO to transform procedures for appointing people, as the private sector has been obliged to do. There is a need to adopt a new management discourse, to move from autocratic managers to facilitators, as shown by the growing importance of Emotional Intelligence as a management skill (Chapter 4). Although it is important to recognise the different responsibilities of the public sector as opposed to the private, as outlined in Chapter 7, this does not mean that there is no scope for a new management style. Innovation and flexibility should be rewarded rather than penalised, often the case with the rigidity of annual performance plans (7.3.3). Ironically, in this case study the manager with the most 'bureaucratic' form of management was in fact the most flexible, which reflects that it is not enough to simply change the procedures. What is needed is a combination of more flexible procedures implemented by a more flexible and open management, prepared to listen to and act on the experiences of those on the ground rather than merely jumping to be at the head of the next bandwagon in order to gain promotion. While there are signs that this is happening, normative commitment must also be built and sustained through more effective and influential 'human resource' strategies. In the current system, staff who start out with good intentions may become

trapped within a particular promotion system requiring them to adopt particular traits in order to obtain promotion. As facilitators, managers should be able to consider the problems of field staff and rely on their experience to improve impact as opposed to imposing top-down decisions often made by those who have been away from the field for a long time.

It is also important to recognise and make clear the realities of staff lives. The political commitment of people may differ according to their life stage. Many informants, for example, described how they were less prepared to follow through with their commitment to working in communities when they had small children who need access to health and education. It is important to recognise that people are not machines and have ambitions and needs which fall outside of their work. In fact as one commentator on an early draft of my thesis pointed out: 'It is a miracle that anything gets done at all and that a proportion of staff continue to be engaged despite their having to deal with a whole set of conflicts, from budgets, to politics and cultural norms!'

Another important 'people' issue which came through in this study was that of cultural differences regarding expectations and what is meant by concepts such as 'participation' and 'empowerment'. People's evaluations of impact may differ depending on their initial expectations. For example, I felt that the Mirerani experience was extremely negative with no impact on children themselves. People in Mirerani, however, expressed what a positive experience theirs had been and that they really felt that they now had the power to make a difference. In terms of awareness raising, there had therefore been a strong impact which then allowed for the creation of space for local initiatives to develop. 'Failure' or 'success' is therefore in the eye of the beholder. With time, the awareness raising may have a far stronger impact than a project designed by outside initiative in that it allows for local initiatives to gain legitimacy and for locally determined action[257]. Another example, was the way in which staff related to management, with non-Tanzanians considering a certain management style as not participatory whereas Tanzanians considered the style to be extremely participatory and empowering. This is

[257] A lesson could be gained here from the experiences of the women's movement. Although a number of local initiatives may have failed, the overall result has been one of immense success.

an important factor to note as many management and development texts convey the impression that there is one particular format that can be used in any context. This thesis shows that meaning is injected locally.

To the initial two hypotheses, I should have perhaps added a third: Children themselves are invisible within policy and programme implementation. My failure to do so reflects my naive assumption that, although I did not expect children to play a direct role in policy development, I did assume that the reality of their situations would remain a primary consideration in implementation. Instead, I found that children themselves become almost irrelevant in the process. In Chapter 8, I argued that the complexity of the child labour phenomenon could help to explain why so many Organisations choose to work with the disembodied, theoretical and universal child. To contextualise action on the basis of the individual circumstances of each child would clearly be impossible and could lead to even more stagnation than was observed in Chapter 7. It is important, however, for children to become more visible within the development and practice of intervention programmes. Children are not objects of intervention but active and critical subjects. With most of the Organisations' resources spent on power plays, procedural problems and people issues, there is little time to consider the children themselves and how best to develop appropriate policy and action. The balance clearly needs to be redressed if the funding raised in their name is ever to reach them.

This final chapter has thus attempted to take the findings of this thesis one step further and to not merely state 'how things are' but to consider 'how things might be otherwise'. It is hoped that such findings are not seen as just another post-hoc development critique, something which has become 'a kind of anthropological speciality' (Ferguson 1997: 165), but as a genuine attempt to consider how anthropological understandings of development initiatives can be improved and consequently of how development practice can become more effective, particularly with regard to child labour intervention. Arguing for a recognition of complexity and context-dependent programming should not give rise to feelings of hopelessness but to feelings of empowerment, in the truest sense.

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Appendix
The Discovery of Tanzanite: A historical analysis

The exact dates of the finding of the first Tanzanite stone are disputed. One man, whom I shall call *Samuel*, was a valuable informant as he was one of the first inhabitants of the Mirerani township, arriving in 1961, and later became village leader for a number of years. Between 1961 and 1965 he worked on the neighbouring sisal plantation. During this time, the *Wandorobo*, a tribe indigeneous to Northern Tanzania (Mercer 1993), had been finding gemstones on the ground and were selling them to visiting *wazungus* who returned and started to survey the area for gemstones. In 1967, the new government closed the large plantations as part of its nationalisation programme, as laid down in the Arusha declaration:

> The way to build and maintain socialism is to ensure that the major means of production are under the control and ownership of the peasants and workers themselves through the government (Arusha Declaration 1967 cited in Kimambo 1984: 67).

The plantation employees were obliged to seek alternative employment and some started to buy stones from the *Wandorobo* and to sell them at a profit. The same source revealed that the first person to start organised mining was a Tanzanian, Ali Juawatu in 1967. Soon after he started an Indian businessman, Manuel D'Souza, started to mine, followed by two Greek men, George Papanicolaus and George Sakris.

This version is disputed by another pioneer who arrived to the village in 1970 and became an important political figure as well as a key representative of the Muslim community. He claims that Ali Juawatu was gamehunting with his porters, who were

Wandorobo. One night the porters were digging a hole for the campfire and discovered shiny stones which they showed to Juawatu. Juawatu showed these to his friend, a Goan named D'Souza, who took them to Kenya to try to sell them. They eventually found their way to America through a Greek man named Papanicolaus, where they were valued and identified as being blue zoisite. Juawatu, D'Souza and Papanicolaus thus started mining the area seriously, with the first prospecting right granted to Juawatu.

Masai history reveals a different story again, claiming that the first person seen mining was a *mzungu* who came to the area in 1954 but left after a year and never returned, 'leaving big holes in the ground' (Masai informant, pers. comm.). According to my informant, a Masai elder born in 1903 in a nearby Masai village, the Masai then copied his activities and that is how the *Wandorobo* eventually found the stones which they showed to Juawatu. This version is denied by townspeople, one of whom maintained that the 'Masai don't know anything' and that 'that is just a story', revealing again the conflict between the different groups of people seeking to use the land. The Masai do not claim, however, that this *mzungu* was the first to find Tanzanite, just that he was the first person seen to be mining in the area.

There is also little consensus amongst authors of texts on Tanzanite. Keller, for example, claims that Tanzanite was first discovered by D'Souza and does not refer to Juawatu at all (Keller 1992: 66-67) whereas another text, by a Tanzanian author, maintains that D'Souza was accompanied by another man, Mayaya (Kimambo 1984: 205). Neither Keller nor Kimambo reveal their sources but Kimambo does introduce a new element to the oral histories given; a certain D. Mayaya. In view of the conflicting evidence, a focus group discussion was held with 5 informants from the township. These comprised of three of the first residents to the area and two more recent arrivals. Unfortunately, no Masai were present due to logistical difficulties, primarily the distance between the Masai villages and the township. There was eventually a consensus that the first person was not in fact Juawatu as commonly stated in oral accounts but an old man, of 70 years of age, named Daudi Mayaya. Mayaya was being funded by D'Souza but laid his own claim in 1967. Kimambo's text (1984, see also Chachage 1995: 65) and subsequent interviews with the Zonal Mining Office (ZMO) confirmed this version. According to

the ZMO, the first person to register a claim to mine Tanzanite was indeed Mayaya. Unfortunately, the Office has no written records to confirm this, although it is interesting how Mayaya has been so easily omitted from the commonly accepted oral history. When questioned, informants said that it was because he was an old man and he did not mine for long. Others said that although Mayaya's was the first legal claim, Juawatu was still the first person to start mining Tanzanite unofficially. The focus group discussion then revealed that a sample of the stone was sent to Germany by a *mzungu* called Wolfgang, where it was identified as *zoisite.*

Juawatu's first wife provides yet another version. She claims that Juawatu was the one who brought D'Souza, Papanikolaus, Mayaya and others and it was a hunter from the *Wakamba* tribe, not the *Wandorobo*, who showed him the stone. According to Juawatu's wife, Daudi Mayaya was in fact called Peter Yaya, a good friend of Juawatu's who encouraged him not to give the licence claim to Papanikolaus but to get it under his own name. Juawatu himself did not have sufficient funds to do this and Yaya assisted him financially.

Interviews at the Ministry of Energy and Minerals failed to confirm that either Juawatu or Mayaya discovered Tanzanite. Instead, they revealed that in 1989 they awarded another man, a certain Jumanne Ngoma, with a certificate in recompense for being the first man to discover Tanzanite in 1967. Discussions revealed, however, that the issue is still contested even within the Ministry. Informants in Mirerani all denied that Ngoma was the first to find the stone. It would therefore appear that the true identity of the first person to discover Tanzanite will remain unclear. With Mayaya, Juawatu and D'Souza dead it is impossible to confirm with them the various versions of events. Whatever the truth, however, the discovery of Tanzanite is an important factor in the development of the Mirerani area as well and the Tanzanian gemstone industry. Furthermore, the debate surrounding the discovery of Tanzanite reveals the dynamics of the area as well as highlighting the inherent difficulties of conducting oral historical research.